TY  - UNPD
A1  - Eufinger, Christian
A1  - Gill, Andrej
T1  - Basel III and CEO compensation in banks: pay structures as a regulatory signal : [March 6, 2013]
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 9
N2  - This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and shareholders to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown to be a difficult task during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 9 
KW  - Basel III
KW  - capital regulation
KW  - compensation
KW  - leverage
KW  - risk
Y1  - 2013
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/29379
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-293795
UR  - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231964
IS  - March 6, 2013
PB  - Goethe-Univ., House of Finance, Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -