TY  - UNPD
A1  - Tröger, Tobias
A1  - Walz, Uwe
T1  - Does say on pay matter? Evidence from the German natural experiment
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 125
N2  - This paper investigates the potential implications of say on pay on management remuneration in Germany. We try to shed light on some key aspects by presenting quantitative data that allows us to gauge the pertinent effects of the German natural experiment that originates with the 2009 amendments to the Stock Corporation Act of 1965. In order to do this, we deploy a hand-collected data set for Germany's major firms (i.e. DAX 30), for the years 2006-2012. Rather than focusing exclusively on CEO remuneration we collected data for all members of the management board for the whole period under investigation. We observe that the compensation packages of management board members of Germany's DAX30-firms are quite closely linked to key performance measures. In addition, we find that salaries increase with the size of the company and that ownership concentration has no significant effect on compensation. Also, our findings suggest that the two-tier system seems to matter a lot when it comes to compensation. However, it would be misleading to state that we see no significant impact of the introduction of the German say on pay-regime. Our findings suggest that supervisory boards anticipate shareholder-behavior.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 125 
KW  - say-on-pay
KW  - corporate governance
KW  - management compensation
Y1  - 2016
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/39302
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-393020
UR  - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2723792
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -