TY  - RPRT
A1  - Laux, Volker
T1  - On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting
N2  - This paper shows that a capital budgeting process in which the division manager is required to engage in personally costly influence activities prior to a project approval has beneficial incentive effects: It provides the manager with incentives to acquire costly information about project prospects and helps to elicit the revelation of the acquired information. As a consequence, imposing influence costs on the manager can lead to improved capital allocations. The optimal level of influence costs, chosen by the firm, trades off ex ante incentives for information acquisition against efficient use of the acquired information ex post.
KW  - Kapitalbedarfsrechnung
KW  - Investitionsrechnung
KW  - Investitionsplanung
KW  - Lobbyismus
KW  - Kapitalallokation
KW  - Capital Butgeting
KW  - Influence Activities
KW  - Principal-Agent
KW  - Information Acquisition
Y1  - 2005
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/34481
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-344814
IS  - Version October 2005
ER  -