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- Der digitale Euro – ein Umweg zur Bankenunion? (2021)
- Die Einführung des digitalen Euro würde de facto die Bankenunion etablieren, die dann jedoch maßgeblich von der EZB getragen wäre. Wenn Kreditinstitute an der Bankenunion beteiligt sein sollen, muss es für den Euro ein einheitliches Einlagensicherungssystem geben.
- More European, more uniform (2021)
- The euro area crisis management and deposit insurance framework is currently more likely to trigger new crises than prevent them. That is why a reset is needed, and why a reset may be feasible
- Reset required: the euro area crisis management and deposit insurance framework (2021)
- The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution. Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage – together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.
- Europäischer und einheitlicher (2021)
- Die Maßnahmen für Krisenmanagement und Einlagensicherung der Eurozone machen neue Krisen derzeit wahrscheinlicher, als dass sie sie verhindern. Deshalb ist eine Neuaufstellung nötig – und machbar
- The digital euro – a different route to banking union? (2021)
- The introduction of the digital euro would de facto bring about banking union. But this would be on the books of the ECB. If banks are to participate in banking union, there must be a Single Euro Deposit Guarantee Scheme.
- Banken auf die richtige Weise nutzen (2020)
- Thomas F Huertas: Wie Banken helfen können, rechtzeitig Geld an Unternehmen zu bringen.
- Use banks the right way (2020)
- Thomas F Huertas: How banks can help get money to businesses while it can still do some good.
- Banken in der Krise besser einbeziehen (2020)
- Einfache Schritte, wie man verhindern kann, dass auf die Coronapandemie eine Finanzkrise folgt.
- Making greater use of banks in times of crises (2020)
- Some simple steps on how to prevent the coronavirus pandemic from causing a financial crisis.
- Plug the gap: Make resolution ready for corona (2020)
- Banks are not immune from COVID-19. The economic downturn may drive some banks to the point of non-viability (PONV). If so, is the resolution regime in the Euro-area ready to respond? No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis. The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it approached or reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind-down strategy. That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.
