TY  - UNPD
A1  - Bienz, Carsten
A1  - Walz, Uwe
T1  - Venture capital exit rights
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2009,05
N2  - Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. JEL Classification: G24, G34, D80
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2009, 05 
KW  - Venture Capital
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Empirical Contract Theory
KW  - Hold-up
KW  - Exit Rights
KW  - Trade-sale Rights
KW  - Deutschland
KW  - Risikokapital
KW  - Vertrag
Y1  - 2009
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/6277
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-63764
ER  -