TY  - UNPD
A1  - Boehmer, Ekkehart
T1  - Corporate governance in Germany : institutional background and empirical results
T2  - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (Osnabrück): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 78
T2  - Institut für Bankrecht (Frankfurt, Main): Arbeitspapiere ; Nr. 78
N2  - Corporate governance is currently a topic of great worldwide interest to academics, legislators, and practitioners. In addition to several academic articles, it has prompted active involvement of the OECD, the EU, the German Monopolkommission, the Bundestag, and several other institutions. Especially in comparison to the Anglo-American system, German corporate governance is characterized by lesser reliance on capital markets and outside investors, but a stronger reliance on large inside investors and financial institutions to achieve efficiency in the corporate sector. Since data on German corporations have become more easily available in recent years, the discussion has lately become more scientific and started to focus on studying the benefits and costs of the German system. The empirical results presented in this survey focus on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in Germany. I summarize several empirical studies on this topic and put them into context to the institutional and legal environment in Germany. Due to data restrictions on unlisted firms, most results are based on corporations trading in official markets, representing the first-tier stock market in Germany. These firms have to publish large blockholdings exceeding 25% in their annual report. While this type of ownership data has been accessible for several years, information on voting control has only become available with the 1995 transposition of the European Union’s Transparency Directive into national law (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG).
T3  - Arbeitspapiere / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Institut für Bankrecht - 78 
KW  - Deutschland
KW  - Corporate Governance
KW  - Aktienrecht
Y1  - 1999
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4727
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-7786
UR  - http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/42780841/arbeitspapiere
PB  - Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht
CY  - Osnabrück
ER  -