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- relationship lending (4)
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- Kreditrisiko / Finanzderivat / Securitization / Wertpapierhandel (2)
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Where do we stand in the theory of finance? : A selective overview with reference to Erich Gutenberg
(1998)
- For the past 20 years, financial markets research has concerned itself with issues related to the evaluation and management of financial securities in efficient capital markets and with issues of management control in incomplete markets. The following selective overview focuses on key aspects of the theory and empirical experience of management control under conditions of asymmetric information. The objective is examine the validity of the recently advanced hypothesis on the myths of corporate control. The present overview is based on Gutenberg's position that there exists a discrete corporate interest, as distinct from and separate from the interests of the shareholders or other stakeholders. In the third volume of Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen, published in 1969, this position of Gutenberg's is coupled with an appeal for a so-called financial equilibrium to be maintained. Not until recently have models grounded in capital market theory been developed which also allow for a firm's management to exercise autonomy vis-à-vis its stakeholder. Klassifikation: B21, G3, L2 . This paper was prepared for the Erich Gutenberg centenary conference on December 12 and 13, 1997 in Cologne.
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Universal banks and relationships with firms
(2003)
- Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned with the close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms, often described as Hausbank relationships. Links between banks and firms include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate governance. Allegedly, these relationships promote investment and improve the performance of firms. Furthermore, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate between large exchangelisted firms and small and medium sized companies throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. Only one study finds that banks´ control of management goes beyond what nonbank shareholders achieve. Proxyvoting rights apparently do not provide a significant means for banks to exert management control. Most of the recent evidence regarding small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial. Hausbanks are more willing to sustain financing when borrower quality deteriorates, and they invest more often than arm´s length banks in workouts if borrowers face financial distress. Klassifikation: G21, G32. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press. September 2003.
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The future of securitization
(2008)
- Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, and the objective is to restore a “comprehensive incentive alignment”. The toe-hold for strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital requirements. JEL Classification: D82, G14, G21, G28, G30
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Streitschrift für eine grundlegende Neuordnung des Sparkassen- und Landesbankensektors in Deutschland
(2011)
- Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1. Motivation und Ausgangslage 2. Die Verwobenheit von Sparkassen und Landesbanken 3. Grundüberlegungen zur Neuordnung von Sparkassen und Landesbanken 4. Gestaltungsvorschlag 5. Handlungsempfehlungen
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Streitschrift für eine grundlegende Neuordnung des Sparkassen- und Landesbankensektors in Deutschland
(2011)
- Inhaltsverzeichnis: 1. Motivation und Ausgangslage 2. Die Verwobenheit von Sparkassen und Landesbanken 3. Grundüberlegungen zur Neuordnung von Sparkassen und Landesbanken 4. Gestaltungsvorschlag 5. Handlungsempfehlungen
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Stellungnahme zum Gesetz zur Restrukturierung und geordneten Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten, zur Errichtung eines Restrukturierungsfonds für Kreditinstitute und zur Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist der aktienrechtlichen Organhaftung („Restrukturierungsgesetz“)
(2010)
- Zusammenfassung - Das Kernanliegen des KredReorgG –die Internalisierung des systemischen Risikos in den Entscheidungsprozess und die Verantwortlichkeit von Bankeignern und –gläubigern – wird im Wesentlichen erreicht. - Die Wirksamkeit des Gesetzes steht und fällt mit der Möglichkeit, jede Bank in systemisch relevante (zu rettende) und systemisch nicht-relevante (abzuwickelnde) Teile zu zerlegen. Dieser Ansatz ist Ziel führend und international „state of the art“ (Bsp. UK). - Unsere Hauptkritik: Um die o.g. Wirksamkeit des Gesetzes überhaupt zu ermöglichen (und eine Unterlaufung der Gesetzesintention zu verhindern), bedarf es einer zusätzlichen und zwingenden Vorgabe, dass jede Bank eine Mindestmenge an Anleihen außerhalb des Kern-Finanzsektors dauerhaft platzieren muss, und dass diese Anleihen zu keinem Zeitpunkt von Banken erworben werden dürfen. - Um dies zu erreichen sind die Anlagevorschriften für Kapitalsammelstellen (Lebensversicherer, Pensionsfonds) und für Banken entsprechend zu ändern bzw. zu verschärfen. - Weitere Kritikpunkte betreffen die vermutete geringe Bedeutung der freiwilligen Verfahren (Sanierung und Reorganisation) und die Gestaltung der Sonderabgabe und der Restrukturierungsfonds.
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Risk transfer with CDOs and systemic risk in banking
(2006)
- Large banks often sell part of their loan portfolio in the form of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) to investors. In this paper we raise the question whether credit asset securitization affects the cyclicality (or commonality) of bank equity values. The commonality of bank equity values reflects a major component of systemic risks in the banking market, caused by correlated defaults of loans in the banks' loan books. Our simulations take into account the major stylized fact of CDO transactions, the non-proportional nature of risk sharing that goes along with tranching. We provide a theoretical framework for the risk transfer through securitization that builds on a macro risk factor and an idiosyncratic risk factor, allowing an identification of the types of risk that the individual tranche holders bear. This allows conclusions about the risk positions of issuing banks after risk transfer. Building on the strict subordination of tranches, we first evaluate the correlation properties both within and across risk classes. We then determine the effect of securitization on the systematic risk of all tranches, and derive its effect on the issuing bank's equity beta. The simulation results show that under plausible assumptions concerning bank reinvestment behaviour and capital structure choice, the issuing intermediary's systematic risk tends to rise. We discuss the implications of our findings for financial stability supervision. Klassifikation: G28
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Risk transfer with CDOs
(2008)
- Modern bank management comprises both classical lending business and transfer of asset risk to capital markets through securitization. Sound knowledge of the risks involved in securitization transactions is a prerequisite for solid risk management. This paper aims to resolve a part of the opaqueness surrounding credit-risk allocation to tranches that represent claims of different seniority on a reference portfolio. In particular, this paper analyzes the allocation of credit risk to different tranches of a CDO transaction when the underlying asset returns are driven by a common macro factor and an idiosyncratic component. Junior and senior tranches are found to be nearly orthogonal, motivating a search for the where about of systematic risk in CDO transactions. We propose a metric for capturing the allocation of systematic risk to tranches. First, in contrast to a widely-held claim, we show that (extreme) tail risk in standard CDO transactions is held by all tranches. While junior tranches take on all types of systematic risk, senior tranches take on almost no non-tail risk. This is in stark contrast to an untranched bond portfolio of the same rating quality, which on average suffers substantial losses for all realizations of the macro factor. Second, given tranching, a shock to the risk of the underlying asset portfolio (e.g. a rise in asset correlation or in mean portfolio loss) has the strongest impact, in relative terms, on the exposure of senior tranche CDO-investors. Our findings can be used to explain major stylized facts observed in credit markets. JEL Classification: G21, G28
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Risk transfer with CDOs
(2008)
- Modern bank management comprises both classical lending business and transfer of asset risk to capital markets through securitization. Sound knowledge of the risks involved in securitization transactions is a prerequisite for solid risk management. This paper aims to resolve a part of the opaqueness surrounding credit-risk allocation to tranches that represent claims of different seniority on a reference portfolio. In particular, this paper analyzes the allocation of credit risk to different tranches of a CDO transaction when the underlying asset returns are driven by a common macro factor and an idiosyncratic component. Junior and senior tranches are found to be nearly orthogonal, motivating a search for the whereabout of systematic risk in CDO transactions. We propose a metric for capturing the allocation of systematic risk to tranches. First, in contrast to a widely-held claim, we show that (extreme) tail risk in standard CDO transactions is held by all tranches. While junior tranches take on all types of systematic risk, senior tranches take on almost no non-tail risk. This is in stark contrast to an untranched bond portfolio of the same rating quality, which on average suffers substantial losses for all realizations of the macro factor. Second, given tranching, a shock to the risk of the underlying asset portfolio (e.g. a rise in asset correlation or in mean portfolio loss) has the strongest impact, in relative terms, on the exposure of senior tranche CDO-investors. Our findings can be used to explain major stylized facts observed in credit markets. JEL Classification: G21, G28
