A Scriptural Sculpture of Knowledges

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The inherited will of those we are betraying.

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Introduction

In principio erat Verbum et Verbum erat apud Deum et Deus erat Verbum. Hoc erat in principio apud Deum. Omnia per Ipsum facta sunt, et sine Ipso factum est nihil quod factum est. In Ipso vita erat, et vita erat Lux hominum. Et Lux in tenebris lucet et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt[1].

I started to write this book neither as someone who has been silenced, nor as someone who is mute. I started to write this book as someone whose voice is often lost in the thoughts moulding the audible voices, those which supposedly articulate more clearly what I have to say. I started this book by collecting some fragments of their ideas, mostly in written form, in order to sculpt what in a material that is legitimate to be used in academic practices, I can hold as mine. I started to write this book with several crisscrossing observations and assumptions yet I have finished it without a general or finite conclusion. I started this book to explore the possibility of thinking on my own using a vocabulary and grammar that I don't own. But I only started to write these sentences when I realized that what was written as a conclusion in my latest manuscript draft was in fact, better suited to an introduction to my book.

[1] This quotation in Latin is an extract of the prologue of the Gospel of St John 1.1-5 in the Bible. According to the Boston Catholic Journal (2013), it means: "[I]n the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him: and without Him was made nothing that was made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the Light shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it."

So I would like to start this introduction by listening to those voices which speak with authority on the main issues that I am addressing. For this task I need to tune my voice to fit with the tempo of the dialogue and with the conflicts from which the rest of my writings emerge. In this process I follow McCarthy's (1996:26) view that the political component of the social construction of meaning becomes visible when the term "culture" no longer refers to shared meanings that reflect a people's way of life. Instead, according to him, "*cultural practices*" refers to the huge number of institutions, classes, and groups that compete in the articulation of the social meaning of things, and to the many sites and positions from which ideas and knowledge tools are developed, and to the conflicts arising out of the struggle to stage performances and to affect audiences. But social sciences distinguish itself by being a particular way of knowing originating in the very function of power. They are not only in the hand of a specific clique, but also sites of different forms of struggle. As such they create the illusion that the knowledge which it produces can result in social liberation (Copans, 1979:57).

Woolgar (1988:12-17) notes that there is no essential difference between science and other forms of knowledge production. Unlike the philosophy of science, he suggests that one of the main characteristic of social studies of science as a discipline is to accept that science cannot be distinguished from non-science by decisions rules. To put this in another way, what is perceived as "universal" in "science" is a set of local practices produced through a process of standardization of methodologies, resulting from the negotiation situated in the networks that has been extended globally (Kuukkanen, 2011:592-598). From this perspective, all object of science are not exclusively produced using

scientific practices and "science is historically connected to a particular culture and that its history is part of the history of culture" (Smith, 2005:17). However, according to Brown (2009:7), the above interpretations of science, and its methodology, are misleading because science achieves its goal by reliance on "scientific method". In a critique of what he calls the "postmodern interpretations of science", he maintains that the contextual explanations of the sociology of scientific knowledge or/and Science, Technology, and Society (STS) "work best analysing science at the frontier, especially when the effects predicted or measured are obscure and the apparatus and experimental design is complicated and delicate". Latour (1981: 212-213) is partly in agreement with Brown, when he acknowledges that once a discipline is mature, it becomes expensive and hard to demonstrate that the discipline itself, divorced from its social context, and the bases on which it rests, must be understood as socially constructed. Although the rationality coined with science cannot be reduced to a given culture , its particular features cease to be the unique characteristics of techno-scientific knowledge rather than traits attached to the collective work of knowledge producers in a given knowledge space (Turnbull,1997:553). According to Daston (2000:3), in the case of science, the space is assumed to be real, historical, local, institutional, intellectual, cultural or philosophical. Although the connection between scientific knowledge production and the social context has been highlighted in different ways, Latour (1994: 50-53) insists that the very definition of social context as presented by the social sciences is of little help as it does not include non-humans. According to Latour (1994), the relationships between humans and non-humans, e.g. computers, microbes, buildings, etc., are so

intimate and convoluted that there is no plausible way to distinguish between the two. Moreover, almost every empirical finding in STS suggests that scientific knowledge has an important material and intellectual locality (Sismondo, 2005). Still any phenomena that are indisputably real in the colloquial sense depend on its integration into scientific thought and practices in order to become more or less understandable (Daston, 2000:1). Regarding the mutation from experiential knowledge to scientific knowledge, Porter (1995: 29) argues that in science there is a preference for precise and standardisable measures rather than highly accurate ones. As such, he emphasizes that frequently "accuracy" is meaningless if the same operation and measurements cannot be performed and duplicated at other sites. Thus data processing as understood by Maunder (1992:75) - the handling of data until they are in a form ready to be used for specific goals - seems to be what renders the laboratory operational and alters the effect of the irregular in the formation of scientific knowledge. In other words data processing alienates the irregular types of relations that may exist between human cognition and other physical environments distinct from the one of the laboratory where it is operated. In so doing it denies the possibility of the existence of something systematically different from what it is accustomed to. But in no way has this process been able yet to erase the presence of what does not resemble what science knows and expects to know, what its own specific configuration prepares to know or validate as knowledge. Therefore, the problem that this book is trying to address is captured with greater intensity. In Demeritt's (2002:780) words regarding western conceptual creations and the physical world:

> Most people are prepared to acknowledge that our concepts and ideas are humanly created and change over time and space through social processes of discovery, debate and, sometimes, domination. Where there is disagreement is about how these conceptual constructions relate to the world and whether the social processes of constructing them have any bearing on the truth of the resulting knowledge. Does the claim that some concept of nature is socially constructed refute that concept? To what extent does the world "constrain" our concepts of it, or at least our epistemologically warranted concepts of it? Different formulations of social constructionism imply different answers to these questions.

However this book does not address Demeritt's concerns in a direct or immediate way. Instead it tries to situate them relatively in the formations of events which might enable their own occurrence, and engage with them at different theoretical and empirical levels, as illustrated by some of the issues that Africa is undergoing from insecurity to climate change. But the aim of this book while giving emphasis to Africa, sketches out how the physical dimensions of the earth (built and natural) and antecedents of history structure knowledges and its physical containers (human and non-human).

Each of the five chapters of this book gives priority to a topic and induces the ways in which it relates to the next chapter. The First chapter stresses how (in) security relates to knowledge creation by drawing a parallel between the proliferation of violent conflict in Africa and the marginal position that the continent occupy in the modern formation

of knowledge. The second chapter explores the concept of creativity in relation to art and to politics and highlights the ways it might be experienced by the black African elite. The third chapter addresses the bottlenecks of African creativity and the role physical space hold together with historical antecedents in the production and reproduction of knowledge and ways of knowing. The fourth chapter tries to revive the existence of irreducible forms of knowledge existing in distinct laboratories and traces how particular biological and environment features interact with human cognition to form what we consider as knowledge. The last chapter interrogates the variety of environmental cognition in the light of an increasing homogenization of human cognition globally with a particular accent on climate change. Thus, these five chapters are not entirely separated from each other and structurally epitomize a non-linear linkage. They form parts of a scriptural sculpture whose set of texts could be read separately by a post-graduate audience or anyone having an interest on knowledge creation in general or Africa in particular, as individual components of the whole, while revealing their intended meanings only in relation to each other.

Chapter 1

(In) Security and Knowledge Creation

1.1. Security and Insecurity

The term security changes through time. McSweeney (1999:14-15) notes that etymologically the noun "security" has evolved from a positive, comforting term to a negative one. From being a psychological condition of the care-free into which we are easily lulled- "mortals chiefest enemy" as the three witches describe it in Macbeth – it is a material condition which we worry about, tighten, and come to fear. "Secure" once meant "careless" (se +cura), or "freedom from concern" – almost the reverse of the current usage implying "careful". Thus McSweeney adds that Sir Francis Bacon, warning of domestic discontent and its threat to the state, opines that "neither let any discontent and its threat to the state, be secure concerning discontentments." Although this "careless" sense of the term dropped out of usage at the end of the eighteenth century, the "Saturday Review" could still capture it in the middle of the nineteenth: "Every government knew exactly when there was reason for alarm and when there was excuse for security". This old sense of the word derives from the same root, and overlaps in meaning, with the English "sure", French "sûr". Larousse Modern Dictionary notes the French usage does not confuse "sécurité" the feeling of having nothing to fear, and "sûreté", the state of having nothing to fear. The connotation of "careless" is thus related to the sense of "certitude" carried by the term "sure". The Oxford English Dictionary expresses it

as "having or affording ground for confidence; safe; (objectively) certain". Therefore, etymologically, the freedom of security is related to the possession of knowledge, confidence in the predictability of things in knowing the objective order. The objective order is both physical and non-physical and its dual dimension posits security not as something apart from the objective order, rather as a practice which relates the physical and non-physical world with reliable means both conceptual and material. Thus the predictability of things in knowing the objective order confers clarity to a degree. But when it comes to Africa, things get chaotic, confusing and somehow obscure. This is no way surprising because in modern formations of knowledge, Africa always occupied an ambiguous position as Achille Mbembe observes:

> As a name and sign, Africa has always occupied a paradoxical position in the modern formations of Knowledge. On one hand, it has been largely assumed that "things African" are residual entities, the study of which does not contribute anything to the knowledge of the world or the human condition in general. Rapid surveys, off-the-cuff remarks, and anecdotes with sensational value suffice. On the other hand, it has always been implicitly acknowledge that in the field of social sciences and the humanities, there is no better laboratory than Africa to gauge the limits of our epistemological imagination or to pose questions about how we know what we know and what knowledge is grounded upon; how to draw on multiple models of time so as to avoid one-way causal models; how to open a space for broader comparative undertakings; and how to account for the

multiplicity of the pathways and trajectories of change (cited in Shipley, 2010:654).

Unsurprisingly, Africa is not the place to find the origin of security, whether as a concept or as a lived experience. In fact the orthodox approach to security reaches back to the Treaty of Westphalia which laid the basis for the modern European State based on the principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty. This approach rests on the three central assumptions, namely, the referent object of security is the Westphalian type of state, that security threats to this state come from other states (i.e. are external), and that the only valid security threats are military threats (Bakhit,3:2002). The prime concern of this approach is the relationship between the individual and the state. However the end of Cold War led to the reduction in armed conflicts between states in the international system. At the same time, the 1990s saw an increase in civil wars, as well as international efforts to reach peace agreements. Alongside peace building, there has also evolved the concept of human security, which has two-fold origin. On the one hand, it stems from the studies promoted since the 1990s by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). On the other, from critical perspectives on the orthodox concept of security based on the role of the state and its armed forces for deterrence and protection of sovereignty and national interests (FRIDE and iecah,2008). According to the Atlas of Human Security (2005:2), the broad concept of human security, first outlined in the 1994 Human Development Report from UNDP rests on two pillars: freedom from want and freedom from fear. On the other hand the narrow concept focuses on freedom from violence, both criminal and political.

In his attempt to explain the insecurity in the African Great Lakes, Bakhit (2002:21-22) stresses the limitations of the state centric orientation of both Third World Critique of security focusing on military and political threat and the "Broadening Critique" emphasizing economic threat. According to him, even a happy marriage of the two concepts cannot explain insecurity in this region. Providing a starting point with the aim to capture insecurity in this region, he argues that security is what people make of it. Also he points out the discursive nature of the term "security" and introduces another concept, the so called "securitization". So in accordance with Bakhit's traditions, securitization is a process guided by a certain security logic or grammar. It involves a securitizing actor that makes a securitizing move, which if successful i.e. accepted by the audience securitizes an issue into a threat to a certain referent object. A securitizing move is a speech act i.e. self-referential in the sense that it does not need to interpret or describe something else but "it is the utterance itself that is the act" so that calling something "security" makes it into a security problem. A securitizing actor tries to securitize by presenting something as an existential threat which requires absolute priority. In the end it is the audience that decides whether to accept this claim or not so that "security" (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects. The success of a speech act is dependent on the speech act's performance in satisfying the grammar of security, the "social capital" of the enunciator and the facilitating or impeding features of the alleged threat and thus represents a combination of language and society.

Having a lacanian premise in mind, I assume that the dominant narratives about Africa's security are conversely a

representation of Africa's insecurity (See Weldes et al 1999:9). In effect Lacan notes that:"[t]here is no absence in the real. There is only absence if you suggest that there may be a presence where there isn't one" (cited in Evans, 2006:25). This implies that the Africa's security which seems to be captured by some narratives does not exist in the physical world. Therefore any attempt to conceptualize it, justifies mostly the authority of a particular symbolic order. Besides the concept of security is shaped by the biases of the very interests of those who hold the power of its definition. As such security remains a function of knowledge that one's possess. In this respect, I posit that security is the certainty of national interest. I understand national interest in the traditions of Alexander Wendt, as "the objective interests of state-society complex, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy and economic well-being, and collective self-esteem" (Burchill, 2005:185). While I will prove that Africa's security does not exist in the physical world in section 1.2 and 1.3, I will also reinstate the link between security and the creation of knowledge in section 1.4.

1.2. Absence of Security within Africa

I posit that if there are some securitized areas in a state, the divergent demands of securitizing moves lead to a general insecurity in the whole territory where those areas are located. In the case of Africa, I argue that the dialectical relationship between the nature of the postcolonial state and securitizing moves of some groups is in favour of conflicts within/between countries. In effect after 1945, with the process of decolonization, post-colonial states were internationally enfranchised with juridical statehood, thereby

enjoying the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states. These states depart from current conceptions and expectations of empirical statehood. In respect to the reality on the ground such expectations have not been filled and the outcomes have been a disproportional invasion of chronic poverty and violent conflicts throughout the continent. In the Chronic Poverty Report 2008-09, among the 76 countries classified as chronically deprived, characterized by relatively low initial levels of welfare (relatively low GDP per capita and relatively high mortality, fertility and undernourishment), and by relatively slow rates of progress over time across all available indicators, there are 40 sub-Saharan countries. Inter-states conflicts rose during the post-colonial period, from the mid-1960s till the end of the century, but have decreased since 1999 (HSRG, 2010:11). However the reputation that Sub-Saharan Africa gained since the 1960s as the region in the world which is more prone to *coup d'état* remains obstinately so especially in West and Central Africa (Human Security Brief, 2007:38). I am fully aware of the differences of African countries; however my argument is based on the historical and socio-economical features shared by these countries as pointed by Jackson (1987:527-528) when stating that:

> The state in Africa is consequently more a personal – or primordial- favouring political arrangement than a public-regarding realm. Government is less an agency to provide political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of privilege, wealth and power for small elite who control it. If there is a consensus among political scientists it is probably that the state in Africa is neo-patrimonial in character .Those

> who occupy state offices, civilian and military, high and low, are inclined to treat them as possessions rather than positions: to live off their rents- very luxuriously in some cases-and use them to reward persons and cliques who help maintain their power.

I claim that the framework of action[1] of African state influences both the agency of the elite and the governed groups in a securitizing move fashion. The formal end of colonization was not the end of the will of western former states to control the former colonies. For instance Akude (2007:1) notes that a successful decolonization implied the transfer of political power to a political elite that was born and bred in colonial practices, structures, ethos and invariably interests. Thus the protection of their class interests, which implied the maintenance of colonial ethos and interests, precluded any impetus towards altering the marginal position of African states in the global political economy. This had debilitating consequences for economic development and state institutional capacity and stability as this elite exploited state power to compensate for lack of material resource base, which in turn resulted from commanding structures of their economies being controlled by firms from the colonizing and other foreign states. Furthermore the lack of empirical statehood of African post-colonial state according to Akude,

[1] At its most abstract, the notion of framework for action or historical structure is a picture of a particular configuration of forces. This configuration does not determine actions in any direct mechanical way but imposes pressures and constraints. Individuals and groups may move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them. To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing historical structure, they buttress their actions with an alternative emerging configuration of forces, a rival structure (Cox, 1981:97-98).

entailed a general conviction that it was necessary to compensate its shortage of positive sovereignty by international aid. Since the main purpose of this kind of aid was to keep control on the post-colonial state, it reinforces Sogge's argument stating that the colonial powers realized in the last decades of their rule in Africa, that direct imperial rule is unaffordable and the preference was then for a less risky and expensive solution than direct rule (Sogge, 2009:9). This situation leads me to think that the first vertical securitizing move at least the most important in the post-colonial era, was initiated by the former colonial powers, creating an African elite with the mission to rule the post-colonial state and since then it reproduces itself with the features captured by Englebert (2000:15):

> The ruling elites of low legitimacy states find it therefore less destabilizing to adopt neo-patrimonial strategies of power with their attendant propensity for corruption, clientelism, nepotism, or regionalism. These policies substitute patron-client links for the lack of moral legitimacy of the state and offer the regime a new lease on life. They buy short-term acquiescence and provide a quick fix to their hegemonic crisis. Neo-patrimonial policies are therefore the equilibrium outcome of illegitimate post -colonial statehood, a condition which entails a dichotomization of power and state structures.

The horizontal securitizing moves in the post-colonial state have been initiated by the African elite through the pursuit of corrupt practices, tribalism, and neopatrimonialism. If such practices have been a mean to overcome the lack of legitimacy of their regime and a tool to control the citizens, it

reflects also the social dynamic of the African society; how the pre-existing network of ethnicity adapted itself in the state apparatus to name but a few. In fact the vertical securitizing move relatively more diversified in term of ethnicity fuelled some horizontal moves often homogeneous and takes the appearance of the duality of two publics illustrated by Ekeh (1975:35) when he argues that:

> Most educated Africans are citizens of two publics in the same society. On one hand they belong to a civic public from which they gain materially but to which they give only grudgingly. On the other hand, they belong to the primordial public from which they derive little or no material benefits but to which they are expected to give generously and do give materially.

Despite the sense of security it may provide to its members, the ethnic group has been an illustration of Africa's fragmentation geographically and politically but also a contingent cause of political violence. Despite the fact that it seems to be a relation between development, freedom and security as pointed out by the report by the Secretary General of the United Nations (2005), the state of affairs seems to be more complicated in the African post-colonial state (FRIDE and IECAH, 2008:8) . For example addressing the crisis in Nigeria, Akude (2007:3-4) criticizes the argument of Ayoob emphasizing the negative role of the international pressure in the process of maturation of African post-colonial state. In effect in the light of European experience, Ayoob argues that the Third World state problem "has been compounded by the fact that they are under pressure to demonstrate adequate stateness quickly, as well as to perform the task of state-

making in a humane, civilized and consensual fashion, and to do all this in an era of mass politics". Akude finds that the problem with this analysis is that it is too simplistic, at least in application to Africa. According to him the maxim of such analysis is "give the third world states more time and they will mature and democratize". In contrast he posits that such a maxim is wrong. And he puts forward that that states need time to mature but most importantly they need a ruling class that is dedicated to the pursuit of economic development which will strengthen states institutions and democratize the society as when possible.

The state of affairs in Africa is far from Akude's expectations rather it reflects the dichotomy to the air-conditioner and the veranda as described by Emmanuel Terray. On one hand "Africa air conditioner", "consists of Presidents, Ministers, Parliaments, Administration, Parties, Constitutions, Laws, Rules, an airport with a VIP lounge, companies of paratroopers… motorcycle outriders with sirens…" maintaining internal order and managing external relations (Reno, 1995:109-110). On the other hand stands "Africa of the veranda" governed not with regard to efficiency, but to the share out. This dichotomy acknowledges the incapacity of both vertical and horizontal securitizing moves to provide "development" whatever the content of this word maybe and security as well. However it points out the architecture of insecurity in Africa.

I espouse the premise that the more horizontal securitizing moves are dependent on the vertical securitizing move, the more the context of negative peace can last. The less the horizontal securitizing moves are connected with the vertical securitizing, the more there is a chance of conflict. In Cameroon for example "the politics of regional or ethnic

balance" stresses how the dynamic of securitizing moves within a country create a relative acquiescence. The heterogeneity of the elite (ethnic diversity and disparities) and their material and political dependence upon the regime sustain this type of situation. In fact the majority of elite belongs to the ruling party no matter the ethnic differences and disparities. They are strongly dependent on neo-patrimonial tactics because their particular position in the state apparatus reflects their economic power (virtual or real) within their own ethnic community. But it is a caution for their political survival as well. In this sense "the politics of regional or ethnic balance" as noted by Nyamnjoh (1996:6), creates the illusion in the elite and masses from the 250 ethnic groups that everything is possible with the state even in economic crisis, and that they must give the regime total support if they wish to maintain or upward their social status. The degrees of convergence between the vertical and horizontal moves sustain a frail stability. In contrast in Ivory Coast the inequalities at the elite level undermined the link between the horizontal and vertical securitizing moves. In effect after the death of Houphouet Boigny, his successor Henry Konan Bédié almost completely stopped the balancing process among the different regional interests and parties and started a process of "baoulisation" – disproportionate nomination of the members of his ethnic groups (Baoulé) in the most important positions – of state institutions (Langer, 2004:6). The "baoulisation" of the state institutions weakened the ties between horizontal and vertical securitizing therefore leading to the conflict which the Ivory Coast experienced afterward. Consequently the relative stability of some African regimes appears just as phase in the cycle of insecurity of the

post-colonial state in respect to the context and the way it is produced.

1.3. The Logic of Securization and the Reproduction of Insecurity

Brett (1995:131) notes that "where violence is possible and profitable, history suggests that it will be used without mercy in pursuit of private or group advantage". Following this path, I assume that the ideas behind the securitizing moves in African countries benefits some particular groups (whether it is the ruling elite or marginalized groups), instead of creating the conditions for peaceful interactions among the different ethnic communities within a territory. In effect according to Aguirre and Sogge (2005:5-6) the colonial state was interventionist, authoritarian, non-representative and acted by coercion and co-opting. These characteristics resurfaced when independent post-colonial states were formed. In fact the post-colonial state used coercion and violence in substitution of social pact between state and citizens. The post-colonial state model implied a formal separation of power. However in reality there was a predominance of executive power and personalism over judicial and legislative powers. Centralization of powers was inherited from a local elite and the leaders of national freedom who gained legitimacy. The process of centralization was justified by the need to achieve national unity (a matter of national security) and a relativist justification that the African state model did not need to follow the European model. Centralization in many cases led to personal and clientelist power, arbitrary and above the law but also to the politicisation of national army and power. Fogue (2006, 55-

57) notes that just after independence, in the French speaking African countries, the role of the army was to defend the regime rather than protecting the civil rights of the masses. These regimes maintain confusion between the "sureté" and "défense" in order to hide the weaknesses which could undermine them. Consequently the politicisation of national army in favour of a particular ethnic group strengthens the vertical securitizing move, but led also to the emergence of divergent horizontal securitizing moves. It has been the case in Uganda under the leadership of Milton Obote. Still in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, Ukeje (2001:353) reveals the limitations of the use of force by arguing that:

> The implication of State-sponsored repression is that the state does not simply respond to violence; it is often the primary instigator of violence. The state is prepared to have repressive violence, not because it has much chance of succeeding, but because its own inherent weakness prevent recourse to less violent alternatives

It follows then that the role of national army in African politics is very problematic because of its politicisation but also of the impacts of its intervention in the political domain. Often the African national army is not a republican army and the quality of training of the soldiers is relatively poor. Reno(2002:839) reports that by 2002 military rulers had supplanted civilian governments in more than half of Africa's states. He adds that from 1970 to 1990 rulers faced a 72 per cent chance that they would leave office under violent circumstances. This probability fell to 41 per cent in the 1990s as more countries held multiparty elections. Yet the rulers still face considerable threats. In 1999, for example,

Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan had major armed struggles to replace incumbent regimes. Six of these conflicts included elements of national armies and individuals who were once colleagues of the rulers they sought to replace (Sollenberg and Wallenstein, 2001:52-64). These dangers encourage incumbent rulers to avoid centralizing military command structures. They keep rivals off balance by manipulating factional conflicts within militaries. In Nigeria in the 1990s, this meant the creation of a national guard loyal to the president, special task forces to attack opposition communities, "anti-crime" units that seized regime opponents and shadowy anti-drug and business investigative units that would use violence against citizens and suspect members of the regime, including army officers (Alli quoted in Reno, 2002:837-858). While providing short term acquiescence, the long term impact has been to distribute weapons and military expertise more widely in society. Both the prevalence of suspiciousness within the national security forces and the need to control the autonomous centre of violence within the state has been an opportunity for the private security companies to strengthen their commercial alliances in Africa. Furthermore the ties between these private companies and both the countries of origin and the recipient countries emphasize how African regimes work for their own survival. In this regards Reno (1997:167) argues that:

> Rulers of some weak states use creditor demands to privatize state agencies and liberalize markets as excuses to hire foreign firms that field mercenaries. These foreign soldiers serve the joint interests of foreign firms and weak states' rulers to control resources and deny them to

independent strongmen. These strategies satisfy demands from creditors that prescribe severe cutbacks in state agencies out of a frustration with the corruption and economic inefficiency of the Cold War politics.

Besides Cilliers (1999:3) notes that there is often a network of personal and financial connections between the heads of state/government members, multinational corporations and private security companies. The economic stakes are high. The host government, in many instances, is poorly equipped, corrupt and faced with internal armed political opposition. For instance Cilliers narrates that former Executive Outcomes head Eeben Barlow, established a joint venture security consultancy company with Raymond Moi, the son of Kenya's president, in 1995. Moi and Barlow are apparently also linked to or through Ibis Air, which is partnered with Simba Air in Kenya, partly owned by Moi. Ibis Air has provided regularly air transport for Executive Outcomes and was generally considered to be part of the same network of companies. In Sierra Leone, Reno (1997:180) notes also that Executive Outcomes plays a crucial role in the Sierra Leone regime's attempts to battle rebels, rein in wayward clients, control resources and satisfy creditors. Consequently, the very idea of private security companies is to reinforce the dominance of some particular groups and protect the interests of foreign companies. Therefore the grievance and the genuine need of security of the masses are neglected and blurred by the frail stability or the war's effort sustained by these companies. In addition, the neo-liberal orientation of these companies is a threat for Africa's security. View the insufficient material capabilities of the post-colonial state and the implication of Africa's

insecurity for the Global War on Terror for instance, it is probable that these private security companies will not stop their activities in Africa overnight (Carmody, 2005).

Emphasizing the importance of the professional trajectory of the leaders of various insurgencies, Bøas and Dunne (2007:25) argue that it often influences the motivations of the group particularly in its desire to capture the state. When the leaders are external to the group's established political elite (as in the LRA's Joseph Kony) the insurgents are often less interested in capturing the central government. In contrast elites who have fallen from the grace of state power may be motivated to join armed struggles that are aimed at capturing the state. Besides, Reno (2002:838-839) argues that organized interests and political networks of state collapse survive corruption and the destruction of state agencies to shape the character and aims of insurgencies. In the case of Nigeria he distinguishes two side of opposition. At times young rebels behave like social bandits struggling to overturn a deeply corrupt political order. Yet, many work for corrupt politicians and strongmen whom they criticize, sometimes clandestinely, but often in public. These opposition groups signal the emergence of social category associated with collapsing states and crises of patronage politics rather than broader notions of "civil society" distinct from collapsing state. Though many see themselves as marginalized critics of corrupt rulers, they often end up serving elite interests. Rebellion on these terms does not represent a collective action found among social bandits and others usually associated with marginalized or excluded groups since its aim is not to destroy the existing social structures of society.

For Weinstein (2007:20-98), the membership of an insurgent group determines the aims of this group at least the way this group uses violence, and this membership depends on the endowment leaders have at their disposal at the start of the rebellion. He thinks that shared identities and social ties help to resolve the dilemma of collective action by providing for reciprocity like in the National Resistance Army in Uganda. Each ethnic group has its own way of speaking[2]; however the existence of different speech communities[3] limits the efficiency of the performance of the enunciator. Thus ethnicity resolves the dilemma of collective action within a particular group and increases the risk of emergence of divergent securitizing moves within the state. Ethnicity provides the same inter-subjectivity among its members. I think that the more a country is endowed with a variety of ethnic groups, the more there is the risk to have many inter-subjectivities existing within the same country. The more there are different inter-subjectivities, the more there is the risk of misunderstanding and conflicts as well. But there is not necessarily a causal relationship between ethnicity and inter-subjectivity in the post-colonial state.

I am of the view that the context of security suggests that there is a national interest which integrates the features of the different inter-subjectivities located in the same state. Such national interest is concerned about the hybridities of the contemporary African societies, the way the indigenous

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[2] Pattern of talk distinctive of a particular group of people, and understood as symbolically meaningful within the broader spectrum of communicative behavior generally(Fitch,2001:57)

[3] Groups of people who share at least one valued way of speaking, and interpretive resources within which that way of speaking is located (Fithch,2001:57)

communities have been related to the state and the way the Westphalian state has been transformed in a non-pervasive way. However neither the absence of the certainty of national interest or national interest *per se* is the drivers of insurgents groups in Africa in most cases. Whereas the grievances of the insurgency groups are legitimate when we locate it in the broader context of the lack of efficiency of the post-colonial state, the issue of the representation of the majority of excluded by these groups is tricky, as it is clearly illustrated by Cox (2001:59):

> People have become depoliticized by awareness that politicians are incapable of dealing or unwilling to deal with the consequences of economic globalization as it affects their lives through decaying public services and unemployment, and by evidence of political corruption that flows from the high cost of election campaigns and the importance of political decisions for corporate interests. The postmodern political condition is one of the weakened and fragmented authority at the top and fragmentation of protest and resistance at the bottom.

1.4. Security - Knowledge Nexus

Disputes around the distribution of national wealth among some particular groups are often the real causes of violent conflicts. But the insecurity caused by these conflicts even filled of atrocity, is marginal. More important it seems to me is the insecurity found under the condition of negative peace, through the self-esteem of the elites and the collective images of the masses about the state- society complex to name but a few. As such Bakhit (2002:21) notes that

"Security, claims Buzan, is like freedom or power an essentially contested concept. It entails an ideological aspect which cannot be verified or falsified by empiricism. However this does not imply that an exchange of views is not possible."

Up until now I considered security as the certainty of national interest and I acknowledge that my definition contains an ideological aspect. This ideological aspect is driven by the conviction that despite the fact that violent conflict seems to be endemic in many post-colonial states, Africa's security remains achievable. However I acknowledge the fact that insecurity seen as the proliferation of violent conflicts, has it ends compromised. But I think that insecurity in Africa is not the opposite of security. Each of these two concepts has its own logic. Therefore thinking about security in Africa as the opposite of insecurity is misleading and confusing. The confusion generated by this kind of analytical endeavours sustains to a degree the reproduction of insecurity. In fact there is a dialectical relationship between security and insecurity. The way we interpret this relationship can produce some illusions of the compromise of Africa's security. Unfortunately the profusion and variety of this kind of interpretations emphasise that the existence of security in Africa is still trapped in the symbolic order. As such the predictive power of any argument about its outcomes in the physical world is a pure speculation as long as there is no material manifestation which supports the claims it posits. Besides this predictive power can be regarded as speculative as much as a starting point to reflect on what we consider as valid knowledge and how we relate to it. However as I explained earlier, the content of the word "security" change through time and space but in no way escape to this very

definition of knowledge understood as "all we currently know and understand; imagination points to all we might yet discover and create (Einstein quoted in Stellenbosch, 2010)." Therefore Africa's security rests on the creation of knowledge in and about Africa, and its predictive power regarding the physical and non-physical world. Such knowledge should not only be aware of the substance of the following observation of Francis Deng but embodies it as well:

> African countries have yet to achieve clarity on what political framework will best manage their rich diversities of people, achieve good governance, and draw upon indigenous African cultures, values, and institutions as sources of strength and legitimacy…[T]he legacy of constitutions and political frameworks left behind by colonial powers has proven largely ineffective…[I]f African nation's constitutions and its attendant governing framework are to embody the *soul* of that nation, as they are expected to do, they must reflect the essential cultural values and norms of all the nation's people and build on their worldview as the starting point for constitutionalism (Deng quoted in Adebajo, 2010:18).

However the cultural values, norms and worldview of "all the nation's people" are not always given, static or uniformly recognized. In fact they can also be (re)created and reproduced through a set of linkages.

Chapter 2

Creativity and Recognition

2.1. Linkage

Montesquieu (1976:157) stresses the links between, ideas, ideas and people, emotions and ideas, biology and aesthetic when he argues that: "All ideas are linked to one another, and they are link to ourselves. If it were known in how many ways a sentiment is held in place within a man's brain, one would not be any longer astonished by his stubbornness in defending that sentiment". But he eludes the texture and magnitude of some distinct selves linking (forming) "ourselves" somehow.Also to see these links does not necessarily translate sight into knowledge or artefact (See, Nyamnjoh, 2012:65).Nonetheless a practice of "cognitive sculpting[4]" can help us to understand how certain ideas connect and how the resulting linkages become readable and concrete. In this respect, I organize some ideas and concepts in this piece of text like a sculptor would arrange different objects (which may or may not have been specially created for the purpose) in space for a metal collage for instance. While the substantive issues addressed and the positions I take remain diverse, the objective of this chapter is to dive

[4] "Cognitive sculpting" is a technique used by managers to explain their views of the world. It emulate the works done by the sculptor in the ways it favour an arrangement of ideas/concepts of different origins and functions for the sake of the views that the manager tries to convey (Sims and Doyle,1994).

into what creativity and recognition is made of; and explicit some of their tenets in relation to black African elite and African continent. It follows then that the next section seeks to establish the existence of creative abilities of the black African elites across fields and the political underpinnings of its usage. Focusing on the case of artistic creativity, I intend to point out in section 2.3 that, creativity is neither a neutral concept nor a neutral activity. As such it is a form of agency informed by what has gone by (past), pragmatic (present) and projective (future) considerations as they relate to recognition. Section 2.4 tries to highlight the attributes of creativity on matters related to state's governance while highlighting the shape they take across fields, be it art or civil society. Section 2.5 interrogates the concept of recognition, tries to grasp and trace what is at its core. This section sketches out the interplays between and betwixt individual and people, the state and society, Africa and the West. Section 2.6 is concerned with the function played by whiteness in regard to recognition. It tries to map this function in the manners which black elite relate to themselves and relate to black masses. Finally section 2.7 infers a reading of the linkages between the various issues discussed and diverse positions I took against the background of the political emancipation of the black African elite.

2.2. Art and Politics

Post-colonial African societies are site of creativity and locus where the pretence is in the core of the relationships of power. Mbembe (1992:3) notes that it "is characterised by a distinctive style of political improvisation, by a tendency to

excess and lack of proportion as well as by distinctive ways in which identities are multiplied, transformed and put into circulation." For Englund (2004:14) "multiplicity is not so much a feature of African post-colonial societies that comprises several distinct "cultures" or "communities" than of post-colonial subjectivity that accommodates multiple identities within a single subject." Examined in the light of Mbembe and Englund's observations, we can find that some experiences in post-colonial societies recall somehow the Aristotelian understanding of politics, in the case whereby the analogy between the craftsman and the politician opens into a reading of politics as an art (Stanford, 2002). Besides while Aristotle's insight suggests that visual arts provides an interesting image of the role of the politician, I am in agreement with Dalloz and Chabal's (2006) view suggesting that political representation can also be considered as a theatre. The analogy between the politician and the artist is not only confined in the creative processes, instead it is also a reflection of their relationship with the other and the society at-large. That relationship is subjected to forms of recognition local or global. Moreover the structuring power of politics goes beyond the understanding of a "medium" as a means to communicate till the definition of what can constitute such a means and the context shaping that very definition. Some features of this structuring power are illustrated by Njami (n.d.:7) when he argues that:

> Yet an artist is someone who thinks up his creation, who knows why he is an artist and whose continual research can be seen through his work. Some "specialists" or other hasn't turned up with his prejudices and his truths, as a kind of Deus ex machine to decree what his art was made

> of in his place and on his behalf. And yet this is the way the West approach African creation. Working on the mistaken assumption that the notion of history of art is absent from the black continent, it reinvents it from one day to the next, according to its own interests. Interests which are often far cry for what it says.

Paradoxically, I notice that in some of the various ways which help them to reach a form of recognition, black African artists and elite in the civil domain mostly pass via a process of individualisation reducing the remaining fats of a surviving communalism in order to enter in the tiny room of the global. That process corresponds to a displacement of the focus of politics from community to individuality and from national project to self-realization. Webb (2010:5-6) stresses that self-realization is inevitably bound up with matters of recognition that are version of individual life politics rather than universal standards of social justice. For Bachler (2009:3), if it is possible to be involved in politics without caring about morality, it is because politics is not anymore the art of achieving a project of society where people live together in accordance to a just order, but the management of individuals. But acknowledging the individual as having an increasing significance in the socio-political arena of African societies is not the same as admitting bluntly an increasing individualization in Africa. Because Calvès and Marcoux (2007:13) report that in many African post-colonial societies, individual with individualistic tendencies are rejected by community and communal solidarities remain relatively strong. Besides research in anthropology has shown a different characteristics of the notion of the self and

personhood in Africa strengthening Calvès and Maroux's insight. In this regard Englund (2004:18) suggests that:

> A crucial observation is that social relations are intrinsic to the person, force that constitute the person rather than coming to existence only when autonomous individuals need each other. For the politics of recognition this form of personhood can have surprising consequences.

Artistic creativity and political creativity is before all a matter of self-reflexivity, the way a subject relate to himself, to the physical and non-physical world, and his capacity to translate that very relationship into a form of presence. That presence is acknowledged and made of local and global influences which tend to render the existence of black African artists, elites in the civil domain and politics interchangeable[5]. Thus I argue that in the matter of

[5] Hyden (167:15) remarks that the first generation leaders were political theorist and as intellectuals who play an important role in before and in the post-independence period because African societies lack an indigenous intellectual tradition similar to what has been initiated in the West. These groups of intellectuals epitomized by Nkrumah, Nyerere, Toure, Mboya, Madeira, Keita to name but a few, occupy influential positions in the state and had the opportunity implement their ideas. In this regard they distinguish themselves from the writers, journalists and lawyers whose roles were insignificant in the political establishment that proceeded the independence era. However the historical relationship between the post-colonial state with the African university evolved from coalition to opposition and sometimes terror (Mkandawire, 1997:17-18; Kerr and Mapanje, 2002:79). As a result the separation between intellectuals, politicians and civil servants in post-colonial Africa is blurry, to a certain degree the same individuals can occupy all these different positions at different times in their life or concomitantly. But also the genealogy of this type of position is often the same as it either reflects the

recognition, black African elite[6] from the civil domain, politics or art are not so different because exposed and responding to the same sources of influence while occupying different positions in the same order. Consequently if their responses to local/global influences seem different, it is less because of their disagreement about some of the structures which are ordering the earth seen from a locale vantage point, rather than an expression of their particularistic interests often rooted in their individual positionality/possession within that very order.

2.3. Artistic Creativity

Creativity is a polysemic notion. It escapes the attempts to define it through its own totality by leaving behind some traces or flash points leading to distinctive cultural paths helping us to imagine what it could be. Hall (1978:273-274) contrasts the senses it bears according to the Whiteheadian language and the Taoism. In the Whiteheadian understanding,

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re-appropriation of colonial institutional inventions or simply acknowledge the means and people keeping actual different forms of relation with the West and their societies.

[6] I have taken note of the argument of Werbner (2004) suggesting that an analysis of the politics of recognition should proceed case by case without condemning subject-elite relations before carefully investigating the politics of recognition. But for the sake of my theoretical argument, I will try to address throughout this book some tenets of the politics of recognition shaping African elite's social scripts but also the elite-masses relationship without falling in the trap of a simplification . So while acknowledging that the political behavior of the elite in the civil and political domain is neither identical nor always wrong, I am in agreement with Johnson and Jacobs who believe that the beginning of wisdom is the suspicion of elite (Werbner, 2004:266).

creativity espouses the creationist thought. It is "the self-creative activity of finite events in process of becoming. Each such event, at full realization, loses its uniqueness. Reality, as interweaving of freedom and novelty, therefore must be seen as a process." Conversely the Taoist vision according to Hall, acknowledges that the more important features of creativity are freedom and reflexivity, expressed through the self-realization of events. "No analysis of experience allows the discovery of a cause of creativity; no component of experience, emotional or conceptual, can provide a reason for the creative process." Some aspects of the Whiteheadian and Taoist's propositions are reflected in the transmission of Yoruba artistry over time and space. In this respect Yai (1993:35) notes that:

> Art is an invitation to infinite metonymy, difference, and departure, and not a summation for sameness and imitation. In such a culture the perennial question in art history of the relation between tradition and creativity is less tragically posed, solved and lived, for to a large extent the tradition/creativity binary opposition is neutralized. Tradition in Yoruba is *àsà*. Innovation is implied in the Yoruba idea of tradition. The verb *sà*, from which the noun *àsà* is derived, means to select, to choose, to discriminate or discern. *Sà* and tan are semantically cognate. Hence *sà* and *itàn* are. That which has not been the result of deliberate choice (*sà*) based on discernment and awareness of historical practices and processes (*itàn*) by individual or collective *ori* cannot qualify as *àsà*. And since choices preside over the birth of an *àsà* (tradition), the latter is permanently liable to metamorphosis.

Yoruba artistry suggests that the distinction between the Western concepts of "art" and "craft[7]" or sacred and profane is problematic in some African settings because they do not admit the process in which art/craft or sacred/profane are mixed, altered, strengthened and transformed into new un-permanent forms. It follows then that the significance of the statement of Richard Thomson is illustrative: "Like the fabled Balinese, it seems to me everything a creative person in Africa does, thinks, wears, makes, sings, chants, moves to and with, is art"(Thompson quoted in Polakoff,1978:23). Moreover Frances Hardings (1999:131-134) study of Nuba people is an interesting emphasis of Thomson's statement. In fact the Nuba people of Southern Sudan have developed an aesthetic display of the self in order to celebrate the young health body. This is the prerequisite for personal and group survival in the dry region of the Southeast Nuba Mountains. This form of self –presentation is limited to the non-farming arid region and to home villages and show different visual arts convention for men and women. Harding notes that there is a clear theatre of activity and a clear duration of performance[8] within the home culture. The experience of the Nuba people with the outside interference has modified their practices and entailed a certain amount of change. Harding notes that the film of Leni Riefenstahl and the two graphic books based on her photographs of the body art of Nuba people has been a catalyst of the popularity of this group of people outside

[7] Contrasting the main difference between art and craft in the Western rationality, Polakoff (1978) suggests that craft is "predictable, traditional, competent but limited by precept and technique" while art is unpredictable and culture transcending.

[8] For Harding (1999:131), there is a performance when people by being themselves, present the self in a special way.

Sudan. He points out the change that such popularity entailed for the Nuba people in the following statement:

> Nuba people's awareness of their potential to use their ordinary practice as an entertainment grew and was recorded on BBC film South- Eastern Nuba (1982) as they decorated for tourists and for the camera crew. At one point, on being criticized by his peers for applying a particular colour and pattern in the wrong order, a young Nuba man answers. 'Oh it will do for the Germans'-the audience to which they have become most accustomed. This demonstrates the clear understanding of the altered practice of self-decoration and of his own altered role as youth painted (Harding, 1999:132).

The process of creation of a work of art can be interpreted as a form of art as well as the product of that process. This process of creation of a work of art can be an ordinary practice holding a supplementary, different meaning or purpose when exposed to an audience other than the individual or the collective who initiated it in the first place. But that ordinariness is not a static one rather than a permanent character continuously asserted in various ways in its relationship with the foreign, unusual or/and the common. Therefore what we can call work of art hold its meaning from the relationship between the practices of creation, "le createur"- title and name assigned to artists in Francophone Africa- the product of that practice and the audiences. To clarify the previously states idea it is necessary to set a definition for the concept of audience.

Hand (2000:26) remarks that audience is a very elusive concept referring to the market or a definable group of actual and potential consumers. For him despite the fact that we cannot reduce the art-making to a response to economic imperatives, such a definition reminds that we should stop romanticising the field of art as an autonomous sphere free from the logic of the market. In the case of tourist art in Africa for instance, Rosette (1986:46-48) opines that "the market alone does not determine aesthetic evaluations, but it does shape the styles and the productivity of artists". She adds that: "The artists employ the consumer connection as a point of reference for their work. Yet, their actual knowledge of consumers' tastes and interests is often indirect and distorted." In the case of Nuba people Harding provide an interesting account of the relationship between artists and their audiences (Harding, 1999:133):

> The body painting is now often carried out as entertainment for outsiders, its meaning for the insiders submerged. The process (self-decorating) and the product (decorated men) have become a performance. Thus the means (body painting) to the end (display of the self to peers, ensuring survival of the group) is seemingly no longer the objective of the practice. Practitioners are no longer carrying out the decoration with a view to identifying themselves within the Nuba group as young, strong, and healthy (Faris, 1972) and simultaneously as an aesthetic work, but as people who paint their bodies-albeit with careless reference to aesthetics. They have moved from doing things with a combined aesthetic, social, and physical focus as part of their experience of growing up and growing older in Nuba society to doing

these things in order to fulfil an externally defined role. The original meaning is ignored. It is not lost or changed, nor (possibly) has it become obsolete; it is just deliberately being ignored. People have selected from isolated practices elements that, once isolated, take on new meanings.

How can we take an account of the above statement of Harding without falling in the trap of the stranger's eye[9]? How well Harding's reading of the Nuba people's transformation of practices escapes the trap of the stranger's eye? Considering the outside interference in the Southeast Sudan is it still right to speak about the Nuba society without considering the presence of tourists? Certainly not, being for the Nuba people has become taking in consideration the tourists' presence in their land but how so? Harding suggests that the Nuba people adopt the role defined for them by the tourists. But that role is not merely defined by tourists since its origin is rooted in the everyday practices of Nuba people. For Harding the problem seems to lie in the alteration of the aesthetic and the meaning of Nuba's body art. Speaking about the original meaning as "deliberately ignored" one can ask by whom? It is more probable that it can be so by the stranger's eyes since it can be still carried by the Nuba in different or new forms not yet rendered intelligible by Harding or someone of his kind. The alteration of the aesthetic of Nuba body art mentioned by Harding cannot be justified as such. What Harding called "visual art conventions" recalls the concept of "craft". Obviously if looking at the Nuba body art

[9] The stranger's eye for Harding (1999:133) refers the dissimilarity of cultural practice of the observer and congruence with the observer's expectations of the observed.

through that eye, there is a risk and care that "traditional techniques" can be lost under the pressure the external world. Nevertheless Polakoff (1978:22) stress that the distinction between art and craft is not relevant in Africa. Thus the change noticed in the aesthetic of Nuba body art can also be regarded as a metamorphosis of their artistry in reaction to external influences. Reading Nuba's transformation of aesthetic otherwise could lead to the abrogation of the primordial ethical responsibility in the Levinasian sense namely the respect for other in their alterity and mistakenly promote a culturalist[10] understanding (Yar, 2002:62). Yet Harding (1999:133-134) reports:

> For the cameras and for the outsiders, the Nuba men were acting as the *Nuba men defined by Riefenstahl's pictures*; They could simultaneously interact with each other in asides (even when still within the acting arena) as the Nuba men they "really" were – intending to eat and drink, to enjoy themselves, to shop with the money they were earning by "acting" as themselves for the outsiders. Acting became the –work-task (Goffman 1959:72) with the acts themselves, based on older practices adjusted to meet the new demands…

Despite the fact that Harding raises a genuine concern about the alienation of Nuba everyday practices to external needs, there is a problem of interpretation or more accurately

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[10] According to Bayart (2005:33) "culturalism maintains that a 'culture' is composed of stable, closed, corpus of representations, beliefs, or symbols that is supposed to have an 'affinity'- the word is used by Tocqueville as well by Max Weber- with specific opinions, attitudes, or modes of behavior."

a challenge of interpretation of the works of art in Africa. For example Rosette (1987:93) notes that in Lusaka, the production of painting by artists often intend to have cross-over appeal and to defy genres classification for symbolic, political, and commercial reasons. She notes that: "The artists skilfully manipulate innuendoes to produces different responses in contrasting consumer audiences. The aesthetic idiolect employed can be decoded and interpreted on several levels by these audiences due to the multivocality of the artwork (cf. Eco, 1979:272)". Therefore as long as we consider the Nuba people as artists, it is possible to trust that the original meaning of their body paintings despite being less obvious than it has been in the past could be still channelled through a dynamic aesthetic. Therefore "being" for a collective or individual can be accessed through but not reduced to its deriving acts even when they are repeated and reshaped as a mode of personal/collective survival satisfying external demands among others. Similarly there is always a possibility to become someone else and concomitantly to create something else but that depends on self-reflexivity and freedom as the use of one's own cognitive skills to imagine, choose and discriminate. A glimpse of these possibilities paved the routes opened by what Okwui Enwezor presents as its main interest[11] without corroborating to that illusion of

[11]"I am much more interested in the complex ways in which our individual paths are entangled and so on, and how those paths deviate from each other. The point is that no singular world is containable by another world, so that we always have to deal with these different worlds in fragments. And the fragments are things that we set up in a chain of narratives that produces very simplified, seductive representations of what we may narrate as our self or what we may narrate as the other. (...) It's important to stress today what we are interested in is the critical network

equal interaction between Europe and Africa or *fait accompli* of the structures of Europe/Africa relationships carried by his pertinent yet personal viewpoint against Africa's passivity[12]. In reality a creative move cannot elude the inequality created or maintained at the level of personal interactions (direct or indirect contact) without being instrumentalized for the greater good of the structural relationships of domination it feigns to ignore**.** Therefore creativity in politics as creativity in the field of arts needs some forms of conflict "to face sights of diverse cultural orientation in order to extent its own social influence and integrate other social influences (Doring, 2002:13)."

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of relationship between territories, identities, and discourses (Enwezor quoted in Doring, 2002:2)."

[12] In response to Valentin Mudimbe well know argument about the "invention" of Africa through European discourses, Doring (2002:13-14) reports Enwezor's vision of artistic interrelations in the contemporary global: "I'm not sure that it is really productive at this late stage in the century to keep imagining (sic) and writing about Africa only in its relationship to what we consider its construction by Europeans. Unless we posit such investigation in a more dialectical framework, allowing not only for the cannibalization of Africa, but of Europe also. We each have to come out of this interaction a little more inauthentic, as it were, since very contact can be understood as the primal ground for contamination and desire, however repulsive it may appear. (...) Therefore the more Europe constructs and consumes Africa, the more Africa constructs and consumes Europe. So Africa must not be approached as passive body completely stripped of agency, completely stripped of critical narration"

2.4. Political Creativity

Similarly to the irrelevancy of the distinction between craft and art in Africa which has been mentioned several times earlier, Mbembe (1992:3) points out that in order to account the mind-set and the post-colonial relations of power, there is a urge to: "go beyond the binary categories used in standards interpretations of domination, such as resistance vs. passivity, autonomy vs. subjection, state vs. civil society, hegemony vs. counter-hegemony, totalisation vs. detotalisation". In the same path Chabal and Dalloz (2006:275), in their reading of political representation as a theatre notes that:

> Representatives need to remain proximate enough to those for whom they speak. At the same time they must maintain suitable distance, so that they can demonstrate the value of their role as spokesperson. In other words, it is often important for these political actors not to appear cut off from those they represent-that is, in some sense to embody their identities and interests. Yet they cannot merely act as a 'mirror' since those for whom they stand frequently aspire to elevate themselves, in part at least by way of the individual they have chosen as representative.

The plasticity of the role of representative is a fruitful terrain for the creative abilities of the politician to manifest, and therefore open to a more nuanced understanding of relationships of domination/representation. For Aristotle the politician is like a craftsman, this comparison is relevant to the extent that politician produces, operates, maintains a legal system according to universal principles (Stanford, 2010:3). I skip a long discussion about certain aspects of Aristotle's

analogy and agree with its comparison in the base of shared creative abilities between politician and artist in the sense of creative abilities pinpointed in the way Dryzek (1988a:715) distinguishes the political man from the social man: "Social man is constrained within or driven by necessity into web of relationships; (classically) political man is free to create and recreate relationships." The freedom to create and recreate relationships is somehow limited whether it is for artist or politician. For instance in his presentation of the concept of passive reception – this concept mediates norms setting, experience and production between passive reception and active understanding- Rosette (1986:45) reports that for Hans Robert Jauss, the audience for an artwork actively defines and shapes its aesthetic evaluation and paves the way for future works. According to her when Jauss' remarks are applied to tourist art in Africa, it may be concluded that the consumer audience actively impacts on artists' products and future projects. In contrast to many African artists who are "in search of as yet an unknown consumer audiences with which they may never have direct contact" in Rosette's terms (1987:96), black African politicians seems to know well their audiences as the multivocality of the stage of political representation suggests. Peter Ekeh's (1975:92) insight about the development of post-colonial politics sketches out the stage where that multivocality is likely to operate:

> There is a private realm in Africa. But this private realm is differentially associated with the public in term of morality. In fact there are two public realms in post-colonial Africa, with different types of moral linkages to the private realm .At one level is the public realm in which primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments

influence and determine the individual's public behaviour. I shall call this primordial public because it is closely identified with primordial groupings, sentiments and activities, which nevertheless impinge on public interest. The primordial realm is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand there is a public realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and which has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. If it is based on civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police, etc. Its chief characteristic is that it has no moral linkages with the private realm. I shall call it civic public realm. The civic public realm is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public.

What Peter Ekeh calls "public realm" can be equated to the scope of the relationship between political representatives and their audiences both at the state and society levels. Ekeh's linkages between the private realm and the public realms reveals some fissures of the state-society apparatus but masks the cohabitation of logic of morality and amorality pervading those two respective realms whether they are public or private. The emergence of new figures of social success in post-colonial Africa namely the sportsman, the musician, the retailer, the religious authority, "the diaspo", the feyman, or the "tcheb-tchab" have considerably modified the separation of those realms and the status of western style trained black Africans who once controlled them almost exclusively(Banegas and Warnier (2001:6-7). For example speaking about corruption, Sardan (n.d:113) notes that the social logics in many African countries are not in harmony

with the legal and administrative measures initiated to cope with this phenomenon. It seems to me that what is seen as gap between the social and cultural drivers of corruption and the inefficiency of state's measures to cope with it, it is not one. It is a failure to acknowledge both the tangible and intangible containers of entanglements in which both the state's measures and the so called "social and cultural" drivers of corruption are enmeshed in. Nonetheless it is in those physical and conceptual containers that corruption makes sense and operates among other as a cause of violent and non-violent conflicts. In relation to conflicts, Englebert (2009:17-54) notes that between 1960 and 2006 Africa has been the region with the higher percentage of civil war (49%) but shared a lower percentage of secessionist conflicts with Europe and Middle East (6-8%), while the percentage of secessionist conflicts is higher in Asia (16%). After a critical review of what has constituted the wisdom about the resilience of the state in Africa, he remarks that:

> While there is plenty of evidence for the attachment of Africans to state structures, imputing it to their failures to imagine alternative scenarios is a bit akin to not explaining it at all: it's all in their head. While there are cultural elements to state acceptance, there must also be some rationality to the endurance of failed institutions.

In order to comprehend the resilience of the state in Africa, Englebert (2009:62) stressed that "what endures of African statehood in times of weakness or failure is the *legal command,* that is, the capacity to control, dominate or dictate through the law. These are functions of the state that are least dependent on the domestic institutional effectiveness and

most on sovereign status". For him the legal command is certainly rooted in the international regime of sovereignty, but its legitimacy is neither contested by those who rebel against state's authorities but not against the authority of the state (a concept whose materiality takes shape by means of its repetition/reproduction and application in the earth through humane reverence and violence). Social acquiescence toward the use of the legal command in the post-colonial Africa assures the reproduction of the existing "political machinery" and weakens the capacity to create or imagine a different mode of political organization. However there are some exception to that rule as he (Englebert) mentions the Rwenzururu kingdom of Uganda in the 1960s and Somaliland since 1991 for example.

The *legal command* as a result of the regime of international sovereignty suggests that the state in Africa is subjected to two types of audience, the first internal and mostly depending on the "taste" of a second one, external[13] . Those two main audiences are neither identical nor homogenous but they have enough of commonalities to stay compact and operate in coalition. And even when there is a conflict among them, what is salient is not the effort to map the extent to which their partnership is fruitful or not. But it is usually an attempt to hide, deny or naturalize the construction of their intimate conviviality in a form of irreconcilable alterity and/or *fait accompli* of assimilation through a common humanity. This indicates that central to the argument of Englebert (2009) is the question of "recognition". In this particular case I notice that black African elite exchange tacitly their capacity to create or innovate functional political organizations beyond the aesthetic of Wesphalian state and its derivatives with their

[13] See the concept "cultural of extraversion" in Bayart (2005:71).

desire to be "recognized" internationally .For example looking at knowledge production, Hountondji (1995:4) pays attention to thirteen elements sustaining the dependence of African societies, among them the seventh and eight provide an overview of the situation stated above:

> Seventh, the need to secure an audience or readership, a legitimate need, often leads Southern scholars to a type of mental extroversion. They are pre-oriented in choosing their research topics and methods by the expectations of their potential public. Eight, as consequence of both this mental extroversion and prejudice against theory, African scholars are often tempted, especially in the social sciences, to lock themselves up into an empirical description of the most peculiar features of their societies, without any consistent effort to interpret, elaborate on, or theorize about these features. In so doing, they implicitly agree to act as informants, though learned informants, for Western science and scientists.

It follows then that the legal command is a transmitter of a social script having multivocality able to reach different audiences with contrasted messages assigning roles that keep the state in many African countries resilient.[1] This situation sustains an on-going and self-reproducing "play" in which some characters have internalized their roles to the extent that they forget who they really were (before), are (during) and where they are located (physical space). The counterparts, for whom they play for and with, reinforce their beliefs that the "play" and reality has merged to the extent that there is no other exit but to continue to play and at best exchange some secondary roles without changing the main tenets of the

script. But the script is written on and to some extent by the body, physical space and on the mode of acquisition of particulars forms of knowledge, and doesn't have to be read aloud but memorize and camouflage within the plurality voices existing within oneself. It has to be performed continuously otherwise the play (or reality of social performances) will be interrupted and the cacophony within oneself will erupt and expose one's unconformity and the script' inconsistency in the light of the presence of diverse creations (both human and non-human) on earth. Thus what is at stake is not to document the creative abilities of black Africans rather it is to understand how that creativity is constrained and canalized and for what ends. In so doing while acknowledging the unlimited possibilities forging the inherent character of creativity, it is equally important to explain how the existing structures of recognition at the theoretical, individual, societal, local and global levels operate.

2.5. Defining and Identifying Some Types of Recognition

For Majid Yar (2002:57) recognition is not only seen "as a form, axis structure or subvention for political life, but also to the different "political" renditions of "recognition" which (for and against, implicitly or explicitly) figure the contemporary theoretical landscape". According to this scholar, "recognition is taken as an instantiation of an economy of power which produces objectified and subjected (subjection), and/or as the *sine qua non* of an ontology which reduces alterity, otherness, to the idantarian totality of the same (see Levinas, 1969; Foucault, 1984; Butler, 1997:1-30)". Illustratively in his inquiry of state-society relations in Burkina

Faso, Hagberg (2004:200) notes that political agency is not the sole outcome of individual rights and freedoms, but it is also related to the interest of collective solidarities. The agency of voluntary associations results from the interdependence of individual and community. In order to establish that agency, the association need to seek three different types of recognition. The first is in the home areas so that they grasp local legitimacy and grassroots support. Second, the association need to be recognized by the Burkinabe state. Third they need to be recognized internationally so as they can raise funding and support. Hagberg reports that while those organizations are often presented as mediating the relation between the state and the society, they are in fact a vehicle of the politics of belonging. According to him party politics influence voluntary association, especially if the leader rally political campaign. Further these associations are less voluntary than what they pretend because the people at the grassroots level are "automatically" included on the basis of their ethnicity. Therefore he suggests that:

> As leaders act as brokers and gatekeepers between external actors and people in the home area, the involvement of international actors nurtures the illusion of distinct state-society boundaries. And as few donors are ready to support ethnic lobbies for political and cultural recognition, the politics of belonging is likely to be articulated in the name of development and culture.

It seems to me that the first type of recognition needed by the voluntary associations in Burkina Faso is more likely to be called a mobilization on the base of ethnicity or solidarity.

In effect the voluntary associations have more power on their members (local people) than the latter do have upon them because of the capacity of the leaders of these associations to use the legal command. Thus the first type of recognition is also the use of the legal command by non-state actors and individuals while the second one is the use of the same instrument of power by the state through the subjection of the associations and/or its leaders. The third type of recognition is different from the two others by its rhetoric but not by its origin. In fact all those three types of recognition are more subjected to an external audience rooted in the regime of international sovereignty and its domestic currency than to an internal one represented by the grassroots. The Movement for Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Niger Delta provide a good way to differentiate the third type of recognition from the two others. In fact this movement has constantly reshaped his objectives in order to grasp support overseas and promote its cause internally- I mean inside the physical space called Nigeria. In fact from the rhetoric of a separatist organization representing the right of a minority violated by the dictatorship regime of Babangida, the former president of Nigeria, in the 1990s, the MOSOP has become a well-known and well-connected organization advocating for environmental and economic rights against petroleum company, Shell in the 1993. Clifford Bob (2005:43-45) attributes the recognition of MOSOP to their capacity to match themselves with potential NGO supporters, to possess a high international standing-being well known abroad for pre-existing, non-political reasons; pre-existing contacts with international gatekeepers or matchmakers, to enjoy a western style of education and large monetary resource. However to the question what did the transnational Ogoni campaign

achieve against its chief opponents, Bob answers that it is not possible to give a definitive answer, but some tentative conclusion may be suggested. According to him, through that campaign MOSOP elevated the international profile of the Ogoni and the Niger Delta. This has forced Shell and the new democratic Nigerian government to devote more attention and care to the problem facing this region and its people. But the fundamental problems encountered by the Ogoni and other minority groups of the Niger Delta- their political marginality- remains unsolved and little known abroad (Bob, 2005:113-15). In the same path Poncelet and Pirote (2007:20) notes that the triumph of the civil society in Democratic Republic of Congo is ambiguous. Because the Congolese civil society does not propose any clear alternative to the challenges currently confronting the country and its achievements in terms of local participation are neither innovative nor important. As a result I can infer that in their search for recognition, the reachable objective of many of the "well known" non-voluntary associations or non-organization created by black Africans: "no longer appear to be the elimination of inequality, but the avoidance of degradation and disrespect; its core categories are no longer "equal distribution" or "economic equality", but "dignity" and "respect" (Honneth, 2002:43)."

In fact the third type of recognition is often reached through rhetoric critical of the practices of states authorities in Africa, the expectations of elite of civil domain are similar to those of who hold a position in the government. For example even a regional power like South Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki or even Jacob Zuma is not concerned with structural conflict in the global political economy, instead this generation of African political

leaders seeks for recognition in society of states while aiming for a redistribution of relative gains - wealth, power and prestige - hoping that this will change the way the rest of the world behave toward them and their people (Nel, 2010:954-974). South Africa's position in the global political economy makes more sense in the light of what constitute the society of states. In this regards Nels (2010:965) reports that:" The society of states as Bull and Watson reminds us, is first and foremost a creation of a number of influential European States, who have gradually, but not always uniformly and evenly extended the invitation to others to join, but largely on terms determined by the founders of the society." Therefore it is important to recall here the viewpoint of Walby (2002:121) about the politics of redistribution and recognition. According to her " the relationship between the role of recognition and distribution politics is not that of alternates, in which recognition is replacing redistribution, as Nancy Fraser argues, but it is actually one in which the politics of recognition is the handmaiden of the politics of redistribution." As such international recognition tends to hinder the political creativity of black African elite. Similarly regarding the recognition from within the state, Englund's (2004:3) found that: "demand for recognition of minorities in post-colonial Africa, for instance, do not necessarily defend an autonomous sphere of civic activism but, on the contrary, represent an effort to become part of, and thereby to transform, the state."

2.6. Inside Recognition: Black Self-Self-Relationship and White Other Mediation

Broadly the attitude of black African elite regarding international recognition can be understood as "a symptom of the pathology of oppression" to use a terminology of Oliver (Oliver quoted in Garret, 2010:1525). In her view oppression creates "the need and the demand for recognition." Though those who can enjoy that type of recognition in the context of Africa has to be found mostly in few privileged groups and individuals able to manage the rhetoric of suffering and distress in order to enhance personal or relative gains. Also Garrett (2010:1527) points out the failure of the theorists of recognition and promoters of recognition in social work to acknowledge the role of the neo-liberal state in the maintenance of patterns and process allowing and perpetuating capital accumulation and therefore source of oppression and domination. In effect through its ability to be responsible for the "discursive promulgation of categories and labels attached to particular groups" and his role as " literal builder and consolidator of difference", the neo-liberal state promotes division, partitions communities, generates, bolters, and structures relations of (mis)recognition and social difference (Garrett, 2010:129-130).

The international regime of sovereignty and its domestic currency (legal command) operate as a vehicle of assimilation, exclusion and reproduction of past experiences (individual or collective) because it informs elite recruitment in the post-colonial Africa. As a result it influences the values-system of African societies, the degree and type of representativeness of the system, the basis of social stratification and its articulation with the political system, and the structure and the change in

political role (See Seligman quoted in Le Vine, 1968:369). By this I mean that their search for international recognition, their desire for identification with the "other" (Western whites) and differentiation with the same (black Africans), black African elite misrecognizes their own alterity for their prominence to be "recognized[14]"and "black body" tolerated. At the global level they communicate mostly with the language of the "recognized" black Atlantic as brilliantly reported by Gilroy (2002:153):

> Today, the notable sporting achievements of Linford, Lennox, Incey and Denise Lewis notwithstanding, to be recognized as belonging means being just like those decaying chalk cliffs which we are told met the anxious gaze of the invader in this country's finest hours. It is to be immobile, silent, apparently unchanging and blankly, blindness-indistinctively, white.

The impact of international recognition is not limited on the elite but it transforms their relationship with the masses as well. Chabal and Dalloz (2006:289) argues that in Nigeria in order to acquire political authority, accumulation and display of one's wealth is not enough, evidence of appropriate munificence is required. "It is the generous patron who will gain prestige and assert dominance". These scholars note that luxury confers upon ordinary people a certain aura which they termed "vertical symbolic redistribution". That reading

[14] "To 'recognize' the other, to render her known, understood, interpretable, is to rob her alterity or difference, to appropriate and assimilate her into a sameness with my own subjectivity (Yar,200:62)"

of local political dynamic of "postcolonial era[15]"in Africa has certainly a contingent sense, by that I mean a sense disconnected or not taking into account sufficiently the historicity of the event which it aim to analyse. But can this sense be separated from non-apparent relationship of "racial" domination still pervading and structuring African societies and subjectivities? My answer is no, in order to make sense of the local dynamic of politics we certainly need to understand the epistemic context of reference, but that very epistemic context is not above the power in play rather it acknowledges that same power in its enunciation. Though it is important to recall that colonial experiences have been in favour of the awareness of a material inferiority of the native comparing to the settler in many African societies (Balandier, 1962:8-11). In fact the material goods introduced through slave trade during the first colonial period were firstly used symbolically by the natives. Then they have been associated with other material goods which were already available locally and then became a symbol of authority and prestige shaping social relationships. Coming back to Dalloz and Chabal analysis of the big man in Nigeria, I suggest that the "big man" attitude takes in its own account what Sardan (n.d:99) calls "la logique du cadeau" (a practice of everyday life in many African countries through which people express their gratefulness and assure the continuity of their "cordial" relationship) as to re-articulate a relationship of domination with its audience which in many ways is adjacent and on occasion even dependent to white

[15] The postcolonial era is thus better understood as one during which 'modern' politics re-appropriated its local, African heritage on the basis of long-established social and cultural codes, rather than as a phase of the continued westernization of colonial institutions (Chabal and Dalloz, 2006:263)

supremacy. The occurrence of this relationship of domination is made possible by the fact that the local audience of the big man perceive the value of material goods displayed and distributed by the big man in relation to their degree of association with the West both at the level of geographical origin and biological authorship. By this it is meant that the interplay between whiteness[16] and wealth is in the core of the relationship of domination and social acquiescence in post-colonial Africa. Black African elite joint some signifiers of whiteness with other local particularities in order to prove their prestige and thereby create or maintain socio-economic inequalities within their own community. This type of attitude erodes the significance of political creativity in relation to structural change within the entire society but broadens the indigenous culture[17].

However the broadening of indigenous culture does not equate with the enhancement of community cultural wealth[18] rather it is mostly seen as a means to upward social status at the individual level (See Yosso:2005:75). In a situation where

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[16] For Kobayashi and Peake (2000:394) whiteness means "a historically constructed position (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996) associated with privilege and power. As such, it is not recognized as being about blackness (for which, read traditional notions of racism), but it has everything to do with not being black, with living in privileged and virtually all-white neighborhoods, with "good" schools, safe streets, and moral values to match."

[17] The culture here is understood here in the sense of Bayart (2005:96) when he state that:" 'culture' is less a matter of conforming or identifying than of making: making something new with something old, and something old with something new; making the Self with the Other"

[18] Yosso (2005:77) defines community cultural wealth as " an array of knowledge of knowledge, skills, abilities and contacts possessed and utilized by community of colour to survive and resist macro and micro-forms of oppression"

the indigenous culture is broadened, within the black being, the white other became a privileged part of the new self, threatening the old self in its alterity and rendering improbable the creativity of the individual which might be triggered by the enlargement of his/her entire cultural capital. But the other is not a radical other; he/she shares similarities with the self because of what is given with us all (a container of knowledge), and which occasionally serve as an acknowledgement and justification of our common presence on earth or the so called "humanity". The problem is that the symbolic and material value of individuals in the physical world pre-empt a fair self-self-dialogue about the white other within the black being. In the physical world inequalities between individuals concerning the body, culture, class, gender to name but a few, foster individual's alterity and distort a self-self-dialogue or a fairly relationship inclusive of the other, this at the expense of the black self. In this case culture and colonialism become tautological because some common practices reconcile the Latin roots of culture, *colere* (meaning anything from cultivating and inhabiting to worshipping and protecting) with the way its meaning as "inhabit" has evolved from the Latin *colonus* to the contemporary "colonialism" (See, Eagleton,2000:2). The approach to the issues of development by prominent black African elite dismissing or neglecting indigenous knowledge provide a good example for this case because often in some African settings, Ferguson (Ferguson quoted in Hagberg, 2004:213) reports that: "What is significantly absent in most public discussion of development are the ways in which the knowledges of the peoples being developed are ignored or treated as mere obstacle to rational progress."

2.7. Failure of Political Emancipation and Specious Humanity

Political emancipation can remain performative[19] as long as its content is not able to meet the challenges at the individual and community levels. It was expressed in the colonies in terms of assimilations, of following, of imitating the republican ideals of the former colonial power (Verges, 2002:170). It is not surprising that many of the attempts of innovation in the earlier years of independence have failed to survive 50 years later. The dual goal of autonomy and assimilation with the other in his own alterity since the 1960s has operated as "working misunderstandings" which reify the social wrongs of the era of colonialism (Bayart, 2005:42). In fact unable to masterize their repressed but surviving desire of identification (assimilation) with the white other (European/American); African elite's attempts to distinguish themselves have been reduced largely to sophisticated mimicry and reproduction of a social scripts of "colonized" throughout African countries. In this respect Englebert (2009:51) opines that: "African political actors tend to show lesser propensity for institutional innovation than they did in the latter years of colonization or in the early years of independence". Still Hyden (1967:18) notes that the first generation of intellectuals in power in post-colonial Africa has not been successful in that only to a very limited extent have managed to realize their model societies. He observes that Nkrumah failed in making Ghana socialist-centred,

[19] Chabal and Dalloz (2006:274) notes that in linguistic "'performative' denotes discourses that contain within themselves the act to which they refer- in order world bringing to life what they claim to formulate'

whilst Azikiwe, Awolowo and others within the ruling sect in Nigeria did not succeed in creating a constitutional-democratic and federal Nigeria.

It seems to me that the propensity of institutional innovations of the first generation of African political leaders reflected to a certain degree a genuine belief to bring in the possibility to create a better project of society in Africa. However this belief does not exonerate the political miscalculation of this generation of leaders. Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, provides an interesting outlook on this miscalculation, when he reports that: "African government … discovers that it inherited the power to make laws but did not inherit effective power over the economic developments. It may be able to stop things but it will not be able to start things (Adebadjo, 2006:17)." Therefore the fact that the drive to innovate in the political arena in Africa decreased over time and the increasing level of violent conflicts throughout the continent may well be the realization that there is a conceptual *cul de sac* and a physical stumbling block in the ways in which African societies and states has been led and imagined so far. Still, Nel (2010) notes some discontinuities between the first generation of African leader and the current one, among them there is the increasing confidence of the current generation of African leader in their ability to effect redistribution of relative gains without structural change in the global political economy. Moreover the current generation of African elite in politics or in the civil domain should be more aware about the miscalculations of the former generation of African leaders regarding emancipation. So if once the first generation of African leaders truly believed that they could emancipate by emulating former colonial powers through assertion of specious

differences and engagement with structural inequalities, today a large segment of black African elite just do not see the point to debunk the unequal structures of the global political economy, instead they pursue different strategies to fit in. For example the vocabulary of human rights and the politics of recognition and distribution provide the elite in the civil domain, an opportunity to save the face and to enhance self-realization by disclaiming, claiming or epitomizing a dubious equality yet sameness among human beings- an equality which they fail to accommodate in their own self-self-relationship. Hence they conceal the current racial difference in power and status relations and negate the need for or weaken a fair practice of special treatment for historically disadvantaged groups. In a western context " this "solo" role of the individual exception reassuringly confirms for the white public that (a) some minority group members can make it, so we can't be blamed, but (b) the minority group as a whole still occupies " its place," so they are not becoming dominant (van Dijk, 1990:9)." In contrast in an African context, the overall attitudes of the black self and the white other can take the form of cohabitation by default if seen through the lens of Mbembe's (2008:7) observation in South Africa:

> The two defensive logics of black victimhood and white denialism collide and collude, often in unexpected ways. Together, they gradually foster a culture of mutual *resentment*, which in turn isolates freedom from responsibility and seriously undermines the prospect of a truly non-racial future.

Although appealing because of its liberal-egalitarian touch, "the freedom from race[20]"lying in Mbembe's vision of a "non-racial future" for South Africa could be a prejudice toward the aesthetic of the physical world and the functionality of the body (sight). Race whether we see it as an historical construct or as a mere colour, participates in the making of multivocality of the physical world as a work of art. What is problematic is the abstraction (symbolic value) surrounding a phenotype (skin's colour) not only in relation to "the overall calculus of status, dignity, opportunities, rights and obligations" but in relation to the self as well. A truly non-racial future has the potential to deny the significance of race for what it really is (pigment) just as a racial present instrumentalize it through what it should not be (a base for a system of social stratification).

The world of colours opens to a world of emotions as well as to a world of cultural connotations. In this regard race (historical construct) speaks primarily the language of cultures/ontologies while colour speaks primarily the language of emotions /materiality. Colour is universal in the sense that in its continuously changing movement, the meanings assigned to it by one individual to another or from one culture to another do not modify the materiality of the pigment it refers to. In contrast race tends to keep a fixed meaning even when challenged by a re-worked aesthetic of the body or a reformed mind. For example, recognition,

[20] For Mbembe (2008:18):"Real freedom means "freedom from race"- the kind of freedom that South Africa is likely to enjoy because this nation will have built, for the very first time in the history of human kind, a society, culture, and civilization in which, for once, the colour of one's skin will be superfluous in the overall calculus of status, dignity, opportunities, rights and obligations."

assimilation or mimicry does not seem yet to be an effective or consistent solution for racism against black people. As a result instead of looking for prospects for a non-racial future in the abstraction of ideas only, there is a practical need to accept race (phenotype) for what it really is (a pigment) and to remove the cultural and institutional bottlenecks (historical construct) discouraging biological diversities, spontaneous and voluntary communion. This can be done through an appreciation of race just like colours as constitutive of the texture of the physical world in their particular presence as individual's or group's characteristics and in their collective presence as human's features . Race (phenotype) is in no way superfluous, hence it is significant enough to be appreciated in its own right not in competition to another one but in collaboration. Failure to which its potential might be continuously be converted into pervasive historical constructs (racism or whiteness for instance). A sane appreciation of one's own race is a prerequisite to the acknowledgment of one's presence on earth and a step to a unique creative move reaffirming the diversity of the universal. Black African elite's creativity passes through the acknowledgement of the factuality and potentiality of race (pigment and construct) as a necessary tool for learning, part and parcel of their experiences both physical and non-physical in the earth. In doing so there is a chance to retrieve the density of the role that both biology and learning plays in their adaptation to different environments.

Chapter 3

Space and Postcoloniality

3.1. Knowledge Space and Cognition

The common ground[21] 20th century scientific approaches to the question of society and space has been that the form of the environment is the by-product of social processes meaning that the space has no existence in its own and that there is no question of space having laws in of its own (Hillier, 2008:221).In the field of science, technology and society the "knowledge space" has been conceptualization as the laboratory. The laboratory in this sense is not limited to the built forms of the physical entity which it literally refers to. Latour (1987:64) defines it as the "the place where scientists work". He notes that "sociologist of scientific practice should avoid being shy and sticking only to the level of the laboratory (for this level does not exist) and being proud of diving inside laboratories walls, because laboratories are the place where inside/outside relations are reversed" (Latour, 1983:160). However to distinguish one laboratory from another, it is important to acknowledge the laboratory as a physical entity (built environment). Even so Hine (2007:663) opines that:

> By studying differences between laboratories we once more assume that laboratories are distinct sites, and that

[21] Hillier (2008) notes that there are some exceptions in research done in archaeology or by some theorists such as Michel Foucault (1975), *Discipline and punish: the birth of prison.*

> sites contain culturally significant wholes. The upshot of the contemporary anthropological thinking suffusing the more imaginative developments in ethnography is that these bounded cultural entities rarely exist, and it is a distraction to assume in advance that they can usefully define our studies. Rather than going to identified places to study science, the spatiality of science becomes a topic of exploration in itself (Law and Mol, 2001).

I have some reservations with Hine's argument because he seems to neglect the fact that both the scientists and some social scientists undertake at least part of their work in the physical space of the laboratory; and that most laboratories studies have been undertaken from North America and Western Europe where the physical spaces of the studied laboratories belong to almost the same architectural discourse[22] (Martin et al, 2012; See Lawhon and Murphy, 2012:362). Besides regarding the colonial encounters during the 1900s, Hobsbauwm (1987:31) notes that " the failure or refusal of most of the inhabitants of the world to live up to the example set by the western bourgeoisies was rather more striking than the success of the attempts to imitate it." Therefore it is not surprising if the differences between laboratories were not culturally or physically significant or perceived as such. Finally the point Hine raises concerning the upshot of contemporary anthropological thinking does not hold much water, especially if we take in consideration the new development of anthropology in Latin America

[22] I draw part of this reservation from Baydar's (2004:22) when he states that "until colonial encounters Western architectural history and theory did not have to attend to cultural particularity as a sign of cultural difference."

regarding "political ontology" (Blaser, 2009). Besides Latour (1983:165) confers a form agency to the laboratory in the following assertion:

> The specificity of science is not to be found in cognitive, social or psychological qualities, but in the special construction of laboratories in a manner which reverses the scale of phenomena so as to make things readable, and then accelerates the frequency of trials, allowing many mistakes to be made and registered.

Whereas Latour seems to deny any special quality of cognition to the scientist working in the laboratory and to the laboratory itself, I can infer from Harvey (2010:199) that the conception of the physical space[23] deriving from his insight is rather incomplete as it favours "examinations of how cognition affects how we perceive and remember space over how space may affect us cognitively". Harvey's argument is reinforced by the very fact that while not being settled about spatiality in its theoretical propositions, social studies of science emerged only after scholars like Bruno Latour, Karin

[23] Law and Mol (2001:612) fathom two interfering spatial systems in Latour's Actor-Network-Theory, namely the network and the Euclidian spaces. The network-space is a syntactical or semiotic space where some elements composing it are static in relation to each other, and able to be mobile in relation to Euclidian space that is defined by a set of three dimensional coordinates. In addition these scholars suggest to *think* about space through the metaphor of fire and fluidity. While the arguments of these scholars (Latour, Mol, Law) infer *de facto* a socio-material agency (actant) to technological artifacts (for example computer, building, etc...), the materiality of the space in their theoretical framework is not completely define though always socially mediated, and still opened to scholarly imagination (Sorensen, 2007:2, Law:2003:10:11).

Knorr Cetina, Michael Lynch among others decided to conduct their research in laboratories (physical entity)(See Law and Mol, 2001:610). In addition Garforth (2011:4) notes that:" Just as natural scientists act on and with scripts, material, methods, and machines so does the ethnographic researcher act on and with her assembled researcher subjects, inscription devices and traces, in the laboratory." Therefore it seems that it is the physical space of the laboratory which seems to embody the special form of cognition which is denied to scientists by many social studies of science. Yet this form of cognition falls indistinctively in the broader remit of the impact which is left by the locale on science.

In effect despite the variability of the imprints of the locale, science exists and maintains a form of coherence because of infrastructure (Harvey, 2000:711). Edwards (2006:239) notes that the term "infrastructure" refers to technological and institutional systems. According to him, infrastructure reflects the invisibility gained by systems as they become embedded in ordinary life and as the reliance place on them by whole societies. He adds that "knowledge infrastructure comprises robust networks of people, artefacts, and institutions that generate, share, and maintain specific knowledge about the human and natural worlds" (Edwards, 2010b:17). Therefore in reference to Harvey's (2010:189) argument putting the emphasis on the fact that the social organization of the physical space enable or constraint certain forms of cognition, it makes sense to assume that the physical space of the laboratory as part of knowledge infrastructure helps effectively in the delimitation of the configuration of cognitive processes. As such a building like the physical space of the laboratory "is more than it seems. It is an artefact - an object of material culture produced by a society to fulfil

particular functions determined by, and thus embodying or reflecting, the social relations and level of development of the productive forces of that society" (Goss, 1988:392). In the same line of thinking, Hillier and the so called "space syntax[24]"research program, confer a form of agency to the built environment, which according to them enable it to influence human affairs .

For Rabeneck (2008:271), the dominance of the design thinking in the field of the built environment epitomized by the influence of space syntax scholars and the fragmented process of construction, has been in favour of object oriented theoretical construct. However according to him, space syntax approach still find difficult to address the process of building. He calls for a theoretical approach encompassing both the object and the process. Whereas the awareness of the shortcomings of a theoretical construct is a form of knowledge, knowledge itself has the capacity to recreate the reality it claims to reject because knowing is also ignoring purposely some aspects of what we know and choosing among what we know the more accurate insight for the reality we want to interpret or (re)create. The capacity to make choice and the relevancy of what we know are important for the making of the reality and for its meanings. The content and the form of knowledge are essential in that process. Yet in a world where "the circulation of forms produce new and distinct geographies, within which forms co-exist in uneven and uneasy combinations" as Appadurai (2010:8) argues, the classroom is particularly helpful in grasping more insights on

[24] Penn (2003:36) suggests that space syntax (the social theory) predominantly look at how individual is constituted by all others in group or society, and space syntax (the analytical methodology) is interested in how space is constituted by all other spaces in configuration.

the cognition of the physical space in relation to postcoloniality.

3.2. Postcoloniality in the Classroom

A classroom is a form attached to education, especially western education and western inspired education in post-colonial Africa. Regarding the design of a classroom, I agree with Graff (2009:9) when she suggests that the way in which the built environment is produced is in relation to social characteristic of distinctive period of time. According to her these practices are in turn affected by the global development in philosophical thinking, associated with power structures, either aligned with or merely representing a resistance to power. Mudimbe (1988:2) identifies one of those structures as the colonizing structure namely: "the domination of the physical space, the reformation of *natives'* minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective." As such the colonizing structure according to him, encompass the physical, human, and spiritual aspect of the colonizing experience. Thus following the steps of the field of the built environment which is trying to emancipate itself from a modern rationality putting outside the realm of analysis what could not be quantify, measure but judge as Rabeneck (2008:272) opines, Nyamnjoh and Nantang (2002:8) insists that: "Education in Africa has been and mostly remains a journey fuelled by an exogenously induced and internalized sense of inadequacy in Africa, and endowed with the mission of devaluation or annihilation of African creativity, agency, and value systems". In fact Western form of education in Africa has been long considered as violence

of conversion[25], that violence has been captured by some African writers concerned about the colonial education. For instance la Grande Royale, one of the main characters of *L'aventure ambigüe* notes that:

> The school I wish for our children, will kill in them what now-a-days we keep carefully and rightfully. Perhaps our remembrance itself will perish in them. When they will return from school, some of them will no longer recognise us. What I suggest is that we accept to die inside our children so that the strangers who defeated us, occupy inside of them the space which we will leave free (Kane quoted in Chevrier 1998:93; my translation).

Thereby the classroom's experience for black African students can be a process which operates a re-articulation of their selves and where their identities inform what they acquire and how they acquire it (Karim, 1999:366). While I agree with Appadurai's insight[26] about the circulation of forms in the local context, I retain also that they are still many differences, sometimes oppositional between the contents and forms of knowledge in the local and global level. Having

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[25] "The essentially violent, externally- and internally-driven initiatives and processes to domesticate or harness, transform, alter, remodel, adapt, or reconstruct Africa and Africans through schools and universities to suit new ways of being, seeing, doing, and thinking, from colonial times to the postcolony (Nantang and Nyamnjoh, 2002:3).

[26] Appadurai (2010:8) argues that 'we need move decisively beyond the existing models of creolization, hybridity, fusion, syncretism and the like, which have large been about mixture at the level of content. We need to ask about the cohabitation of forms, such as the novel and the nation, which in the peculiarity of the ways in which they inflect each other are actually the producer of the local'.

that in mind, I imagine below how the geography of whiteness influence the consumption and production of knowledge by black African students in western settings, and I reflect on the making and the meaning of reality which result from that very knowledge afterward . This emphasis on western settings of a classroom is motivated by the fact that the most prominent voices in African studies are "diasporic intellectuals" relying more on their understanding of European theorists than their ability to use local knowledge of the cultural politics of daily life in African post-colonial societies (Werbner quoted in Nyamnjoh, 2002:19). I assume that this feature of diasporic intellectuals is a marker of the violence of conversion which occurred during their experience as student. I suggest that in such a violence lays the explanations of the obstinacy of African scholars like their non- African counter parts to describe "Africa as an object apart from the world, or as a failed and incomplete example of something else; perpetually underplays the embeddedness in multiple elsewheres of which the continent actually speaks" as Mbembe and Nuttall would say (2004:348). What is at stake in that type of description is not the relevance of the differences of Africa or African people but the fraught dimension of their exaggerations or invisibility? Still I agree with Bourdieu (1999:9) that "to exist within a social space, to occupy a point or to be an individual within a space is to differ, to be different". However I propose that the amplification of African otherness or its invisibility results from the impact of some sequences of the mutation of the selves of black African subjects upon their acquisition and their production of knowledge. Moreover while there is a risk for African scholars to amplify African otherness in one side there is also the trap of alienation by

dissociating their selves from the task of knowledge production on the other. The postcoloniality captured by Appiah (1995:119) is a reflection of that tension:

> Postcoloniality is the condition of what we might ungenerously call a comprador intelligentsia: a relatively small, Western-style, Western trained group of writers and thinkers, who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery. In the West they are known for the Africa they offer; their compatriots know them both through the West they present to Africa and through an Africa they have invented for the world, for each other and for Africa.

In the next sections of this chapter, I will put forward that the processes of self-identifications and un-identifications of black African students in a classroom of international relations theory (IR classroom) informs how that postcoloniality occurs, how it is maintained and how it illustrates and reinforces the existing trends of global political economy in relation to Africa. This will be done through re-examination of several ideas and assumptions, following Kotkin (2010:32) remarks that: " For centuries we have used maps to delineate borders that have been define by politics. But it may be time to chuck many of our notions about how humanity organizes itself." In so doing I will infer a theoretical standpoint from Kadiatu's (1998) suggestions about the numerous sources[27] influencing the construction of African identities.

[27] Kadiatu (1998:1) argues that: "An analysis of how African identities are made meaningful relies on attention to construct Africa across and between disciplines. Discourses of Africa are significant in relation to the

3.3. The Scope of IR Classroom

While international relation theories as a discipline are taught in many part of the world including Africa with different emphasises, its factuality is not representative of the diversity of ontologies and epistemologies in the earth. Jones (2006:3) opines that a lot of writings in IR are an illustration of the discipline itself, focusing largely on an idealized version of the history of the West and the powerful, with little concern about other regions of the world. Jones' view is reinforced by Kim Richard Nossal (Nossal quoted in Nyamnjoh and Nantang, 2002:17), who once argued that the textbook in IR discipline "portray the world to their readers from a uniquely American point of view: they are reviewed by Americans; the sources they cite are American; the examples are American; theory is American; the experience is American, the focus is American; and in some cases, the voice is also explicitly American". IR scholarship usually ignores African issues and Africa is almost absent from leading IR text (La Monica, 2008). Furthermore Krishna (2006:90) notes that the students are encouraged to display their energy in abstraction by eluding the questions related to the theft of land, violence, and slavery. For instance at the introduction of her book titled *International relations theory: a critical introduction*, Cynthia Weber (2001:xvii) addresses these notes to teachers of International relations theory:

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politics of Black identities and cultures in the African diasporas, and any theorisation of these constructions and subjectivities needs to recognise, not only the interrelatedness of disciplines in the present, but also the ways in which the present has been constructed by its historical traces".

> My experiments in the classroom with these teaching techniques left me feeling both fulfilled and disappointed. I was pretty good at narrating the traditions of IR theory, situating them historically, and bringing to a lively conversation one another. This allowed me to enjoy. All this was fulfilling. But I was disappointed with how students interact with IR theory. Despite my best critical intentions, students would find a particular aspect of IR theory they could identify with, attach themselves to it as "the way things are", and evaluate any other IR theory in relation to it. Most often this theory was realism. Occasionally, it was idealism. And in some cases, it was historical materialism and gender.

Besides the mythological dimension of IR theory the issue of marginalization of other forms of knowledge, people and histories in the discipline is central. Krishna (2006:94) adds that:

> It is also, then a quintessentially white discipline. It is not that race disappears from IR; it is rather that race serves as the crucial epistemic silence around which the discipline is written and coheres. That which is made to appear in the IR discourse is that which conceals the silent presence of race. "Postcolonial IR" is thus an oxymoron- a contradiction in terms. To decolonize IR is to deschool oneself from the discipline in its current dominant manifestation: to remember international relations one need to forget IR.

Questioning both the applicability of the mainstream IR theory in the third world and the African contribution to the

discipline, Karen Smith (2009:275) suggests "to look beyond the disciplinary boundaries of IR, beyond the often aggressively guarded notions of what constitutes the field. This follows in the tradition of an increasing number of IR scholars who are drawing on other disciplines…" It seems to me that Smith's input on African contribution to the theoretical development of international relations is in tension with Krishna insight about the connection between race and epistemology in IR theory. Though the misrecognition of African scholars and the misrepresentation of Africa are not an epiphenomenon in academic milieu or especially in IR, they have a structural aspect and race is one component among many others (Nyamnjoh and Nantang, 2002:5; Jones 2006:235). However I would like to consider both Smith's suggestions and Krishna's epistemological insights. Seemingly I assume that IR classroom is a site of International relations operating through the influence of the symbolic currency of students and lecturers identities (citizenship, race, culture, class, gender) but also through the human connection (friendship, love, sympathy, empathy, admiration etc.). The fact that students in a classroom meet each other regularly (once a week at least), during a relative long period (semester at least), are in favour of those types of interactions. This reading of IR classroom depends on the understanding of students as social individuals[28]. As such the interactions among students and lecturer in an IR classroom

[28]Tetreault and Lipschutz (2005, 20) notes that:" By using the term" social individual" we recognize people as social beings born with and socialized into relationships that grow over a lifetime, who create and rely on mutual relations with others and responsibilities to them, who develop through their own histories, and who act historically, materially and collectively."

are not only rational but emotional too. Besides they are not happening in the vacuum but within the built environment of the IR classroom. This built environment is neither silent nor impotent. Because "geographically, human beings reciprocally, shaped by their surrounding environments to produce landscapes that conform similarly to ideals of beauty, utility, or harmony, values not immediately associated with "race" but predicated upon whitened cultural practices" (Peake and Kobayashi,2010:394). It is in a Western context where I locate the IR classroom that I am referring to in this text. As such IR classroom is a physical space where the dynamic of IR theories as an academic discipline collide with the identities of students to form their personal practical knowledge[29]. Therefore the IR classroom is not only a class where IR is formally taught, but any knowledge space where the transmission or the presentation of IR theory and the people's identities collide effectively due to a discussion about social issues. Such a space is both the siege of a dominant white group and a means of transmission and reproduction of whiteness[30].

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[29] " By "knowledge" in the phrase " personal practical knowledge" it means that body of convictions, conscious or unconscious, which have arisen from experience, intimate, social, and traditional and which are express in a person's actions..." Personal practical knowledge" is knowledge which is imbued with all the experiences that make a person's being. Its meaning is derived from, and understood in terms of, a person's experiential history, both professional and personal (Cladinin,1985:362)"

[30] Kobayashi and Peake (2010:394) insists that: "Whiteness, therefore, is historically constructed position (Ignatiev and Garvey, 1996) associated with privilege and power. As such it is not recognized as being about blackness (for which read traditional notions of racism), but it has everything to do with not being black, with living in privileged and virtually all-white neighbourhoods, with 'good' schools, safe streets, and

3.4. Inside the Informal Economy of Whiteness

3.4.1. Being African and Becoming Black

There is a distinction between being and becoming. According to Karim (1999:354):"The former is an accumulative memory, an experience and a conception upon which individuals interact with the world around them, whereas the latter is the process of building this conception". As a result being African is not the same thing as being Black despite the entanglement of both signifiers. It is a truism that young urban Africans are generally better informed about the West than about their own country. They usually see the West as lands of hope comparing to their own country. Nonetheless the white people remain part of the otherness against which they construct their identity. In the case of a group of black Cameroonian students living in Cameroon, Nyamnjoh and Page (2002:629-630) report that:

> Young Cameroonians see white people as exploitative, creative, hard-working, self-interested, incorruptible, cruel, efficient, ignorant, racist, unemotional, cunning, and unnatural. White bodies were seen as weak, alluring, non-responsive to rhythm, clever, unable to stomach African food, shabby, sweaty, dirty and effeminate. They see the behaviour of whites toward blacks as patronizing, capricious, partisan and bossy, though it is assumed that whites encountered in Cameroon are second-rate examples.

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moral values to match. One reason that whiteness is so powerful is that it promotes re-articulations of racisms of the past. It incorporates some lessons from civil rights movement, erases racial differences, and pretends that its values apply to everyone."

Such a representation of white people is the outcome of hearsay, personal experiences with whites, traveller's tale which are authored by Cameroonians outside Cameroon (Nyamnjoh and Page 2002, 608-631). Throughout the meaning of white in Cameroon, there is the assumption that being African or Cameroonian means being black while being " white is to be sufficiently different, to be constantly remarked upon" as Nyamnjoh and Page observe .You can therefore have a black skin but being consider as white because you endorse the positive features attached to whiteness like being clever, incorruptible, efficient hard-working etc…Still in the context of Cameroon often black means African and African means black vice versa.

In contrast in western settings, African and Black are two different entities which sometime meet together in the name of the colour of the skin of a subject or the location of its homeland or simply because of the degrees of fixity for those markers. The consciousness of the black body in western settings marks the frontiers between African and Black (Fanon, 1995:323). "African" is a name which a black (African) subject can change with relative success, depending on his agency. But black is much more than a name; it is a visible scar, a reminder of Africanity and often a source and a justification of pain. The South African whiteness for instance is illustrative of the difference between African and Black. For white South Africans "home is where other whites are", namely Euro-America and Australasia (Steyn, 2005:126). Despite the abstraction of their claim of homeland in regard to the geographical position of the land they inhabit, this type of affiliation to whiteness is in no way extraordinary even for the ordinary black Africans. It is in fact an extreme version of the inclination toward whiteness of a group of people, who

possess the racial and often the economic resource to aspire for that "standard" while living in the African continent. That attitude is an attempt to purify Africanity by removing its assumed blackness. In so doing, white South Africans, challenge the equation African equals black and reinforce the hegemony of diasporic whiteness. Moreover white South Africans by distinguishing themselves from the black African, dissociate at the same time the blackness rooted in the assumption of African identities. In making that distinction, they detach themselves from embarrassing African images yet simultaneously claiming the legitimacy of their presence on the continent -their rights over land and citizenship. To put this another way, their claim for the belonging to South Africa (even considered as a western outpost) is not a claim for the same Africa illustrated by the dominant discourses mentioned by Mbembe (2001:1-2):

> ...discourse on Africa is almost always deployed in the framework (or on the fringes) of a meta-text about the animal – to be exact, about the beast: its experience, its world, and its spectacle. In this meta-text, the life of Africans unfolds under two signs. First is the sign of the strange and the monstrous-of what, even as it opens an appealing depth before us, is constantly eluding and escaping us...The other sign, in the discourse of our times, under which African life is interpreted is that of intimacy.

However it is hard to believe that African people *per se* or black people only are targeted in those discourses about Africa. In reality both white and black Africans are affected distinctively by the negative discourses on Africa and their responses to that are just two different strategies to cope with

the marginalization of Africa (land and people). Following that path it seems that being African is not in opposition with being white neither being African in opposition with being black. Nonetheless the racial tension between blacks and whites affect their relationship with Africa as a geographical location. While black people suffer more for the double marginalization of Africa as a "black body" and land, for whites the marginalization of Africa as a land seems more relevant. In this regard their attempt to question blackness as the major determinant of African identities is also an attempt to clean their privileges in the global political economy from the stain of blackness. Therefore being African is being passed through the prism of the consciousness of black body and/or the belonging to the African continent and kept an IMMEMORIAM[31]. Further in the case of black African identities, the reflection of Nyamnjoh (2010:76) about Africanity is essential:

[31] "It is in this sense that African Identity can be defined as above: INMEMORIAM i.e. in memory I am. This does not exactly negate the Cartesian cogito: I think, therefore, I exist. Even though it is an affirmation of the Cartesian cogito, it transcends it. This is because even though existence precedes identity, both existence both existence and identity work together in defining the existence of the phenomenology of human existence and identity which, in this case, is the essence of African identity…INMEMORIAM, in nutshell, defines the person, in primary sense, in terms of memory, wonderful clue in defining what the human person is that Rene Descartes omitted…In another sense, INMEMORIAM defines group identity in terms of memory in which everyone in the group finds, most suitably, where each belongs by working on the memory in terms of similarity of history, ideas and experiences (Idowu 2009, 440-441)".

> It is safe to say, however, that to most ordinary people in the geographical location known as "Africa", Africanity is more than just a birth certificate, an identity card or a passport—documents that many of them do not have, even as others coming from elsewhere and waving the flag of Africanity may have all these documents and more. For the ordinary person, to be African is not simply to be labelled or merely defined as such. It is to be a social actor or actress enmeshed in a particular context that has been and continues to be shaped by a history of connections and disconnections informed by interconnecting local and global hierarchies. That history is marked by great social movements and achievements as well as by unequal encounters and misrepresentations. For the masses of Africans, Africa is above all a lived reality, constantly shaped and reshaped (*socially produced*) through toil, sweat and struggle to live in dignity and transform society progressively. The fact of their Africanity is neither *in* question nor *a* question.

The "ordinary African" is certainly the black African living in an African post-colonial society, less concerned about its blackness than its Africanity *per se*. Once again the South African context suggests that one can be white but also being subjected to Africa's economic misfortune just like his/her black counterparts. This fact is neither against nor denies the racial dimension of the blatant inequalities still existing among South African citizens in the post-apartheid society. Hence looking through this perspective African identities are not homogenous rather than pervaded by differences along the lines of race, gender, sexuality, social class, ethnicity, religion, language, region, nationality and so

on. Unlike for " ordinary Africans" equating African and black identities is not incidental, it is purposive action to grasp the benefits of black culture beyond the African continent and forge a kind of solidarity of oppressed people despite the inner differences among blacks or Africans themselves. In that matter, music in particular appears as one of the main means of (re)articulation of racial selves of Africans, this in relation to some sources which originate far beyond the continent (Gilroy, 1995:25). As a result the fusion of black and African identities conceals a sub-scale of humanity in relation to whiteness broadly represented as followed:

> African = Black + many other negatives images
>
> Black = inferior to white + many uncertainties about citizenship (more mobility toward whiteness)
>
> Therefore, African= inferior to white + many other negatives + relative certainty about citizenship (less mobility toward whiteness)

In effect the marker of Africanity seems less easy to bear than the marker of blackness. Consequently becoming black instead of staying African is much more a strategy to cope with the marginalization of black African subjects in western settings. In this light blackness is a kind of cosmetic makeover able to hide the differences among subjects usually seen as blacks or Africans .Moreover for a black African, while presenting himself/herself as a black rather than African, there is the possibility to resist or alter the stereotypes of blackness by associating the colour of her/his skin with a traditional white citizenship. In contrast there is less mobility toward whiteness with a self-presentation as an

African. Nonetheless the black culture as a whole brings more prestige than the sole African one at a global level. It is in this fashion that we can read the positive appropriation of black identity (American rap and hip hop) by sub-Saharan black African students in western settings (See Karim, 1999).

3.4.2. Currencies of Racial Signs Underlying Self-Presentations in IR Classroom

In IR classroom a black or an African belong to a minority in term of racial and cultural affiliation of the students' population. The group that he/she represents is barely misrecognised in that field of study whether because of the authority of a particular form of epistemology or because of the ways in which the white group is inscribed in the classroom. Black African students are deprived in IR discipline of role models to whom they can identify themselves. Further their position as a minority in that space reflects the marginality of their communities in the earth and comforts them to adhere with the status quo of the existing social structures (See Paolini, 1997:33). I suggest that while they use different strategies to succeed as students but more accurately as social individual; their experience in IR classroom is likely to inform their positionality in the global political economy in their professional career. In this regard Tetreault and Lipschutz (2005:27) argue that:

> The social individual does not necessarily possess greater autonomy- after all, to paraphrase Karl Marx; we live in the world as it is given to us. Much of that world today is a liberal one- but the social individual lives in a somewhat different epistemic context. ('Epistemic" refers to particular ways of knowing and groups who share them.)

By this, we mean that an awareness of the social and emotional relations that constitute the social individual can help us to understand her relationship with global politics and world economy. This awareness also opens up new possibilities for action and autonomy.

Does a black African student have the same status in IR classroom like his/her counterpart white? The formal answer is yes, because in principle he pays the required student fees as a white counter-part pays his/her. But we cannot escape the fact that he is mostly seen as black, African but also as a student inside a particular geography of whiteness. Also even the fees that he pays could be a reflection of that fact. Thus there is an implicit hierarchy of racial ranking in IR classroom. In the economy of whiteness in IR classroom, the most valuable currency are the values of the white race, then follows a line of value systems in-between black and white, then the values of the black race and finally at the bottom of the hierarchy those of Africanity . For instance to understand why an Indian dark in complexion seems more valuable than a black African, one should compare the symbolic currency Indian and African culture and current level of economic development in the contemporary world instead of looking at the colour of the skin. The same type of ranking operate also within black race and the Africanity mediated by the symbolic currency of citizenship. Obviously citizenships associated with the virtues of whiteness are more valuable than those which are not. The communities and physical spaces they refer to are equally less valued than those close to white communities and western physical geographies. This tacit ranking is embedded in an informal economy of whiteness supported by the epistemology of IR, the cases studies taken

during the lectures, the identities of lecturers, and also by the geographical position of IR classroom. That economy can be highlighted by interrogating the repertoire whiteness, blackness and Africanity in the way students perform themselves in IR classroom.

3.5. The Search for Knowledge and the Quest for Survival beyond IR Classroom

3.5.1. The Strictures of IR Classroom

> What! When it was I who had every reason to hate despise, I was rejected? When I should have been begged, implored, I was denied the slightest recognition? I resolved, since it was impossible for me to get away from an inborn complex, to assert myself as a black man. Since the other hesitated to recognize me, there remained only one solution: to make myself known (Fanon 1995:324).

For a black African in IR classroom being conscious of the low currency attached to the colour of his/her skin or to their belonging to Africa do not lead directly to a self-affirmation *a la* Fanon. Leilde (2006:210) argues that the notion of African identity is "caught between the desire to know and to think and the urge to act to quote Mbembe (2002:636) as much analysis struggle to differentiate between what the identities of African *are* and what they *should be* for action and redress to take place." Even so Paichelier (1985:102-108) notes that the individual is bounded with the judgement of his fellows. He is afraid of negative judgement and seeks to induce positive opinions about himself. He is inspired by others to frame his viewpoint in consensus with

them. She adds that the incentives to speak the "truth" are negligible comparing to the punishment of isolation. However the influence of the majority is not always determinant. After an experiment on male subjects in order to explore the influence of chronic self-esteem on self-presentation, Baumeister (1982:44) concludes that:

> The results of the present investigation suggest that self-presentational constraints implied by a reputation are acknowledged by both high and low self-esteem persons, but it seems that persons respond to these constraints differentially as a function of their self-esteem. Persons who habitually expect successful and self-enhancing interactions with others seem guided by the desire to benefits themselves by material gain and by impressing others as favourably as possible. They appear to the note of such constraints as public knowledge only in order to aid them in devising their self-presentational strategies in the services of these ends and they apparently feel free to disconfirm implicit public behavioural expectancies. On the other hand, person who habitually expect failure, rejection or humiliation appear reluctant to discomfort public behavioural expectancies and generally behave as if they experienced the situational structure more as a source of constraints and guidelines than a source of opportunities.

For Gecas and Schwalbe (1983:79) "human beings derive a sense of self not only from the reflected appraisals of others, but also from the consequences and products of behaviours that are attributed to the self as an agent in the environment." For them efficacy based self-esteem depends

upon an individual's opportunities (material and non-material resource) to undertake an efficacious action. For these scholars various social structures enable and constraint individual's opportunities for engaging in efficacious based actions. In order to contribute to the self-esteem, the actions that these conditions allow must also be perceived and evaluated in a particular way. Finally, they argue that efficacious action is not only dependent upon social structural condition but reproduce them as well. Thus Gecas and Schawalbe try to connect efficacy based-self-esteem to social structure through consideration of the context of action, the meaning of action, and the unintended consequences of action.

Following the above, being a black African in IR classroom can be on one hand a sort of privilege and on the other hand a burden. The privilege is the acknowledgement that one is among the few black who deserve to be in that environment. It is both a recognition and exclusion of a self-achievement. To occupy that position means often to assume that we are better than other blacks especially those who are still living or studying in Africa. There is a belief that a black African student in an IR classroom should become influential back home and occupy a leading position in the state or society at large. This appraisal of the self-achievement of black African students in IR classrooms even by their counter-part white students, illustrates a tendency to overestimate their intellectual potential and other abilities compared to those struggling with their fate in Africa. The quality of the education in IR classroom and its promise for a better social mobility in terms of professional career can partly justify those attitudes if it is understood in relation to the lack of efficiency of higher education systems in many

African countries. Yet the burden is both the perception and the reality of racism and inequalities in IR classroom. It is self-devaluating for a student to always find himself associated with the phenomenon of corruption, dictatorship, diseases, war, and poverty real or mythical. In addition the recognition and the exclusion of African students cease to be a paradox when strictly comprehend within the perimeter of the economy of whiteness. In this fashion recognising the academic abilities of some black students as better comparing to those living in Africa and deserving to be acknowledged while marginalized in IR classroom reinforce the African students' position (the supposed crème of African elite in the making) at a lower level of the hierarchy of humanity .

The quasi absence of black lecturers and the limited exposure to the works of critical scholars in IR classroom preclude the capacity of African students to think independently- I mean to use critically and consistently different modes of reasoning inspired by different epistemic contexts of reference. Put succinctly IR classroom is not only a space where intellectual stimulations occur and knowledge transmission happens, more, it is an infrastructure where the majority (or dominant group) turns the cultural heritage (or specific contribution) of the minority (or dominated group) into deviant and trivial activities (Paichelier,1985:138). The mechanic of this infrastructure as foulcauldian means to control and punish, lies in the way assignments are marked and in the dynamic of affective relationship among the students. For example if the mode of reasoning of examiner is rooted in the modern rationality and western universalism, it is evident that they will be more inclined to mark nicely the assignments which acknowledge a mode of reasoning more accessible and more familiar to their own. While such attitude

appear natural and irrefutable, it is important to point out its pervasive effect. In fact for those of the students born and bred in different epistemic context, hoping to have a good grade in IR means converting his/her way of reasoning and often adapting its whole way of being to the canon of IR classroom. During that very process of adaptation, a fracture is created between the epistemic context of black African students in their country and the epistemic context in IR classroom. That fracture is also a scale of epistemologies, where sometime the black African student comes to realize that the knowledge circulating and available in his own locale is less valuable than the one he can get in IR classroom. Such a realization is falsely true because the sophistication and seduction of scientific knowledge acquired in IR classroom overshadows its contingency with the so called "indigenous knowledge"; and the myths about black communities weaken the individual will to connect them both analytically as the flows of their immateriality mixed. That artificial division of knowledge is a dilemma which any black African student in IR classroom can't escape to face as long as the mode of reasoning of the examiner is a deciding factor in IR classroom. If we assume that the aim of black African students in IR classroom is to obtain good grade in the examination's papers, we can also acknowledge that they will be inclined to adopt the mode of reasoning of the examiner. Also the fact that there is a limited exposure to critical literature especially about Africa in the IR classroom undermine their capacity to develop subversive narratives or to erect a different mode of reasoning substantiated by their own epistemic context of reference.

Moreover for those students with the naïve belief that the IR classroom is just a space in the vacuum where one can

explore freely and critically the depth of any topic there is still at the risk of being isolated by the rest of the group. In other word it is not fashionable in IR classroom to speak about slavery or racism or to trace the drivers of African civil wars up until the West, to question the nature of foreign aid and its psychological effect and the condition of African migrants in the western countries to name but a few .Whereas the interests in mentioned issues exhibit more some facets of student's identities than it could possibly justify a genuine search for knowledge, Marx reminds us that the disconnection between the work and the self means the alienation of the subject (Gecas and Schwalbe,1983:79). Therefore IR classroom is definitively more than a space of knowledge transmission; it is a space of knowledge reduction and inhibition of need for justice in the name of a transcendental/scientific epistemology. In IR classroom students learn how to behave within the current structures of glocal politics, how to accept injustice as inevitable, how to suppress or corrupt the will for social change and how to camouflage the physical determinisms (biological and environmental) inherent to his/her identities in order to enhance his/ her personal social mobility. Hoppers (2009:174) echoes the above when she paraphrases Visvanathan's argument by putting forward that: "the way science is constituted prevents the entry of pain and compassion, leaving the 'I' of science an impoverished self without a backstage. He argues that science is not only political, but goes beyond politics to create its own micro-physics of power, with its own capillaries, by pre-empting and terminally judging the way one thinks (Visvanathan 2002)".

3.5.2. Incorporation of A Black Elite's Social Script

According to the negrescence theory or the process of becoming black, Cross and Vandiver (2001) show eight identity types clustered into three majors:(a) pre-encounter; (b) immersion-emersion; and (c) internalization. In effect pre-encounter miseducation suggest a black person who absorbs without question the negative images, stereotypes, and historical misinformation about black people and finds little strength in his community. Further he/she hesitates to engage in solving or resolving their issues but also tends to consider himself as a different person comparing to the other members of his community. Many black African students in IR classroom hold this type of attitude as a strategy to avoid the rejection of the rest of the groups of students. But assuming the relevance of the stereotypes attached to the black African community is not enough, if one want to be or feel accepted one shall acknowledge them but also show its will and capacity to change or more clearly of being black but performing the character of a white individual. This performance means to abandon the cultural frame of reference[32] at least temporally and to behave and talk like the members of the white dominant group in order to improve one's chances of self-betterment in situation controlled by them (Ogbu, 2004:6). To forsake the cultural frame of reference is to nullify the black African epistemic frame of reference, but what is the point of giving up such a resource? In order to understand the reason why black students might behave like that, it is important to recall the nature of the IR

[32] I use cultural frame of reference to refer to the correct way of behaving and 'language or dialect frame of reference' to refer to the correct way of talking from the point of view of the minorities (Ogbu, 2004:5).

classroom as a space where an economy of whiteness occurs. Therefore such a resource can become a source of existential problems and academic failure for the one who tends to adopt it in IR classroom. However black African students who might accept such a view about the identities of their community might be those with low self- esteem or/ and those who lack the cultural capital to support a counter-narrative or/and those who seek to benefit from the privileges associated with whiteness. Obviously there is a relationship between black African self-conception of his/her own racial attribute and interracial friendliness. Following that path, Hallinan and Smith (1985:5-6) opines:

> Regardless of opportunities for interaction and pre-existing racial stereotypes and prejudices, interracial friendliness is likely to vary with the social environment of the classroom. Allport's (1954) contact theory suggests that interracial contact may reinforce stereotypes and increase hostility between whites and blacks unless it occurs in a situation that promotes equal status for blacks and whites students and support positive interactions.

IR classroom does not offer equal status to blacks and whites rather than reinforcing the existing unequal interracial patterns of relationship in global political economy. However some black African students are more aware about the state of their condition in IR classroom than others and because of that they might experience more emotional and psychological problems than their fellows. Gifted black African students found themselves in a situation in which they have to choose between social acceptance and academic success.

At some point in time a gifted black African student attending IR classroom may perceive academic achievement as a "pyrrhic victory". To broaden my analysis, I will speculate on the meanings of the following assertion of a gifted black African American student in a similar context as reported in the works of Lindstrom and San Vant (1986) by Grantham and Ford (2003:22):"I had to fight to be gifted and then I had to fight because I am gifted". Why using "fighting" instead of "learning" or "working hard", the use of that type of vocabulary illustrates the unrelenting effort to become educated but also an exposure to a form of violence of conversion inherent to IR classroom. Being critical to the received wisdom of IR classroom is to fight against the other (epitomized by the markers of whiteness) and against oneself (epitomized by the fact of his own blackness). It is not a struggle related to the difficulty to comprehend the "new" knowledge which is transmitted to the self but it is both an acknowledgement of the mutations of the self and an attempt to liberate the knowledge he/she is supposed to receive from the effects of distortion of the power which drives it. The outcome of that mutation can lead to the next identity stage of the negrescence theory, immersion and emersion which is characterized by two types of identity (Cross, 1995:63). Firstly in the immersion-emersion anti-white, the individual is almost absorbed by the hatred of white people and all that it represents. This individual engages in black problems and culture, but is often full of fury and pent-up rage. Secondly, in the immersion-emersion intense black involvement, the individual starts to hold a simplistic, romantic and obsessive dedication to all things black. At this stage a black student's conceptions of his/her identity becomes afro-centric, a state of mind which undermines his/her ability to perform well in

class by constructing a self-righteousness veil erecting a distortion in his/her perception of racism. As well that mutation of the self can result to what Ogbu (2004) calls assimilation or emulation of whites and accommodation without assimilation. Assimilation or emulations of whites refers to black African student who chooses to abandon their cultural frame of reference to behave and talk directly according to the white frame of reference. They strongly believe that their choice is more likely to help them succeed in education. Some other black Africans do not only reject things related to blackness but develop also a kind of self-hatred about being black African. The students who fall in the trap of self-hatred risks also to undermine his/her ability to obtain good grade in an IR classroom because whiteness is not about blackness *per se* but not being black instead. So a raw racial distortion even against oneself (black African self) cannot fit with the subtlety of the mode of reasoning in IR classroom. But that attitude can probably enhance the interracial friendliness with white students and increase the chances to upward one's social status.

On the other hand accommodation without assimilation suggests that black African students adopt the white cultural frame and language frame of reference only to succeed in IR classroom. They do not give up their black African identity or cultural and language frame of reference. Black students who fall in that category once outside of a white controlled environment do not transmit the same knowledge they received in IR classroom, rather a personal practical knowledge is transmitted. That knowledge contains a blend of the theories learned in IR classroom mixed with their emotions of repressed black African subject in white controlled settings. It is also a form of memory connecting

the student experience in IR classroom and their actions in professional life.

3.5.3. Black Elite's Social Script

Borrowing on traditional definitions of script, I define the black elite's social script as the sum of shared dispositions and actions sustaining the ways in which prominent black individuals across geographical locations accommodate themselves or are assimilated in the global political economy. The black elite's social script do not overlook the differences and tensions existing within black people as a whole or between continental black Africans and diasporic blacks whether it is African Americans, African Europeans or African expatriates. However it illustrates a terrain where their aspirations meet, merge or clash in order to outline the guidelines of the politics of being black in a physical and conceptual environment mostly authored by white individual or western collective. Ogbu (2004:22) notes that according to black autobiographers accommodation maintain the black sanity in a racist society and it helps them to get ahead in the white establishment. That type of survival mechanism is the result of personal practical knowledge as illustrated by Wiederman (Wiederman quoted in Ogbu 2004) in the following words:

> It was a trick I learned early on. A survival mechanism as old as slavery. If you are born Black in America you must quickly teach yourself to recognize the invisible barriers disciplining the space in which you may move. This seventh sense you must activate is imperative for survival and sanity. Nothing is what it seems. You must always take a second reading, decode appearances, and

> pick out the abstractions erected to keep in your place. Then work around them. What begins as pragmatic reaction to race prejudice gradually acquires the force of an instinctive response.

Hanchard (1996:103) notes that black intellectuals, like other middle-class professionals, in their attempt to provide a defence for their personal success amid high black unemployment, urban violence and everything considered as a " black problem" in a capitalist society, express guilt and criticism. According to him, such an attitude "is informed by archaic presumptions about correlations among political commitment, creature comforts, and community advancement within black nationalist and white leftist traditions in the United States". Along the same lines, the priorities put forward by the black African elite represented in the so called "New Africa" initially comprising Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa can be understood in the light of that paradox. In effect Taylor and Nel (2002, 164-172) note that there is not a clear cut between the North and the South at least in the top of each respective society. According to those authors the New Africa-based transnational elites cannot openly reject the neoliberal thrust of globalization because this would mean a rejection of their own positions and privileges. Such situation explained why at World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference at Seattle in 1999, the elite from the South were not advocating for a radical restructuring of the global capitalist order. Instead what most Southern delegations were pressing for was increased access to the world market for externally oriented fractions of the South, as well as the greater part in the leading positions to manage the global political economy. In this respect the

substance of the New Africa's message and other reformist impulse is that it is the South that has had to shoulder much of the burden for global restructuring, and it is the elites in the South who have to encounter the wrath of the affected. Thus to improve these conditions New Africa's elites are claiming a much greater input in managing the global economy. As a result a first reading of the position of the "New Africa" in international fora suggests that African ruling elite are less concerned with the issues of inequalities inherent to the neo-liberal ideology rather than reinforcing their own position for accumulation and domination in the existing global political economy. But if I take into consideration Hanchard's (1996:107) suggestion that "the strength and weaknesses of individual black public intellectuals are largely irrelevant without any consideration of the larger political struggles they engage in, whether in the academy or in the black communities", then the black elite's social script reveals the tensions it hides in relation to identity, knowledge and purpose as briefly explored in the case of the gifted black student in IR classroom earlier.

3.5.4. Fluctuation in Black Elite's Scriptural Model

Examining black peoples' educational experience and how they work to transform school 'failure' in the UK, Wright et al (2010:121) highlight some drivers of their goals: the inspirational capital, the need to eradicate the stigma of school exclusion, the attachment to education and achievement and the capacity to use social support and collaborative action through their experience of marginality. But it is unlikely to isolate the embodied knowledge resulting from the knowledge which is formally taught in IR classroom. These forms of knowledge are constitutive of each other.

Therefore one can ask what type of knowledge shall we pursue in the IR classroom when we are a black African and yearning for knowledge? Ideally I suggest that what we can consider as an efficacious action for black African student in IR classroom is not the pursuit of the best grade *per se* in IR assignments but the exploration of a knowledge liberated from interests of the domineering group but also of the self-righteousness of the dominated. This leads me to interrogate what should be considered as relevant knowledge but also one's relationship with knowledges? Consequently it is important to ask: is to think an action *per se* or a meditation in between action and non-action? If it seems easier analytically to divide the thoughts and the action, it is important to note that such a dichotomy is artificial. There is continuity between action and thought even when they are not intended by a subject. A subject pretending to be concerned only by the urge to think justifies his action of non-action by denying the material manifestation of its very action. Likewise someone concerned only with the urge to act lets the logic of practicality to impose its trajectory upon his relative capacity to partner with the earth through his thoughts. But the continuity between action and thought does not equate to a kind of fluidity or homogeneity between the two rather than a co-habitation. In this regard the subject is also an agent who can cohere yet simultaneously alter the co-habitation of thoughts and action inside a specific physical space. Therefore if to think in a particular way can trigger a social transformation and can be appraised or repressed as an act of revolt, it cannot replace the material impact of the latter. Instead the former can even be weakened by the practicality of the latter or prevent its happening. Is it foolish for an African student to revolt in an IR classroom? As foolish as it

can be Gerbeau (1970:70), notes that it was the gifted slaves. Hence, those who had the potential to benefit from such an order were the first to revolt against the master in the plantations or in the slave galley. Some sons of the Matabele leader in Zimbabwe underwent the same fate. For instance Lobengula, who were educated by Cecil Rhodes, instead of serving the colonizer, devoted his training in law for the reclamation of land, the unity of his people and his place in the royal hierarchy (Moore, 1991:479). This type of heroic encounter between Africa and the West is not what students are accustomed to reflect upon in IR classroom. Consequently the possibility to nurture this type of heroic spirit among black African students stays elusive. Besides in this context, it appears that one of the main features of the social script of African intelligentsia the devotion to think within the gaps left in the existing structures of power and the irrelevance of one's cognitive skills for efficacy-based collective actions. This form of prescribed self-censorship may not be the exclusivity of African intelligentsia and as such be a component of what has been termed in science studies laboratory politics. However Lave et al (2010:664) insist that science may always have had economic and political dependency, but the character of that dependency is extremely important. Therefore I agree with Mudimbe (1988:6) when he states that the colonizing structure might not be the only explanations of Africa's current marginality. But I hold for fact that Africa's marginality intersect and parallel others forms of marginality while retaining some specific features.

It is the postcoloniality which is likely to model African students whether as a "rite of passage" or as a hearsay. Neisbitt (2002:71-74) distinguishes three types of African

intellectual migrants in Europe and United States namely, the comprador intelligentsia, postcolonial critic and the progressive exiles. The comprador intelligentsia use strategically their national origins, colour, and education to serve as spokespersons and intellectual henchmen for organizations such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Moreover they accept uncritically the free market ideology of globalization as the solution to Africa's development crisis. The postcolonial critic specialises as interpreters of the African experience for Western audiences mostly through the lens of an adaption of the Euro-American theories while taking advantage of their colour, nationality and location in the West. Finally the progressive exiles are those who manage to maintain their African identity by keeping it in dialogue with their experience in exile. The three major figures mentioned by Njubi Neisbitt are certainly not the sum of what could be the experiences of migrant African scholars in the West. But Neisbitt's account of the typology of black African migrant in the West insists on the same fluctuation encounter by different individuals and often for similar reasons. It is a fluctuation in the ways in which the black self, Africa and the western world relate to each other. It manifests itself as a multiplicity of reactions having in common the stamp of the "colonizing structure". Drawing from that trend, one can expect at least that a black African student would inform his/her capacity of acting white with its critical awareness of social injustices and inequalities in order to guarantee both academic success and secure a minimum of social acceptance both by white and black communities necessary for the sanity of the self and the practicality of an incremental version of social change in Africa as well as to guarantee one's future. In so doing they will learn how to

invent an incomplete Africa which the properties can easily straddle from one epistemic context to another and the stories they tell, be sold at any point of the globe without losing their insight about human condition. In that fashion they can acknowledge their powerlessness without betraying themselves, without sacrificing their self-betterment for an improbable social transformation in their country of origin and live their postcolonial condition as knowledge producer or international civil servant without a deep seated guilt. In this regards the recruitment of the best African intellectuals by the Bretton Woods institutions and by other non-governmental organizations due to attraction of salaries and the limited virtues backing the concept of civil society, hinder the emergence of a counter-elite addressing anew African issues and challenges (Lacoste,2003:102).

Speaking about black public intellectuals in the US, Michael Hanchard (1996) has noticed the guilt present in their narratives. What does someone has to become guilty of what he has chosen to become? As long as it is not an isolated guilt, particular to an individual but a common feature of a group of individuals in their interaction with another, one can suggest that is an illustration of disagreement toward oneself (self-destruction in relation to one's personal "old" values and dual responsibility toward one's community) and toward an external object which has been failed to master or change (for example failure to envisage a practical solution to change structural inequalities and injustices in an institution). The guilt of black public intellectuals points out the plasticity of the self in regard to the content of the social script which in many cases is not a definitive trait of personality built in stone

and leaving no hope for modification. Therefore the black elite's social script is a constant proposition happening during the negotiations where a subject finds himself in, on what s/he currently is and what s/he is becoming. In this manner the guilt forged under self-betterment liberated a subject's remaining good intentions from the compromises of which enabled his/her privileges without changing the broader material circumstances in which s/he and its community finds themselves in, but his own material comfort for the better.

Moreover there is an historical link between black African student's performances in IR classroom and the social script of the black elite of the yesteryears. In effect many African countries, the first generation of leaders was at the same time intellectuals in many African countries. They had the opportunity to continue their studies in the West and I assume that they had similar experiences as those of black African student in IR classroom. Some of the leaders who participated in the fifth Pan-African Congress in Ghana in 1945 had studied in United States of America and Britain. Among them we can name, Dr. James Aggrey, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr Mbonu Ojike, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore, S.L. Akintola, Magnus Williams and Wallace Johnson (Obi, 2004:4). Furthermore by awarding scholarship some Western governments have seen in the need to enhance the education of few black Africans a means to render them more sympathetic to their interests at the expense of those of African masses in the advent they occupy key leadership position in their countries of origin. For example in 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency created a non-profit organization

called the Africa- America Institute (AAI) to fund the education of Africans in the United States using African American scholars from historically black colleges as the front men. Neisbitt (2002) notes that many of the students awarded through that process used the contacts in the U.S. to acquire key leadership positions during the era of independence of African states' and set up afterward "neocolonial relationship with the United States". What I would like to point out here is neither the outcomes of the exposure in IR classroom in terms of blatant refusal or acceptance of Western domination in professional career nor a cynical portrayal of the strategic use of studentship or Western styled education to alienated Africans students. Instead I would like to bring more clarity on how what is left behind this type of personal and to some extent collective experiences affects the black self and post-colonial societies at large continuously. For example in an analysis of the relations between African intellectual, knowledge and power, Boulaga (n.d.:31) argues that:

> Because he considers that knowledge is linked to power, his approach has been warped, since it is about an immanent power resting on the materiality of knowledge production. His aim is neither the quest of truth; nor he try to solve by means of theory and by rational action (action raisonée) problems that are given to him in the world he lives and in his relation with others. The intellectual wants to be part of administrative networks and to become a member of clubs where luxury goods, prestige and pleasure are distributed (my translation).

Such depiction is concomitant to the expectations resulting from the context of independence of African states connecting de facto intellectual occupation with leadership position in the state. However Boulaga (n.d:34) notices aside of the "l'intellectuel Africain", the one he calls "intéllectuel authentique", a marginal who operates: "A rupture both with servility and complacency coupled the myths of identity and alterity. The courage of his endeavours renders him a marginal and solitary, as such his condition could lead to restrictions and troubles." Boulaga's description of the "l'intellectuel Africain" work and condition is at the image of the pyrrhic victory of the gifted black in the IR classroom to the extent that I am not admitting his ("l'intellectuel Africain") subjection and complacency regarding issues around identity and alterity. Boulaga's views on the " intéllectuel authentique" is similar to the figure of the " true artist" depicted by Rosteutsher (1958:8) in a social context where the pursuit of power and the ever increasing material gains had lead more and more to compete lack of understanding and even to anti-artistic attitude in the aftermath of Renaissance in Europe. Also it seems to me that the pertinence of Boulaga's usage of the term "authentic" is not to be understood as a claim for a past which has been lost and regained over the past century as some Middle East scholars put forward (Kurzman and Owens, 2002:63). In contrast "l'intellectuel Africain" as a concept stabilises some phases or aspects of the metamorphosis operating within the black's self in relation to his awareness and identities. In this respect "l'intellectuel Africain" and the "authentique intellectuel" cease to be only two opposite archetypes of what it means to become an intellectual for a black African rather they characterize two intricate moments of fluctuation, one

within the self and another in the physical space where the self finds himself in. These fluctuations reflect the negotiation of an agreement within the self (the multiplicity, heterogeneity, plasticity and the dynamic stability characteristic of the self should be consider in this case) between the self and the space in which he finds himself in (body or physical environment). Thus both the "African intellectual" and the "authentique intellectual" using Boulaga terminology, will recognize themselves in the figure of African intellectual describes by Valentin Mudimbe as being both Africanised and westernised (Semumjanga, 2001:160). But they will differ from physical space "A" to physical space "B" in the way they assume that dual identity which carries Africa and the West within oneself and on/under a body which apparently is supposed to belong (originate from) solely to Africa.

3.5.5. Metaphysical Racism, Ethical Identity and Responsibility of the Black Self

Black African students in the IR classroom are among the few with the promise of a better life in their communities. They constitute the outcome of what Hoppers (2009:171) names the *triage society* which has the effect "to reduces whole classes of people within otherwise bountiful countries, and whole countries themselves, and whole regions in some cases, and even continents, to one or other of the hopeless categories (McKinley, 2001)-deemed irrelevant to their use." But still even when they are not exposed to biological racism or manage well to cope with cultural racism, there is still the ghost of metaphysical racism to face namely:

> … a basis for group difference not in genetic traits uniquely or shared by members of a group or as a function of distinctive cultural homogeneity-but in essential (i.e. extra-genetic and cultural) features of a group which, in one direction, are transmitted to individual group-members; and which in the other direction mark a place for the group in relation to other groups within a common ontological and hierarchical framework (Lang, 1997:24).

The metaphysical racism cannot be concealed by the black African scholar/ student's self-achievement, neither by the recognition (s) he might enjoy among his whites fellows among others. What (s)he represents as a racial sign seems more important than what he is or became as an individual. This recalls his relation with an Africa real or imagined which (s)he assumes or rejects. Hence arises the issue of the ethical identity of black African scholars. In this respect, trying to draw a parallel between gender and race, Appiah (1997:78) notes that:

> I am asserting here, therefore, a contrast between our attitudes to (ethical) gender and (ethical) "race". I suggest that we standardly hold it open to someone to believe that the replacement of the characteristic morphology of their sex with a (facsimile) of that of the other (major) one would produce someone other than themselves, a new ethical person, while the replacement of the characteristic morphology of their ethical "race" by another would not leave them free to disclaim the new person. "Racial" ethical identities are for us- and that

means something like us in the modern West- apparently less conceptually central than gender ethical identities.

To strengthen his viewpoint Appiah (1997) contrasts the agency enjoyed by Irish-American and African American in relation to their ethical identity. According to him while a shared culture appear determinant to the ethical identity of Irish-American, for African American it is the morphology. In effect people from Irish descendants adopted and raised outside the Irish American culture can be still considered as Irish American. But they to have the agency to choose if such a marker should be central to their ethical identities, and their taking it as central would evolve them in adopting certain cultural practices. Contrarily African Americans who respond in this way fall into two categories, depending on whether or not their visible morphology permit them to " pass", meaning to act in society without their African ancestries being noticed. In this regard Appiah (1997:79) adds that:

> If they cannot pass, they will often be thought of as inauthentic, as refusing to acknowledge something about themselves that they ought to acknowledge, though they will not be thought to be dishonest, since their morphology reveals the fact that is being denied. If they can, they will be thought of many as being not merely inauthentic but dishonest. And while they may have prudential reasons for concealing the fact of their (partial) African descent, this will be held by many to amount to inauthenticity, especially if they adopt cultural style associated with "white" people.

The metaphysical racism while attempting to devaluate the achievement of some black individuals asks the question

of responsibility of the black self, perhaps in a racist fashion but without altering its pertinence. It seems that the black African subject and agent is condemned to be seen especially by its counterpart whites through the lens of the fate of Africa (geographical location) in the earth. The black African no matter how great is his personal achievement remains a carrier of the symbolism of the physical space called "Africa". If sometime his/her personal achievement denies such a symbolism, the subject physically confirms it, with emphasis depending on the distance emotionally, morphologically, geographically, or intellectually separating him/her from what Africa is or ought to be. Furthermore a black African as a signifier is a carrier of Africa and he/her is carried through Africa (a sign) in IMMEMORIAM. His fate is not bounded to Africa's fate but its meaning heavily relies on the latter as an invalidation/ validation of their connection but also of the very determinism of the idea of fate. Therefore in the relationship between African subject and agent as a signifier and Africa as a sign lies the issue of responsibility of the black self toward Africa as a whole. The wholeness of Africa speaks to the black African self bluntly and interrupt the illusion of freedom which he/she want to convince himself that he/she possess when individually he/she have managed to escape the fate of its land and subvert the current meaning of its sign. The following account of the experience of Moses Isegewa (Ugandan writer) in Europe paint this moment of epiphany:

> When you first leave Uganda for Europe you think, "At last, I'm free to do what I want." But when you arrive there, you become an African for the first time, in a sense. Because you are responsible for Somalia! They call you up and say, "What do you think about Somalia?" And you

> can't say, "I'm Ugandan, I have nothing to say about Somalia. " You have this big, huge chunk of experience to defend- and you will defend it, because nobody else is defending it. You become sort of Ambassador and for the first time you become conscious of what Africa means (Isegewa quoted in Neisbitt, 2002:71)

Whereas the sense of responsibility varies from one subject/agent to another and it often shapes and reshaped by the subject's account of his own experience in bad faith, the significance of some aspects of the permanence of Africa's physical differences (black body, built and natural environment etc…) remain relatively stable. In this regard the work of Eric Kandel (2006) in neural biology suggests that we cannot only take an account of memory through what is said in the narratives of a subject alone because a state of mind is also a brain's state.Besides the very modification of the molecular composition at a genetic and synaptic levels of a biological being through his/her learning experience determine to some extents the way s/he is likely to remember and to react in a given situation (Kandel, 2001). Thus, a subject's memory maybe also the epitome of how biology impedes the acquisition of new knowledge or some particular forms of knowledge discriminated during a learning experience.

Chapter 4

Science and Knowing

4.1. Memory and Scientific Theory

Animals and humans have only two main mechanisms for adapting to their environment, the first one is biological evolution and the second one is learning (Kandel and Mack, 2003:273).In matters of learning, it is important to note that scientific reasoning differs from heuristics. Nonetheless in relation to the case of the revolution in geology, Solomon (1992:452) argues that whereas heuristics reasoning, brought about the division of cognitive labour which in turn contribute to scientific success, these very heuristics may also lead us inadequately, causing us to invest too much time in hopeless theories. But in a language which seems to deny their permanence, theories are usually presented in academia as a permanent snapshot of what the contingent world is or was. The genesis of that presentation in the mind assures the continuity of their relevancy throughout the existence of subjects both as a form of memory and script for social performances. An outdated theory no matter its irrelevancy is not excluded from the legacy of knowledges in academia and its capacity to create reality is not neutralized. Yet for Livingstone (2003:4) scientific theories do not spread uniformly from its point of discovery. According to him in the process of their circulation, they are modified and transformed. As a result, he notes that the meaning of scientific theories is not stable; rather it is mobile and varies from place to place. In this regard the objectives of this

chapter are twofold. Firstly I will highlight both the agency and the cognition of the built forms of the laboratory in section 4.2. Secondly I will investigate how scientific reasoning operates in its encounters of new knowledge and distinct ways of knowing from place to place in section 4.3.

4.2. Cognition of the Physical Space of the Lab

Nola (2010:266) argues that by virtue of being a descriptive activity rather than an explanatory, the ethnomethodology at the core of the social studies of science has led to: "a spate of studies, now subsiding, in which the activities of scientists, along with their notes recorded conversations, gossip, and the like, are viewed with the eye of an anthropologist visiting a strange tribe." While the representational and subjective aspect of ethnography has been often criticized, Rooke and Clark (2005:564) point out those interpretive practices are central to all sciences. According to them, ethnographic studies of science have amply demonstrated the interpretive practices taking place in the laboratories. Still Garforth (2011:3) notes that by paying attention only on what can be seen, most approaches on social studies of science miss to acknowledge the importance of solitary thinking work. In this regards, he notes that:

> …lab study genre has tended to rely on the rhetorical authority of witnessing and revelation, rather than exploring the discursively and materially situated gaze and "partial vision" (Haraway, 1991, 1997) of the ethnographer as part of the reflexive methodology. Lab studies have tended to treat being there as straightforward outcome of "penetration these black boxes," the scientific

> laboratories (Latour 1983, 141). But being there, as Geertz reminds us (1988), is a textual construction, not a simple matter of fact. Appeal to being there are no guarantee of seeing there, and indeed may gloss the interactional and epistemic dynamics of doing observation (Garforth, 2011:12)

Garforth's argument is insightful to the extent that one defines "being solitary" as being without companions or merely out of the reach of a physical space. In contrast I think that inside the physical space of the laboratory the scientist is never alone. Because as Hillier (2008:228) puts it the physical space (built environment) has social behaviours resting on laws which in turn are informed by particular social values. According to Him, by the means of these very laws, the physical space is not only impacting on human affairs when manipulated, but do retain a form of agency. It follows then that the physical space of the laboratory is a repository of social values which might filter in its own right the information we cognitively code or retrieve. In other words, "society is hiding behind the fetish of technique" as Latour (1994:53) argues. Though it is important to emphasize that the society hiding itself behind technological artefacts (ex:physical space of the laboratory) might not always correspond to the one co-existing with these very artefacts contingently. It seems to me that it is this way that the physical space (in this case the built environment) is likely to retain a form of agency. For instance, a building that has been designed for specific purposes and is restricted to some people during the apartheid regime in South Africa may now be accessed in post-1994s by "everyone" and perhaps be used differently. In this case if the purposes of the designer during

the apartheid regime do not meet entirely with the bulk of expectations of the users in post- 1994, what is left in the middle is the building itself as an hybrid entity where two forms of political ideologies meet, mix or part. Nevertheless the building is no longer conforming totally to any of them nor the actual users and practices. Consequently the building retains a form of agency through a dynamic of projection of the past in the present and retrospection of the present in the past dialectically entertain with users' cognition. But these forms of influence can remain unnoticed because cognitive influences are often intangible, even the use of questionnaire is unlikely to grasp it (Collins, 1974:167).

4.3. Circulation and Relevancy of Knowledge

All types of knowledge contain a certain amount of tacit rules which may be impossible to formulate in principle, but the irregular (localized, non-ubiquitous and context specific) is what makes tacit knowledge different from scientific knowledge (Collins, 1974:167). In effect Michael Polanyi's original conception of tacit knowledge is experiential and cognitive (Gertler, 1989:89). It is experiential in the sense that it is seen as an acquisition of "know how" through experience. It is cognitive because it is not easy to articulate consciously, and we may not be aware of it, or the way it influences our behaviour. Gertler (2003:95) stresses that Polanyi's conception of tacit knowledge, does not devote sufficient attention to the role of origins and social context. According to him, we need to consider more carefully how tacit knowledge and context is produced before we can say anything intelligent about the conditions under which tacit

knowledge can readily be shared. Edwards (2010:19) follows Gertler's insight when he states that:

> Get rid of the infrastructure and you are left with claim that you can't back up, fact you can't verify, comprehension that you can't share and data you can't trust. Without infrastructure knowledge can decay or even disappear. Build up a knowledge infrastructure, maintain it well, and you get stable, reliable, widely share understanding.

As a result tacit knowledge in places where there is no or weak infrastructures may end up being seen as mere claims. But it is generally held that tacit knowledge can only be shared by two or more people having in common the same social context, namely share values, language and culture (Gertler, 2003:78). Since a "claim" is devoid of proof, only some regime of "claims" can be seen as a manifestation of tacit knowledge among people living in a given locality because of being outside the reach of infrastructure, or other forms of societal influences (be they share values, culture, or language to name but a few) recognizable by those who hold the power to evaluate, validate and classify what is deem to be considered as knowledge. It follows then that even the most high-minded human agency has its roots in biology and the natural environment, yet as Eagleton (2000:5) puts forward: "[h]uman beings are not mere products of their environs, but neither are those environs sheer clay for their arbitrary self-fashioning. If culture transfigures nature, it is a project to which nature sets rigorous limits." Furthermore tacit knowledge being cognitive, the inherent heterogeneity of the natural environment could be seen as relatively stable base

from which it emerges from. Though seeing the natural environment as a heterogeneous source of knowledge is somehow acknowledging a pre-modern conception of the world and departing from a constructionist framework celebrating human beings as the only meaning maker (See Crist, 2004:9).

A reflection on an empirical study undertaken by Laet and Mol (2002) in Zimbabwe can restore to a certain degree the agency of the physical space be they the natural environment or the built environment. The study in question tries to understand what makes the Zimbabwe Bush Pump "B" type and appropriate technology. Laet and Mol (2002) stresses that the Bush Pump is a fluid object that keeps in each of its identities a variant of its environment. They note that it is a different thing when sitting on the premises of V&W Engineering, than it is when pouring water in say, Marondera. A reading of their entire article, suggests that the physical space (V&W Engineering or Marondera) which they are describing is not changing as much as their understanding of the physical space and the technological artefact has changed after following the very object of their inquiry in different sites. But the shift in their understanding parallel the way that the Bush Pump is changing from one site to another. Because as they note without room for methods and insights of the people who are supposed to use it (Bush Pump) or read their text (academic article on the bush pump "B" type) in the case of Laet and Mol, the implementation of the bush pump or of Laet and Mol's argument is bound to fail (See Laet and Mol, 2002:251). In the case of Laet and

Mol's text, the methods[33] and insights originate both from the sites where they have followed the Bush Pump (V&W Engineering and Marondera for example) but also from the site where it is supposed to be "implemented" (the field of STS among others for example). Similarly Laet and Mol's way of reasoning in the text, parallel the thinking of the scientist who engineers the pump. In this regards they report:

> Instead, he tries to learn from the way the pumps have evolved on-site, from the ways in which users have repaired and adapted their devices. Instead of striving to keep the pumps as they were, he is curious to see what they have become. So once a pump is out there, it is out there and it will have to do without any further unsolicited intervention (Laet and Mol, 2000:251).

In reading Laet and Mol's text the skills that enable the Bush Pump to change without alienating its "hydraulics principle" from one site to another are not transmitted to, not even clearly understood by a reader knowledgeable in hydraulics or not. But they are literally believed so that the act of making sense of Laet and Mol argument become possible. As for Laet and Mol or the scientist ("he" in the above quotation), anyone interested in getting those skills, will have to move from observing and describing to learning and practicing. In moving that way, that person is likely to fail to give an account in her own terms of the most basic

[33] This inference can be drawn as the sense of purpose in STS studies is supposed to be adapted as the project come into being (Hine, 2007:667).

information made by his/her informants[34] and may even fail to notice that the Zimbabwe Bush Pump "B" type is not losing its "hydraulics principle" when moving from one place to another rather it gains what each of this place has to offer in order for it to stay relevant and functional. Drawing from this example, it follows then that what Valentin Mudimbe (1988) sees as an epistemological ethnocentrism in scientific knowledge, may well reflect at least partly the functional dimension of knowledge in general which without any form of ownership or appropriation can't be relevant even when it is available. In this respect this epistemological ethnocentrism is also a form of self-preservation and celebration of a particular epistemic community[35] because it holds dear the belief that "there is nothing to be learned from "them" unless it is already "ours" or comes from "us" (See Mudimbe, 1988:15). Therefore the success of the Bush pump "B" type echoes the success of building strategies by reinforcing the

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[34] Laet and Mol are not importing consistently the terms of the local people responsible for the different variants of the pump in their text. Instead they use a terminology that derives from the methodical stances of STS. In this manner the distinction between physical science and social studies of science is done. Apparently what is lost, it is what is to be learned and practiced from each other, either social scientists or scientists. But deeper than that, this study shows us that if there is no possibility to give an account of a phenomenon by the people who experience it and in their own terms, the distinction of their insight and method will remain misrecognized. Similarly to the way that the science wars hide both the inherent value of science and social sciences, across societies, the ontological politics and relationship of domination embedded in them mask the worth of different forms of life.

[35] By epistemic community, I mean "a loosely constituted network of professionals that possess a shared set of values, a common way of seeing the world, and a common language for describing what they see (Allen and Imrie, 2010:7)".

fact they have to be based upon the ability to solve problems defined within the prevailing local worldview (Rabeneck, 2008:271)

Even so the Zimbabwe Bush Pump is not a unique example where we can find a relation between human cognition and the physical space. In effect they have been a great deal of studies investigating the cognitive maps[36] of rooms, buildings, college campuses, neighbourhoods, cities amongst others. While some of these environments have been chosen for specific reasons, it remains rare for researchers to justify the choice of the environment they have used (Kitchin and Blades, 2002:6). The means to make choice and the relevancy of what we know are important for the social construction of material reality and for its meanings. In this regard Davies et al (2004:361) suggest that: "researchers see meaningful actions in the world, analysing them both in their own terms and at the same time, as a result of their constitutive acts engaged in and made visible by researcher themselves." There are both some obvious, tacit and exclusive elements attached to the non-justification of the choice of the environment by researchers. These elements operate together when what constitute the choice of the environment is understood as tacit knowledge. Understood as tacit knowledge, the choice of the environment is obvious for those among whom it is shared, remain tacit because it is a function of this very physical environment and exclusive because of the neglect of its specific features both by those who are part of it and those who are not. Beyhan and

[36] Cognitive map is a term which refers to an individual's knowledge of spatial and environmental relations, and the cognitive processes associated with the encoding and retrieval of the information from which it is composed (Kitchin and Blades, 2002:1)."

Cetindamar (2010:112) provide an interesting illustration of the conflation of cognitive processes and the physical environment in the field of technology-innovation and management (TIM) worthy to be quoted at length:

> The contribution of developing countries to the international TIM literature has been growing substantially in the last decade (2).Our analysis shows that in 2007 nearly one fourth of the articles published in the ten specialized journals in TIM under study are written with the contribution of at least one author affiliated to developing country institutions. Although (1) and (2) provide evidence that the TIM literature generated in developing countries differs from its counterparts generated in developed countries in terms of themes and concepts that are focus on, these studies do not present a detailed analysis of knowledge sources and intellectual pillars that developing countries studies are based on…One likely avenue for future research is the investigation of the observed convergence of theories. Our study show that's that developing country researchers utilize theories created in developed countries to understand even issues specific to developing countries, however our study does not pass any judgment on reasons/mechanisms behind it.

Considering that what is considered as scientific knowledge is not equally distributed or available worldwide -some countries and individuals have the capacity to produce, consume or purchase it more than others-, Beyhan and Centidamar's observation reflect to some extent an "intellectual globalization". Krishnan (2006:197) understands

"intellectual globalization", as the production of new sources of data, information and knowledge in different geographical and national context in the world to enhance the organizational mechanisms of multinational and global corporation. According to her this "intellectual globalization" can take the forms of creation of regional centre of excellence in different national context in the world; fostering political and economic relationships with national governments, educational, legal, and other relevant institutions so that this process of creating regional centres of excellence be maintained; and putting the emphasis on the need for creating the kind of organizational knowledge that can be transferred from these regional centres of excellence to the various subsidiaries and networks of the global organization or other important partners. Hence Maton (2003:62) insists that actors within the intellectual field are not solely interested in status and resources but aims at acquiring also epistemic benefits namely a better knowledge of the world. Nevertheless for Berg (2004:554), ideas and the place in which they are produced are not solely dependent of their intellectual value. Instead they are inserted into space of academics production that shape with scale politics. These scale politics define how ideas circulates within the academy and, and in specifically how some ideas come to be seen as having international import while other simply provide a better understanding of local space. According to this scholar (Berg) the implication of academic knowledge production in the hierarchical scaling of places has resulted in the adoption to particular set of strategies by critical geographers namely to publish in the "right" journals, getting noticed, being cited, obtaining research grants, going to conferences etc.

Scale is central to the political discourse both lay and academic, it points out the various ways in which the diverse sciences of politics (i.e. political sociology, political economy, political geography and political science) organize the subject matter of politics according to various spatial qualifiers such as, local, regional, national etc. (Cox, 1997:1). The use of the concept "scale" puts the emphasis on at least three interacting facets constituting it – size, level and relation – (Howitt, 2002:305). Scale as size is really important for geographers as it helps for the choice of appropriate map scale for specific forms of analysis and presentation and to transfer conclusions drawn from and analysis at one geographical scale to another. The idea of scale as level is often conflated with scale as size. Therefore understanding scale as level means that one alludes to wider scales encompassing greater amount of complexity (division of labour, administrative reach, cultural diversity).The literature on scale as relation suggests that scale boundaries are better represented as interfaces in through which larger scale entities (global or national) and smaller scale entities contain each other. In relation to that, as a response to the question what sort of thing scale is? Howitt (2002:306) says: "It is an abstraction, and as Ollman (1993) observes, like any abstraction it will demonstrate elements of "extension", "level of generality" and "vantage point". It reflects facets of space, time, culture and environment". Terkenli (2005:166-167) insists on a close relationship between scale and landscape which is revealed in the definition of scale itself which he considers to be a: "a metric of spatial differentiation", which "arbitrates and organizes the kinds of spatial differentiation that frame the landscape". He adds that ontologically and epistemologically, the theoretical and geographical construct of landscape are

scale dependent. But scale is not a tangible entity like a landscape; as such it enjoys an elasticity which is more a function of the multiplicity, fixity, and diversity of the physical components of the earth than the other way around. What Terkenli (2005) sees as scale dependent is a fraction of the dialectical relationship between human cognition and the natural environment. It is in this manner that some theories of cognitive mapping conflate cognitive processes with the environment itself by insisting on landmark knowledge, in doing so they elude the fact that landmark knowledge may differ from place to place (Kitchin and Blades, 2002:6). Nevertheless Jorland (2000:131) reports that "a working scientist does not quit a theory except for another one, otherwise he could no longer think at all". But the trenches of knowledge upon which some of these theories are based are neither uniform nor similarly acclaimed. Seen from this perspective, it is important to recall that knowledge has the capacity to recreate the reality it claims to reject because knowing is also ignoring purposely some aspects of what we know and choosing among what we know the more accurate insight for the reality we want to interpret or (re)create.

Ryles identifies two bodies of knowledge (Rooke and Seymour, 2002:304). The first one is practical and refers to skill and the ability to perform an activity. The second is "an objectified form of knowledge", a knowledge about something such as the one mastered by academics and professionals. According to Rooke and Seymour (2002:310), the distinction between interpretations of a phenomenon which originates from " knowing how " and "knowing that" are based on the different ways of learning and of validating one's knowledge through a cultural filter. Besides, as those authors notes all human being possess these two bodies of

knowledge but their knowledge of a distinct domain of interest may be biased toward one type or the other. For example the process leading to the writing of a scientific text is tuned and biased towards "knowing how". This process is a part and parcel of the author's experience, as such it is not a passive and neutral activity but an exercise which leaves in the mind of a subject resilient meta-structures influencing his analytical capabilities beyond the timeframe ascribed to it. The theoretical markers resulting from that activity are exposed to a critique because of their visibility (writing or spoken); whilst the biological and mental supports upon which they repose are exempt of any substantial examination and seem often superfluous either because of their intangibility or of the intimacy surrounding the banality of their continual presence. As a result in the case of black African researchers, the resilient use of theories created in the developed world even to understand specific issues related to their environment cannot be justified by their incapacity to create their own theories but by a lack of /failure to create and maintain reliable infrastructure in their own locale based upon the collective experiences of their communities in the earth, physical and non-physical. For example Nyamnjoh (2004:4) notes that African scholars are involved in similar practices while trying to fulfil the academic requirement of publishing. They face the dilemma of sacrificing recognition for relevance or relevance for recognition as the political economy of the publishing industry prevent them to achieve both of these values at the same times. Conversely Simonsen (2004:525) put forward that we cannot however, only blame, the power of the English language or the political economy of international publishing for this situation. According to her views this scalar politics finds also its roots in "a discursive

field of power relations in which theoretical truisms based on Anglo-American interpretations and "right" ways of being "critical" more or less consciously enclose the writing spaces."

However in principle the normal state of affairs in science is unsettled and uncertain, and no amount of research will completely eliminate uncertainty (Pollack, 2003:16). So what should constitute a "scientific method" is still an open question in many cases both in social sciences and physical science. However different forms of empowerment are implicit in research methodologies, with some carrying a greater potential than others (Rappert, 1999:716). But for some scientists a universal account on scientific method should be used or help to improve science, others retain a relative view about it. In an attempt to find a middle ground between what he calls sceptical relativism and universal method, Chamers (1990:7) opines that the aim of physical science is to find general laws and theories to the world through the most demanding way possible when considering existing techniques. In contrast Woolgar (1988:22) notes that there is no way we can find these general laws and theories out there. According to him science is not universal at all but the outcome of complex social processes whereby the variations in the form of legitimacy of scientific knowledge claims are gradually eliminated. Also John Law argues that in social science method are constitutive of, rather than a reflection of social reality and any attempt to impose a methodological stance on it, is doing injustice to some features of the situation that one want to investigate (Hine, 2007:662). He adds that "methods that imagine the world to be relatively neat and tidy and try to enact it in that way are missing the point" (Law, 2008:641). For Latour (2000:120)

the goal of social science is not to copy physical sciences by inventing infrastructures, but to modify the representation the public has of itself.

While the main function of scientific theories in natural sciences is explanation and prediction, scientific methods are never truly devoid of theoretical assumptions (Snow et al 2003:183; Koskela, 2008:37). Robert Cox (1995:31) notes that there is no theory in itself, no theory independent of concrete historical context. According to Cox, theory is the way the mind works to understand the reality it confronts. It is the self-consciousness of that mind, the awareness of how facts experienced are perceived and organized so as to be understood. Theory thus follows reality in the sense that it is shaped by the "objective world". But it also precedes the making of reality in that it directs the minds of those who by their actions reproduce or change that reality. But what is constitutive of that reality is physical and non-physical, stationary and dynamic.

Chapter 5

Human and Environmental Cognition

5.1. Thinking Globally, Thinking Through Numbers

To think globally refers to seeing the world as a knowable entity, namely a single interconnected whole that lacks in a sense a secure stasis of maps, parlour globes, or pre-Darwinian cosmologies (Edward, 2010b:2-3). For Schneider (2009:3) global changes (e.g. growing number of people using technology or increase in the per capital level of consumption) may have a significant impact on the "human and natural systems". In this regard the industrialization of Europe is often cited as a point of reference to evaluate human component on the atmosphere or as part of justification of right of non-Western countries (Brazil, China and India for instance) to follow a similar path (Bohme et al, 2012:3). Still during the 20th century, the advent of modernity in Europe was seen in material terms as a form of knowledge and capacity to transform nature for the sake of progress (Hobsbauwm, 1987:26). According to Hobsbauwm "progress was measured by the ever rising curve of whatever could be measured, or what men choose to measure." Besides the 1900s century was characterized by a transition from ontological to symbolical interpretations of mathematical entities. This transition entailed the creation of new units of analysis, while the real computation was still done in terms of numbers (Feldhay, 2000:55). The power of abstraction gained from it (transition) while found in non-numerical ordered societies in forms of games or music, remained largely

associated with an unequal distribution of the general use of writing and formal schooling by-product of the "mass education" of 1900s and European domination of the rest of the world (Crump, 1990:4-8;Hosbauwm, 1987:22).

The ontological interpretation of mathematics can be illustrated in the difference between the climate and the weather. The climate is often defined as "the statistics of the weather average over a time period that contains many weather events, usually at least a month's" (Stern and Easterling, 1999:18). Conversely the weather means "the condition of the atmosphere at a certain place and time, with reference to the presence or absence of sunshine, rain, wind etc." (Oxford, 2002:1193) As a result the climate depends on techniques able to measure the weather in terms of numbers. But from a statistical point of view the fluctuation of the weather might be regarded to be nothing more than high frequency noise interfering with a more meaningful climate signal (Hack, 2009:284).

The prediction of the climate rely more on the symbolical interpretation of mathematics (e.g. algorithm). In this regard Trenberth (2009:XVII) see climate models (GCMs) as the only quantitative tool for predicting future climate and for Kielhl (2006:1) the global earth-system model is the most comprehensive tool to understand the earth system. In effect climate models are based on mathematical representations which attempt to reproduce the behaviour of the earth system yet simultaneously accounting for the most important external and internal forcing factors (Kielhl, 2006:2). But climate models present some limitations as Demeritt (2001:318) contends:

> Unlike the stochastic tradition of numerical modelling common in economics, engineering, and other disciplines, GCMs are mathematically deterministic. That is, they calculate a given set of initial conditions. As a result, the probability of any particular system state outcome must be estimated from its frequency within a population of GCM runs from slightly different initial conditions. These ensemble of techniques are in the infancy within the GCM community.

Even so mathematical rigor are advantageous because they participate in the formation and preservation of scientific communities concerned with phenomena that are not already well controlled in the laboratory or observatory or with understanding that are not consensual (Porter,1995:227). It is important to note here that it is not the science of mathematics itself which is deterministic at least as far as we understand science as "an imaginary unity masking the disparate kinds of activity that trade under the label." (Livingstone, 2003:15). Broadly speaking mathematics essentially consists of open ended skills, conveying continuously new information after mastery (Crump, 1990:24-28). Crump adds that although the cognitive capabilities in numeracy are shared by every human being, their development depends on the socio-cultural and environmental context. As such climate modellers being still a small community predominantly located in western countries and the use of GCM by researchers being often the result of a pragmatic decision based upon the country where researchers are based, can be seen as an interesting example (Crosby et al 2011:1). This example suggests also that the development of climate modelling goes hand in hand with the availability of

computational power (See McGuffie and Sellers, 2000:1078). Therefore while the computational power seems to be context-dependent, the impersonal, objective methods of quantification and mathematics rigor among others factors, grants some universal features to what is accepted as scientific knowledge (Porter, 1995:219). In this manner the symbiotic relationship between data and models combined with high dependency on scarce skills in modelling and computation resource concentrated in dozen institutions or on few stations spread around the world, gives to climate modelling a distinguishable character in relation to what counts as scientific knowledge, and the significance of the physical space[37] (built and natural environment) upon which the data processing and knowledge production depend (Edwards, 1999:461; Katzfev et al, 2009:3943).

Brown (2009:220:228) notes that if human beings were pure minds living in a nonphysical world with no discrete objects, it would be probably impossible to discover or invent any mathematics. For him the sociology of scientific knowledge failed to account for the universality of mathematics by not being able to provide a system or a body

[37] So it is important to take note that the infrastructures and human resource designed to model the African climate are very limited within Africa. The Climate System Analysis Group at the University of Cape Town is the only "African" institution based in Africa that is generating empirical downscaled climate through multiples models, but applications and further analysis originating from this data remain limited (Ziergovel et, 2008:2). Moreover the existing institutions generating African climate model are part and parcel of what Edwards (2006:230) call "infrastructural globalism" namely "a phenomenon by which "the world" is produced and maintained", this is similar to "intellectual globalization". As a result the experiences of black African researchers in that context may well be similar to the experiences of black African students in IR classroom.

of theorems in the discipline that we now regard as totally false. Brown's viewpoint in relation to the making of mathematical knowledge is reinforced by Feldhay (2000:53) through his analysis the *Dissertatio Physico-mathematica de motu terrae of* Paulus Guldin, in which he argues that Guldin's techniques contain a conceptual framework that implies new options for interpreting mathematical entities and their relation to physical reality. The relation between the physical world and mathematics reflect the assumption that there is an isomorphism between the two (Crump, 1990:8). This isomorphism does not confer to mathematics a form of universality regarded as uniformity of processes of discovery and invention but as similarities in resulting conclusions. What account from these similarities is what is common in the natural environment, what it has as different (both in terms of content and properties) dependent heavily on infrastructure and differentiated processes of invention and discovery. The relationship between classical mathematics and intuitionism epitomized the above inference.

In fact the goal of intuitionism has been so far to rebuild mathematics from the ground up while avoiding what is considered as illegitimate method and assumptions. It only rejects classical theorems if they cannot be proven in its own framework. What can be proven in an intuitionist framework, can also be proven in more orthodox mathematics, but the reverse is not true. Nelson (2012:18) notes that intuitionism is an extension of classical mathematics, meaning that to explain it in terms of logical constants it is not viable. Consequently intuitionists negate the fact that the physical environment is endowed with a form of cognition and just like constructionists they give a priority to human mind as the only meaning maker (Snapper, 1979:210-211). The narrow

explanatory power of intuitionism denotes a crisis of trust in the field of mathematics, and suggests that mathematics itself is not deterministic but the priority which is given to certain technique over another is likely to be. Nevertheless intuitionism is particularly appreciated in the design of algorithm and computer programs which in a sense justifies the deterministic and discriminative character of climate modelling as a way of knowing the weather. Consequently the deterministic and discriminative aspects of climate modelling overlook the relationship existing between the physical space and human cognition as it is apparent in the processes of creation of model narrated by Hume (2008:7) reported:

> Weather is first captured locally and quantified, then transported and aggregated into regional and global indicators. These indicators are abstracted and simulated in models before being delivered back to their starting places (locales) in new predictive and sterilised forms. 'Digitised' weather for virtual places can even be conjured from these models using stochastic weather generators. Through this circuitry, weather-and its collective noun climate-becomes detached from its original human and cultural setting.

Nevertheless the changes in these processes whereby the weather become climate are not what the group of words "climate change" try to highlight, rather they are part of its conceptualization.

5.2. The Glocality of Climate Change

Climate modelling homogenizes the differential experiences of the weather across the earth in the name of climate. The climate changes locally and its causes -if there are any attached to human activities -remain local while able to affect distinctively multiple localities. Yet what is considered or intend to be considered as solutions for climate change are more informed by local priorities rather than global or more precisely universal concerns. I think that this situation is enabled through the device of glocality. I define the glocality of climate change as a cognitive form of ubiquity deriving from an attempt to compress the spatiotemporal dimension[38] of the changing weather within the time and space of the human mind. This form of ubiquity erects an apparent unity through a focus on a dual object both conceptual (climate change) and material (earth) and overshadows the significance of its differential manifestations by insisting rhetorically on some of its material aspects (for instance rising sea, desert encroachment, floods etc…); and by trivialising the fact that although depicting some common patterns of the earth, climate change (the concept and its relation to the earth) remains before all a local problem with distinctive physical and conceptual features. Concretely the

[38] By spatiotemporal dimension, I mean the differential ways in which the climate change is caused and manifested across the globe and across periods of time. For example it can be accepted that the CO2 emitted during the industrial revolution or the on-going industrial pollution in France is responsible of the coldest winter in that country's history which happened in 2008 but also of the acceleration of the rising sea in some pacific islands in the years to come. In the same vein the current deforestation of the Equatorial forest in the central Africa can be seen as another cause of the situation in France and Pacific islands.

illusion created by that projection of the mind is sustained partly by the physical presence of human beings in the earth and the different political arrangements and conceptual constructions trying to stabilise and homogenize it, for example the objects of the "provisions[39] linking developed-world distributive transfer with developing-world substantive environmental commitments while recognizing Southern development imperatives" (Drumbl, 2002:854). So the glocality is central to what Hulme (2008:12) labelled "geopolitical engineering" namely a process assembling together insight from political scientists and economist to yield a system of "Earth system of governance". For example the alignment of UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Tokyo protocol, the Stern Review and the new round for negotiations and diplomacy seeking a new post-2012 global settlement underpins a rational alliance of interests which can deliver a global climate regime. As a result the glocality erases the possibility that some differences in the natural environment maybe as well differences in forms of cognition that each of these physical component of the earth may nurture. In so doing the glocality of climate change present three problems. Firstly the problems of climate change's phenomena, secondly the problem of the ontologies of climate change's phenomena and finally the problem of the logics of climate change's phenomena.

[39] These provisions are, 4(7) of the article of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Amended Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the ozone layer and Convention on Biological diversity.

5.2.1. The Problem of Climate Change Phenomena

The enunciation of the phrase "climate change" recalls an imagery broader than the semiotic scope of the word "weather". According to the Oxford dictionary the weather is defined as "the condition of the atmosphere at a certain place and time, with reference to the presence or absence of sunshine, rain, wind etc. "In contrast climate refers to "the regular weather conditions of an area or an area with certain weather condition". Climate suggests a set of regular features of the atmosphere in a specific area while the weather is characterised by the contingency of the features of the atmosphere in a particular place. Therefore "climate change[40]" is not the equivalent of "weather change"- in fact the weather always changes and it is exempt from any regularity in its manifestations. The idea of regularity of the climate originated from a synchronic snapshot of the repeating sequences of a diachronically changing weather captured by the human mind. But the climate does not change in the same way from one area to another and it is only from the locality that we can grasp accurately the significance of the changing weather primarily through the human body. As such the gap between climate change and the changing weather is not only the fact of the literal distinction between "climate" and "weather" but also of an extent to which different modes of knowing can acknowledge the same phenomenon and provide explanations.

Climate change articulates its own grammar across the logics of the fields which speak of itself. It evokes many

[40] From this view point, climate change refers to a change of climate that is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and that is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.

things which find a principal connection in its literal meaning. Defining it would be authoritatively and instrumentally choosing among its meanings, the one suitable for the purpose of the present analysis. To avoid this temptation, I prefer to acknowledge instead the particular genealogy of climate change in regard to its corollaries global warming and greenhouse effect[41]. As a result climate change can be dated back to the work of the French scientist Jean Baptiste Joseph Fourier in the early part of the nineteenth century and later of John Tyndall, a scientist working at the Royal Institute in London. The works of those scientists have established a causal relation between human industry and climate change through the greenhouse effect (Giddens, 2009:17-19). In other words the greenhouse effect explicit the "scientific" foundations of the anthropogenic cause of climate change. From having been more or less ignored by policymakers between 1970s and 1980s regardless of the worrying evidence provided by the research community, climate change became considered as a serious matter thanks to the sophistication of climate modelling by the 1990s (Brown et al, 2007:141). However it is important to notice that while this "scientific" explanation seems new, the impact of human beings on the climate has been acknowledged but explained differently elsewhere (non-western settings) . In Cameroon for instance in relation to "natural" disasters and witchcraft, Geschiere (1995:22) notes that:

[41] Nhamo (2009:118) notes that the climate of the world is not static and their change are expected and natural. Energy from the sun drives the global climate system. Gases in the earth's atmosphere, which trap this energy and consequently warn the earth, are called greenhouse gages (GHGs) and the process is known as the greenhouse effect.

> By definition, witchcraft is practiced in secret; it is therefore often very difficult to know who did what. Yet it is also a basic tenor to these discourses that they explain each and any event by referring to human agency. Thus, they tend to personalize the universe: all sorts of events, especially those that Westerners call "natural" disasters or chance, are seen as direct consequences of human acts- either individual initiatives or, more often, collective conspiracies fomented by shadow gangs.

It seems to me that the significance of the human induced-climate change is less about the validity of the explanations provided to understand the human impact on the weather but about its cogency in relation to its practical implications in everyday life. In comparative studies inquiring into the public opinion on global warming in 48 countries (including among others, South Africa, Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda and Zambia), Kvaloy and Listhaug (2010:16-17) find that climate change is a political issue of potential importance across the globe. However they note that the perception of the problem is positively correlated with high education, post-materialism, and left-right self-identification (with strong concerns on the far left). Besides Giddens (2009:27) recapitulates three main positions linking the various views of the earth and the impact of human on it. First, according to him the sceptics are those who think that the earth is robust and the human impact upon it is deemed to be negligible. Second those closer to the mainstream, for whom the earth-at least the ecosystems- is fragile and has to be protected from the damaging intrusion we are making into it. Finally they are those who see the earth like "wild beast, ready and able to

react violently and precipitously once it is sufficiently roused" (Giddens, 2009:27). In this regard climate change differs from a mere explanation about the way human beings impact on the earth not by being immune of the negatives consequences of the fantasy of "non-scientific" explanation but by being tied to the strategies of mitigation (i.e. how to get society to implement alternative approaches to economic growth that are less carbon intensive) and adaptation (i.e., solutions to help society to cope with the impacts of climate change). Consequently the various degrees of cogency which enjoy any explanation about the human impact on the weather reflect the features of the site (s) of cultural production of the physical space where their implications can be traced. Moreover, in order to find a solution to the indifference originating from the relativity of the cogency of the various explanations of the human impact on the weather (in this case the scientific one), Anthony Giddens suggests that the politics climate change has to cope with what he calls "Giddens' paradox" meaning:

> Since the dangers posed by global warming aren't tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before being stirred to serious action will, by definition be too late.

Giddens's paradox is a paradox of a particular locality (an imagined geography of the West) inhabited by a particular group of creatures, having escaped temporally the incertitude of the nature through technology and lost the functionality of their bodies (embodied knowledge). Those creatures can

understand the language of climate change but cannot experience the change in the climate yet; therefore they postpone the possibility to act accordingly until their body sensory systems (sight) witness that very change underground. In Giddens's paradox the intelligibility of the body is overshadowed by the predictive power of the mind. As such it is the outcome of a particular history of rationality. In this respect Semali and Kincheloe (1999:30) note:

> Rationality emerged as the conceptual base around which civilization and savagery could be delineated (Giroux, 1992; Alcoff, 1995; Keating, 1995). This rationalistic modernist whiteness is shaped and confirmed by its close association with science. As a scientific construct, whiteness privileges mind over body, intellectual over experiential ways of knowing, mental abstraction over passion, bodily sensations, and tactile understanding.

Apparently the creatures described in Giddens' paradox are not human beings as human being think and feel with their entire body, certainly not only with the heart and mind (Trinh, 1989). In case they were and even if I admit the possibility that technology acts as a wall distorting the communication between them and the earth via their body sensory systems; there is still no significant evidence why they do not take the risks of global warming seriously- especially if the assumption behind Giddens's paradox is that they (the majority of them at least) do understand the language of science (rationality) and trust its outcome. As such Giddens falls in the trap of intellectualism which treats perception as a matter of judgement (See Cerbone, 2006:120). It follows then that the scientific argument driving climate change just like

the "non-scientific" explanations of the human impact on the earth enjoy a relative degree of cogency. The predictive power of science obviously enjoys more regularity than witchcraft's predictions, but science is neither immune of risks and limitations. Schimank (1992:219) distinguishes two kinds of conditions leading to the production of societal risks of science-based technologies namely the general systemic dynamic of scientific risk production and the specific institutional conditions. Along the lines of the first conditions Shimank adds that:

> Scientific truths are, at least in the natural and engineering sciences, almost always produced under a laboratory conditions which constitutes extreme simplifications of the conditions under which these truths are implemented in technologies (Bohme and van den Daele, 1977:188). This simplification is necessary to detect isolated causal relationships which would otherwise be hidden within the dense texture of "real-life" causalities. The "tight coupling" of the world has to be substituted by the "loose coupling" of the experiment. Thus scientific truths are strictly speaking, very artificial propositions which can only cover the reality outside the laboratory inaccurately.

In this respect "knowledge, or more accurately, knowledges (in the plural, to indicate the disappearance of a unified mental world) are both a personal and social force and resources containing unprecedented social and political consequences (McCarthy, 1996:19)".

In the fourth report (2007) of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC says that "warming of the climate system is equivocal" while the rest of the report is

couched in terms in probabilities (Giddens, 2009:21). Those probabilities go hand in hand with the inaccuracy of the scientific answers on climate change (Revilla et al, 2010:5). Sandvik has noted that the research agenda on climate change is a twofold project; on one side it plans to provide the scientific foundation of climate change, and on the other side it presupposes the integration of purely scientific argument with factors that influence attitude formation and decision making (Kvaloy and Listhaug, 2010:4). The strength of the argument driving climate change has as main pillar not its shaky scientific character but the authority of the IPCC which recognized its validity by moving from a focus on decreasing uncertainties in climate models to informing decisions that are increasingly based on what we know as basic science (Revilla et al, 2010:1-2) - this is not to say that there is not an inner scientific foundation of climate change but that that scientific foundation is still fragile as much as numerical climate modelling is a relatively young academic discipline (See McGuffie and Sellers, 2001).

The scientification of the global character of climate change through political recognition, blurs the lines between the outcomes of climate change *per se* and the inherent dynamic of the weather. The causes of climate change are local, the effects are global but the scientific measurements (or experiential ways of knowing) of those effects remain mostly local. For instance Russo and Zack (1997:27) reports that they are only about 7000 surface stations and 800 rawinsonde stations worldwide belonging to international networks. According to these scholars these stations are extremely sparse and mostly biases toward northern hemisphere. As a result the scientific knowledge on climate change is not carried out in an impartial manner. In fact there

is a tendency in the literature which misrepresents certain geographical locations, especially the Global South where the majority on people on earth lives (O'keefe, 2009:259). For example Africa is portrayed as the region which will suffer the most from climate change, despite the fact that African countries are both absolutely and per capita terms an insignificant source of emissions of CO2 globally while the developed countries remain the major emitters (Carius, 2009). That depiction of Africa as the victim or as merely incapable to deal with the effects of climate change is not scientifically valid. Few scientific researches delineating the effects of climate change from the inherent dynamic of weather has been conducted on the continent and few are likely to be conducted because of the financial constraints of African countries, high cost of climate change modelling, lack of maintenance and destruction of infrastructures due to violent conflicts (Giorgi et al, 2010:2; Stern and Easterling, 1999:20). However portraying Africa as a "victim" (or more accurately "incapable") can originate from a teleological reading of both climate change's potential physical impact and Africa's current technological (in) capacity to adapt to the effects of global warming. Therefore it is likely that this type of understanding of Africa does not escape the western foundations of the discourses about Africa studied by Mudimbe and paraphrases by Mbembe (2002:257) in the following words:

> From this point of view, Africa as such exists only on the basis of the text that constructs it as the Other's fiction. This text is then accorded a structuring power, to the point that a self that claims to speak with its own authentic voice always run the risk of being condemned

to expressed itself in a pre-established discourse that mask its own, censures it, or forces it to imitate.

For example if I totalise my experience of climate change through what my mind has understood during the reading-phase of this process of academic writing, I am not only distorting the entirety of "my climate change's experience" by negating the physicality of my being and the manifestation of the changing weather. But I am also favouring a particular mode of cognition encompassing its distinct "knowing how" and "knowing that" over another uncritically-in this case the analytical power of the mind over the intelligibility of the body for example. Besides while it is clear that the conventions of personality are rhetorically constrained in academic writing, I am cognisant that in adopting the practices and discourses of a community one tend at the same time to adopt its perspectives and interpretations, seeing the world in the same ways and taking on identity as a member of that community (Hyland, 2002:1092). However for Barnett (2003:103) there is no empirical entity that we can point to that resembles "an academic community", he notes that individual academics secures their identity in quite different kind of community and multiple communities. But the term "academic community" is rooted in social reality and has a material origin, hence Mann (2008:60) puts forward that:

> They are real social structures that differentiate between individual human beings, privileging some over others. And they are real norms, conventions, taken for granted assumptions and discourses that exist prior to any one individual and which govern what are appropriate and valid social and academic practices. To participate one has

to enter into this prior order and one access to it is differentially structured.

As a result the norms informing academic writing are not emerging from an imagined "academic community" abstracted from the material effect of social and physical structures. Smith (2005:17) notes that some of those norms such as requirement of truthfulness, consistency, and simplicity in science are embedded in a particular form of life. But as he adds, these norms are not validated or even clear by any scientific knowledge. Therefore it seems to me that the accessibility and acknowledgement of this type of norms depend on a considerable amount of freedom of mind which is practically remote from the bulk of black African post-colonial subjects and citizens living and researching whether in a post-colonial society or elsewhere given the unequal relationship of power enmeshed within the existing local, global, physical, political and socio-economic structures (See Nyamnjoh 2011; Sithole:2009). For instance in many universities in the UK, Lillis (2001:53) reports that there is an institutional "practice of mystery" ideologically inscribed in that it works against those least familiar with the conventions surrounding academic writing, limiting their participation in higher education as currently configured[42]. Therefore while

[42] The same line of argument can be applied in South Africa if the "elusive equity of doctoral education in South Africa" is interrogated (See, Herman, 2011). In addition, Lillis (2001:76) would stop any temptation to believe that a mere writing centre at university would correct this imbalance by reinforcing that the current skills approaches to communication in type of centre is inadequate to enable student-writers learning of academic norms. According to her, this inadequacy is due to the absence of the material condition that have put learning as implicit

academic writing are constitutive of what it means to be an academic, it contradicts with the very aim of scholarship by erecting some norms enshrined in its foundational ontology[43] out of the reach of any given critique that may not recognize it as universal. In this regard the "universality" implied by the term university is problematic because it is not a reflexion of the different forms of life that university contains and takes for granted the fact that its reason is susceptible of a single description (Barnett, 2003:13).

Furthermore, I am aware that the style of writing which is required to communicate argument about climate change constraints the depth of understanding of this phenomenon by limiting its scope to what the existing configurations of the discursive field in the academy can accommodate, translate or mimic without the risk of a significant transformation. Consequently these processes of translations and mimicry instead of making the "universality" of university more concrete, seems to homogenize the realities on the ground, render them more complex analytically by degrading the simplicity bounding the worth and language of alternative forms of life in earth. As a result by faking "universality", it is not only the presence of those different forms of life which is at risk but these very norms as well. This is because they can be insidiously converted into self-righteousness and soft

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induction, an inscription of the traditional elitist higher education system in the UK.

[43] The following article, Blaser, M. 2009. "Political Ontology: Cultural Studies without "Culture"? in *Cultural Studies*, 23(5-6):873-896, gives a point of departure to think about a foundational ontology configuring the discursive field in the academy. In this paper Blaser stresses how the Euro-modern ontology erect itself above other ontologies mostly belonging to post-colonial societies by reducing them to a notion of culture with a "c" through the device of its own cultural trope with "C".

instrument of domination. Though a significant amount of clarity, simplicity and truth can truly exist only where there is freedom of mind. For instance universities (including their physical spaces) are rendered homogeneous or ascribed a "fluid continuity[44]"characteristic when solely understood as a field constituted from the text. In this manner, the norms of academic writing operate like the "hydraulic principles" of Bush Pump "B" type, they make it work and they are seemingly flexible enough to set apart one text from another while keeping their shape intact. In the same fashion that the Bush Pump needs the people's methods and insights to be implemented from one area to another, different authors are brought into conversation in academic writing to construct distinct arguments from one academic text to another. Whether the argument is valid or not, whether the bush pump works or not, it is both a combination objectivity and subjectivity (See Latour, 1994:64). But these types of judgment about validity are more often mirroring local expectations of specific communities rather than the universality that any of their claims may content. It follows then that when looking only at an academic text, the physical space where scientific activities mainly occur is abstracted, its alterity is removed or/and conflated with the cognitive processes of the author. By this I mean that the text itself functions as an embodiment of knowledge as discourses but cannot subsume entirely materialized ideas such as building, paper, or computer and to some extent some human subjects

[44] That means that university could be seen in this regard as fluid object which while changing its shape, still retains the dominant features which have been the causes of its very name. In this manner the mutability of university recall Wittgenstein's notion of family relations (See Law, 2003b:8).

to name but a few (See Henry and Pinch, 2000:203). Although these materialized ideas are essential for the epistemic authority of any university, the cognitive function of the physical space supposed to contain them is not consistently considered as a factor among others capable to impact on the scientific production of knowledge. No reason can justify it because the physical space of any university is local and certainly not universal. As a result, giving a complete account of universities from the text only reveals yet simultaneously hides the economic and socio-political imbalances among individual academics and geographical locations and tends to reproduce them. Those imbalances are reversely manifested by the physical space of each university and can be visible or invisible depending on the way absence or presence is enacted, I mean by filling or normalizing the absence of others by the very presence of some. The field of STS itself epitomizes this situation, in this regard Martin et al (2012:1192) acknowledge that:

> From 1960 onwards, this STS community grew in size and geographical coverage and developed into a number of distinct specialized groups; for example, at Columbia (under Robert Merton), Yale (Derek de Solla Price), UC Berkeley (where Kuhn worked from 1961 to 1964), Cornell (where the Science, Technology and Society Program was set up in 1969 under the directorship of Frank Long), Edinburg (where the Science Studies Unit was set up in 1966 by David Edge), York (Michael Mulkay), Bath (Harry Collins), Bielefeld (Peter Weingart), Paris (Bruno Latour and Michel Callon at CSI, Ecole des Mines), Amsterdam (Stuart Blume, head of the Science Dynamics group set up in 1982) and Leiden (Antony van

Raan, founding Director of CWTS, the quantitative science studies group set up in the early 1980s).

5.2.2. The Problem of Ontologies of Climate Change Phenomena

Nel (2010:971) stresses that the struggles against invisibility of the specificities of Third World attributes is still relevant nowadays in a variety of contexts in the process of global governance, from issues in Doha up until the UNFCCC post-Kyoto negotiations about global climate change mitigation strategy . This situation leads to a problem of ontologies of climate change's phenomena which is illustrated in global governance by the permeability of two types of ontologies (universality I and universality II) through the device of power or authority. Robert Cox (2001) distinguishes two types of ontologies, "universality I" and "Universality II". "Universality I" is an affirmation of the ultimate reality of the universe. It has its roots in monotheist religion and was taken over in secular form of enlightenment. In this ontology human being invent the idea of God as the all-powerful creator; from that they reverse the process of invention to assume the human mind to be the Godlike, which is to have the potential for understanding the truth of the universe. "Universality I" according to Cox is represented by the affirmation of the kind of truth embodied in religious revelations or certainties of enlightenment philosophy. It can also in a spurious form be applied to affirmations of the universality that are manifestly products of a particular historical situation but not recognized to be such for lack of critical self-appraisal. For example: neoliberalism. "Universality II" is the attempt to identify the basic constitutive factors that help toward understanding and

acting upon a particular historical conjuncture. We could say the task is one perceiving the historical structures that characterize an epoch. These structures, which are mental constructions, summarize the cumulative result of human actions over time. The purpose of defining them is to construct a base point for considering the problems of maintenance or transformation of a particular order. Thus Cox adds that "Universality II" is universal in transitory way, the snapshot of a world in a perpetual motion, the synchronic picture of something which is diachronically changing.

I think that the recognition of global warming by IPCC legitimates the use of "universality I" on behalf of "universality II" as a way to tackle the threat represented by physical change on earth for the current world order. While they are certain elements of responsibility in IPCC's decision we cannot ignore its instrumental character. In this light IPCC has acted as an intelligent actor. For Dryzek and Berejikian (2000:205), in case actions constitute situations, then intelligent actors should reason constitutively as well as instrumentally, such that constitutive concerns should often override instrumental ones. For this scholar "instrumental rationality is the capacity to devise, select and affect good means to clarified and consistent ends." Conversely in constitutive reasoning, an actor does not ask the instrumental question, "Does action X help achieve goal Y? " Instead, the actor asks, "Does action X help to constitute a world I find attractive? In contrast Falk (1999:60) remind us that neither the nation-state nor the United Nations has the capacity to tackle the environmental problems in the current world, such a role should be played by the global civil society in what he

calls "the globalization from-below[45]". But "global civil society" as a concept and material reality is problematic as Bob (2005:195) notes:

> The term 'global civil society' is often used to counter pose a realm of principle and morality against one marked by self-seeking, profit, and power. Yet this view, reflecting one aspect of transnational relations, obscures as much as it illuminates. For academics, it furnishes few analytic tools for explaining why some challengers excite major support while others, equally if not more worthy, remains orphans. More broadly it misrepresents the underlying realities. The organizations and individuals composing networks are certainly motivated, in part, by high principles. But questions of organizational maintenance and survival also permeate NGO decision making.

Thus in order to grasp the "underlying realities" of climate change it is important to stay critical about the "cognitive globalization" enhanced by global civil society in matter concerning a common consciousness around environmental issues. Interesting enough in Falk's insight, it is his suggestion of a cooperative relationship between the market and the global civil society. In this regard the global civil society it is not that different from United Nation or the nation-state in his ability to use both instrumental and

[45] The globalization-from- below is "an aggregate designation for the overall efforts of global civil society to restore the various social and political gains made during the latter stages of the industrial era, as well as to move consistently forward to establish the cosmopolitan democracy as the political template for an inevitably globalizing world" (Falk, 1999:60).

constitutive rationality while leaving the current world order unchanged. Furthermore its role suggests that we delineate what is global from what is universal and face the fact that the priority of locality (multiple localities if global) remains the shaping force of political action and activism. But under the cover of global civil society or a cause affiliated to it, Northern countries can justify undue interventions in Southern ones. As such a term like "global civil society" eludes the historical relationships of domination still pervading North-South relations nowadays and homogenizes some of the competing logics at work underground, this for the sake of mainstream politics (See, Slater, 2004). Nevertheless Drumbl (2002:854) in what he calls the "compact swap[46]", North-South relationships are witnessing some changes in relation to environmental issues. For him (Drumbl) "compact swap" means a "deal or arrangement to come together strategically to attain a particular goal". In other words " it is one thing to say that A should (even, shall) provide X to B, it is quite another thing to say that, should A not effectively provide X to B, then B's promises to A may no longer be binding".

5.2.3.The Problem of the Logic of Climate Changes Phenomena

The problem of the logic of climate changes phenomena is stringed with matters of governance. Concerning the global governance of climate change Dryzek (2009b:7-11) identify seven relevant discourses available in the public space namely ecological limits, promethean discourse, energy security, radical transformation, denial that climate change exists, ecological modernization and climate justice. But it is

important to bear in mind that those discourses neither enjoy the same discursive significance (the number of time a discourse is repeated) nor are they fairly represented as Dryzek puts it:

> In the global governance of climate change, of course elections do not exist, and national elections make very little contribution to transnational accountability. More generally, states governments are rarely called to account for their act of commission and omission in relation to global concerns; they always have a national interest in defence that can cover up any failures to respond to concerns emanating from public space. Failing that, they can always blame other states or international processes for their own deficiencies. In short accountability within the global deliberative system is currently weak.

Giddens (2009:50) warns us against the bandwagon effect which according to him is the use of the global warming as a way to legitimate other concerns .That proposition is highly limited regarding the fact that climate change affects people and regions in different ways, the diversity of the discourses on it is illustrative. Furthermore by grounding his analyses on climate change in the realist's theory of international relations and by virtue of being a pro-European (supporter of EU), Giddens has almost no leverage to escape the bandwagon effect (Giddens, 2010:4-14). In fact the limitations of the realism and his position (Europe and white body) constitute an enclave in which he thinks and experience the world to produce the narratives of Energy security (one of the relevant discourse on climate change available in the public space). Moreover Falk (1999:58) notes that: "realism" continues to

hold sway in foreign offices and within the academic establishment, especially among those experts who interconnect with those who shape global policy. Realism is conflict-oriented and state-centred, dismissing law and morality". In this regard the contribution of Anthony Giddens titled *The Politics of Climate Change* is one of the dominant logic among the competing logics addressing the climate change problem and its insufficiency of reflexivity makes it a part of the problem of the logics of climate change's phenomena. Conversely Falk (1999:59) proposed a logic encompassing well-being of people and success of markets. But a question remains about Falk's suggestion, who or how many are the people selected for that well-being, knowing that a market-driven economy has been seen as a major cause of inequalities and conflicts in the global south (See, Allouche, 2011:7).

It follows then that climate change transcends boundaries and categories and erects itself as a cosmopolitan phenomenon (Hulme, 2010:268). Hargens (n.d.:144) notes that climate change is a *multiple object*, a *hybrid object* – a combination of scientific third-person observation and cultural second-person meanings – and an *integral object i.e.* "an ontologically distinct phenomenon that is a combination of first and second, and third person dimensions". In this regard he argues that distinct and overlapping intrinsic features of climate change are enacted by various individuals with their own "kosmic address" which highlights that an observer uses a method of observation to observe something. In the light of the above, Jamison (2010:811-812) reports that there are three main positions in relation to climate change knowledge depicted as dominant, oppositional and emergent. The dominant position is assumed by those who have been more

active in the last decade promoting the reduction of emission of carbon dioxide and the transition to a "low-carbon society". The oppositional is associated with those who have been termed climate sceptics and question the importance of dealing with climate as opposed to others issues. The emergent position is associated with those who acknowledge the happening of climate change and its serious consequences. However this group stresses at the same time the significance of dealing with climate change in a manner that issues of justice and fairness are seriously considered. Moreover Jamison (2010) suggests that the rise of the dominant voices in climate change knowledge has been facilitated by their connection with the neo-liberal and transnational capitalist movement. According to him many of the dominant voices in the field of climate change politics have been promoting the establishment of closer relationship between academic scientists, business firms, and in commercializing scientific knowledge. In this respect, the conception of science deriving from the vocal voices on climate change is non-disciplinary and entrepreneurial and makes the knowledge produced in climate research centres dependent on contexts both financial and organizational. Unfortunately if there are voices not fitting in this version of science or in the three positions numbered by Jameson (2010), the articulation of the irregularity of their country or continent's specific experience in the earth is likely to be eluded.

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This book is a scriptural sculpture of how the physical dimensions of the earth –built and natural – and antecedents of history structure knowledges and the physical containers – human and non-human – that embody those knowledges. The book deals with universalisms grounded on African experiences and perspectives. A key theme is how (in)security relates to knowledge creation by drawing a parallel between the proliferation of violent conflict in Africa and the marginal position that the continent occupies in the modern formation of knowledge. Also explored is the concept of creativity in relation to art and politics, as experienced by the black African elite. Bottlenecks to African creativity and the role of space and history in the production and reproduction of knowledge and ways of knowing are critically reviewed. The author makes a case for the existence of irreducible forms of knowledge existing in distinct laboratories and traces how particular biological and environment features interact with human cognition to form what passes for knowledge. He interrogates the variety of environment cognition in the light of an increasing homogenization of human cognition globally with a particular accent on climate change. This is a bold and legitimate voice on an important conversation.

* * *

SERGE NTAMACK is a Cameroonian born artist living in South Africa. He holds an MA degree in International studies from Stellenbosch University and Peace Research International Institute of Oslo. His works of art attempt to capture, liberate, and articulate the immateriality of the physical and the materiality of the non-physical both in relation to cognition and the environment.

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