TY  - UNPD
A1  - Lipatov, Vilen
A1  - Weichenrieder, Alfons J.
T1  - A decentralization theorem of taxation
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 105
N2  - n the EU there are longstanding and ongoing pressures towards a tax that is levied on the EU level to substitute for national contributions. We discuss conditions under which such a transition can make sense, starting from what we call a "decentralization theorem of taxation" that is analogous to Oates (1972) famous result that in the absence of spill-over effects and economies of scale decentralized public good provision weakly dominates central provision. We then drop assumptions that turn out to be unnecessary for this results. While spill-over effects of taxation may call for central rules for taxation, as long as spill-over effects do not depend on the intra-regional distribution of the tax burden, decentralized taxation plus tax coordination is found superior to a union-wide tax.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 105 
KW  - fiscal federalism
KW  - taxing rights
KW  - decentralization theorem
Y1  - 2015
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/37450
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-374507
UR  - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2607967
IS  - May 2015
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -