TY  - UNPD
A1  - Carletti, Elena
A1  - Cerasi, Vittoria
A1  - Daltung, Sonja
T1  - Multiple-bank lending : diversification and free-riding in monitoring
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2004,18
N2  - This paper analyzes banks' choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts. The model predicts a greater use of multiple-bank lending when banks are small relative to investment projects, firms are less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs. These results are consistent with empirical observations concerning small business lending and loan syndication. JEL Klassifikation: D82; G21; G32.
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2004, 18 
KW  - individual-bank lending
KW  - multiple-bank lending
KW  - monitoring
KW  - diversification
KW  - free-riding problem
KW  - Kreditgeschäft
KW  - Unternehmenskooperation
KW  - Kreditrisiko
KW  - Portfoliomanagement
KW  - Kreditwürdigkeit
KW  - Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
Y1  - 2004
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4423
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-10690
IS  - June 1, 2004
ER  -