TY  - JOUR
A1  - Destri, Chiara
T1  - Extrinsic democratic proceduralism: a modest defence
T2  - Res publica
N2  - Disagreement among philosophers over the proper justification for political institutions is far from a new phenomenon. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that there is substantial room for dissent on this matter within democratic theory. As is well known, instrumentalism and proceduralism represent the two primary viewpoints that democrats can adopt to vindicate democratic legitimacy. While the former notoriously derives the value of democracy from its outcomes, the latter claims that a democratic decision-making process is inherently valuable. This article has two aims. First, it introduces three variables with which we can thoroughly categorise the aforementioned approaches. Second, it argues that the more promising version of proceduralism is extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, and that extrinsically procedural accounts can appeal to other values in the justification of democracy without translating into instrumentalism. This article is organised as follows. I present what I consider to be the ‘implicit view’ in the justification of democracy. Then, I analyse each of the three variables in a different section. Finally, I raise an objection against procedural views grounded in relational equality, which cannot account for the idea that democracy is a necessary condition for political legitimacy.
KW  - Democracy
KW  - Justification
KW  - Legitimacy
KW  - Value
KW  - Instrumentalism
KW  - Proceduralism
Y1  - 2020
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/63753
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-637530
SN  - 1572-8692
N1  - Open Access funding provided by Projekt DEAL.
VL  - 27
IS  - 1
SP  - 41
EP  - 58
PB  - Springer Science + Business Media B.V
CY  - Dordrecht [u.a.]
ER  -