TY - UNPD A1 - Bienz, Carsten A1 - Hirsch, Julia T1 - The dynamics of venture capital contracts T2 - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2006,11 N2 - We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and mixes). Thereby, contract completeness reduces when going from pure milestone financing via mixes to pure round financing. We show that the decision for a specific form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the development process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the lower the entrepreneur's expected bargaining power - the maximum level depending on the predictability of the development process. JEL Classification: G24, G32, D86, D80, G34 T3 - CFS working paper series - 2006, 11 KW - venture capital KW - corporate governance KW - moral hazard KW - renegotiation KW - contract theory KW - empirical contract theory KW - contract econometrics KW - Risikokapital KW - Corporate Governance KW - Vertrag Y1 - 2006 UR - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/2794 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-26076 ER -