TY  - UNPD
A1  - Ewert, Ralf
A1  - Feess, Eberhard
A1  - Nell, Martin
T1  - Auditor liability rules under imperfect information and costly litigation : the welfare increasing effect of liability insurance
T2  - Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 28
N2  - This paper examines auditor liability rules under imperfect information, costly litigation and risk averse auditors. A negligence rule fails in such a setting, because in equilibrium auditors will deviate with positive probability from any given standard. It is shown that strict liability outperforms negligence with respect to risk allocation, and the probability that a desired level of care is met by the audi tor if competitive liability insurance markets exist. Furthermore, our model explains the existence of insurance contracts containing obligations - a type of contract often observed in liability insurance markets.
T3  - Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting - 28 
KW  - auditor liability
KW  - risk allocation
KW  - liability insurance
Y1  - 2022
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/55356
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-553566
EP  - 15
PB  - Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -