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- National interests and supranational resolution in the European banking union (2022)
- We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
- National interests and supranational resolution in the European banking union (2022)
- The decision on the resolution of European banks should be taken entirely at the supranational level to prevent the dominance of national interests.
- Nationale Interessen und supranationale Abwicklung in der europäischen Bankenunion (2022)
- Die Entscheidung über die Abwicklung europäischer Banken sollte vollständig auf supranationaler Ebene getroffen werden, um die Dominanz nationalstaatlicher Interessen zu unterbinden.
- Institutional protection schemes: What are their differences, strengths, weaknesses, and track records? (2022)
- This briefing paper describes and evaluates the law and economics of institution(al) protection schemes. Throughout our analysis, we use Europe’s largest such scheme, that of German savings banks, as paradigm. We find strengths and weaknesses: Strong network-internal monitoring and early warning seems to be an important contributor to IPS network success. Similarly, the geographical quasi-cartel encourages banks to build a strong client base, including SME, in all regions. Third, the growth of the IPS member institutions may have benefitted from the strictly unlimited protection offered, in terms of euro amounts per account holder. The counterweighing weaknesses encompass the conditionality of the protection pledge and the underinvestment risk it entails, sometimes referred to as blackmailing the government, as well as the limited diversification potential of the deposit insurance within the network, and the near-incompatibility of the IPS model with the provisions of the BRRD, particularly relating to bail-in and resolution. Consequently, we suggest, as policy guidance, to treat large IPS networks similar to large banking groups, and put them as such under the direct supervision of the ECB within the SSM. Moreover, we suggest strengthening the seriousness of a deposit insurance that offers unlimited protection. Finally, to improve financial stability, we suggest embedding the IPS model into a multi-tier deposit re-insurance scheme, with a national and a European layer. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
- Bewertung des Vorschlags der BaFin für eine Richtlinie für nachhaltige Investmentvermögen (2021)
- Die BaFin hat im August 2021 eine Richtlinie für nachhaltige Investmentvermögen vorgelegt. Diese soll regeln, unter welchen Voraussetzungen ein Fonds als „nachhaltig“, „grün“ o.ä. bezeichnet und vermarktet werden darf. Zwar sind aufsichtsrechtliche Maßnahmen, die darauf abzielen, die Qualität von Informationen zu Nachhaltigkeitscharakteristika von Finanzprodukten zu erhöhen, grundsätzlich zu begrüßen. Der Erlass der konsultierten Richtlinie ist jedoch nicht zu befürworten. Im Lichte der einschlägigen unionsrechtlichen Regelwerke und Initiativen ist unklar, welchen informationellen Mehrwert diese rein nationale Maßnahme schaffen soll. Ferner bleibt auf Grundlage des Entwurfs unklar, anhand welcher Maßstäbe die „Nachhaltigkeit“ eines Investmentvermögens beurteilt werden soll, sodass das primäre Regelungsziel einer verbesserten Anlegerinformation nicht erreicht würde.
- The role of disclosure in green finance (2021)
- We study the design features of disclosure regulations that seek to trigger the green transition of the global economy and ask whether such regulatory interventions are likely to bring about sufficient market discipline to achieve socially optimal climate targets. We categorize the transparency obligations stipulated in green finance regulation as either compelling the standardized disclosure of raw data, or providing quality labels that signal desirable green characteristics of investment products based on a uniform methodology. Both categories of transparency requirements can be imposed at activity, issuer, and portfolio level. Finance theory and empirical evidence suggest that investors may prefer “green” over “dirty” assets for both financial and non-financial reasons and may thus demand higher returns from environmentally-harmful investment opportunities. However, the market discipline that this negative cost of capital effect exerts on “dirty” issuers is potentially attenuated by countervailing investor interests and does not automatically lead to socially optimal outcomes. Mandatory disclosure obligations and their (public) enforcement can play an important role in green finance strategies. They prevent an underproduction of the standardized high-quality information that investors need in order to allocate capital according to their preferences. However, the rationale behind regulatory intervention is not equally strong for all categories and all levels of “green” disclosure obligations. Corporate governance problems and other agency conflicts in intermediated investment chains do not represent a categorical impediment for green finance strategies. However, the many forces that may prevent markets from achieving socially optimal equilibria render disclosure-centered green finance legislation a second best to more direct forms of regulatory intervention like global carbon taxation and emissions trading schemes. Inherently transnational market-based green finance concepts can play a supporting role in sustainable transition, which is particularly important as long as first-best solutions remain politically unavailable.
- Die Bedeutung von Offenlegungspflichten im Bereich Green Finance (2021)
- Gesetzliche Offenlegungspflichten können dazu beitragen, Investoren mehr und bessere Informationen zur Verfügung zu stellen, die sie für eine Kapitalallokation im Sinn „grüner“ Anlagestrategien benötigen.
- When and how to unwind COVID-support measures to the banking system? (2021)
- This in-depth analysis proposes ways to retract from supervisory COVID-19 support measures without perils for financial stability. It simulates the likely impact of the corona crisis on euro area banks’ capital and predicts a significant capital shortfall. We recommend to end accounting practices that conceal loan losses and sustain capital relief measures. Our in-depth analysis also proposes how to address the impending capital shortfall in resolution/liquidation and a supranational recapitalisation.
- What are the main differences between the practice of supervising large banks in the UK and in the euro area, and what are the main risks of regulatory divergence? (2021)
- This in-depth analysis provides evidence on differences in the practice of supervising large banks in the UK and in the euro area. It identifies the diverging institutional architecture (partially supranationalised vs. national oversight) as a pivotal determinant for a higher effectiveness of supervisory decision making in the UK. The ECB is likely to take a more stringent stance in prudential supervision than UK authorities. The setting of risk weights and the design of macroprudential stress test scenarios document this hypothesis. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee. This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. It was originally published on the European Parliament’s webpage: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/689443/IPOL_IDA(2021)689443_EN.pdf
- The role of disclosure in green finance (2021)
- Mandatory disclosure obligations can improve the availability and quality of the information which investors need to allocate capital in line with “green” investment strategies.
