- Investment performance and market share : a study of the German mutual fund industry (2006)
- We study a set of German open-end mutual funds for a time period during which this industry emerged from its infancy. In those years, the distribution channel for mutual funds was dominated by the brick-and-mortar retail networks of the large universal banks. Using monthly observations from 12/1986 through 12/1998, we investigate if cross-sectional return differences across mutual funds affect their market shares. Although such a causal relation has been established in highly competitive markets, such as the United States, the rigid distribution system in place in Germany at the time may have caused retail performance and investment performance to uncouple. In fact, although we observe stark differences in investment performance across mutual funds (and over time), we find no evidence that cross-sectional performance differences affect the market shares of these funds. Klassifikation: G 23
- Performance and market share : evidence from the German mutual fund industry (1997)
- In this paper we analyze the relation between fund performance and market share. Using three performance measures we first establish that significant differences in the risk-adjusted returns of the funds in the sample exist. Thus, investors may react to past fund performance when making their investment decisions. We estimated a model relating past performance to changes in market share and found that past performance has a significant positive effect on market share. The results of a specification test indicate that investors react to risk-adjusted returns rather than to raw returns. This suggests that investors may be more sophisticated than is often assumed. First version - May 1997
- Credit unions and the common bond (1999)
- Credit Unions are cooperative financial institutions specializing in the basic financial needs of certain groups of consumers. A distinguishing feature of credit unions is the legal requirement that members share a common bond. This organizing principle recently became the focus of national attention as the Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress took opposite sides in a controversy regarding the number of common bonds that could co-exist within the membership of a single credit union. Despite its importance, little research has been done into how common bonds affect how credit unions actually operate. We frame the issues with a simple theoretical model of credit-union formation and consolidation. To provide intuition into the flexibility of multiple-group credit unions in serving members, we simulate the model and present some comparative-static results. We then apply a semi-parametric empirical model to a large dataset drawn from federally chartered occupational credit unions in 1996 to investigate the effects of common bonds. Our results suggest that credit unions with multiple common bonds have higher participation rates than credit unions that are otherwise similar but whose membership shares a single common bond.
- Mergers and acquisitions in Germany : social setting and regulatory framework (2003)
- The paper describes the legal and economic environment of mergers and acquisitions in Germany and explores barriers to obtaining and executing corporate control. Various cases are used to demonstrate that resistance by different stakeholders including minority shareholders, organized labour and the government may present powerful obstacles to takeovers in Germany. In spite of the overall convergence of European takeover and securities trading laws, Germany still shows many peculiarities that make its market for corporate control distinct from other countries. Concentrated share ownership, cross shareholdings and pyramidal ownership structures are frequent barriers to acquiring majority stakes. Codetermination laws, the supervisory board structure and supermajority requirements for important corporate decisions limit the execution of control by majority shareholders. Bidders that disregard the German preference for consensual solutions and the specific balance of powers will risk their takeover attempt be frustrated by opposing influence groups. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.