TY  - UNPD
A1  - Tröger, Tobias
A1  - Kotovskaia, Anastasia
T1  - National interests and supranational resolution in the European banking union
T2  - SAFE working paper ; No. 340
N2  - We investigate whether the bank crisis management framework of the European banking union can effectively bar the detrimental influence of national interests in cross-border bank failures. We find that both the internal governance structure and decision making procedure of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and the interplay between the SRB and national resolution authorities in the implementation of supranationally devised resolution schemes provide inroads that allow opposing national interests to obstruct supranational resolution. We also show that the Single Resolution Fund (SRG), even after the ratification of the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the introduction of the SRF backstop facility, is inapt to overcome these frictions. We propose a full supranationalization of resolution decision making. This would allow European authorities in charge of bank crisis management to operate autonomously and achieve socially optimal outcomes beyond national borders.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 340 
KW  - SRB
KW  - SRF
KW  - bank resolution
KW  - banking union
KW  - bail-in
KW  - ESM
KW  - national interest
KW  - political economy
KW  - bureaucrats' incentives
Y1  - 2022
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/64499
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-644990
UR  - https://ssrn.com/abstract=4024343
N1  - The paper benefitted greatly from discussions at the Center for Advanced Studies Foundations of Law and Finance (CAS LawFin) funded by the German Research Foundation project number 392809952.
IS  - February 2022
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -