Toward a Practice-Theoretical Framework on Rule in International Relations

Inauguraldissertation

zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie im Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften

der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität
zu Frankfurt am Main

vorgelegt von

Maya Hatsukano
aus: Darmstadt

2019

2021

---

1. Gutachterin: Prof. Dr. Nicole Deitelhoff

2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Christopher Daase

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:

05.03.2021

This dissertation is dedicated to Evan my sunshine and Felix my love

Acknowledgements

I hereby wish to thank Prof. Dr. Nicole Deitelhoff for her guidance, Prof. Dr. Christopher Daase, Philip Wallmeier, Martin Schmetz, Dr. Tobias Wille, Max Hoffmann, Regina Hack, Dr. Valentin Rauer, and Daniela M. Schmidt for fruitful discussions and advice. I wish to thank Prof. Dr. Roland Kaehlbrandt, Dr. Wolfgang Eimer and Tobias König for their support. My special thanks also go to my family, in-laws and friends.

Abbreviations

ANT	Actor Network Theory
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria)
EU	European Union
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
IPT	International Practice Theory
LGBTQ	Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender and Queer
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
PAR	Practice Analysis of Rule
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organization

Figures

Contents

1 Introduction

Diplomacy is a field in international relations[1] in which traditionally state representatives negotiate about issues of common concern. It is described as an institution or a field which is characterized by many codified and non-codified rules diplomats generally adhere to. This is called diplomatic conduct, or in a broader sense diplomatic culture, from which specific diplomatic practices have emerged (Sharp 2004). What distinguishes diplomatic practice from other practices is that it aims at peaceful and smooth processes (ibid.). Diplomacy can thus be described as an old institution which is characterized by a high level of stability.

Classic International Relations claims that anarchy is the ordering principle for international relations. In neorealism, but also in neoliberalism and some strands of constructivism, power is seen to be at play in international relations, and rule can only be observed in the nation state, where a monopoly on violence exists (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014). Because in anarchy structures of power are absent, the term implies a high level of movement and power struggle, which in many contexts in international relations cannot be observed. A high level of institutionalization and bureaucratization, however, can be perceived (Onuf and Klink 1989: 160). Diplomacy is generally characterized by its specific norms and rules, and the number of international organizations (IOs), which are said to execute increasing authority, has increased markedly in the last few decades (Herborth 2014).

The modern nation state is also characterized by a high level of institutionalization and bureaucratization. In bureaucracy, rule is implemented, contingency minimized, and life chances often distributed. The stability provided by institutionalization in nation states is self-evidently described as rule (Schlichte 2017). It is puzzling however, why this is generally not described as rule in international relations, when many settings in the international realm display similar characteristics.

[1] In the following, international relations will describe the object of study, i.e., international politics. International Relations will describe the discipline, which is occupied with the study of which.

As rule in International Relations is not theorized extensively yet, empirical research on the topic is a logical next step as a basis for further theorizing. Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) therefore suggest reconstructing rule through the empirical analysis of resistance. This work accepts this as a fruitful approach. However, more detailed methods of how to conduct research on rule in International Relations are yet to be developed (Anderl, Daase, Deitelhoff et. al. 2019). This work uses different strands of practice theory to make rule in International Relations tangible and therefore researchable. The result of this work is hence a practice-theoretical tool for the analysis of empirical cases of rule in international relations called *Practice Analysis of Rule* (PAR). The PAR can be applied to cases of rule in International Relations because it enables the researcher to reconstruct relations of rule through the analysis of single social situations[2]. Further steps allow the researcher to make careful interpretations to widen the geographical, personal, and temporal scope of the analysis. This enables the researcher to follow networks of actors, objects, and practices and draw conclusions about the form of rule at play in the empirical case at hand. By doing so, this work takes a first important step toward the development of methods for the analysis of rule in International Relations.

To summarize, this work develops a practice-theoretical understanding of rule and conceptualizes a method for the research on (transnational) rule. It is an important power theoretical step for practice theory and offers a useful tool for the research on rule in International Relations.

1.1 Rule in International Relations

In the following, this work is situated in the discipline of International Relations. After that, to illustrate the relevance for the reality of global politics in the 21st century, examples of rule in international relations are described.

International Relations as a discipline used to look at the international as a system of states, which were seen as the most important, if not the only, actors with agen-

[2] These situations will be called performances throughout the work, because of its practice-theoretical influence. In practice theory performances are instances of a practice, which is much more widespread.

cy (Brühl et al. 2001). In the face of the absence of a world state, grand theories of IR (realism, liberalism and even constructivism influenced by Wendt (1992)) conventionally see the international system as anarchic. That means that states are sovereign entities which are formally equal. As there is no entity which is hierarchically any higher than the other, it is said that anarchy is the ordering principle of international relations (Guzzini 1998). In this picture, rule is bound to the nation state. By contrast, international relations are shaped by power, and power only. The so-called anarchy assumption is made particularly strongly by the neorealist school, which dominated for a long time in IR (Waltz 1979). Because of this prevailing framing, thinking in terms of rule in International Relations is a relatively new – and one might say overdue – venture.

As mentioned, works in International Relations have started to refute the anarchy assumption altogether, so rule in IR has entered the picture. Daase and Deitelhoff claim that the anarchy problem is replaced by what they call the *problem of rule* in International Relations (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014, 2015). In some form, many recent works have been interested in the question: Who *can* and who *may* prescribe to the actors of international politics how they should act (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 3)? This is why the question of rule often arises in the discussion about autonomy of International Organizations (Finnemore and Barnett 1999: 699) or their authority (Zürn 2013b). Onuf and Klink (1989) describe international relations as a realm of rule. They describe three forms of rule – hegemony, heteronomy, and hierarchy. Whereas their concept helps understand possible forms rule in international relations could take, it does not help so much in detecting specific empirical forms. They did not manage to change the overall discourse situation in the discipline at the time of publication. Donnelly (2009) describes international relations not as anarchic but as heterarchic. That means that in the age of globalization multiple hierarchically ordered realms exist simultaneously. Thus, for him international relations are a sphere neither of anarchy nor of hierarchy. This description seems to be plausible. At the same time, it stays very abstract and does not help understanding the specific forms, transnational rule can take in the 21st century.

Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff call all asymmetrical power relations 'rule' which are of some permanence and institutionally consolidated. In their reading, it is a structure of institutionalized supra- and subordination, through which goods and chances to influence are distributed, and expectations about readiness to comply are stabilized, whether these structures are primarily of a sociocultural, economic, or military nature (Daase et al. 2017). They follow Foucault's reasoning on the issue. Foucault claims that where there is rule, there is resistance. Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) turn this assumption around by contending that resistance is an indicator for rule. They reflect on this on the international level. By looking at resistance, they try to shed light onto the complexity of international ruling. In their research program, resistance and rule are regarded as a complex of phenomena, which are seen as co-constitutive. Analyzing this complexity can reveal aspects of the substance of rule in international relations that lay unnoticed otherwise (Koloma Beck, Veit, Alex 2015: 99). Daase and Deitelhoff made it the heart of their research endeavor to reconstruct transnational rule out of the research on transnational resistance. This work seeks to shed light onto the question how rule can be reconstructed by analyzing resistance. It can be assumed though that there are empirical cases in which resistance is so subtle that it cannot be perceived easily empirically (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014).

In everyday life, there are many instances that can be seen as examples of transnational rule, but which are not termed that way, because transnational rule is not extensively theorized and never found a favorable situation in the academic discourse in International Relations. Traditionally, states were seen as the only actors equipped with agency in International Relations. In recent decades however, International Relations has accounted for more actors on the international stage than before. Globalization has led to various changes in the international system (Slaughter 2004). Civil society groups have gained influence in international politics including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), media, foundations, and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs; Keck and Sikkink 1999). What is new is not their existence but that their "number, size, professionalism, and the density and complexity of their international linkages have grown dramatically" (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 92). Transnational Corporations (TNCs) increasingly see themselves as truly international and not as nation-based companies whose actions

reach beyond borders (Bartlett et al. 1991). States bind themselves ever deeper in cross-border institutions, so ruling is looked at as multi-level governance. Political authority is thus not only executed by national governments, but also by entities above and below them (Neyer 2013: 17). Benjamin Herborth writes in his doctoral dissertation that "there is no shortage of evidence of the emergence of autonomous *contexts of rule* beyond the state" (Herborth 2014: 14) and refers to 125 international institutions which can decide on disputes in a legally binding manner, such as the European Union (EU), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (ibid.). It is often described that international organizations increasingly decide by majority vote, which effectively overrides the states which are not in favor. This can also be seen as a sign for rule beyond the nation state, because it exceeds intergovernmental politics noticeably.

International institutions and organizations even face fierce, at times violent resistance. This can be considered another indicator of the existence of a form of international rule which is more than the sum of its parts. The so called "Battle of Seattle" is seen as a symbol of that (Rucht 2013: 81). A WTO ministerial meeting faced severe resistance with tens of thousands of protestors involved (Wood 2012: 4). Seattle was part of the anti-globalization movement (Adler-Nissen 2014: 658). Another example of resistance to global political processes is the "No Logo" movement, which is based on the book by Naomi Klein, criticizing global corporate capitalism (Adler-Nissen 2014: 658).

Klaus Schlichte describes in "Cubicle Land – Bürokratie und Demokratie in der Regierung der Welt"(2015b), how modern practices of conducting projects in self-organized teams can count as a modern form of bureaucratic rule. This is done in all spheres of professional life, including international relations. He sees cubicle land as a metaphor for networks of decentralized bureaucratic cells, which execute transnational rule. As part of this rule, he sees the practice of "ranking", e.g., on the human development index, which he sees as a measure of control and potential shaming (Schlichte 2015b: 189). This is an example of rule, which is so subtle, it will not provoke direct or open resistance.

A case of a relatively recent phenomenon of transnational rule is that of the 'Islamic State' (IS). Transnational terrorism evolved, from 1979 on, from the re-

sistance against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan (Steinberg 2015). IS, or Daesh, is seen as the result of a long series of war, occupation and resistance, and claimed to have founded a state (al-Istrabadi and Ganguly 2018). If an organization claims great masses of land in Iraq and Syria and establishes a state-like system, this can easily be categorized as a form of rule. By attracting young people from many different areas globally and committing terrorist attacks in far-away places, it can be seen as very transnational. Even though it called itself a state and dominated a vast number of people over various national borders, IS sees itself as a resistance movement (Krause 2018). This example shows that it in empirical cases, it is not always clear, which kind of actor the researcher is faced with. At times, the boundaries between resistance and rule are blurred. That is why a concept is needed, which can trace rule through practice.

World history is full of examples of one great power dominating others. Forms of formal rule, such as colonization, have a long history. In postcolonial times, it is widely acknowledged that certain forms of rule are still at play between metropolitan and postcolonial societies (Schlichte 2015a: 122). Some recent developments in international politics can be easily described in traditional terms. If Russia invades the Ukraine, this can be regarded as power politics to enhance influence and defend or restore a hegemonic position in the post-Soviet region (Klein 2015: 115). This shows that global politics is shaped by asyncronicity and contradictions (Schlichte 2015a). Power politics between nation states, dependencies based on historic conditions, as well as governing through international organizations are only examples of phenomena which take place simultaneously in this historic era of globalization.

From the descriptions above, various contexts could be identified that entail patterned interaction with socially controlling effect. International Organizations and institutions at times overrule national sovereignty. Also, informal (resource-based) asymmetries such as the North-South divide can lead to unfavorable results for populations (Klein 2018). All described examples can be seen as part of a phenomenon called *rule in international relations*. Transnational rule is a complex and heterogeneous field, which can entail many forms of actors, practices, and contexts. A concept to analyze heterogeneous cases like that thus needs to be very

context-sensitive and precise. The example of the IS shows that the categorization of resistance and rule is at times challenging. So, the concept to be developed here, needs to make sure not to make premature judgements about the quality of the involved actors in the cases at hand. A broad and open concept is needed to analyze this complex and heterogeneous phenomenon called transnational rule.

1.2 Practice Theory in International Relations

Bourdieu conceptualizes symbolic violence as a form of power, which works solely through symbols. These can work very subtly. By looking to Bourdieu, it is possible to conceptualize more subtle, symbolic forms of rule. That is why this work thus looks to practice theory – especially Bourdieu – for an understanding of subtle forms of rule.

In recent years, International Relations – like other academic disciplines – has undergone a practice turn (Bueger and Gadinger 2014). That means that many scholars have looked to practice theory for insights about their respective research topic. Practice theory is interested in social phenomena and looks at them through the theoretical lens of practice. Practice theory sees practice as the center of 'the social' itself (Reckwitz 2003). It sees social interaction as something that is learned 'by doing'. Practice theoreticians see actions as guided by a practical sense and therefore often as routinized and not so much as consciously calculated. Practice theoreticians in International Relations often base their thoughts on works by Pierre Bourdieu, who wrote an extensive oeuvre in particular on reproduction of social inequalities, especially in France (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 22). Others use e.g. Actor Network Theory to describe and explain the influence of (technological) devices on international relations (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 43). Practice theory and practice theory in IR are at times criticized for being too power blind (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014: 2). This work outlines the existing understandings on power and rule in practice theory and further theorizes them for a more comprehensive understanding.

In practice theory, social order is the effect of practices, and each performance can stabilize practice. Looking at rule through the theoretical lens of practice draws attention to practices of power. Watson (2017) states that practice theory should

become able to "understand how certain practices are distinctively capable of orchestrating, disciplining, and shaping practices elsewhere […]" (Watson 2017: 174). Certain practices must contribute to consolidate relations of power and thus make them durable, as well as stabilize them. This then can be called rule under certain circumstances. In Bourdieu's view, bodily practices and spaces in which actors move habitually reproduce relations of rule e.g., patriarchy (Bourdieu 2005). Actor Network Theory stresses the role of objects to consolidate and reproduce power relations (Latour 2007). Practice theory offers some insights which can be fruitfully used to highlight aspects of rule in International Relations. Thus, this work is going to consider the question of rule in IR and practice theory in IR together. Even though various practice theories focus on different aspects of social reality, they can work toward a deeper understanding of power and work complementarily, as they have similar epistemological and ontological foundations.

This work also connects with the discourse about praxiography, which has developed in recent years in International Relations. Praxiography describes the practice of doing practice theoretical research (Bueger 2014; Jonas et al. 2017; Bueger and Gadinger 2018). This work formulates a practice-theoretical framework for the study of transnational rule, which itself is an upcoming field. It can be said that this work is situated in the nexus of two discourses, which are little theorized: The discourse on 'how to research transnational rule' and the discourse on 'how to research power practice'.

1.3 The Objective of this Book

As mentioned, Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) state that rule is not theorized appropriately in International Relations so far. Therefore, they suggest reconstructing rule through the empirical analysis of resistance. They contend that the one is inextricably connected with the other. By analyzing the justifications of the ruling party on the one hand and the resisting party on the other, they hope to be able to deduce which empirical forms of rule are at play (Anderl, Daase, and Deitelhoff 2019). By analyzing manifold empirical examples, they contribute to theory-building on rule in International Relations (2019). They do however concede that there may be forms of rule which are so subtle that resistance either does not occur or is itself so subtle that it is not perceivable empirically. This is a considera-

ble disadvantage in their theorizing, because for a comprehensive understanding of rule in International Relations, an understanding of more subtle practices of rule is of great importance. Schlichte describes international relations as a realm which is heavily shaped by bureaucratization. He describes this as a subtle form of rule, which does not spark considerable open resistance, but which has a grave influence on life chances nevertheless (2015b). Another important example of subtle phenomena of rule is self-censorship, which Albrecht (1996) describes as prevalent especially in diplomacy (1996). If an actor decides not to even issue their opinion openly vis-à-vis a ruling actor, arguably there will not even be an empirical trace. Because power-related social interaction in international relations can heavily influence the life chances of actors without leaving easily perceivable empirical traces, International Relations needs to be able to analyze forms of rule that spark no or only subtle forms of resistance.

To be able to analyze subtle forms of rule and resistance, and to be able to take into consideration emerging forms of transnational rule, a concept is needed which can reconstruct rule out of concrete situations. It should be able to analyze situations in which humans interact with each other and with objects and can then make sense of these situations in a theoretically guided manner. The concept needs to include a heuristic as to which phenomena can be considered signs of rule. In this way the concept can generate insights as to how actors are entangled in relations of rule, and which these could be. It is thus the objective of this work to develop a methodical framework from practice theory, which can make transnational rule researchable through the analysis of concrete performances of practice. To make rule researchable, the concept should allow for the reconstruction of rule through resistance, but also for the analysis of symbolic forms of rule. It should enable the researcher to be able to find rule and resistance, even in everyday practices.

To make subtle forms of rule tangible, this work looks to Bourdieu who has formulated the concept “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu 1992). Bourdieu sees rule as something that becomes perceivable through symbols. This kind of rule he describes as indirect and obscuring. The affected party does not always notice that they are affected by symbolic forms of rule. Bourdieu describes the effect of this

as subtle. Though the analysis of the affected actor's body language, used language etc. can this form of rule be perceived. Bourdieu has formulated the concept of rule, which is considered suitable to approach the conceptualization of subtle forms of rule to make them then researchable. Therefore, the guiding question for the theorizing in this book is:

Which contribution can a practice-theoretical framework on rule, which is based on Bourdieu's praxeology, make to International Relations?

From Bourdieu's work the symbolic dimension of rule is theorized, which makes it possible to analyze rule even if resistance does not occur openly. The formulation of the symbolic dimension makes symbols perceivable in bodies, language, objects, and non-objects.

In this work, in total, four dimensions of rule are deduced mainly from different practice-theoretical strands. These dimensions are inspired by Daase and Deitelhoff and Schäfer's "Die Instabilität der Praxis. Reproduktion und Transformation des Sozialen in der Praxistheorie" (2013). Daase and Deitelhoff stress the importance of resistance as an indicator for rule and the latter highlights power theoretical aspects in practice theory, which can be formulated as practice theoretical dimensions. Drawing on Daase and Deitelhoff (2014, 2015, 2017), Butler (1993), Hollander and Einwohner (2004), and Scott (2005) resistance as a dimension is theorized. Practices of resistance are presented, especially infrapolitical[3] practices, which can be subtle expressions of resistance. Based mainly on Latour's (2007) take on Actor Network Theory, the material dimension of rule is theorized. In this dimension the specific nature of objects is made analyzable. As objects can contain inscribed rules, minimize contingency and options for action, they can function as agents of rule. However, used in a specific way and in specific situations, they can be used as means of resistance. The fourth dimension theorized is iterability. Drawing on Schäfer's work on repetition (2013, 2016) and Butler's concept of iterability (1993), an understanding of iterability as a dimension of rule is developed. Iterability describes the repeatability of practice. It includes the meaning

[3] Infrapolitics means practices of resistance, which, like infrared lights, cannot be perceived at first glance. They are part of what is termed everyday resistance (See Chapter 6).

of repetition of practice as well as its potentiality. Whereas the symbolic dimension, resistance as a dimension, and the material dimension indicate practices of power, iterability indicates whether practices of power can be carried out repeatedly. In this way iterability is an indicator for the consolidation of power.

By drawing on works from political theory, International Relations and using the four developed practice theoretical dimensions the following definition of rule is formulated:

Rule comprises durable asymmetrical power relations of super- and subordination, enacted in iterable practices *with (long-distance and long-term) socially controlling or inhibiting effect on certain actors, may it be executed by competent bodies, encrypted in symbols, indicated by resistance, or inscribed in or executed by material objects. Rule can work through creating the belief in its legitimacy or through practical constraint, coercion, or violence.*

As stated, this work accepts the stipulation from Daase and Deitelhoff's work (2014; 2019) that (transnational) rule can be reconstructed through the analysis of empirical examples of resistance to it. However, doing so can get the researcher into difficult positions, if the resisting actors follow intenable beliefs, e.g. certain conspiracy theories (also about this see Anderl, Deitelhoff and Hack 2019). That is why a methodical framework is needed that can stay close to the actors and at the same time enable the researcher to draw theory-led, reflective, and fact-based interpretations. Anderl, Daase et. al. write about the kind of work that is needed to reconstruct rule from resistance:

> [The reconstruction of rule through resistance] needs a theoretical perspective and/or historical depth to make sense of this complex relationship. [Researchers should] develop methods that stay close to the actors while also being able to describe their relationship in terms of rule and resistance. (Anderl, Daase et. al 2019: 290).

In order to do this, following specification of the guiding question is used throughout the book:

How can transnational rule be made researchable?

By drawing on the work of Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Bourdieu's work on symbolic violence, a methodical tool is developed, which can trace executions of rule in (transnational) empirical cases – the Practice Analysis of Rule. The

same empirical performance can be analyzed for traces of rule through the symbolic dimension, later in resistance as a dimension of rule, the material dimension, and lastly, in iterability as a dimension.

The Practice Analysis of Rule allows the researcher to study rule – seemingly a macro phenomenon – as a heterogeneous network of practices involving bodies, language, objects, and non-objects. The PAR enables a hypothetical researcher to study practice by starting with a single performance which is studied in detail. By taking more information into account with every step, the researcher is asked to make careful interpretations as to which practice the performance is part of. It can be assessed if the performance is part of common practice and how it fits into the political and historical context. By conducting this hypothetical research in the four suggested dimensions of rule, the researcher can develop a comprehensive view of the practices of power and their consolidation in the empirical case at hand. The PAR suggests a fine-grained analysis of a (transnational) empirical case rule and enables the researcher to draw theory-guided and historically informed interpretations. The developed Practice Analysis of Rule (PAR) is a variable methodology, which can analyze what seems like a macro phenomenon (rule), which is difficult to grasp, as *practices of power*. It enables the researcher to analyze how these become consolidated – also in practice – and can then be called rule. Because practice theory sees social order as produced and reproduced in practice, even global phenomena can be studied through a flat ontology, which makes them more tangible. This is arguably the most striking strong suit of practice theory in the context of power and rule.

The Practice Analysis of Rule can make the development, the perpetuation as well as the decline of rule perceivable. It enables the researcher to analyze stability and change of rule and resistance. Through reflective steps of interpretation with a theory-led, historical perspective, relations of resistance and rule are made describable.

1.4 Plan of the Book

Chapter 2 outlines basic understandings of power and rule, which can be divided into more positive views based on Weber and more negative ones based on Marx.

For empirical research on rule in International Relations, it becomes clear that a concept is needed which is normatively open. That means that a view on rule is developed which does not conceptually already imply legitimacy or illegitimacy. Later, Popitz delivers the aspect of consolidation of power. He sees power and rule on a scale, which starts with situational power as the weakest form of power and ends with the monopoly on the use of violence as the strongest form of rule. This scale implies that weaker forms of consolidated forms of power can already be regarded as rule and therefore used for analysis of rule in international relations. After that, understandings of power and rule in International Relations are described to place this book in the discourse on rule in International Relations.

Chapter 3 describes in its first part what practice theory is, and how it is applied in International Relations. For further practice-theoretical theorizing, existing works on practice theory and power are outlined. The preliminary conclusion is presented that practice theory itself is critiqued for being power blind. From a practice-theoretical view, concepts for the analysis of "long-term and long-distance social control" are needed (Watson 2017). Nevertheless, practice-theory can contribute greatly to an understanding of power and rule in International Relations. The second – praxiographic – part of Chapter 3 focuses on methodological considerations for the research on rule and on practice. Research strategies and methods are presented which are vital for the research on practices of power and rule.

Chapter 4 describes Bourdieu's work in detail to understand his take on power and rule. Thereby the chapter especially focuses on symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is the concept which helps analyze rule if resistance is not perceivable prima facie. Also, Bourdieu's insights into the state as an epistemic category are outlined to understand how methodological nationalism can be avoided in doing research and theory building.

Chapter 5 takes the content of Chapter 4 as its basis and develops "symbolic carriers of meaning" in which symbolic violence becomes manifest: bodies, language, objects, and non-objects. By taking symbolic interactionism and Actor-Network-Theory into account, the 'symbolic dimension on rule' is developed. Indicators for the symbolic dimension of rule are presented, which help find rule

empirically in symbols. The Practice Analysis of Rule is presented as a table to illustrate the rationale of the tool. At the end of the chapter the table is filled with example questions, which can give a hypothetical researcher ideas on how to research the symbolic dimension of rule.

Chapter 6 develops resistance as a dimension of rule. It describes how resistance can materialize and how it can be perceived. Sociological works are discussed to increase awareness of different positions in sociology that must be present to assess resistance. The chapter focuses on everyday practices of resistance, because they are an important form of subtle resistance, which can easily be overlooked. After outlining specifically practice-theoretical works on resistance, again indicators for resistance are deduced from the literature and presented in a table with example questions for ideas for research.

Chapter 7 describes materiality as a dimension of rule, based on Bourdieu's understanding of materiality of bodies and an ANT-understanding of objects and the connection of human and object. The chapter works out the specific characteristics which objects display in practices of power. The notion from ANT that the researcher should 'follow the actor' epistemically delivers first insights, how rule can be understood as networks of humans and objects, thus cause long-term and long-distance socially controlling effects on certain actors. After developing indicators for the material dimension, a suggestion is made for its research.

Chapter 8 defines iterability as a dimension of rule. Whereas symbols, resistance, and materiality can be seen as characteristics for practices of power, iterability is the dimension which is most useful to analyze power's state of consolidation. Iterability of practice encompasses transferability of power between individual actors, temporal, and spatial aspects of iterability. The chapter also discusses important conditions for iterability. After describing how iterability is understood in connection with the other dimensions of rule, indicators are developed and a table for its analysis presented.

Chapter 9 systematizes the findings of the previous chapters and draws conclusions first about the ontological nature of transnational rule. The practice-theoretical definition of rule is deduced from the understandings outlined and pre-

sented in the preceding chapters. Later, it is outlined how rule can be best researched using the developed "Practice Analysis of Rule" and what the contribution is that it makes to the discourse on rule in International Relations.

Chapter 10 summarizes the insights and arguments of this book. Desiderata for further research are discussed. To conclude, the overall contribution of this book to academia is outlined. This book's possible influence on the discourses on rule in International Relations, on power in practice theory, as well as research in practice theory is described.

2 Theories of Power and Rule

Many philosophers following Hume have been occupied with the question why many people willingly let a minority rule them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). The fact that mostly few govern many people has led many theoreticians to ask questions like: How do the few gain power? What makes acquisition of power successful? How can a small advantage over others be expanded to become the steady power over others (Popitz 1979)? Thus, questions of power and rule have been enormously important for the disciplines of sociology and political science, whereas no unified understanding of the terms could be reached in either of them (Anter 2012: 11). The same is true for International Relations.

This chapter serves the goal of showing, how rule is understood, so far, in social sciences. Therefore, in this Chapter, basic understandings of power and rule are briefly outlined. For this, firstly, approaches from political theory and philosophy are consulted. From these understandings it is deduced that a normatively open concept is needed for an understanding suitable for empirical research on transnational rule. Furthermore, an understanding of rule is needed that does not define rule through the criterion of 'monopoly to force', which is almost exclusively attainable in nation states. In the second part of the Chapter, the understandings of power and rule in the classical schools of International Relations theory are described. After that, the discourse on rule in International Relations is described and what its contribution to a practice-theoretical understanding on transnational rule is, which enables research on the phenomenon.

2.1 Political Theory

As understandings of power and rule in International Relations build on a broader understanding in political theory in the following, important theoretical understandings of power and rule are outlined.

2.1.1 General Understandings of Power and Rule

Power is often either seen as a positive trait of human relationships, which can enable actors to do something - or as an inhibiting means of controlling others. The first is called “power-to”, which implies that through means of cooperation etc. actors are enabled to a certain action. The second is described in the concept of “power-over”, meaning that one party can control another’s action and thus minimize their ability to act. These implications are responsible for a strong normative evaluation that is often present in concepts of power (Imbusch 2012: 10). Steven Lukes defines power in an abstract way: The power of one or more acting person(s) A regarding a goal Z becomes manifest when A reaches that goal through the agreement of one or more acting person(s) B (Lukes 1983: 107). This corresponds with ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ in the sense that the agreement by B can be coerced or it can be consensual (Lemke 2009: 471). So, power can be seen as cooperation and consent or as hierarchy and rule/domination, whereas both readings are deeply engrained in Western thought (Lukes 1983: 107). These strong normative evaluations make the discussion of power and rule complicated.

In this work, power is seen as normatively neutral. Power means the potential to positive action but also the potential to inhibit others. Power can be based on various resources, may they be material, symbolic or of a completely different kind. It can take various shapes and forms. The Weberian description as amorphous thus seems adequate in this context (Weber 2013).

In its original sense, rule meant giving order to one’s house and entourage. It was the right to command over people (violence) and things (property; Imbusch 1998). In the course of the development of the nation state, power relations were increasingly depersonalized and formalized. Rule was seen as a property of the state, which was now seen as the superordinate entity of order (Imbusch 1998: 19). People ruling over other people was more and more seen as contradictory to hu-

man rationality and freedom so that rule needed complex justifications (e.g. through sovereign contract). That means that rule became increasingly abstract (Imbusch 1998: 20). Relations of rule have always in some way decided upon the livelihoods and chances of individuals and groups. They produce and reproduce asymmetries in affluence, property, life chances and produce processes of exclusion (Imbusch 1998: 21). The two strands of power conceptions that follow the symmetrical and the asymmetrical normative interpretations of power and rule are mainly represented by accounts that are based, on the one hand, on Weber, and on Marx on the other.

2.1.2 Weber's Understanding of *Herrschaft*

Weber is so influential on the discourse on the term that hardly any work on power exists that does not refer to him (Anter 2012: 53). Weber defines power as *any chance to enforce one's own will also against opposition or reluctance in a social relationship, regardless, what that chance is based on* (Weber 1972: 122; highlight added). This definition implies that power is relational but also based on resources, whatever those might be. Weber says that power is sociologically amorphous and thus not suitable for analysis (Weber 1972: 122). That is why rule i.e. *Herrschaft* is to be preferred. He defines *Herrschaft* as *the chance to find obedience for an order of certain content by a certain group of people* (Weber 2013: 210; highlight added). Weber's concept of *Herrschaft* is thus dyadic. That means it requires a ruling and a ruled party. For Weber, rule is the institutionalized form of power, which presupposes a body politic (Herrschaftsverband, see Weber 2013: 211). Weber defines three forms of legitimate rule: rational, traditional, and charismatic rule. Rational rule is a legal form that relies on a bureaucracy to execute it. Traditional rule is based on the belief that a certain order is legitimate, which uses narratives of sacredness or god. Charismatic rule creates an atmosphere, in which a leader is entrusted to rule because of his (her) heroism and model role (Weber 2013: 453). In a Weberian reading, legitimacy is a defining characteristic of rule. A certain minimum of interest in following orders from the ruling party is implied. As long as the ruled believe in the legitimacy of the rule, they are likely to follow (Imbusch 1998: 22). Weber sees rule as the counterpart to violence and as unavoidable and universal. This view of rule can arguably be seen as the most

dominant in social sciences and therefore the one, which is used intuitively in everyday life.

2.1.3 Marx's Understanding of Rule

The legitimacy of rule is often questioned on the basis of its consequences in critical accounts that base their reasoning on Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Imbusch 1998: 20). In critical accounts, the submission of the ruled can only be reached by an illegitimate amount of violence (Imbusch 1998: 21). For Marx, power depends primarily on the structure of ownership in a society. For Marx, history is the history of class struggles (Fetscher 1976: 55). If the people who produce goods are not the same people as the ones possessing the means of production, necessarily there will be a social asymmetry to the disadvantage of a certain class of people. Marx's account on rule is thus not so much directed at the state but at the ruling class, which entails many societal actors (Fetscher 1976: 57). Marx and Engels formulated the view of historical materialism, saying class structures are historically bound to change toward being ever less dominating than before (Hösler 2012: 64). Marxist accounts thus see rule as fundamentally negative because it inhibits people and curtails personal freedom.

Marx and Weber thus are read as opposed theoreticians when it comes to evaluating the legitimacy of rule. These two strands of thought are the basis of more recent accounts on power and rule. Interestingly, accounts of rule which see rule as legitimate tend to use the term *rule*[4], whereas critical accounts often use the term *domination*, which implies illegitimacy[5]. Furthermore, the difference is that rule implies formality. It's meaning derives from "'principle or maxim governing conduct, formula to which conduct must be conformed' from Old French riule", (Online Etymology Dictionary 2018b). On the other hand, domination implies informality. The etymology of the word "domination" is the Latin word "domus", which means "house". It implies the existence of a dominus, literally, the master

[4] The Oxford Learner's Dictionary defines rule as "the government of a country or control of a group of people by a particular person, group or system" (Oxford Learner's Dictionary 2018).

[5] The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology defines domination as "Rule by Coercion of noncoercive compliance. Individuals or groups may exercise power over others – domination – either by brute force or because that power is accepted as legitimate" Marshall (1994: 132).

of the house (Online Etymology Dictionary 2018a). In Social Dominance Theory, it is described that there are three kinds of social domination: In almost all societies, men dominate women and older humans are superordinate to younger humans. The third kind they describe as 'arbitrarily set hierarchies', which grow culture-dependently, which could be religion or region of origin as well as skin color or other socially constructed factors (Sidanius and Pratto 2001). To summarize, the general meaning of the terms rule and domination depends on their perceived officiality. That means that if the researcher wishes to understand forms of rule of the 21st century which reach beyond national borders, it is important to formulate a concept of rule, which implies both forms. Rule in international relations does not take the form of a monopoly on the use of force, so the traditional Weberian reading of the term is not sufficient for this work. The Marxian understanding has always implied forms of rule, which are not necessarily carried out by state officials, thus it includes societal actors as actors of rule. Also, the Marxian account looks at transnational forms of rule, as class structures pervade national borders. This work thus needs a broad understanding of rule, which can imply many kinds of empirical cases of structured power. Only a broad understanding of rule can be the basis of a concept for making transnational rule better researchable.

2.1.4 Popitz's Understanding of Power and Rule

A normatively open, broad concept of rule needs an understanding of how power and rule are connected. By distinguishing the two, it will become clearer which empirical cases can be regarded cases of transnational rule and are therefore of interest to this work.

In theoretical writings on power and rule generally there seems to be the attitude that the concepts stand in a certain kind of relation to another. Whichever way power is defined, rule seems to be the more institutionalized form of power (Popitz 1992). Although Popitz's conception of power and rule is abstract, it is very helpful to understand the relation between the two concepts. Also, it helps to understand the consolidation of power to rule.

Popitz describes that the process of institutionalization seems to follow a certain pattern: Firstly, relations of power become increasingly depersonalized. Secondly, they become formalized which means that they increasingly follow rules, rituals and set processes. Thirdly, the power relation is integrated in a certain political order (Popitz 1992). In his view, when power becomes institutionalized or, as he puts it, solidified (Popitz 1992: 234), its scope, validity or intensity increase (Popitz 1992: 235). Popitz formulated five steps of institutionalization of social power to rule. The first step he calls *sporadic power*. It occurs occasionally, and its repetition is not guaranteed. This is what Weber means by saying that power is sociologically amorphous. It means that it can be carried out in any context by anyone (Weber 1972: 28). In order to become more institutionalized, resources of power must be available and situations must be repeatable. Also, the executing side needs to be able to offer repeatable benefits and possess the means to immobilize the dependent party (Popitz 1992: 237f.) The second step is *normalizing power*. This kind means that rulers can not only reach submission in particular cases but standardize it. This is the case when all four mentioned conditions are fulfilled (Popitz 1992: 239). Obedience is then normatively consolidated, whether the desired behavior of the obedient is internally accepted or not. So, from a situational here-and-now obedience, it becomes an always-when-obedience (Popitz 1992: 239). The third step is called *positionalizing* of power and means that specific functions of normalizing power are condensed to a power position that is independent of certain individuals. In Popitz's view, this step is where power starts being rule (Anter 2012: 85). He describes that the most powerful incentive for positionalizing of power is the wish to pass on power. The rules, as to how this is done, are the riskiest hurdle in the positionalizing of power (Popitz 1992: 245). At this stage, questions of safety and peace become important, so that the positions of a judge (to mediate between fighting parties) and of the military leader develop (Popitz 1992: 247). The forth step is called the *development of structures of position* which is the establishment of apparatuses of rule. It means that apparatuses of rule evolve that are intended to be long-term relationships of power and are thus connected to a functioning system of supplying supporters (Popitz 1992: 254). Typical for the fourth step in the model is a long-term division of labor that turns into positions that are transferrable to different individuals. Normally at this

stage, there is a territory that is controlled (Popitz 1992: 258). The fifth step is *state power*. Rule is centralized and accepted. A central structure of position executes its entitlement to monopolizing certain functions: rule-making, jurisdiction and norm execution (Imbusch 1998: 15). This stage Popitz calls the *normalization of centralized rule* (Veralltäglichung zentralisierter Herrschaft; highlight in the original, here translated by M.H. ibid.).

When it comes to answering the question, how the few can rule the many, the privileged seem to have the capability to organize their interests better (Popitz 1979: 9). If this state is achieved, the negatively privileged have a much harder time organizing solidarity among each other. They need to have their goals and hopes much clearer in their minds than the privileged group and follow them disproportionately in comparison to the privileged (Popitz 1979: 13). The internal recognition of an order of power by the underprivileged and the oppressed may seem absurd, but there is one advantage that this has in contrast to resisting the order: predictability of the order. The dominant as well as the dominated seek the feeling of predictability (Popitz 1979: 35). The longer the order exists, the more its participants gain an interest in keeping it up, as they have invested in it (Popitz 1979: 36). So, the stability of an order seems to be regarded as an end in itself. The impression of legitimacy can hereby continue for much longer than the social order it was the consequence of. Popitz mentions the example of the German aristocracy, which is still perceived as important and powerful (Popitz 1979: 16). One can also think of traces of colonial thought in nowadays reasoning.

To summarize Popitz's thoughts, the connection between power and rule is that power might be executed once without the possibility to repeat the same. Rule is the more institutionalized form that one can think of as a scale. The ruling group gradually gains advantages over the ruled. Power positions become more and more depersonalized in the course of this. In his view then, the monopoly on the use of force is the pinnacle of this process.

In theorizing rule in International Relations where there is no monopoly on force, it seems logical to look at processes of positionalizing, i.e. institutionalization of power. If the sovereignty or the existence of a world government ceases to be a necessary condition for the possible existence of rule in the international realm,

milder forms of institutionalization should be looked at as forms of rule. Popitz's concept contributes to this. In the frame of mind of Popitz's work, super- and subordination are used as asymmetrical expressions of power between actors. Super- and subordination can thus be situational. On the other hand, in this work, rule and obedience are their perpetuated counterparts.

Therefore, this work accepts Popitz's view on power and rule as a scale and stipulates that rule can be defined by signs of positionalization that go beyond situational power. The assumption is that transnational rule can be defined as somewhere in between situational power and the monopoly on the use of force. It is, however, not possible to define theoretically, at which point the International Relations researcher should see the threshold of where rule begins. This definition can only be carried out by empirical research.

2.1.5 Foucault's Understanding of Power and Rule

As mentioned, for an understanding of rule which is open enough to function as a basis for empirical research of transnational rule, a concept is needed which can include ruling practices which are not executed by state actors. For this aspect, Foucault's understanding of governmentality is helpful. Thus, Foucault's understanding of power and rule is the basis for further theorizing and helps to formulate a working definition of rule, which will be formulated in Chapter 3. Foucault's oeuvre is divided in different phases in which his understanding of power changed (Bröckling et al. 2011a). Foucault's focus changed from disciplinary power, which works on the body and thus forms subjects, to an understanding of governmentality (Bröckling et al. 2011a). In the following, Foucault's understanding of power, rule and governmentality is described.

In Foucault's reading, power is not only restrictive, but also productive. As well as limiting a subject's possible actions, it also produces the very subject itself (subjection; see Schäfer 2013: 143). Foucault says that "power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (Foucault 1977: 94). In his conception, power ceases to be a relationship between a superior and a subordinate but is distributed in society (Daase and De-

itelhoff 2014: 8). It is relational and not a substance that can be possessed (Lemke 2009). In Foucault's reading, power is not bound to any structure, but is present in all human relationships. Also, it is not solely a negative trait, but neutral. Foucault calls power a *strategic game of freedoms* and differentiates rule/domination from this (Lemke 2009: 480).

> States of rule and domination are in contrast to power solidified power relations that restrict alternative actions and inhibit freedoms. The existence of relations of rule means that a group in society was able to block power relations and install a permanent asymmetry (Lemke 2009: 481).

That means, also in Foucault's understanding, rule is a consolidated form of power. In between power as free flowing and rule as consolidated, Foucault describes governmentality.

Governmentality was a neologism, which was constructed out of the French words *governer*, which means to govern, and *mentalité*, which describes modes of thought (Lemke 2001: 191). This combination expresses the need to study the political rationality behind governing (ibid.). Foucault shows that in history, government was a much broader term than it is contemporarily. It was used for "problems of self-control, guidance of the family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul etc." (Lemke 2001: 191). Foucault uses governing in this broad meaning and calls it the conduct of conducts, which includes self-governing as well as governing others. Foucault wants to show how the modern (neoliberal) state and the modern (autonomous) individual have constituted each other in their emergence (Lemke 2001: 191). "From the perspective of governmentality, government refers to a continuum, which extends from political government right through to forms of self-regulation, namely 'technologies of the self" as Foucault calls them" (Lemke 2001: 201).

That is how the governmentality perspective opens the view for practices of power which are not exercised by the state itself, but show that the boundary between state and society itself is an effect of governmentality. Foucault offers a perspective, which shows the freedom in neoliberalism as an effect of government, rather than its opposite. In neoliberal societies, subjects are rather governed "through their freedom" (Bröckling et al. 2011a). Not every action is viewed as political, but politics is not restricted to polity, politics and policy (Bröckling et al. 2011a).

Foucault's contribution is of importance to this work, because he draws attention to practices of power which are not necessarily directly linked to official political channels. Also, the governmentality perspective shows that power can be seen to be a continuum between free-flowing situational instances (see Chapter 2.1.4) and rule which Foucault describes as consolidated power. This work argues that states of relative consolidation should be describable as instances of rule. In this view, governmentality helps understanding *how* power can become consolidated.

By looking to Weber, Marx, Popitz and Foucault, it became clear that for the research into transnational forms of rule, a concept is needed which does not preclude empirical cases by implying a normative judgement. It needs to define rule through the consolidation of power and is therefore independent from the monopoly to force. An understanding of rule is needed which sees the execution of power as a specific form of practices which are independent from the quality ascribed to the actor.

2.2 Understandings of Power and Rule in International Relations

In this part of the Chapter, first, the classical schools of International Relations are looked at for their understanding of rule in international relations. Then, works specifically on rule in IR are summarized. At the end of the Chapter, a working definition on rule is given, which is normatively unbiased and open enough to serve as a basis for research on transnational rule.

Similarly to other social sciences, in International Relations the state used to be the sole realm of rule. Therefore, the international system was seen as a realm of power exclusively (Schimmelfennig 1998). As international politics shows tendencies of transnationalization, it is of interest to IR theory, if and how rule can be a valuable category for politics beyond the nation state. Governance beyond the nation state follows other logics than rule in nation states because of the absence of a monopoly on the use of force. Thus, theory building needs to answer to this in innovative ways.

In realism, which was the dominant theoretical school in the 20th century in IR, power is seen as "the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they would otherwise not" (Barnett and Duvall 2005). That is why in realist

works the paradox of power (disconnect between power and outcome in international politics) is often the center of attention (see Baldwin 1979). Liberals and constructivists on the other hand try to show how realist power variables are not responsible for certain outcomes to prove their point (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Barnett and Duvall criticize this and claim that apart from realist approaches, power is not well theorized in IR. They on the other hand, outline a taxonomy along two axes (specific/direct and diffuse/indirect). The four forms of power they identify are compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 39). So, also in International Relations there is no standardized understanding of power that is shared by all schools of the discipline. However, Barnett and Duvall have contributed to opening the understanding of power across different theoretical schools.

Theories writing about domination have already made their view on rule clear, because the concept itself implies illegitimacy (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 4). An understanding of rule as an empirical phenomenon, which is neither automatically legitimate nor illegitimate is still to be formulated. Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) state that the classical IR schools of thought imply a certain legitimacy bias. Liberals tend to look at rule as legitimate, whereas critical works tend to look at it as illegitimate. In this work, rule is used as an umbrella term which describes all types of structured power relations, regardless if they are of an official or unofficial, political or social kind. To become able to detect rule in the international sphere, where it can take unusual shapes and be executed by atypical agents, it seems practical to keep an open mind in formulating concepts, in order not to theoretically exclude empirically important instances. In the 21st century, many everyday practices will relate to international relations, so the use of a broad term is necessary.

2.2.1 Rule in Realism?

As mentioned, realism used to be a very dominant school of thought in International Relations. Therefore, it has influenced the discipline greatly, especially in its take on power.

From a neorealist view there are two ordering principles for political systems: hierarchy and anarchy, the latter being the relevant one for the international system (Krell 2009: 157). Because there is no entity which has the monopoly on the use of force on the international level, the international system is seen as anarchic. Basically the absence of a world state is the basis for the anarchy assumption (Waltz 1979). Therefore, in a realist view there can be no rule in the international sphere because there is no overarching executive power and no formal hierarchy, which would be defining factors for rule in a realist reading (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 4). In realism, the absence of rule is the prerequisite of international relations and power is the central explanatory variable for processes of international politics (Schimmelfennig 1998: 317). "Nationally, the force of a government is exercised in the name of right and justice. Internationally, the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and advantage" (Waltz 1979: 112).

2.2.1.1 Absence of rule in anarchy

Generally, realism sees power political competition as the central political process under the conditions of anarchy. It is thus hypothesized: The higher the concentration of power in the international system, the higher the possibility of peace and cooperation (Schimmelfennig 1998: 321). Hence, for great powers, hegemony in the system is the goal to achieve.

Rule from a realist point of view means that there must be an entity, which can force an actor to do what another actor wants it to do. Waltz describes anarchy like this:

> The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic (Waltz 1979: 88).

The basic difference between realist and other accounts is that realists look at the formal side of power relations. States are formally to be regarded equals, because of the norm of sovereignty.

In a realist view, certain strategies are employed by major powers and other states to have the best possible position in the anarchical state system. Realist accounts reflect on *balancing* (building its own resources) and *bandwagoning* (following the powerful state) as power strategies vis-à-vis other states in order to defend

their power position or even enhance it (Walt 1987). In realism (Morgenthau 2006: 179) and in neorealism, from the point of view of the individual state, balance of power is preferable to *bandwagoning*, because *balancing* prevents another state from becoming too powerful. Hence, realism expects a fragile balance of power as a result of power politics between great powers (Schimmelfennig 1998: 321). Wohlforth et al. describe power concentration on one state as neither bad nor especially surprising. They refute balance-of-power theory (Wohlforth et al. 2007: 179).

Mearsheimer calls himself an "offensive realist", because in his view, states must be aggressive to survive (Mearsheimer 2001). He does not see how cooperation in international institutions should foster peace, because they merely mirror existing power asymmetries and have thus no influence on state behavior when it comes to war and peace (Mearsheimer 1994-1995). Because of balance of power mechanisms, from a realist point of view, a centralization of political power in the sense of a monopoly on violence is not on the horizon on the international level. So, rule cannot be found and is therefore not conceptualized (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014).

2.2.1.2 Material basis for power in (neo)realism

In realist accounts, power is based on material resources, and power differences between states can be explained based on these. Therefore, the *paradox of unrealized power* is often reflected upon (Baldwin 1979; 2013). It means that states that have the necessary resources to prevail in an international dispute often did not do so, or did not to the expected degree. If power is the direct expression of material resources, as neo-realist accounts presume, the outcomes of negotiations must be more predictable than they effectively are. Baldwin (1979) explains it thus: "[…], failure to translate alleged "potential power" (or power "re- sources") into actual power may be explained in terms of malfunctioning conversion processes." (Baldwin 1979: 163). For him, a lack of skill or will must be at play if a powerful actor cannot fulfil its power potential. It was acknowledged early on that the mere possession of a power resource did not automatically mean that the possessing party would automatically win either a negotiation or even a violent struggle (Baldwin 1979). What was a useful resource of power in one policy field could

easily be a liability in another. This is termed *fungibility problem* (highlight added; Baldwin 2013: 278).

Barnett and Duvall (2005) write that realist work is important for IR because it focuses on power. On the other hand, other schools should not fall into the trap of wanting to explain outcomes solely by differentiating themselves from the realist take on power and thus neglect the concept (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 41). Barnett and Duvall argue not only for balanced attention to resource-based power conceptions but also to widen one's theoretical view beyond that. To take the material basis of power into account is valuable for this work. There are undeniably other driving forces for action and there are other bases for power than material resources. This has been theorized thoroughly by many. However, it should not be denied that power can have a material basis which can be an important factor in explaining outcomes. The importance of the material basis of power is henceforth accepted for this work.

At the same time, the realist school of thought is very occupied with questions of power *between* states. In the period in which realism and neo-realism were most popular - the Cold War - it was vital to understand interstate power politics. The way power is understood though does not seem adequate to understand power and rule in the postnational constellation (Habermas 1998) of the 21st century. The realist reading denies various relations of domination and submission which transcend national borders. Anarchy was called *the* ordering principle to distinguish between the domestic and the international political sphere (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 301). In an anarchical understanding of the international system though, ruling is per se conceptually impossible (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 5). Realist research focuses on a resource-based analysis of interstate politics, which is not the goal of this work. As the development of an approach to the research on rule in IR will be approached here and in the realist perspective, transnational rule is not accounted for, realist works will not be consulted on questions of power. Nevertheless, the importance of the analysis of material resources is accepted.

To summarize, realism does not directly help in conceptualizing transnational rule. However, realism's focus on power strategies and the material basis of power is seen as extremely valuable for the analysis of rule in international relations.

Material asymmetries between states and other entities will play an important role in analyzing transnational rule. Whereas realism's focus on specific empirical phenomena is seen as valuable contribution, certain epistemic assumptions are not shared in this work. If the researcher approaches empirical issues using anarchy as a preformulated assumption, her focus will be on specific empirical issues and some conclusions will be predetermined. For research on transnational rule a more fluid picture of 'the international' is needed. For the purpose of this book, a more practice-oriented view of power is helpful. Also, realism sees rule is mainly legitimate, but nation state bound. Its strong normative judgements about the legitimacy of power are also an aspect which this book refutes.

2.2.2 The Liberal View on Politics Beyond the Nation State

Anarchy as it was framed by realists was generally understood as an absence of "legitimate authority" (Hurd 1999). Exactly this point is being challenged by liberals in IR who see authority in the international system as given. As soon as it can be said that legitimate institutions exist in the international system exuding authority, there can be no anarchy (Hurd 1999: 401).

In liberalism, the international system is anarchic insofar as there is no force monopoly beyond the nation state. However, liberals see anarchy as less influential on international processes than realists. They see international anarchy as complemented by a non-rule based normative order. So, power politics is limited by interdependence between states and international organizations (Schimmelfennig 1998: 317).

