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We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators' trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, issuers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. Issuers may either under- or over-provide information compared to the socially efficient level if speculators have more bargaining power than hedgers, while they never under-provide it otherwise. When hedgers have low financial literacy, forbidding their access to the market may be socially efficient.
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.
In contrast to the popularity of financial education interventions worldwide, studies on the economic effects of those interventions report mixed results. With a focus on the effect on disadvantaged groups, we review both the theoretical and empirical findings in order to understand why this discrepancy exists. The survey first highlights that it is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of, and the relationships between, financial education, financial literacy and financial behavior to identify the true effects of financial education. The review addresses possible biases caused by third factors such as numeracy. Next, we review theories on financial literacy which make clear that the effect of financial education interventions is heterogeneous across the population. Last, we look closely at main empirical studies on financial education targeted at the migrants/immigrants, the low-income earners and the young, and compare their methodologies. There seems to be a positive effect on short-term financial knowledge and awareness of the young, but there is no proven evidence on long-term behavior after being grown up. Studies on financial behavior of migrants and immigrants show almost no effect of financial education.
Based on a sample of university students, we provide field and laboratory evidence that a small scale training intervention has a both statistically and economically significant effect on subjective and objective assessments of financial knowledge. We also show that for a large part of students whose self-assessed financial knowledge has improved we do not find an increase in their actual skills.
This dissertation consists of three essays, which study the implication of financial frictions in business cycles and monetary policy making. The first essay develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to study how the instability of the banking sector can amplify and propagate business cycles. Model simulations show that in an economic down turn, in addition to credit demand contraction induced by low firm net worth, low bank capital
position can create strong credit supply contraction, and have a quantitatively significant effect on business cycle dynamics. The second essay studies the optimal Taylor-type monetary policy rules based on the model developed in the first chapter and find that with interest rate smoothing, 'leaning against the wind' can significantly dampen the procyclicality of financial distortions, and increase the welfare of the economy. The third chapter examines the role of households frugality in a financial crisis and finds that higher savings by more frugal households provide an important cushion for the fall in private investment funding.
In this paper, we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. We study detailed transactional information of more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers shift their efforts towards monitoring poorly-performing borrowers and issue fewer loans. However, these new loans are of above-average quality, which suggests that loan officers have a pecking order and process loans only for the very best clients when they are under time constraints.
In this paper we investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance versus a fixed wage unrelated to performance. We study detailed transaction information for more than 45,000 loans issued by 240 loan officers of a large commercial bank in Europe. We examine the three main activities that loan officers perform: monitoring, originating, and screening. We find that when the performance of their portfolio deteriorates, loan officers increase their effort to monitor existing borrowers, reduce loan origination, and approve a higher fraction of loan applications. These loans, however, are of above-average quality. Consistent with the theoretical literature on multitasking in incomplete contracts, we show that loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. In addition, while the response by loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, their reaction to incentives appears myopic in other dimensions.
Since the financial crisis financial literacy has attracted growing interest among researchers and policy makers, as there is international empirical evidence that financial literacy is poor among both adults and students. In Germany we have almost no empirical evidence on financial literacy, especially in the case of students attending secondary schools, as financial education has not featured on German school curricula to date. Besides, Germany has not yet participated in the optional financial literacy module of PISA, which was offered for the first time in 2012. However, a lack of private pension provisioning, in spite of demographic change, and low stock ownership among German households indicate a deficit in financial knowledge and skills in this country as well.
In this paper we investigate financial literacy among students aged 14 to 16 attending a secondary school in the state of Hesse. The foundation is a test designed according to international standards. The statistical analysis of the test reveals substantial deficits in key areas of financial literacy. Particular deficits could be identified in the fields of basic knowledge of financial matters and, to an even greater degree, in more advanced concepts such as risk diversification. Applying interest calculations to financial matters turned out to be problematic for many students.
Furthermore, the paper analyses the impact of gender and type of school on the overall test score as well as test performance in specific tasks. The findings suggest that financial matters should be covered in some form at secondary schools. In light of the potentially far-reaching consequences of financial illiteracy for financial wellbeing, German participation in future PISA financial literacy tests seems highly advisable to gain a deeper understanding of the preliminary findings presented in this paper.
This paper studies insurance demand for individuals with limited financial literacy. We propose uncertainty about insurance payouts, resulting from contract complexity, as a novel channel that affects decision-making of financially illiterate individuals. Then, a trade-off between second-order (risk aversion) and third-order (prudence) risk preferences drives insurance demand. Sufficiently prudent individuals raise insurance demand upon an increase in contract complexity, while the effect is reversed for less prudent individuals. We characterize competitive market equilibria that feature complex contracts since firms face costs to reduce complexity. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we propose a monetary measure for the welfare cost of financial illiteracy and show that it is mainly driven by individuals’ risk aversion. Finally, we discuss implications for regulation and consumer protection.
Savings accounts are owned by most households, but little is known about the performance of households’ investments. We create a unique dataset by matching information on individual savings accounts from the DNB Household Survey with market data on account-specific interest rates and characteristics. We document considerable heterogeneity in returns across households, which can be partly explained by financial sophistication. A one-standard deviation increase in financial literacy is associated with a 13% increase compared to the median interest rate. We isolate the usage of modern technology (online accounts) as one channel through which financial literacy has a positive association with returns.