TY  - RPRT
A1  - Hirsch, Julia
T1  - Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: a contract design approach : [This version February 2005]
N2  - The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
KW  - public policy
KW  - contract design
KW  - venture capital
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - asymmetric information
KW  - Öffentliche Ordnung
KW  - Risikokapital
KW  - Moral Hazard
KW  - Asymmetrische Information
Y1  - 2005
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35722
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-357220
UR  - http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/profs/walz/pdf/papers/Public_Policy_and_Venture_Capital_Financed_Innovation.pdf
IS  - This version February 2005
ER  -