TY  - UNPD
A1  - Reiffen, David
A1  - Robe, Michel
T1  - Demutualization and enforcement incentives at self-regulatory financial exchanges
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2008,44
N2  - n the last few years, many of the world’s largest financial exchanges have converted from mutual, not-for-profit organizations to publicly-traded, for-profit firms. In most cases, these exchanges have substantial responsibilities with respect to enforcing various regulations that protect investors from dishonest agents. We examine how the incentives to enforce such regulations change as an exchange converts from mutual to for-profit status. In contrast to oft-stated concerns, we find that, in many circumstances, an exchange that maximizes shareholder (rather than member) income has a greater incentive to aggressively enforce these types of regulations.
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2008, 44 
KW  - Demutualization
KW  - Ownership Structure
KW  - Regulation of Financial Institutions
KW  - Enforcement Delegation
KW  - Customer Protection Rules
Y1  - 2008
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/6187
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-62239
ER  -