2.2.2.1 International Order

Theoretical approaches associated with liberalism in International Relations came to be popular in the 1970s, when great changes in the international system became apparent and theory-building changed accordingly. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the first and the second oil crisis were examples for such world economic changes (Spindler 2007: 205). *Power and Interdependence in World Politics* (written 1977) by Keohane and Nye was not a complete break with the realist tradition. The argument they put forward in the book is that interdependence in international politics had increased noticeably. But from their point

of view this did not automatically mean that world politics would be more peaceful than it had been before (Keohane and Nye 2001: 9). Keohane writes: "Thus, even a riding absolute level of cooperation may be overwhelmed by discord, as increased interdependence and governmental intervention create more opportunities for policy conflict (Keohane 1984). Interdependence is not to be confused with interconnectedness. In Keohane and Nye's view, parties were only interdependent if there are costly effects of interactions involved (Keohane and Nye 2001: 8). Interdependence functions as an intervening variable when it comes to power resources and policy outcomes (Spindler 2007: 207). Keohane and Nye (1977) were influential in formulating the liberal institutionalism in International Relations (Tömmel 2007).

Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society* is part of the so called English School which was established in the United Kingdom (Morisse-Schilbach 2007). Bull describes the international system as an international society in which states are the main actors, but are in relations of cooperation in international institutions such as international law. A society of states is formed by a group of states which acknowledges that common interests and values exist. When this group feels bound by a shared set of rules in their dealings with each other and cooperation in shared institutions, Bull calls this the formation of an international society (Bull 1995). Others share the view that despite the international system being anarchical, some kind of order exists. Lisa L. Martin for example looks at multilateralism as one organizing form for states to conduct their relations, which structures international politics (Martin 1992). Wendt argues that interaction on the state level changes state identities and state interests. For him, as a constructivist, intersubjective dynamics shape world views and therefore world politics (Wendt 1994). He sees states as capable of collective identity formation (Wendt 1994: 388). Some academics even see the formation of a world state as a possibility. Wendt argues that a world state is inevitable (Wendt 2003) whereas Kelsen sees international law as an important means to reach a world federal state after a slow and long process of diminishing cultural differences (Kelsen 1944).

The work by James N. Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (1992) was one of the first to

describe the exercise of politics beyond the nation state in the international sphere as global governance (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Until recently, liberal works on global governance were very prominent in the field, especially in Germany (Schlichte 2015a). They focused on core concepts of cooperation, integration and governance. Global governance was described as efficient production of collectively binding decisions that are supposed to produce collective goods (Schlichte 2015a: 114). The global governance discourse was critiqued to be blind to the mechanisms of power which was seen to be theoretically and conceptually inadequate (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Ole Jacob Sending and Iver B. Neumann critique the existing literature on global governance as misinterpreting the empirical facts. From their point of view, it is not the case that NGOs and other civil society actors gain influence while governments lose power. They contend that it is governments who have delegated certain tasks to civil society actors. The distribution of tasks is then a mechanism of "governmentality". That means that governance should be analyzed as following the rationality of government (Sending and Neumann 2006; also for governmentality in global governance see Guzzini and Neumann 2012).

So, liberalists strongly focus on interdependence and cooperation and therefore focus on specific empirical cases.

2.2.2.2 Authority of International Organizations

In recent years, research and theorizing about international organizations has increased markedly. This is the case because their number and power seem to have increased lately.

Ian Hurd writes that the question of how social control works is especially important for IR because there is no overarching sovereign power. He outlines three general reasons that actors can have for obeying a rule. Firstly, fear of being punished, secondly, self-interest and thirdly, he/she feels the rule is legitimate (Hurd 1999). The underlying question for him is, why do states comply with rules made by institutions that do not have the power to punish them in the case of non-compliance (Hurd 1999). The phenomenon of international legitimacy is of great importance and in his view, it is not considered enough in IR (Hurd 2007: 1). Hurd defines legitimacy as "the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institu-

tion ought to be obeyed (Hurd 1999). In his view, if actors do believe that an international rule or institution is legitimate, it becomes an authority. He refutes the anarchy assumption, as it is based on exactly the premise of absence of international authority (Hurd 1999: 382). He writes about the connection between authority and legitimacy:

> An institution that exercises legitimated power is in a position of authority. […] In international relations, this means that a legitimated international organization possesses sovereign authority" (Hurd 2007: 3).

Compliance by states which are not controlled by a superordinate power thus becomes a normal phenomenon (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 6).

Liberal accounts in IR often examine international organizations' influence on international processes and on national policies. In this context, Michael Zürn also writes about authority. Zürn describes a phenomenon called politicization, which means that there is resistance against and increased utilization of international organizations (Zürn 2013: 9ff.). Politicization of international institutions and organizations is, in Zürn's view, a sign that those affected by their policies see them as an expression of increasing political rule in the international realm (Zürn 2013a). For him, the increase in power of international organizations is not a sign for rule. In his reading, rule needs to be backed by an executive entity of force (Zürn 2012: 48). Zürn et al. see politicization as a sign of authority that international organizations have gained (Zürn et al. 2012). They describe how sovereignty was something that major powers never respected fully and which was increasingly undermined by processes in international organizations that are not in accordance with the consensus principle or the principle of non-intervention (Zürn et al. 2012). They argue that "international institutions have authority when the addressees of their policies recognize that these institutions can make competent judgments and binding decisions" (Zürn et al. 2012). The main claim of their article is that political authority beyond the nation state requires legitimation and results in politicization (Zürn et al. 2012). The concept of politicization has two facets, which are closely linked to legitimacy. As far as the political authority of international organizations is perceived as legitimate, a utilization of them will take place. If said authority is perceived as illegitimate, it will provoke resistance (Zürn et al. 2012). Zürn et al. criticize Hurd for equating authority with legitimacy (Zürn

et al. 2012). They formulate two layers by which authority can be recognized: The first is that an authority's existence is necessary and the second is the "acknowledgement of the rightful exercise of authority in the context of a given stock of normative beliefs in a community" (Zürn et al. 2012). So, the mere belief in an authority's legitimacy does not make it legitimate but the *justifiability in the belief system of the affected*. So in Zürn et al.'s view, international authority can be legitimate to different degrees (Zürn et al. 2012). Authority is executed in various governance areas: formulation of rules and decision making, rule interpretation, enforcement of rules in the case of non-compliance, and direct implementation conducted by international agencies (Zürn et al. 2012). Increased authority is seen in the fact that around two thirds of IOs which include at least one major power, can vote by majority (Zürn et al. 2012). Zürn et al. formulate two different kinds of politicization which correspond with legitimacy. Firstly, international organizations violating principles of legitimacy such as transparency, fairness, and inclusiveness will face more polity politicization (resistance against the organization itself). Organizations perceived as legitimate will face predominantly policy politicization which means that societal actors will try to influence the content of the decisions and thus utilize the organization (Zürn et al. 2012).

In Zürn's recent monography, he outlines a more balanced account of world politics as

> embedded in a normative and institutional structure that contains hierarchies and power inequalities and thus *endogenously* produces contestation, resistance and distributional struggles (Zürn 2018a).

Zürn makes clear that because global governance includes normativity, it does not make it automatically peaceful or just. He points out that also normative arguments are being made strategically and that the global governance system includes violence and injustice as do other political systems (Zürn 2018b: 139). In the book, Zürn shows under which conditions global governance deepens and under which it declines (Zürn 2018a). Zürn delivers a comprehensive book, which avoids the legitimation bias of some liberal works. He does not however look at global governance as a form of rule.

Jürgen Neyer sees international rule as a phenomenon which is largely synonymous with what Zürn calls authority. He describes governing beyond the nation

state as highly fragmented and dependent on the respective policy field (Neyer 2004: 18). He calls for an understanding of rule that resolves the dichotomy of national and international politics (Neyer 2004: 20). In economic relationships rule can be found when one party can make another party do something that is against their own interest (Neyer 2004: 25). Rule can be formal, i.e., based on transparent and maybe even legally codified processes. It can on the other hand be the product of informal actions that can evolve spontaneously and are not codified (Neyer 2004: 25). It can describe a dyadic relationship between two actors, but it can also describe social associations (Neyer 2004: 26). He quotes Weber who says that a certain minimum of wanting to obey is part of rule (Neyer 2004: 26). Legal rule seems to be a form of rule that is important for the analysis of the phenomenon (Neyer 2004: 27). Neyer says that rule can exist when there are relations that are institutionally perpetuated and are based on processes which are recognized as legitimate. In this relationship one party (or both) need(s) to have the authority to formulate binding regulations (political competence) and that the other party complies with this by adapting his/her individual actions accordingly (factual acceptance) (Neyer 2004: 28). Neyer sees political rule as a combination of competence, acceptance, and legitimacy which can vary to any degree on the spectrum they form (Neyer 2004). Normative considerations are thus also a defining part of rule in his work.

Liberal accounts in IR have steered attention in many important directions. Firstly, they helped International Relations gradually move away from the anarchy assumption, which laid the ground for the paradigm change towards the paradigm of rule in IR, which this work contributes to. Secondly, liberal accounts draw attention to governing beyond the nation state and the wide-ranging effect international institutions have on citizens' daily life. Also, they describe how far their power reaches into national sovereignty. These are important empirical processes, which can be described as phenomena of international ruling. The power executed by international organizations is structured, at times asymmetrically (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014) and has manifest consequences for the affected parties. Speaking with Popitz (1992), their power is neither bound to persons, nor is their power sporadic or situational. Their power is positionalized and that is why it can be called rule.

Liberal accounts are concerned with authority which is mostly defined as a legitimate form of rule. They look at institutionalized forms of power in international relations which tend to be suspected to be legitimate. Some make legitimacy a defining factor for deciding if a form of power can be called authority. Liberal works often do not make a distinction between legitimacy and obedience. In this work, legitimacy is *not* a defining factor for rule, but a concomitant one. Obedience is regarded as a hint to legitimacy. It might also mean that the affected of a certain kind of rule cannot see a better alternative because the costs of revolution are too high[6]. As a result, from the liberal point of view, illegitimate forms of rule are widely ignored[7].

To summarize, liberal works in International Relations are often focused on researching competencies of international organizations and the authority they execute. The normative take on the power of IOs as legitimate authority, which is often used, can be seen as a premature judgement about legitimacy, which will shape the researchers view. Therefore also, certain empirical observations seem predetermined, and the view of other cases obfuscated. Thus, whereas this work sees the focus on international organizations as a useful one, it takes a different epistemic position toward research. A practice-theoretical view on rule attempts to label macro concepts such as 'authority' very late in the research process. The labelling of macro concepts is thus *a result of research*, not the starting point. From a practice-theoretical perspective, judgements about legitimacy can also be a result of research, not a starting assumption to deduce empirical results from.

[6] Popitz describes that the ruler and the ruled have a certain interest in keeping the order up, because of a certain inertia and wish for stability (1992).

[7] The German Nazi regime 1933-18945 could be considered an example for an illegitimate form of rule. Even though a large part of the German population in 1945 believed in its legitimacy, presumably also a large part of the population followed their leaders out of fear of their lives.

Another example for a form of rule which could be seen to be illegitimate are the North-South or postcolonial relations. It can be suspected that not all forms of obedience in that field are carried out because the structures are believed to be legitimate, but out of necessity, stark economic asymmetry and coercion.

2.2.3 Domination in Critical IR Theories

The third important school of IR that needs mentioning is 'critical accounts' in IR. These are generally based on Marx's work. Marx analyzed rule through constellations of interest. Specifically the constellation of classes based on ownership structures is of importance here (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 7). In capitalism, ideology legitimizes the specific constellation of classes. One important theoretician on whom many accounts in IR are based, is Gramsci. In Gramsci's work, ideological power and rule were connected in the concept of hegemony (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 7), which was influential for IR. Gramsci sees the state not only as consisting of police, military and administrative apparatus, but as the mentioned institutions in combination with civil society, which together can be hegemonic. For Gramsci, civil society is where hegemonic consent is produced primarily (Buckel and Fischer-Lescano 2007a). This is where self-subjugation under rule takes place (Buckel and Fischer-Lescano 2007a).

2.2.3.1 Neo-Gramscian approaches in IR

At the beginning of the 1980s, works in IR based on Gramsci's writings became largely influential. At the time, politics among states was seen to be shaped by anarchy (Rupert 2009). Especially Robert Cox juxtaposed this picture of a state-centric view on IR with a Gramscian vocabulary. Cox describes a difference between 'problem-solving theory' and critical theory. Whereas 'problem-solving theory sees the world as a given entity, critical theory does not take constructs such as the state for granted (Cox 1995). For Cox, states in international relations are not actors that consist of foreign ministries but are complex entities in which society and the state are inherently interwoven. He calls them "state/society complexes" (Rupert 2009: 176). Cox argues that states, social forces and world orders are connected. Social forces are not strictly bound by nation states, but they may as well transcend national boundaries (Cox 1981). When social forces change in accordance with modes of production by transnationalization, this has an impact on the world order (Cox 1981: 149). Cox mainly uses the Gramscian concept of hegemony to describe his take on international relations. In contrast to realist accounts, hegemony does not mean domination in the form of 'power over'. For Gramsci, hegemony is a form of power which is backed by a possible use of force which is latent but is primarily based on consent (Rupert 2009: 177). In this read-

ing, it is social relations which are at the core of changes at the international level (Cox 1983). In contrast to a realist reading of hegemony, the Gramscian reading explicitly includes civil society. Cox's view on world hegemony is thus:

> World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries - rules which support the dominant mode of production (Cox 2005: 44).

Gill describes hegemony as "the foundation of a system with relatively universal appeal" (Gill 1995). Hegemony on the global scale has to be the philosophy of a dominant (hegemonic) group which becomes a widely shared *world* view that is implied in art, economy, politics and law (Buckel and Fischer-Lescano 2007b). Whereas Cox looks at state/society complexes as the center of hegemony, other works focus on other actors. Leslie Sklair for example criticizes works on globalization as fatalistic. When depicting globalization as external to human control, he describes this literature as misguided. He contends that there are specific actors who profit from globalization who work through institutions they control to shape it reflecting their interests (Sklair 2001). Murphy looks at international organizations and how their number has increased recently. He describes in his work how they are part of a historic bloc. He describes how IOs are the expression of interests of liberal internationalists (Murphy 2004). Buckel and Fischer-Lescano describe international tribunals as global juridical hegemonic apparatuses (Buckel und Fischer-Lescano 2007b). Generally, one can say that in critical IR accounts there is huge debate on not only who the drivers and profiteers, but also the agents of globalization are. In so far, they draw attention to power and rule being phenomena which involve specific actors who have specific interests, even if power might be positionalized. These are important empirical phenomena to keep in mind when analyzing transnational rule.

Neo-Gramscian approaches in IR make the important contribution of drawing attention to the non-state level of international politics. They highlight how rule can work through consent, which is produced predominantly in civil society. However, the purpose of this book is to develop a concept to enable the researcher to a finer grained view on the workings of power and rule than the thinking in hegemony and historic blocks. From the perspective of this work, the same critique toward realism and liberalism is true for critical accounts based on Gramsci.

The existence of hegemony taken as an assumption at the beginning of research is seen to predetermine empirical results. From a practice-theoretical view, the *result* of research could be that certain practices lead to the development, perpetuation, or decline of a hegemonic constellation. Also, the implied illegitimacy of relations of rule is seen to be made prematurely in critical accounts.

2.2.3.2 Feminist and Poststructural Works in IR

Critical works which focus on identity- or culture-based forms of rule seek to find out the patterns of social domination which lie behind the official forms of codified norms such as laws and regulations:

> Some norms are so deeply woven into the fabric of social life, in fact, that they seem 'natural' and are taken for granted, though even these naturalized conventions, such as the norm of racial inequality, likely had active entrepreneurs at some moment far distant in time. It is precisely this deep, widely shared ranking of actors that creates the organized inequality behind the broad, structural, or institutional conception of hierarchy […] (Lake 2017).

Many works in IR refer to Foucault who is representative of post-structural accounts. His work was outlined in Chapter 2.1.5. Whereas traditional theory on power was occupied by the question how the few can rule the many and thus, how obedience is produced, Foucault is interested in the opposite. By looking at the dissident he wants to find out what legality was seen to be; by analyzing the mentally ill, he wants to grasp how sanity was defined etc.

Foucault says that in these cases of economic, social institutional or sexual rule, it is difficult to see where resistance could be formed (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 8). However, resistance in his view is possible in most power relations and even states of domination, because the subjected often still has the chance to flee, strike, or end her life (Foucault 2005: 890). For Foucault, rule is completely independent of questions of legitimacy or consent (Lemke 2009: 481) in contrast to Weber.

Critical accounts in IR have contributed greatly to an understanding of illegitimate forms of rule which exist and are important in the international realm, such as gender inequalities, neo-colonial relations and exploitation (Seth 2013). From critical accounts we get a broad understanding of what transnational rule can entail, and that it is of utmost importance to look at informal, non-official forms of

asymmetry. By describing hegemonic forms of rule, it is made clear that ruling is not only something done by the state, but that it is also a matter of (transnational) societal actors. Also, it becomes clear that rule does not have to work through violence, but that it can be relatively consensual.

In critical accounts rule is often described as very structural and working through language and cultural practice where it is hard to detect and thus to critique (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 8). This work sees Foucault as a valuable starting point for the theorizing of transnational rule because he makes clear that practices of power which can have a consolidating effect, are independent of the state as an entity. No monopoly on the use of force is necessary to create consolidated forms of power to varying degrees which are here called rule. Governmentality is, however, not a fully developed theory. It is a perspective which Foucault developed using a few empirical examples. Therefore, there is no distinctive governmentality methodology (Bröckling et al. 2011a). A practice-theoretical account on rule thus takes potentially governmental practices as a starting point and looks to Bourdieu for factors which can help analyzing rule, especially subtle forms of rule.

From the descriptions of classical IR theory, it can be concluded that the difference between classical International Relations and a practice-theoretical view on rule in IR lies not in the interest in empirical cases, but in the epistemic position. The practice-theoretical position sees social interaction as the most valuable entry point into research and seeks to interpret the working of macro phenomena – if at all – at the end of a research process.

2.2.4 Accounts of Rule in IR

The classical schools of IR have contributed greatly to an understanding of power relationships in the international realm, which can take manifold shapes. They have, however, seldomly termed them rule. As the notion of rule in International Relations could not be established in the discipline's discourse, there are not so many works that focus on the topic. Nevertheless, the works that do exist, offer many interesting insights on the topic.

Writings on rule in IR are often concerned with systemic questions of the modi of rule. Onuf and Klink mapped out a concept of rules and rule in IR as early as 1989

(Onuf and Klink 1989)[8], but were not heeded much because of an unfavorable discourse situation, which was dominated by the anarchical conceptualization of IR (Onuf 2014). They discuss, if and in which cases rule is organized hierarchically, heterarchically or hegemonically (Onuf and Klink 1989). Others reflect on the system's increasingly heterarchical structure (Donnelly 2009), whereas the concepts of *power over* and *power to* (Allen 1998) as well as the taxonomy of power in IR by Barnett and Duvall (2005) work on very abstract levels.

Chapter 2 shows that terms used to describe power and its consolidated forms often imply meanings about their perceived legitimacy. It was argued above that *rule* should be used to imply apparently legitimate and illegitimate forms of consolidated power. Daase (2018) argues that International Relations scholarship has been too focused on formal institutions and the development of legal structures of cooperation. He claims that after 9/11 even in security policy, new, informal fora of cooperation were used (310). Daase describes informalization taking place on the level of modi of cooperation and informalization of bindingness. That means that settings of cooperation as well as the results of which, are to varying degrees formal or informal (Daase 2018: 312). Daase contends that a comprehensive analysis of international politics needs to take formal *and* informal structures, formalizing as well as informalizing tendencies into account (Daase 2018: 310).

As increasingly more private actors execute regulating functions in international relations and an informalization of settings and results can be observed, it would exclude a vast array of empirical cases to focus on formal forms of consolidated power. Thus, in this work the term *rule* encompasses formal and informal forms of consolidated power. Rule is used as an umbrella term, encompassing all forms of legitimacy as well as all types of formality. This prevents the researcher from conceptually excluding empirical cases using a specific term. Hereby the danger of legitimacy bias as well as actor centrism can be reduced. Actor centrism describes the focus on the involved actors in a case to decide if it is a case of transnational rule. This might obfuscate changes in actors and theoretically preclude

[8] Onuf spells out the argument of the article from 1989 in his monograph "World of our Making. Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations" (2013) in detail.

the researcher from discovering new empirical constellations. Actor centrism is further discussed in Chapter 3.3.1.1.

2.2.4.1 Early examples of Works on Rule in International Relations

A seminal work on rule in International Relations is "Anarchy, Authority, Rule" by Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink (1989). This article was a very early attempt at establishing rule as a concept in International Relations.

For Onuf and Klink, rule is the more encompassing notion and goes beyond the divide of authority which was largely reserved for domestic policy and anarchy, which was applied to international politics (Onuf and Klink 1989: 149f.). Onuf and Klink reflect on the three types of legitimate rule formulated by Weber and state that they are based on the historical experience of rulers in localized contexts, which are not directly applicable to international relations. They therefore develop three different kinds of rule especially for international relations. The first is hierarchy, the second hegemony and the third they call heteronomy, based on Kant's moral philosophy. (Onuf and Klink 1989: 150). Heteronomy for them is the opposite of autonomy (Onuf and Klink 1989). Onuf and Klink claim that "[t]he crucial point is that the presumption of autonomy disguises the persistent asymmetry of heteronomous relations" (Onuf and Klink 1989: 150). They thus see international relations as relations of super- and subordination (Onuf and Klink 1989: 150). Onuf and Klink write that the notion of authority as legitimate exercise of power is accepted as a Weberian notion, whereas they say that the term Weber uses is mostly 'Herrschaft' which does not have a direct counterpart in English (Onuf and Klink 1989: 152). Onuf and Klink suggest rule as the counterpart to Herrschaft, because they claim it contains its paradigmatic meaning.

Onuf and Klink's account argues that rule in international relations is executed through rules. They say rules do not need to be formal or enforced to qualify as such (Onuf and Klink 1989: 154). They only need to be generalizable statements including expectations about required or permitted behavior (Onuf and Klink 1989: 156). They describe three types of rules which correspond to types of rule: instruction rules, directive rules and commitment rules. Whereas instruction rules assert the state of affairs, directive rules give orders to secure said state of affairs, and commitment rules turn promises into duties that can be claimed by other

states (Onuf and Klink 1989: 158). In their article, hegemony is described thus: "Hegemonial rule refers to the promulgation and manipulation of instruction-rules by which superordinate actors monopolize meaning which is then passively absorbed by subordinate actors" (Onuf and Klink 1989: 159). The ruled do not recognize that they are in a subordinate position, which is why they cannot think of alternatives to this rule, so the ruling class seems to offer the natural and inevitable state (Onuf and Klink 1989: 159f.). Onuf and Klink describe hierarchy as an arrangement of directive rules, i.e. bureaucracy. Thus, hierarchy is closely connected to Weber in the authors' reading. One entity commands, while an apparatus exists which passes this command to the public (Onuf and Klink 1989: 160). Heteronomy is depicted as a form of rule which functions through contract between the actual ruler and the ruled. Heteronomy corresponds to commitment rules. This social arrangement gives the impression that all participating parties are autonomous. By producing asymmetrical consequences for parties depending on their position, heteronomy obfuscates the dominating nature of this form of rule (Onuf and Klink 1989: 163). These described forms of rule are deeply intertwined and thus difficult to distinguish (Onuf and Klink 1989: 164). Heteronomy was not considered for use in international relations because the liberal paradigm assumes that actors are autonomous (Onuf and Klink 1989: 164). Onuf and Klink describe heteronomy for international relations as follows:

> Formally free and equal agents will always find themselves trapped in heteronomous influence relations because of the asymmetrical opportunity costs that necessarily obtain in systems of exclusive property rights, like international relations. That the structure of opportunity costs is quite stable means that relations of influence are stable too-stable enough to warrant description as relations of super- and subordination. To say this, however, is to switch from the paradigm of anarchy to the paradigm of rule (Onuf and Klink 1989: 169).

Onuf and Klink give two examples of rule in international relations at their time of writing: Soviet-Eastern European relations as an example of hierarchical rule and North-South relationships as an example for heteronomous rule. Whereas the Soviet Union rules through directive rules backed with threats of physical coercion, North-South relationships are heteronomous, because Southerners could formally back out, but are in fact too poor to do so (Onuf and Klink 1989: 170). Hegemony backs these forms of rule and makes them seem inevitable (ibid.). Onuf and Klink see international relations as surprisingly similar to domestic pol-

icy as they are conducted through rules and rule. For them, international relations are "an overlapping web of hierarchical, heteronomous and hegemonial relations of rule" (Onuf and Klink 1989: 170).

Onuf and Klink (1989) is an early example of a work on rule in International Relations which gives important indications of how rule in International Relations can manifest itself. For the application in research, it is too abstract. From a practice-theoretical view, the assessment, whether a form of power is hegemonic, heteronomic, or hierarchic is a possible result of research, not its starting point.

Another example of a scholar thematizing rule in IR is Ulrich Albrecht. He writes about *Herrschaft* regarding International Relations as if it were a standard description of power in International Relations. He describes the norm of sovereignty as a democratic principle applied to international relations being analogous to 'one man one vote' as an amiable fiction. He contends that it is one of the most important utopias in international politics (Albrecht 1996: 155). Albrecht uses the term *Herrschaft* regarding international relations as if it were self-evident to do so. He does not mean that rule in IR is executed through brute force but to the contrary says that everyday international relations are shaped by subtle, smooth processes which expressly do not show any violence openly (Albrecht 1996: 156). He contends that the ruled know their ruler and their interests and thus react with self-censorship which is then a form of submission (ibid.). This connects well with the symbolic violence conception by Bourdieu, which is described below. It includes self-censorship and compliance. Bourdieu says that signs for this might appear in a person's posture or in gestures. Thus, bodily movements or postures can be indicators of this (Albrecht 1996; Rupert 2009). Albrecht's work offers important hints to empirical cases in which resistance will not become obvious, which are nevertheless relevant to questions of rule in International Relations. It shows the significance of a focus on symbolic forms of rule.

2.2.4.2 Hierarchies in International Relations

Some International Relations scholars who refute the anarchy assumption are ones who research hierarchies in International Relations.

Ayse Zaracol (2017a) edited a volume on "Hierarchies in World Politics", in which the concept of hierarchies is first contextualized, then theorized and finally applied to various empirical contexts. Zaracol describes hierarchies as "creat[ing] the actors of world politics and/or their repertoires for action. They also produce the boundaries that define who and what belongs where in world politics" (Zaracol 2017b: 7). Zaracol depicts two main categories of hierarchies: Narrow hierarchies understood as legitimate authority and broad hierarchies, which describe organized inequality (Zaracol 2017b: 13), which is likely to be identity-based. That means that the second form concerns the characteristics of certain people and groups and their corresponding social position. David Lake presents his take on hierarchies (Lake 2017), which is based on Lake 2009. Lake sees hierarchies as relations of super- and subordination, in which the subordinates give rights up in exchange for "the provision of social order" (Zaracol 2017b: 5). The notion of legitimate authority is criticized by Pouliot (2017: 118), who says that authority does not have to be based on recognition through the actors. In contrast to that, it can be based on *misrecognition* (Pouliot 2017: 118) through the actors. Pouliot thus contends that assuming consent would make hierarchy seem too light and voluntaristic, whereas hierarchies weigh heavily on actors, who are surrounded by them (Pouliot 2017).

"Hierarchies in World Politics" shows clearly that there are manifold contexts, which should be considered through the lens of inequality rather than formal equality. It draws attention to authority-based as well as identity-based hierarchies and seeks to shed light on intersections of these in international politics (Zaracol 2017a). For the research on rule in International Relations, it is of utmost importance to keep theis distinction and intersection in mind when looking for cases of transnational rule. In the following, hierarchies are seen as an important example of rule in international relations, which can shed light onto a variety of empirical instances. A hierarchical form of rule is a possible result of many cases for empirical research.

2.2.4.3 Heterarchy as the ordering principle for times of globalization

Nevertheless, this work follows Donnelly's (2017) criticism that anarchy-centrism should not be replaced by a hierarchy-centrism, which implicitly accepts the

Waltzian ordering principles (Donnelly 2017: 243). Also, hierarchy offers many great insights for analysis but excludes other forms of inequality, which can also be considered to be important:

> Hierarchy thus understood includes an important but limited range of authorities, (in)equalities, and forms of rule. Hierarchies are *systems* of stratification and differentiation (not ad hoc, isolated, or purely interactional relations). They involve a rank or *structure* that creates a *body* of ranked persons or things. […] Only when we have a structured system of ranks, levels or grades that differentiate actors as parts of a complex whole – rather than simply array them along a scale of comparison – do we have a hierarchy (highlights in the original; Donnelly 2017: 249).

Even though Donnelly seeks to understand international inequality, he proposes analyzing it by using authority, (in)equality and rule as analytic entry points (Donnelly 2017: 265).

Jack Donnelly describes heterarchy as a more adequate ordering principle for the world order of the 21st century. He contends that anarchy and hierarchy do not express sufficiently *how* the units are ordered (Donnelly 2009). He proposes a model including three different ordering principles which he sees as more useful to describe actual international systems: autarchy, meaning unranked unites among another, single-hierarchy, which is singly ranked and heterarchy, which he describes as multiply ranked (Donnelly 2009). If there is no anarchy, then units must be ranked in some way. That means that superordination and subordination of some kind must be given. Donnelly describes political rank to be a matter of authority and of (material) coercive capabilities (Donnelly 2009). He contends that the informal hierarchy which is based on material capabilities is no less important than the formal hierarchy based on authority (Donnelly 2009). Whereas realist conceptions focused on the formal side of the system, newer concepts seem to be taking the informal side of international relations more into account:

> In the 'Westphalian' system, for example, the formal equality of sovereign states has been combined with substantial, politically vital, material inequality (and often some modest elements of formal inequality as well). That the special rights, powers, privileges, and opportunities of great powers often have been principally informal does not make them unimportant – a point one would have thought realists would want to highlight rather than hide (Donnelly 2009: 59f.).

Donnelly describes heterarchy thus: "Power (capabilities and authority) may be distributed differently in different spatial, functional, or relational domains, producing *multiply ranked ('heterarchic') orders*" (highlight in the original; Donnelly 2009: 63). The term has also been used to describe the organizational structure

of transnational companies (Hedlund and Rolander 1990) and has been used in cybernetics and archeology (Donnelly 2009: 64). Heterarchy is centralized and decentralized and does not entail unranked orders. In contrast to hierarchy, heterarchy has various tops (Donnelly 2009: 64). Donnelly calls hegemony a kind of heterarchic order, which means that one power can guide others that are formally independent and significantly influence their domestic policy (Donnelly 2009: 66). Donnelly quotes Gilpin who claims that hegemony was "the fundamental ordering principle of international relations" (Gilpin 1981: 144) and thus not anarchy (Donnelly 2009: 68). The notion of heterarchy in International Relations can contribute greatly to theorizing of power relations, ordering principles, and international order. Donnelly states that it is a powerful tool for thinking about globalization, because he anticipates a truly post-Westphalian order to be fully heterarchic. This kind of anticipation is not possible if thinking is restricted to anarchy and hierarchy as possible ordering principles (which he claims they are not in the first place; Donnelly 2009: 69).

In this work, the world order is seen as structured through power centers (heterarchy; Donnelly 2009), depending on the policy field and the actors relevant, in which patterned forms of power exist, which can be described as rule. This space is inhabited by state and non-state actors, such as international organizations and transnational corporations as well as individuals. These power centers are structured by multiple formal and identity-based hierarchies, which can intersect (Zaracol 2017a). For actors or groups of actors to gain and reproduce their power and consolidate it, material resources are necessary, even though they do not translate into influence on outcomes one to one (Baldwin 1989). Power and rule can be executed through direct, violent means, but often they work through consensual (Cox 1983) or symbolic (Bourdieu 2005) means. Nevertheless, the contemporary world order can be described as a shifting and changing order. Therefore, this description deduced from the works in IR serves as a heuristic for further theorizing. In this work, it is acknowledged that theory is always situated, and universalization is impossible and not desirable. In praxiography, theories are merely considered to be sensitizing frameworks (Bueger and Gadinger 2018). This is also, what this framework attempts to be.

2.2.4.4 Reconstructing Rule Through Resistance

Several scholars have been concerned as to how rule in IR can be best conceptualized. Some have made suggestions how to conceptualize it, so it would be possible to conduct empirical research on it (e.g. Daase and Deitelhoff 2014).

Klaus Schlichte appeals to IR to not lose sight of historic-dialectic processes when analyzing rule and resistance (Schlichte 2015a). He claims that by looking at historic processes of conflict, it is possible to theoretically grasp the anatomy of political rule (Schlichte 2012: 19). Schlichte proposes reconstructing rule in IR using conflict as an indicator for rule. His central theoretical thesis is that the concept of conflict can be understood as to quarrel about legitimacy (Schlichte 2012: 13). In his understanding though, rule is legitimate. He thus also constructs rule by looking at obedience. The question of how obedience is produced is of central interest for him (Schlichte 2012: 34). This understanding of rule, however, blurs the view on forms of rule to which the subordinate complies, but cannot be called legitimate.

Christopher Daase and Nicole Deitelhoffs' endeavor to reconstruct rule through resistance is laid out in their book "Herrschaft in den Internationalen Beziehungen" (2017), which they edited with Ben Kamis, Jannick Pfister, and Philip Wallmeier. In this volume, the theoretical foundations of the reconstruction are outlined and applications of which presented. Pfister (2017) shows how, arguably, transnationalizing radical protest leads to more transnational police work – to a phenomenon he calls transnational protest policing. Schlichte (2017) describes how in development aid, a new (or old) form of indirect rule has become effective lately, using the example of Mozambique. He circumscribes this form of rule as a bureaucratic rule, which he sees as the most important ideal of how to rule in contemporary world politics (Schlichte 2017: 74). Schlichte stipulates that in such cases, resistance does not occur, because this form of rule takes the form of discipline, sedimented in the habitus of the actors, which leads to compliance (Schlichte 2017: 76). Teresa Züger (2017) describes the role the internet plays in newer forms of dissidence in international politics. She describes Wikileaks and Anonymous as dissident organizations, which can directly influence international poli-

tics and, in her view, only mark the beginning of emergent practices of resistance (Züger 2017: 196).

Priska Daphi, Nicole Deitelhoff, Dieter Rucht and Simon Teune edited a volume of Leviathan: "Protest in Bewegung? Zum Wandel von Bedingungen, Formen und Effekten politischen Protests" (Daphi et al. 2017) in which they scrutinize tendencies in (transnational) protest movements. They contend that in some fields transnationalization has recently taken place, but in others, a renationalization can be observed. Also, it cannot be said that protest has become depoliticized because its form might have changed and looks more like fun and event than in the past (Daphi and Deitelhoff 2017). The book shows many empirical examples of changing protest culture and offers theoretical insights about them and is thus helpful in the research of (transnational) resistance. It does not however thematize the inference on rule.

Daase and Deitelhoff state that the question of rule is asked increasingly in IR: 'Who can and who may prescribe actors how to act?' (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 3). As mentioned above, the question of rule thus often arises in the discussion about autonomy of International Organizations (Finnemore and Barnett 1999: 699) or their authority (Zürn 2013). The concept of rule has historically been intertwined with the question of legitimacy, which Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) try to avoid by formulating rule as normatively neutral. Daase and Deitelhoff

> define rule as asymmetrical power relations that are institutionally perpetuated, i.e. structures of super- and subordination that distribute life chances and chances of influence which minimize options for action effectively, regardless if these structures are primarily of socio-cultural, economic or military nature (translated M.H.; Daase und Deitelhoff 2015).

They write that the more rule is executed outside of formal-legal rule systems and the less it operates with direct force and the less it operates in a unitary system of super- and subordination, the more difficult it gets to grasp it empirically. This is the case in the international system (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 305). The system is shaped by formal and informal institutions that have partly overlapping, or competing, competencies which exist without a regulative entity which could mediate between them (ibid.). As coercive relationships (e.g. colonialism) or asymmetrical institutions (e.g. unequal treaties) are rare in international relations, rule can be detected in discourse, in the existence or absence of rules and the analysis

of limits and options of action of certain actors (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 305). They thus write that rule can be made visible by tracing resistance. They turn around Foucault's sentence: "Where there is power, there is resistance […]" (Foucault 1990: 95) and expect to find rule through detecting resistance. When it needs to prevail in conflict it becomes visible. They write that only when it can assert itself in conflict can it be called legitimate (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 9). For them, not legitimacy is the defining factor for the existence of rule but resistance. It is inherent to rule, regardless if it is executed subtly or violently (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 11). They define system conform resistance to be opposition and resistance external to the respective system as dissidence (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 12f.). Rule as institutionalized power has the tendency to marginalize resistance, through the production of legitimacy and voluntary obedience or through force and submission (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 305). Rule seeks to make resistance impossible, so resistance is sometimes hard to detect (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 306). They write that rule makes itself more or less invisible by not using force and choosing more subtle forms of control in the international system. But in the case of resistance, it needs to act and thus becomes visible. These reactions can then be empirically analyzed[9]. (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 307).

They do admit, however, that the direction of the causality of rule and resistance is not clear. This is a typical instance of the chicken and the egg problem, because it might be obvious that they stand in some interrelation to each other, but it is not obvious how this relation is constituted (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 312). The limits of reconstructing rule through resistance they see in instances where rule is so complex and opaque that resistance can hardly find targets for attack. Also, the reconstruction of rule through resistance will be difficult where rule is so brutal in suppressing resistance, that even dissident forms of resistance seem to cease (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 312). Daase and Deitelhoff contend that if it is not clear, where the center of rule is, the place where resistance can spark is missing. Therefore, the subtler a form of rule is, the less probable it is that it would spark

[9]An empirical example for this is how in the protests against international institutions in the early 2000s, police forces became visible through acting very forcefully. Graeber describes it as "heavily armed riot police ready to reveal just what those bureaucrats were willing to unleash against anyone – no matter how nonviolent – who tried to stand in their way" (Graeber 2015: 30).

enough resistance to become empirically noticeable (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014: 21).



Figure 1: Assumed Connection between Resistance and Rule

The existing works specifically on rule in International Relations contribute important insights toward a new picture of international relations. By describing heterarchy as the likely ordering principle for the postnational constellation, Connelly (2009) has offered a much more suitable picture of the world order than anarchy or hierarchy as its ordering principles. Onuf and Klink (1989) have offered a description how ruling can work in international relations and Daase and Deitelhoff (2014, 2015, 2017, 2019) have offered a methodology how to go on about researching the complicated phenomenon. Nevertheless, in Daase and Deitelhoff's work, the premise is stipulated that rule can be successfully reconstructed through analyzing resistance. It is not entirely clear however, how this can be done. In the following, this work seeks to shed more light onto this question.

Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) contend that empirically analyzing resistance can lead to a new understanding of rule in International Relations. They do admit however, that this endeavor has limits. That is why in this work, rule in International Relations is conceptualized theoretically. Resistance is regarded as an important indicator for rule, but because of the problems that Daase and Deitelhoff

describe, this work sees the need to theoretically outline what other dimensions of rule are relevant (in the international realm). That is why in the following, first, practice theory and practice theory in IR are described. Then, based on Bourdieu's praxeology, the symbolic dimension of rule is theorized to narrow the outlined gaps theoretically.

3 Practice Theory

In this chapter practice theory and practice theory in International Relations are outlined, in order to formulate a practice-theoretical understanding of rule. The understanding of power and rule in practice theory is described. Afterward, methodological considerations regarding the research of rule and later the research of practice are fleshed out. At the end of the Chapter, an interim conclusion is formulated to come to a working definition and a theoretical starting point for further considerations.

3.1 Practice Theory and its Social Theoretical Context

This Chapter goes into the social theoretical context of practice theory to distinguish it from other forms of social theory and to elaborate on its foundations. According to Joas and Knöbl there are three structuring questions in social theory: What is social action? What is social order and what drives social change (Joas und Knöbl 2004)? These questions are answered differently by social theorists and can be described as basic questions of inquiry in social sciences (Joas and Knöbl 2004: 37). The issue of reproduction and change of social order is at the heart of social theory. Practice theory finds specific answers to them, which will be outlined in the following.

One characteristic which sets practice theory apart from other strands of theory is that it does not assume a calculating rational actor or an actor acting consciously according to social norms (Reckwitz 2002). Practice theory assumes actors who participate in practice do so mainly by imitating other actors. Instead of assuming conscious decisions behind action, practice theory assumes many actions to be automated or subconscious. When e.g., driving a car, most people have internalized the movements necessary and do not need to think about each of them. This

is assumed even for diplomatic practice where new diplomats learn to act diplomatically from more experienced colleagues (Pouliot 2008). In a practice-theoretical reading of the world, it is assumed that social reality consists of manifold practices that are the product of former practices, and which are connected to other practices. Each actor connects with former practice and thus the performance becomes intelligible to other social actors. When both assumptions are accepted, rule and obedience must also be part of practices that are carried out partly subconsciously and these ruling and obeying practices must imitate former practices.

Practice theory can be looked at from two different angles. Like social theory in general, practice theory is concerned with the question about how social order develops and how it is reproduced. Schäfer (2013) categorizes practice theories in two different strands: Either they are more interested in explaining social stability or they primarily focus on explaining social change, i.e., transformation or reproduction of the social (Schäfer 2013: 11). Pierre Bourdieu for example is seen as a theoretician who is primarily interested in explaining social stability in order to put forward his overall argument about social inequality (Moebius 2011: 66). Judith Butler, on the other hand, is more interested in explaining how social order changes. She describes that practices can only be citations of practices in the past and are therefore inherently instable. Reckwitz therefore criticizes practice theoreticians for having specific goals in mind when writing their theories and for not being transparent about this. He claims that this amounts to a generalization, which practice theory supposedly does not do, and worse, not being transparent about it (Reckwitz 2004: 41). Nevertheless, by taking practice theoreticians' foci into consideration, a sufficiently broad understanding of practice can be formulated. Practices can only be imperfect imitations of former practice. This means that through the "instability of practice" (Translation M.H.; Schäfer 2013), change gradually happens even without the conscious doing of a specific actor (Schäfer 2013: 377). Schäfer conceptualizes *repetition* as at the heart of practice to be able to incorporate change, as well as stability, conceptually.

Considering the two different strands in practice theory helps to conceptualize rule in International Relations, because it enables the theoretician to have repro-

ductive and transformative aspects in mind. Rule is often associated with a consolidation of social relations. That means that power relations have somehow become perpetuated. One can think of them as solidified to a certain extent. Resistance however can be associated with transformation of social relations, as it necessarily entails actors who turn against an established or establishing order. Resisting actors arguably have the wish and possibly the intention to transform. If they succeed in doing so is a different question, which is independent from the intention to transform.

To summarize, to conceptualize the relationship between rule and resistance practice-theoretically, it is important to think along the lines of reproduction and transformation, because both social dynamics are of highest importance in that context. Rule per se has an interest in stability and reproduction, whereas resistance has an inherent interest in social change. At the same time though, rule can change (gradually or abruptly), and resistance can become permanent. An empirical example for the latter would be Socialist regimes in South America and Asia which legitimize their rule through resistance against US-American imperialism (Ellner 2008). Reproduction and transformation are an integral element of the analysis of rule and resistance in this work. The Practice Analysis of Rule looks at the changes rule and resistance make over time to make inferences about their quality. In this way, the question at the heart of social theory about reproduction and change is made fruitful for the practice analysis of rule in IR.

3.2 Practice Theory in General

Practice theory is originally social theory which sees society as a repertoire of practices subjects connect with in different ways. Reckwitz places practice theories in the environment of social theories as follows: He categorizes social theories in different strands, dependent on where they place *the social*, i.e. where social meaning is produced (Reckwitz 2003). He mentions structure-theoretical approaches, purpose-oriented, and norm-oriented action theory as well as culture theories. Structure-theoretical approaches see the social in material structures. Reckwitz sees Simmel, the early Durkheim and Marx as representatives of these theories. (Reckwitz 2003). As purpose-oriented theories he describes Scottish moral philosophy and rational choice theory, which can be summarized by taking

the model of the homo oeconomicus as a basis of thought (Reckwitz 2003: 287). Norm-oriented action theories see norms and rules as guiding human actions and thus take the model of the homo sociologicus as their basis of analysis (Reckwitz 2003: 287). Reckwitz divides culture theory in *mentalism* and *textualism*. Mentalism sees culture as a mental, imaginary phenomenon. Symbol systems that help human interaction are thus placed in the inside of human minds (Reckwitz 2003: 288). Textualism sees the place of knowledge systems and social interaction in discourses and texts.

Practice theory, from Reckwitz's point of view, is part of culture theory but opposed to mentalism and textualism. The models of homo oeconomicus as well as the homo sociologicus as intellectual bases for social inquiry are too far off empirical reality to serve as analytic bases for academic inquiry (Reckwitz 2003: 289). So, in practice theories collective knowledge orders are not based on mental contents, purely cognitive schemata, or codes in discourses and communication, but on practical knowledge, ability, and *knowhow* (Reckwitz 2003: 289). The social is seen to be found in the meaningful-symbolic of a certain culture (Schäfer 2013). Practices are not single actions but are always to be considered to have a certain context and to be embedded in other practices. This consequently means that it is not possible to distinguish them from another without a certain context (Schäfer 2013: 19). In practice theory, knowledge is embodied. This means that for social cooperation, implicit knowledge is of paramount importance and does not constitute an order outside of human beings (Schäfer 2013: 21). The various strands of practice theory have in common that they see the social world as a result of former practices. So, social order as well as the geographical surroundings of human beings are reproduced through practices.

Practice theory is not a unified approach, but has many diverse roots such as Bourdieu, Giddens, Garfinkel, Butler, Latour, Taylor, and Schatzki (Reckwitz 2002). Basically, these are united in seeing practice as the center of the social. Nicolini describes practice theory as distinct in seeing the world humans live in as routinely produced and reproduced by practice "using tools, discourse and our bodies" (Nicolini 2012). Even if, from a practice-theoretical view, social order is produced and reproduced through practices, this does not mean that it is volatile

or easy to change (Nicolini 2012: 3). Especially in relation to discrimination, i.e., between men and women or between racial categories, practices can be very stable and thus seem natural and are taken for granted (Bourdieu 2005). Practice theory stresses that social order is not simply produced through mental content, but that it is produced by human beings who perform practices with their bodies and use material goods to do so. Some practice theoreticians argue that relations of rule and domination cannot be maintained without materials to uphold them. Mere interaction between humans, however violent it might be, is too volatile to stay stable. Latour states that without the use of objects, "[…] apes we were and apes we would have stayed" (translated by M.H.; Latour 2007: 128).

Sherry Ortner notices that the practice approach accepts certain assumptions about agency: "that society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet that the system can be made and unmade through human action and interaction (Ortner 1984). When individuals start certain practices, they accept what is generally seen as right and wrong in performing these practices. They even buy into the emotional setup of other people performing the same practice (Nicolini 2012: 5). Bueger and Gadinger summarize practices as being: "body-based activities and engagements with things" (Bueger and Gadinger 2007). Practices are sometimes defined as "competent performances" (Adler and Pouliot 2011a: 1) or as "patterned doings", which are located between idea and matter, because they act on the world with its natural and unnatural objects and artifacts (Adler and Pouliot 2011b: 6ff.). So, practices can be purely interpersonal or include objects. Reckwitz describes the most important positions of practice theory as *the materiality of practice* and the *implicit, informal logic of social life* (Reckwitz 2003: 290). That means that one of practice theory's basic assumptions is that not all actions are intentional - quite to the contrary. Practices are based on practical knowledge, which is acquired through doing (Pouliot 2008). Schatzki describes practices thus: "embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understandings" (Schatzki 2001).

To summarize, practice theory's view of the world is that social order is built by practice, which coagulates in social norms and the world of objects surrounding human subjects. The world and humans as social beings are thus the results of

former practices. Practice theory sees social order as anchored in human bodies and in artifacts. Practice is built on practical knowledge, which can be routinized and subconscious. Practice moves between routine and systematic unpredictability (Reckwitz 2003: 282). In contrast to other strands of theory, practice theory is not much focused on text. Discursive practices are seen as important practices among many bodily practices, which are considered at least equally important. Also, by looking at practice as guided by practical knowledge as opposed to conscious decision, it seems ontologically much more realistic than theories based on the homo eoconomicus or sociologicus. Humans are capable of reflection, in practice however, they do not reflect on every move or decision, because in every-day life it is not feasible to do so. Regarding power and rule which are immanent features of social life, from a practice-theoretical perspective the researcher necessarily needs to assume the same. If it comes to super- and subordination, actors will not and cannot reflect on their every move. Pouliot puts it thus:

> People are born in, and with, multiple hierarchies. Most of the time there are no (apparent) ways around them; social stratification simply is the order of things (Pouliot 2017: 114).

Therefore, from a practice-theoretical view, the assumption that rational calculation, or the following of norms, guide human action, constitutes a consciousness bias, which can be avoided by consulting practice theory.

3.3 Practice Theory in IR

In order to understand the view International Relations has taken of practice theory, and the way it has been applied, practice theory in IR is outlined. From there, practice theory's take on power and rule is presented in search of useful insights for the theorizing of a practice-theoretical- view on rule applicable to international relations.

The so called *practice turn in IR* is part of a movement in the social sciences generally, which was initiated by the publication of the seminal work "The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory" (Schatzki et al. 2001). In this publication not only the variety of practice theoretical works that had been written at that point was shown, but it was observed also that the focus on practice constituted a turn (Bueger and Gadinger 2014). Practice theory has since often been applied to in-

ternational relations and its use for the discipline of International Relations has been reflected on. The practice turn in IR is represented especially by the volume edited by Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011), in which practice theory is presented as a framework, which can include various opposing theoretical positions (Adler and Pouliot 2011b). They describe practice theory as a "conceptual focal point (Adler und Pouliot 2011b)" for International Relations. As such, it was applied to emotions (Bially Mattern 2011b), international law (Buneé und Toope 2011) and deterrence (Morgan 2011). Ringmar doubts that an inter-paradigmatic research program constitutes academic advancement and poses the question, whether the pluralists, who are against inter-paradigmatic research, could not be right in their approaches (Ringmar 2014: 23).

Generally, practice theory and especially applications of Bourdieu's work have been applied to diplomacy and diplomatic settings many times (Adler-Nissen 2014; Pouliot 2010; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Mérand 2010; Kuus 2015; Pouliot 2011; Villumsen Berling 2012; Schindler and Wille 2015; Cornut 2017; Pouliot and Cornut 2015; Neumann 2005, 2007, 2010). Practice theory is now widely used as a framework for theorizing in International Relations (Hopf 2017; Bueger and Gadinger 2018). David McCourt even contends that practice theory (in connection with relationism) constitutes the new constructivism, because constructivism has been unduly narrowed down in its understanding lately (McCourt 2016).

