TY  - UNPD
A1  - Camera, Gabriele
A1  - Gioffré, Alessandro
T1  - Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium : [Version 30 September 2013]
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 32
N2  - Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude enforcement — external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot operate independently of institutions — formal or informal — designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying monetary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 32 
KW  - social norms
KW  - repeated games
KW  - cooperation
KW  - payment systems
Y1  - 2013
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/31788
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-317888
UR  - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2334192
IS  - Version 30 September 2013
SP  - 1
EP  - 31
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -