TY  - JOUR
A1  - Kauss, Dominik
T1  - Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence
T2  - Synthese
N2  - It’s intuitively plausible to suppose that there are many things that we can be rationally certain of, at least in many contexts. The present paper argues that, given this principle of Abundancy, there is a Preface Paradox for (rational) credence. Section 1 gives a statement of the paradox, discusses its relation to its familiar counterpart for (rational) belief, and points out the congeniality between Abundancy and broadly contextualist trends in epistemology. This leads to the question whether considerations of context-sensitivity might lend themselves to solving the Preface for credence. Sections 2 and 3 scrutinize two approaches in this spirit—one mimicking Hawthorne’s (2002) Semantic Contextualist approach to an epistemic version of the Preface, the other one analogous to Clarke’s (2015) Sensitivist approach to the doxastic version—arguing that neither approach succeeds as it stands.
KW  - Certainty
KW  - Closure
KW  - Consistency
KW  - Context-sensitivity
KW  - Probabilistic Coherence
KW  - Total Evidence
Y1  - 2021
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/71589
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-715891
SN  - 1573-0964
N1  - Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
VL  - 199
IS  - 3–4
SP  - 7303
EP  - 7320
PB  - Springer Science + Business Media B.V.
CY  - Dordrecht [u.a.]
ER  -