3.3.1 Main Strands of Practice Theory in IR

The book by Bueger and Gadinger (2014, 2018) argues that International Practice Theory is so influential and its rise and extent so important that it deserves an acronym - IPT. Bueger and Gadinger state that Bourdieu in IR is the practice theoretical variety which is quoted most, although there are four additional strands of practice theory in IR that need mentioning: The Communities of Practice approach, the Narrative approach, the Actor-Network Theory and the pragmatic sociology of Luc Boltanski (Bueger and Gadinger 2014), which highlight different aspects that are relevant to practice theory. These differ inter alia in their interest in either social stability or social change (Schäfer 2013). The Communities of Practice approach studies how knowing and doing are connected and how individuals become members of knowledge communities. It highlights how communi-

ties of practice function and develop (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 29). Learning and becoming a member of the community is thus practical and done by socialization (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 30). In International Relations, Emanuel Adler was influential in applying the Communities of Practice Approach. His goal was to understand transnational communities of practice in international relations (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 30). In IR, especially security communities, diplomacy and epistemic communities were and are studied under this approach (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 32). The Narrative Approach is represented by Iver B. Neumann who used to be a Norwegian diplomat and could thus gain great insights into the workings of the Norwegian diplomatic system. He used these for his academic work. He analyzed how in discourses meaning was produced and how that is connected to practice (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 39). Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has its origin in Science and Technology Studies, which analyzes how in laboratories humans and non-human objects interact with each other to produce new research results. Therefore, it focuses on innovation instead of social stability and especially emphasizes the symmetry between human and non-human actors (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 43). ANT is interested in how new forms of actors (which in ANT are called actants) assemble. Only the assemblance of new forms of actors shows innovation of a social kind. If social relations remain stable, from an ANT perspective, they are not noteworthy. ANT wants to be a toolkit for detecting new social formations (Latour 2007). ANT was used in IR by Bueger and Gadinger for a deeper understanding of the sociology of IR, i.e., how in IR knowledge generation works. ANT was also used in IR research to better understand diverse phenomena like democratic peace, securitization of climate change, airport security and the international political economy (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 49).

3.3.2 Applications of Practice Theory in IR

Generally, practice approaches have been applied to a wide array of topics. Important works have been written on practice in the security field (Villumsen Berling 2012; Pouliot 2010; Huysmans 2006) and also largely applied to diplomacy as diplomacy itself comprises many practices which are interesting to study. Guilhot studied democratization (Guilhot 2005); Neumann wrote papers on how to be

a diplomat and which social roles this entails (Neumann 2005), or how, in a foreign ministry, speeches emerge from practices (Neumann 2007).

Generally, practice theories in IR, like other theories, are interested in certain empirical issues. They all work to understand certain aspects of the international realm better. Bourdieu's work, however, is the strand of practice theory which is best used for the study of power and rule, especially subtle forms, because it works extensively with symbolic variations.

3.4 Power and Rule in Practice Theory

To develop a practice-theoretical account of rule as a basis for research, it is important to look to existing practice-theoretical works for their understanding on power and rule. These existing ideas will be taken as a basis for further deliberations and developments.

Practice theory has been criticized for not taking the dynamics of power into account sufficiently (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). It is said that practice theory often looks at the productive side of practice, not so much at the inhibiting and socially controlling side, which practices of power arguably possess (Watson 2017). Adler-Nissen and Pouliot describe in "Power in practice: Negotiating the international intervention in Libya" (Adler-Nissen und Pouliot 2014), how the performance of diplomatic practice is connected to a certain understanding of diplomatic competence which leads to an "emergent" understanding of power. That means that diplomats drawing on their social skills execute a form of endogenous power which works in practice (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). What can be said about practice theory's understanding of power is that power is relational, and not understood as a kind of possession or good (Guzzini 2011). This means that power is something which develops between human beings, not something that is given to a person per se, or which can be possessed at all.

Watson writes that the understanding of power implicit in practice theory is that power is *acting with effect* (Watson 2017: 171), but then for practice theoreticians, power is ubiquitous because the study of practice theory comprises of looking at action with effect. Watson contends that this understanding does not grasp the gist of power. For him, the importance of power comes from its "capacity to direct or

influence the actions of *others*" (highlight added, Watson 2017: 171). So, in his reading, practice theory has no well thought out answers yet to the question, as to how power can have an inhibiting effect on others in the sense of power-over. If practice theory wants to understand the social, it needs to understand long-term power related phenomena such as institutions, ideologies, domination etc. (Watson 2017: 173). Watson argues that the workings of power should not be understood as the mere "capacity to act" (Watson 2017: 174). Practice theory should become able to "understand how certain practices are distinctively capable of orchestrating, disciplining and shaping practices *elsewhere* […]" (highlight added, Watson 2017: 174).

Watson describes that it is Foucault's solution to take practices of power as a starting point, which Foucault demonstrates in his governmentality studies. Although Watson states that focusing on practices of government often blurs the manifold mundane practices around practices of power, they are nevertheless necessary to enable practices of power (Watson 2017: 176). Because practice theory is so localized in its focus, it has difficulty to explain macro phenomena such as rule. It is argued that social order is generated in social practice as well as reproduced in them. Reproduction and social change both have their roots in social practice (Schäfer 2013).

> […] The embodied action at the core of all performances of practices can only be spatially and temporally immediate. As a result, the extension and amplification of action can only happen through intermediation. Such intermediation can rarely, if ever, be accomplished without depending on other practices as well as on technologies and more (Watson 2017: 177).

As practice theory is often focused on enabling practice, it is not equally equipped to understand techniques that inhibit certain performances yet.

Understanding the temporal and spatial dimension of power which amounts to a basic understanding of rule, seems to be at the heart of the question, whether practice theory can truly contribute to social theory (Watson 2017). Even though practice theory's focus is on concrete practice, it is argued in this work that it can contribute greatly to an understanding of rule. Practice theory accounts for the fact that practice is never an isolated phenomenon but comes in a net of other practices. Practice thus is the starting point for a broader view on context around practice, which is necessary to understand practice in the first place.

Up until now, practice theory has not come up with a specifically practice-theoretical account on rule. Practice theory seems to be strong in explaining phenomena which fall under the "power-to" category. Explaining practices which have a restricting effect on other actors ("power-over") seems to not be its strong suit yet. In the following, a practice-theoretical understanding of rule will be formulated to better become able to research rule in international relations for an understanding of it as the consolidated form of "power-over".

Taking Watson's deliberations as a basis, Practice Theory needs an understanding of power as practices that are capable to inhibit *others elsewhere.* Practices should be seen as surrounded by other practices, which therefore form *a net of practices*. By following certain practices and actors to affected actors, it should thus be possible to trace inhibiting effects of practice.

3.5 Methodological Considerations

For the development of a practice-theoretical method to research rule in International Relations, it is necessary and fruitful to look to existing methods used for the research of practices. Therefore, in the following, some methodological issues regarding the research on transnational rule are lined out. Later, research on practices is discussed. At the end of the Chapter, it is discussed how the research on rule and research on practice can work well together.

3.5.1 Researching (Transnational) Rule

Reconstructing rule through resistance is prima facie a great idea. Resistance seems easy to detect in empirical cases – much easier than obedience. When the researcher considers the conduct of such research however, methodological questions arise. These are going to be discussed, first looking to Bourdieu's insights on the matter. Later, actor centrism – the problem of theoretical pre-formulation of actors – is outlined. Then the addressee problem, which is specific to the reconstruction of rule through resistance, is discussed.

Bourdieu's work has been applied in International Relations in manifold ways using different concepts from his theoretical body. Bourdieusian IR can show a way to avoid state-centrism through looking at everyday practices and symbolic

structures. It focuses on all kinds of actors not just state representatives. It wants to make visible how international relations are produced through daily activities, i.e. practices (Adler-Nissen 2013). Moreover it is said that Bourdieu can combine the material structuralism of realism and ideational dimensions which are in the focus of constructivism (Mérand 2010). A Bourdieusian sociology for IR sees the world as constructed, but also takes power as an important factor into account (Guzzini 2013). Bourdieu's works build a bridge between objectivism and subjectivism and thus overcome the agent-structure problem (Adler-Nissen 2013). Rebecca Adler-Nissen claims that a Bourdieu-inspired IR can "map political units as spaces of practical knowledge on which diverse and often 'unconventional' agencies position themselves and therefore shape international politics" (Adler-Nissen 2013).

From what is described above, one can learn that Bourdieu's work enables the researcher to think beyond state-centrism and is therefore well suited for thinking about power constellations in times of globalization. It is open to various actors and can account for actions and processes beyond formalized procedures. The aim of placing the practice turn in IR is to bring in a deeper social understanding of the workings of the international realm.

Bourdieu's practice theory is used for the analysis of rule to conceptualize practices and symbolic forms of power on the international level, and thereby to make especially subtle forms of rule more easily recognizable. To conceptually grasp the subtle side of transnational rule, Bourdieu's work is made the basis of discussion in this work. Rule and resistance are both respectively seen as a set of practices that can be carried out in manifold ways by a variety of actors. Formulating a theoretical concept that can take symbolic power into account and be sensitive to resistance and other indicators for international rule, is a promising endeavor for the research on rule in IR.

The stance of this work is that the focus on practices of rule in IR can contribute to the overall discourse of rule in IR. Additionally, it can contribute to the discourse on power in practice theory and the praxiography of power and rule. In this work the question of rule that is of primary interest is neither the 'who' nor the 'what' of rule but the 'how'. Rule is considered not to be a static container of so-

cial relations, but a result of social practices which connect with former practice. Ruling like any other social action may look stable for a certain amount of time, but it is dependent on execution or action on behalf of specific agents at some point. This work wants to draw attention to the dynamics of ruling and resisting and thereby focuses on practice, because practice is considered to be the entity between structure and agent and constitutive for social order. Therefore, practice theory can serve as a link between singular actions and rule systems which can seem rock-hard and stable. By drawing attention to the *patterned doings* of rule, the aspiration of this work is to contribute to reducing the impression of self-evidence or naturalness of rule generally.

3.3.1.1 Actor Centrism

Thinking about transnational rule an obvious method would be to look for a case, in which a state and a non-state actor are involved beyond national borders for a certain period of time. This approach is seen critically in this work and termed actor centrism. Conducting research in this way would mean to theoretically predetermine the outcome of one's research. A theoretical account should leave the discussion about the actors (or actants, depending on the theoretical approach) to empirical analysis. Each instance of inter- or transnational rule will involve different actors and possibly kinds of actors that need to be considered. Here I follow Latour's argument that by defining who the relevant actors are *a priori* and what category they belong to, analysis might preclude new actors or processes from becoming apparent in the research process (Latour 2008: 43). That is why rule is going to be conceptualized on the level of dimensions. It is of interest which practices indicate rule and what must be given to be able to talk about rule. An analysis on the level of dimensions permits the definition of rule as an empirical phenomenon which is not constituted by its legitimacy.

3.3.1.2 Addressee Problem

This work accepts that the reconstruction of rule through empirical analysis is a plausible approach to better understand the issue. In this work, resistance is seen as an important dimension of, and inseparably linked to rule. When reconstructing rule though resistance, the question of the epistemic position of the researcher becomes relevant (Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 308). The researcher receives the

first description of the quality of rule that is analyzed from the resisting party. The researcher needs to take this interpretation of the world at face value as long as possible. Latour appeals to researchers to stop seeing themselves as above the researched. He contends that to conduct true research, one must take the world view of the researched seriously (Latour 2007: 28). This means that if a group resists against an international conspiracy to install a world government of witches, the researcher may be in a dilemma. By doubting the existence of witches, the researcher interprets the situation in her worldview, which consequently might lead to incorrect inferences. In empirical cases, it will often be the case that e.g., god is invoked to justify rule as well as resistance. The researcher needs to take this at face value, because he has no proof that it is not true. This is termed the *addressee problem* of constructing rule through resistance. So, resistance can offer an idea about the form of rule involved, but not a clear-cut template of its quality. That is why taking other factors into account is of great importance. These will be called dimensions in the following.

3.5.2 Praxiographic Considerations

Practice theory in International Relations has been applied for a long time and manifold times to various topics and fields so that it can be said that it is established as a research paradigm. Praxiography however, the methodology which is specific to the research on practice, in contrast, has not been discussed extensively (Bueger 2014). Praxiographic research "take[s] social practices which are materially anchored in bodies and artifacts and dependent on implicit knowledge as the smallest and prior unit of analysis" (Bueger 2014: 384). Conducting research on practice was termed *praxiography* by Annemarie Mol (2002).

Bueger (2014) sees an increase in the discussion about praxiography in social sciences generally. At the same time, he sees a lack of such in International Relations. The question *how* practice should be researched, for Bueger, constitutes an important lacuna in International Relations theorizing, which needs to be addressed (Jonas et al. 2017; Bueger und Gadinger 2018; Bueger 2014).

Andersen and Neumann critique practice theory for working very inductively and its concepts not being sufficiently theorized and conceptualized (Andersen and

Neumann 2012: 458). They contend that a lot of academic work on practice is being misunderstood as looking at 'what is being done' directly. Instead, they appeal to scholars to formulate a model of practice first, before researching it (ibid.). The critique by Andersen and Neumann is very much in contrast to Bueger who critiques especially International Relations for being too abstract about practice (Bueger 2014: 384). So, it can be assumed that somehow the connection between empirical research and theory building needs to be improved in International Practice Theory. That is why this work conducts in-depth reflection on a theory-guided way to research practices of rule.

Practice theory sees the center of the social in implicit or practical knowledge, which is not directly observable. That is why the conduct of praxiographic research is somewhat challenging. Bueger presents an illustrative graphic to show this (Bueger 2014: 388).



Figure 2: Observing Practices

Whereas bodily movements and artifacts and their use can be directly observed by the researcher, implicit knowledge needs to be reconstructed, which is done by interpretation. This work argues that the researcher needs to be very cautious when interpreting as to not impose meaning onto the involved actors.

Bueger (2014) juxtaposes two different positions about research. He says that social sciences generally look up, i.e., taking the system as stable and set, while searching for regular patterns. It means to "make the social whole knowable" (Bueger 2014: 389). Praxiography on the other hand wants to look down. That

means it seeks to understand the local. The embeddedness in time, space, and context is taken for granted and concepts seen as part of these. For praxiography then two problems emerge: Making statements that are important not only to the immediate local context and how to cope with contingency (Bueger 2014: 390). Generally, the praxiographic approach uses ethnographic methods and logics. The goal of which is also to understand the local and to carefully interpret from it (Thomas 2020).

Practice theory looks at the distinction between micro, meso, and macro level as constructed and thus produced by social interaction. Praxiographers have chosen two distinct strategies of coping with these levels: They study how levels are produced, or they formulate concepts which transcend levels, such as Karin Knorr Cetina's "Complex Global Microstructures" (Knorr Cetina 2005).

Bueger summarizes the challenges of praxiographic research as follows:

> In summary praxiography is on the one hand a straightforward affair: it is to observe and record the movement of bodies and the handling of artifacts in situations. Yet, on the other hand it also involves the very intricate task of drawing on these observations to interpret the implicit orders of knowledge that inform the practices. How do we get after the background knowledge? This question remains the main challenge of praxiography. Moreover, praxiography aims at transcending scales and levels. It is a strategy of looking down and studying up. Yet, how to transcend scale? And how to cope with the concomitance of the emergent, innovative side of practice and it's repetitive, producing one? (Bueger 2014: 392).

In Chapter 5, a possible strategy is worked out, to not only be able to study the movement of bodies and handling of artifacts. It seeks to enable the researcher to also interpret the situations studied in a way that makes it possible to study up and to understand some of the implicit knowledge which informs patterned super- and subordination.

This work argues that practice is not something that can be researched at first glance at all. Looking at the social world at one moment in time t_1, all the researcher can perceive is a *performance* of a practice. That is why it is argued in this work, that the researcher needs to reflect thoroughly, how she can reconstruct practice out of performance. This includes much more interpretation than is commonly accounted for. In this work, a performance is a situation or an interaction, which may be interpretable as part of a practice. A single performance can become a practice if it is repeated. If at company A the employees started ordering

sushi every lunch, one could call this a practice at company A. If in city B employees started ordering sushi every lunch, the researcher could call it a practice at city B. If employees worldwide took to ordering sushi every lunch, it could be called common practice. This shows that one performance needs repetition to become a practice. There are more local practices than others. Also, to determine, if a practice can be called common practice is dependent on the empirical case at hand. This can be achieved inter alia by researching the prevalence of a practice in a certain population, how long it has been practiced, and by determining its geographical scope. Finding ways of researching common practice is nevertheless best left to empirical research.

3.5.2.1 Research Strategies in Practice Theory

Praxiography has a set of strategies that are used to research practices. A commonly employed one is to study specific sites. Sites in that context are places at which practices are carried out with material arrangements. This can be an organization or a different place, where many practices are being conducted. In Latour's view, there are no macro and meso levels. He suggests looking at connections the actors make and intermediaries they employ to carry out practice (Latour 2005: 176). In this view, e.g., an organization appears larger, if it can employ multiple other organizations for their cause, even though the organization itself might be small (Bueger 2014: 393). Bueger summarizes this as follows: "The key idea expressed here is that structure becomes *structural*, and order becomes *orderly* by practices of *structuring* and *ordering*" (highlight in the original; Bueger 2014: 393). Employing the site strategy means to first identify places at which structure and order might be produced through practices. Then, the researcher can analyze which practices have the effect of structuring and ordering. The last step is to reconstruct the orders that are supposed to be established or stabilized (Bueger 2014: 395).

The second strategy identified by Bueger is to study moments of crisis, because implicit knowledge often becomes explicit when challenged. Also, they allow for new practices of ordering to become established. That means moments of crisis pose a likely opportunity for the research on emergent practices (Bueger 2014: 396). Studying moments of crisis thus implies following procedure: First these

moments need to be identified, second, it needs to be studied how actors react to them and how possible coping strategies are justified. Then it can be studied which decisions are made and if former practices are adjusted or reinvented (Bueger 2014: 397).

The last strategy outlined by Bueger (2014) he calls 'following objects'. This could describe material artifacts such as technology, which can be studied regarding its effect on practice, e.g. a new weapon's effect on security policies. The strategy can however also encompass studying non-objects such as concepts. To conduct research using this strategy then means identifying one or more suitable objects and following them back and forth in time (Bueger 2014: 398).

