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- 2022 (4) (remove)
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- Institutional protection schemes: What are their differences, strengths, weaknesses, and track records? (2022)
- This briefing paper describes and evaluates the law and economics of institution(al) protection schemes. Throughout our analysis, we use Europe’s largest such scheme, that of German savings banks, as paradigm. We find strengths and weaknesses: Strong network-internal monitoring and early warning seems to be an important contributor to IPS network success. Similarly, the geographical quasi-cartel encourages banks to build a strong client base, including SME, in all regions. Third, the growth of the IPS member institutions may have benefitted from the strictly unlimited protection offered, in terms of euro amounts per account holder. The counterweighing weaknesses encompass the conditionality of the protection pledge and the underinvestment risk it entails, sometimes referred to as blackmailing the government, as well as the limited diversification potential of the deposit insurance within the network, and the near-incompatibility of the IPS model with the provisions of the BRRD, particularly relating to bail-in and resolution. Consequently, we suggest, as policy guidance, to treat large IPS networks similar to large banking groups, and put them as such under the direct supervision of the ECB within the SSM. Moreover, we suggest strengthening the seriousness of a deposit insurance that offers unlimited protection. Finally, to improve financial stability, we suggest embedding the IPS model into a multi-tier deposit re-insurance scheme, with a national and a European layer. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
- National interests and supranational resolution in the European banking union (2022)
- We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
- National interests and supranational resolution in the European banking union (2022)
- The decision on the resolution of European banks should be taken entirely at the supranational level to prevent the dominance of national interests.
- Nationale Interessen und supranationale Abwicklung in der europäischen Bankenunion (2022)
- Die Entscheidung über die Abwicklung europäischer Banken sollte vollständig auf supranationaler Ebene getroffen werden, um die Dominanz nationalstaatlicher Interessen zu unterbinden.
