TY  - UNPD
A1  - Moretti, Laura
A1  - Suzuki, Toru
T1  - Strategic transparency and electoral pressure
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2012,19
N2  - This paper investigates how an office-motivated incumbent can use transparency enhancement on public spending to signal his budgetary management ability and win re-election. We show that when the incumbent faces a popular challenger, transparency policy can be an effective signaling device. A more popular challenger can reduce the probability to enhance transparency, while voters can be better off due to a more informative signaling. It is also shown that a higher level of public interest in fiscal issues can increase the probability of enhancing transparency, while voters can be worse off by a less informative signaling.
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2012, 19 
KW  - Fiscal Transparency
KW  - Electoral Pressure
KW  - Signaling Game
KW  - Perfect Sequential Equilibrium
Y1  - 2012
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/28634
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-286340
IS  - Version 4 December 2012
PB  - Center for Financial Studies
CY  - Frankfurt, M.
ER  -