TY  - UNPD
A1  - Mosk, Thomas
T1  - Bargaining with a bank
T2  - SAFE working paper series ; No. 211
N2  - This paper examines bargaining as a mechanism to resolve information problems. To guide the analysis, I develop a parsimonious model of a credit negotiation between a bank and firms with varying levels of impatience. In equilibrium, impatient firms accept the bank’s offer immediately, while patient firms wait and negotiate price adjustments. I test the empirical predictions using a hand-collected dataset on credit line negotiations. Firms signing the bank’s offer right away draw down their line of credit after origination and default more than late signers. Late signers negotiate price adjustments more frequently, and, consistent with the model, these adjustments predict better ex post performance.
T3  - SAFE working paper - 211 
KW  - Credit lines
KW  - Contract terms
KW  - Bargaining
KW  - Screening
Y1  - 2018
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/46677
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-466774
UR  - https://ssrn.com/abstract=3186111
IS  - This version: January 2018
PB  - SAFE
CY  - Frankfurt am Main
ER  -