TY  - UNPD
A1  - Latham, Mark
T1  - The road to shareowner power
T2  - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (Osnabrück): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 81
T2  - Institut für Bankrecht (Frankfurt, Main): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 81
N2  - A dramatic rise in shareowner power and improvements in corporate governance tan be achieved in the next few years by expanding the role of proxy advisory firms. This will require changing the way such firms are paid. They are now paid directly by investors who buy their advice; but this arrangement suffers from a free-rider problem. Instead, they should be paid by each corporation about which they are advising, in accordance with shareholder vote so as to preclude management influence. This arrangement would make it economically feasible for advisory firms to expand their services, becoming proactive like relational investors. Any proxy advisor other than the market leader Stands to gain tremendously by initiating this new System. lt would eliminate the natura1 monopoly feature of the current System, and spread the tost more equitably across all shareowners. lt would also enable proxy advisory ftrms to market their Services to individual investors via the internet.
T3  - Arbeitspapiere / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht - 81 
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Wirtschaftsprüfung
KW  - Aktionär
KW  - Trittbrettfahrerverhalten
KW  - Aktienrecht
Y1  - 1999
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4713
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7758
UR  - http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/42780841/arbeitspapiere
PB  - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht
CY  - Osnabrück
ER  -