TY  - UNPD
A1  - Kräussl, Roman
A1  - Pollet, Joshua M.
A1  - Stefanova, Denitsa
T1  - Closed-end funds and discount control mechanisms
N2  - The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value. We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors. Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk- adjusted performance.
T3  - CFS working paper series - No. 707 
KW  - Closed-end funds
KW  - discount
KW  - performance
KW  - skill
KW  - signaling
KW  - information asymmetry
KW  - repurchases
KW  - continuation vote
Y1  - 2023
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/69128
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-691288
UR  - https://ssrn.com/abstract=4345001
PB  - Center for Financial Studies
CY  - Frankfurt, M.
ER  -