TY  - UNPD
A1  - Faia, Ester
T1  - Credit risk transfers and the macroeconomy : [This Draft: September 2010]
T2  - Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2010,26
N2  - The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the “originate to distribute” model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmström and Tirole [28] and Parlour and Plantin [39] and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the effect of productivity and other macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation. By offering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more risk. Keywords: Credit Risk Transfer , Dual Moral Hazard , Monetary Policy , Liquidity , Welfare JEL Classification: E3, E5, G3 First Draft: December 2009, This Draft: September 2010
T3  - CFS working paper series - 2010, 26 
KW  - Credit Risk Transfer
KW  - Dual Moral Hazard
KW  - Monetary Policy
KW  - Liquidity
KW  - Welfare
KW  - Kreditrisiko
KW  - Risikoverteilung
KW  - Bank
KW  - Kreditwesen
KW  - Allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell
Y1  - 2010
UR  - http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/20482
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-87147
N1  - First Draft: December 2009 ; This Draft: September 2010
IS  - Draft: September 2010
ER  -