TY  - UNPD
A1  - Ignatowski, Magdalena
A1  - Korte, Josef
T1  - Resolution threats and bank discipline – What Europe can learn for the Single Resolution Mechanism from U.S. experience
T2  - SAFE policy letter series ; 33
N2  - Can a tightening of the bank resolution regime lead to more prudent bank behavior? This policy paper reviews arguments for why this could be the case and presents evidence linking changes in bank resolution regimes with bank risk-taking. The authors find that the tightening of bank resolution in the U.S. (i.e., the introduction of the Orderly Liquidation Authority) significantly decreased overall risk-taking of the most affected banks. This effect, however, does not hold for the largest and most systemically important banks – too-big-to-fail seems to be unresolved. Building on the insights from the U.S. experience, the authors derive principles for effective resolution regimes and evaluate the emerging resolution regime for Europe.
T3  - SAFE policy letter - 33 
KW  - risk-taking
KW  - bank resolution regimes
KW  - USA
KW  - Europe
Y1  - 2014
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/35678
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-356787
UR  - http://safe-frankfurt.de/policy-center/publications/detailsview/publicationname/-f45f90d141.html
IS  - October 2014
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -