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2010, 04
We estimate the risk and expected returns of private equity investments based on the market prices of exchange traded funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity funds. Our results indicate that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal returns of about one to two percent. We also find that the market expects listed private equity funds to earn zero to marginally negative abnormal returns net of fees. Both listed and unlisted private equity funds have market betas close to one and positive factor loadings on the Fama-French SMB factor. Private equity fund returns are positively correlated with GDP growth and negatively correlated with the credit spread. Finally, we find that market returns of exchange traded funds of funds and listed private equity funds predict changes in self-reported book values of unlisted private equity funds.
2004, 21 r
The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basle Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. We carefully highlight the pathology of the new “securitisation framework” to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although we incorporate a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions, we do not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework. JEL Klassifikation: E58, G21, G24, K23, L51. Forthcoming in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 13, No. 1 .
2002, 14
Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently stirred the financial services industry to collateral loan obligations (CLOs) as an important balance sheet management tool. CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), with investors acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds generated from a portfolio of bank loans in the form of tranches with different seniority. By way of modelling Merton-type risk-neutral asset returns of contingent claims on a multi-asset portfolio of corporate loans in a CLO transaction, we analyse the optimal design of loan securitisation from the perspective of credit risk in potential collateral default. We propose a pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss based on parametric bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). The analysis illustrates the dichotomous effect of loss cascading, as the most junior tranche of CLO transactions exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance compared to the remaining tranches. By solving the puzzling question of properly pricing the risk premium for expected credit loss, we explain the rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the basis of our simulation results for pricing purposes under the impact of asymmetric information. Klassifikation: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G20
2002, 13
The following descriptive paper surveys the various types of loan securitisation and provides a working definition of so-called collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). Free of the common rhetoric and slogans, which sometimes substitute for understanding of the complex nature of structured finance, this paper describes the theoretical foundations of this specialised form of loan securitisation. Not only the distinctive properties of CLOs, but also the information economics inherent in the transfer of credit risk will be considered, so that we can equally privilege the critical aspects of security design in the structuring of CLO transactions.
2004, 21
The Basle securitisation framework explained: the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation
(2005)
The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the supervisory policy adopted by the Basle Committee for the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation. We carefully highlight the pathology of the new “securitisation framework” to facilitate a general understanding of what constitutes the current state of computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although we incorporate a simplified sensitivity analysis of the varying levels of capital charges depending on the security design of asset securitisation transactions, we do not engage in a profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework. JEL Klassifikation: E58, G21, G24, K23, L51. Forthcoming in Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Vol. 13, No. 1 .
2006, 13
This paper compares the boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 with the average boom-bust pattern in industrialized countries as calculated from an international sample for the period 1970-2002. Two clear conclusions emerge. First, the Finnish-Swedish experience is much more volatile than the average boom-bust pattern. This holds for virtually every time series examined. Second, the bust and the recovery in the two Nordic countries differ markedly more from the international pattern than the boom phase does. The bust is considerably deeper and the recovery comes earlier and is more rapid. We explain the highly volatile character of the Finnish and Swedish boom-bust episode by the design of economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s. The boom-bust cycle in Finland and Sweden 1984-1995 was driven by financial liberalization and a hard currency policy, causing large pro-cyclical swings in the real rate of interest transmitted via the financial sector into the real sector and then into the public finances. JEL Classification: E32, E62, E63
2010, 22
We investigate the incentives for vertical or horizontal integration in the financial security service industry, consisting of trading, clearing and settlement. We thereby focus on firms’ decisions but also look on the implications of these decisions on competition and welfare. Our analysis shows that the incentives for vertical integration crucially depend on industry as well as market characteristics. A more pronounced demand for liquidity clearly favors vertical integration whereas deeper financial integration increases the incentives to undertake vertical integration only if the efficiency gains associated with vertical integration are sufficiently large. Furthermore, we show that market forces can suffer from a coordination problem that end in vertically integrated structures that are not in the best interest of the firms. We believe this problem can be addressed by policy measures such as the TARGET2-Securities program. Furthermore, we use our framework to discuss major industry trends and policy initiatives. Keywords: Vertical Integration , Horizontal Integration , Competition , Trading , Settlement JEL Classification: G15, L13, L22
2002, 05
Within a two step GARCH framework we estimate the time-varying spillover effects from European and US return innovations to 10 economic sectors within the euro area, the United States, and the United Kingdom. We use daily data from January 1988 - March 2002. At the beginning of our sample sectors in all three currency areas/blocks formed a quite homogeneous group exhibiting only minor sector-specific characteristics. However, over time sectors became more heterogeneous, that is the response to aggregate shocks increasingly varies across sectors. This provides evidence that sector-specific effects gained in importance. European industries show increased heterogeneity simultaneously with the start of the European Monetary Union, whereas in the US this trend started in the early 1990's. Information technology and non-cyclical services (including telecommunication services) became the most integrated sectors worldwide, which are most affected by aggregate European and US shocks. On the other hand, basic industries, non-cyclical consumer goods, resources, and utilities became less affected by aggregate shocks. Volatility spillovers proved to be small and volatile. JEL_Klassifikation: G1, F36
2001, 06
This paper investigates how US and European equity markets affected the US dollar-euro rate from the introduction of the euro through April 2001. More detailed the following questions are raised: First, do movements in the stock market help to explain movements in the exchange rate? Second, how large is the impact of stock market returns on the exchange rate? And third, does the exchange rate respond differently to different equity markets? The investigation was carried out using daily data within a vector-autoregression model (VAR). Surprisingly, positive returns on US equities as well as on European stock markets had a negative impact on the US dollar-euro rate. Quantitatively, the US dollar-euro rate seems to be more influenced by European stock markets compared to US stock markets. Further, there is evidence for a somewhat weaker impact of technology stock indices on the US dollar-euro rate compared with broader market indices. Finally, the long-term interest rate differential seems to contain more information about exchange rate movements than the short-term interest rate differential. This Version: August, 2001. Klassifikation: C32, F31
527
As the financial crisis gathered momentum in 2007, the United States Federal Reserve brought its policy interest rate aggressively down from 5¼ percent in September 2007 to virtually zero by December 2008. In contrast, although facing the same economic and financial stress, the European Central Bank’s first action was to raise its policy rate in July 2008. The ECB began lowering rates only in October 2008 once near global financial meltdown left it with no choice. Thereafter, the ECB lowered rates slowly, interrupted by more hikes in April and July 2011. We use the “abnormal” increase in stock prices — the rise in the stock price index that was not predicted by the trend in the previous 20 days — to measure the market’s reaction to the announcement of the interest rate cuts. Stock markets responded favorably to the Fed interest rate cuts but, on average, they reacted negatively when the ECB cut its policy rate. The Fed’s early and aggressive rate cuts established its intention to provide significant monetary stimulus. That helped renew market optimism, consistent with the earlier economic recovery. In contrast, the ECB started building its shelter only after the storm had started. Markets interpreted even the simulative ECB actions either as “too little, too late” or as signs of bad news. We conclude that by recognizing the extraordinary nature of the circumstances, the Fed’s response not only achieved better economic outcomes but also enhanced its credibility. The ECB could have acted similarly and stayed true to its mandate. The poorer economic outcomes will damage the ECB’s long-term credibility.