These outlined strategies can be used singularly or in combination. In Chapter 5 a suggestion is made how they can be employed using the tool of analysis developed in this work.

3.5.2.2 Methods employed in practice theoretical works

In "Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytic Tool" (Bennett and Checkel 2015a) edited by Bennett and Checkel, Pouliot suggests a methodological approach to empirical research on practices he calls "Practice Tracing" (Pouliot 2015). Pouliot describes Practice Tracing as inhabiting the middle ground between process tracing and interpretivism. In Pouliot's view, the value of practice tracing lies in its compatibility with singular causality and analytic generality (Pouliot 2015: 238).

Bennett and Checkel describe Process Tracing as " key technique for capturing causal mechanisms in action" (Bennett und Checkel 2015b), which enables the researcher to conduct qualitative in-depth, within-case research. In classical process tracing, the causal mechanisms, which connect the independent and outcomes of the dependent variable, are identified (George and Bennett 2005).

Pouliot (2015) uses the term mechanisms to describe analytic entities, in contrast to Bennett and Checkel who see mechanisms as ontological phenomena (Pouliot 2015: 238). In practice tracing, not empirical generalizations are sought after but analytic ones, which are abstracted away from data (Pouliot 2015: 239). That means that theorization from practice research understood this way cannot be test-

ed against empirical data[10]. Pouliot explains that the worth of analytic generalizations is *usefulness*. Practice tracing should serve two objectives: to demonstrate causality in the local and to produce analytically general insights: "[…] as contextualized as the study of practices may be, the social scientific gaze must always look beyond specific cases, toward cross-case generality" (Pouliot 2015: 239).

Pouliot describes practices as inherently causal. "[Practices] make other things happen" (Pouliot 2015: 241). This is also expressed by practice theory's basic take on power as practices with effect. That means that presumably any praxiographic research on power and rule at least implies causality. This causality however is understood as local, i.e., context dependent: X counts as Y in context C. The operation of assessing which practice performances are part of can be easy, but in some empirical cases it can be very challenging. This can only be achieved by reconstructing the logic of practicality by staying as close to the community of practitioners as possible (Pouliot 2015: 243f.). From the performance at hand, the researcher can inductively interpret implicit knowledge. For example, to follow directions from a signpost one needs to know that the point, not the end indicates the right direction (Pouliot 2015: 244). So, from the performance of following the arrow's point the researcher could reconstruct the implicit knowledge that the point is what indicates the right direction.

Bueger suggests three main methods to study practices: Participant observation, expert interview, and document analysis. Whereas participant observation is a very important method for praxiography (Pouliot 2015: 245), it is also one which cannot be used in all cases. Sometimes access to sites is not granted to the researcher, in sensitive security matters e.g. nuclear laboratories (Pouliot 2015: 246). Also, the studied practice might lie in the past (Bueger 2014: 399). In these kinds of cases, the researcher needs to look to different methods to research practice, which Pouliot calls "proxies to direct observation" (Pouliot 2015: 246).

[10] As practice theory wished to be a focal point for various strands of theory, it is incomprehensible why it should not be possible to conduct practice tracing with more positivist means and conduct variable and hypothesis formulation. It is perceivable to use the Practice Analysis of Rule in an explorative study in a case, derive at middle-range theoretical generalizations and use those for hypothesis-driven research in the next step.

Researchers working with Bourdieu have suggested turning implicit knowledge into conscious knowledge through acts of reflexivity. This means that the researcher can recover this through narratives of experience by the researched (Costa 2015: 165). She can try to do this especially well using interview techniques. There are two different types of praxiographic interviewees who are interesting to praxiograpic research: The expert, who participates daily in the practice on the one hand, and the expert who has spent a lot of time observing the practice in question intensely on the other (Bueger 2014: 400). In expert interviews, the researcher can try to reconstruct implicit knowledge by finding out at first about explicit contents, such as descriptions of bodily movements, utterances, or handling of artifacts. She can obtain statements on interpreted meanings which can be co-produced in the interview, and the researcher can gain interpretations of implicit knowledge by the interviewee (Bueger 2014: 401). According to Pouliot, it is important to interpret not necessarily what the interviewee talks about, but what (implicit knowledge) she talks *from*, in order to interpret practical knowledge (Pouliot 2015: 246). Pouliot suggests asking about daily activities and destabilizing tacit knowledge by asking about it and therefore making it explicit (Pouliot 2015: 247). The downside to interviews as praxiographic methods are that rationalized versions of practical knowledge can be presented by the interviewee in contrast to direct observation (Pouliot 2015: 247).

Praxiographic works can use documents to interpret implicit knowledge. Handbooks and manuals also serve as sources of reconstructing practice. Self-descriptions or ego-documents such as auto-biographies, diaries, activity reports etc. can also serve as sources about implicit knowledge. The third source Bueger mentions, are visual sources such as videos, photographs, paintings, or other forms of art (Bueger 2014: 402). Pouliot describes inter alia memoirs, handbooks, annual reports, diplomatic cables, meeting minutes, and written correspondence as useful for practice research (Pouliot 2015: 249).

When conducting praxiographic research, the researcher needs to keep in mind that

> as inductively derived as it may be, a social scientific account of practices necessarily remains metaphorical. […] Even with best efforts, it consists of a scholarly interpretation that inevitably departs from the practical interpretive logics on the ground […] (Pouliot 2015: 250).

Praxiographic research is characterized by a high sensitivity and reflexivity about the practice of research. That is why it is especially surprising that practice theory has not worked on a specific methodology until recently (Bueger 2014; Bueger and Gadinger 2018). This work seeks to contribute to the theory of praxiographic research in manifold ways which are described from Chapter 5 onward.

3.6 Preliminary Conclusion

In the following it will be discussed what can be learned from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 about power and rule, and about research on power and rule.

To summarize the works outlined in Chapter 2, it becomes clear that power is considered fleeting potentiality, whereas rule is its more consolidated form of which. There are forms of institutionalized rule that are considered legitimate and are thus called authority. Other forms of rule, especially identity-based forms of rule are often considered illegitimate and often called domination. Power and rule can be looked at as a scale ranging from situational power (weakest form of power) to the monopoly on violence (strongest form of rule). It is argued in this work that if the researcher wishes to understand rule in international relations, she needs to look to weaker forms of rule rather than the monopoly on violence. Hence, practices that can lead to consolidation – practices of governmentality – become important. The material basis for power, which is derived from realist works in IR, is considered of utmost importance and will be discussed at length in Chapter 7. As stressed in liberal works, international organizations are sites at which practices of *structuring* and *ordering* are conducted (see Chapter 3.3.2). They are seen as important cases to analyze when analyzing transnational rule. Identity-based forms of rule, in the focus of critical works in IR, are considered to be omnipresent and thus to have an effect on international politics. These are considered important regarding transnational rule, as they intersect with other forms of rule and influence outcomes. Practices of super- and subordination will often be based on identity, even if the context does not explicitly indicate it.

Chapter 3 shows that even if practice theory is not so much concerned with questions of power, it nonetheless offers important insights. It describes power as practices with effect. Watson (2017) argues that practices of power should be analyzed

as having an effect of (an inhibiting) social control of others. This amounts to practices in one place shaping practices in another, likely on other actors. As a working definition thus, in this work, power will be seen as *practices which can exude social control or have an inhibiting effect on certain actors*. This definition leaves the aspect of "power-to" out consciously, because in this work the understanding of rule as a consolidated form of "power-over" is theorized. Thus, deducted from the works on political theory, International Relations and practice theory in the chapters above, we can learn that *rule comprises of durable asymmetrical power relations of super- and subordination, which are enacted in practice. It has a socially controlling or inhibiting effect on certain actors. Rule can be based on the belief in the legitimacy of something or through practical constraint, coercion or violence*. This notion is the basis of further discussions on power and rule.

From the works on praxiography, the researcher can learn that analysis of practice means 'looking down and studying up'. For a deep understanding of rule in this work both notions are taken seriously. This work sees the formulation of a practice already as a big step of interpretation. What is perceivable at first are situations and interactions which can be interpreted as *performances* of certain practices. Thus, for an understanding of a practice, in this work, the entry point is not the practice itself but the performance. By analyzing more material, the researcher can then study his way up to practice.

It seems counter-intuitive to want to study rule through a practice-theoretical framework, because rule seems to be a macro phenomenon, which cannot be understood by looking at single situations. This work agrees with Latour who contends that academia does not need to throw away the notion of power, it just needs to shift from an ostensive to a performative definition of society (Latour 1986: 272). The same is true for rule. Even if rule seems structural and unshakable, it is performed in some form by something and/or someone. Practices of power which can amount to rule if they are consolidated enough, can be studied through a *flat ontology*, if they cease to be regarded as structures over actors' heads. Instead, performances of power can be part of practices of power, which can amount to

practices of rule. The social substance that they consist of however, is exactly the same. What distinguishes them is repetition or repeatability with effect.

Causality is implied in the research of rule because studying practices with effect means studying both the practice and the effect and tracing the in-between. It is therefore intuitively logical to conduct practice tracing in this context.

If the researcher seeks to make rule analyzable with practice-theoretical means, she needs to dig deep into the case at hand and she needs to take a broad view. She needs to be aware of spatiality[11] and temporality of power and the repeatability of practice. This work argues that rule is such a complex issue that it is best studied by looking at dimensions of rule, which are deduced from practice theoretical understandings of power. How this can be done, will be explained in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.

Whereas the overall endeavor of researching rule through the reconstruction of resistance seems a fruitful way of approaching the topic, for the research of subtle forms of rule, it is necessary to look at more symbolic forms of rule. Therefore, in the following Bourdieu's theory is consulted for aspects of power and rule, to be able to formulate a framework for its research.

4 Bourdieu

This Chapter outlines Pierre Bourdieu's oeuvre and what his work can contribute to a practice-theoretical understanding of rule as a basis for empirical research. A practice-theoretical contribution based on Bourdieu promises to make aspects of rule in international relations visible that otherwise stay hidden. Through a practice theoretical lens, it is possible to frame rule, as well as obedience, as a set of practices which do not need to be intentional. This draws attention to the dynamic of rule. It appears not so much as a static frame but as a dynamic, ongoing process, carried out or endured by specific actors. A practice approach can draw the focus on performative aspects of ruling as well as subordinating. It can also focus on material aspects. Theorizing rule praxeologically helps grasping subtle forms

[11] The term space is used to imply geographic places as well as cyberspace, as in the 21st century both will be important for the study of power.

of rule that are otherwise hard or indeed impossible to detect. That is why in this chapter Bourdieu's work is presented. It is argued that subtle forms of rule can be analyzed by using Bourdieu's insights especially on symbolic violence. This enables the researcher to study instances of rule which seemingly do not spark resistance. It thus enables her to find forms of rule and resistance which are subtle and work through symbols. By analyzing Bourdieu's work regarding its contribution to the analysis of rule, especially subtle forms, the symbolic dimension of rule is deduced.

Bourdieu was a theoretician who claimed that for a discipline it is important to develop a meta-language that is distinct from everyday language. He justified his own complex style of writing with the complexity of the social world, which he wanted to see reflected. Thus, he tried to gain distance to the object of inquiry (Schwingel 1995). His theory is composed of concepts which need some explanation to be understood. Also, they should not be considered separately from each other, because they form a body of theory which is coherent and the components depend on each other (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). Therefore, to theorize the symbolic dimension of rule it is necessary to describe Bourdieu's main concepts to understand his thinking, i.e., habitus, field, capital, practical knowledge, and symbolic violence. These are outlined later because they arguably are the most important concepts to understand Bourdieu's way of thinking about social order and rule. Whereas habitus describes the incorporated history of a single actor, the field constitutes the environment in which the actor moves, e.g., the world of art. Each field has its own logics and values. That is why in Bourdieu's theory capital is understood as different forms of material and immaterial capital of which actors possess varying amounts. These forms of capital are valued differently, depending on the field in which they are used (Fröhlich and Rehbein 2009a). In later theorizing habitus plays an important role, because in the symbolic dimension, it will become analyzable. Bodily movements will be considered an important factor for analyzing practice. Also, capital will be important, because it is a specific form of good that an actor can possess which has implications for power relations. Practical knowledge is considered the main driving force of practice which is embodied in actors. However, symbolic violence is the concept which is most important for

the development of the symbolic dimension of rule, which is outlined in Chapter 5.

4.1 Habitus

The habitus concept is often described as the central concept in Bourdieu's work (Krais and Gebauer 2010). Talking about habitus implies that the personal, the subjective, is socially embedded. The habitus means socialized subjectivity (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 159). It is the result of the experiences that an individual has made throughout its life[12]. It is the principle of action, perception, and thinking of social individuals that is inscribed in their bodies (Fröhlich and Rehbein 2009a). For the actor, the social world seems evident, because the social world has produced not only the actor herself but also the categories that this actor uses upon the social world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 161). This means that it is not only the way of thinking that is part of habitus but also the bodily appearance, the way someone dresses, and even their taste. In *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* Bourdieu describes how social distinction is produced and reinforced by taste, a certain kind of education and other symbolic markers (Bourdieu 1984). Bourdieu describes how unequal access to the educational system of various classes in a society disadvantages people from lower classes. This is so because the educational system's meaning in the reproduction and legitimation of social inequality has grown (Steinruecke 1992). Bourdieu describes how the position of an individual in society connects with its life-style (Bourdieu 1992a). So, habitus is the subjective manifestation of objective structures. It is where society and the individual converge. It is a system of dispositions that are trained during a lifetime. This means that most actions actors carry out are determined by habitus and are thus not actively reflected on. Habitus entails in-

[12] Bourdieu himself comes from a poor family in rural France which is noticeable in his theorizing. He stresses that to become an academic in the French system there is a lot about him he had to change - not only a certain accent. He also says though that anthropology and sociology helped him reconcile himself with this past and integrate it into the persona that he became later (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). It is said that his past led to and serves as a justification for his merciless view on French society. He seemed to take the sociological figure of 'the outsider' who can claim to have gained especially deep insight into normal society by having experienced forms of 'social racism' (Joas and Knöbl 2004: 519).

formation about someone's background such as social class. Habitus is the opus operatum, coagulated experience (Krais 2004: 191).

Bourdieu describes habitus as a system of boundaries. If someone possesses a petty bourgeois habitus, there are certain things that are unthinkable or impossible for that actor. Certain things upset her. Also, the actor can only think in the categories of her former education and upbringing (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 160). Nevertheless, it is impossible to predict the actions of said petty bourgeois(e), because there is room for creativity in his or her behavior. In this context, Bourdieu mentions the example of the artist who can create something new, but in retrospect, it will become obvious in which way this artist was influenced by her era and by preceding works. So everyone acts within a system of boundaries called habitus (Bourdieu 1992a). "Through the habitus, the individual incorporates her history, both personal and collective, into a set of guiding principles and dispositions which dictate effective practices" (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 29). The diversity of experiences of actors leaves different possibilities of action. Habitus is historical and relational. "[Agents'] identities, personalities, and even bodies are not autonomous points, but points in relation to other points" (Bigo 2011: 236). That means that it is always the product of context and interaction with others. Bourdieu estimates that three quarters of all human action is automated (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). This means that most actions are practical (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 165). Bourdieu writes that when habitus enters a social field, it will move like a fish in water. This world will seem completely natural to it (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996).

However, habitus does leave room for creativity. It is dispositional, produces tendencies and propensities and thus leaves room for creativity within the given boundaries. Habitus is not destiny; it is an open system of dispositions that is confronted with new experience and thus needs to change accordingly. Bourdieu and Wacquant write in this context that through socio-analysis the habitus can change, whereas this very analysis is determined by the habitus of the individual as well as the surrounding conditions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). Bourdieu says that the habitus is best imagined as a spring under tension that reacts to its surroundings. Depending on the stimuli, habitus can produce practices that are completely op-

posed to each other (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 168). This does not mean however, that habitus can be changed quickly or radically. Individuals are product of their socialization. This being so, they have limited capacities to change their views, as cognitive processes are always based on former experience. Bourdieu calls this a relative closure of the disposition system that is constitutive for the habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). This inertia of the habitus Bourdieu calls *hysteresis effect* (Suderland 2009). It is precisely because there is no distinction between body and mind in Bourdieu's work that an individual's habitus is regarded as rather stable. The body thus functions as a dynamic storage for social experiences (Schäfer 2013: 80).

Even though habitus produces regular forms of practices and representations, it is not guided by a set of explicit rules. Although social practices can be complex and collectively aligned, they do not follow orders of some kind of conductor (Bourdieu 2009). They seem to be the product of habitus adapting to a social situation. Bourdieu calls habitus the creating principle of strategies which can face new situations over again, but which is determined by the conditions of its own creation. So because actors are the product of objective conditions, they are inclined to reproduce exactly those (Bourdieu 2009). So the principle that habitus follows, Bourdieu calls regular improvisation (Bourdieu 2009).

As mentioned, in International Relations many scholars have based their work on Bourdieu. Regarding habitus, especially diplomatic habitus was examined (Neumann 2002), e.g. as an important factor in how effective diplomats can be in negotiations (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). If social order is incorporated in subjects in the form of habitus, in Bourdieu-based works it is assumed that in trans- and international settings similar learning effects takes place. Habitus interacts with each field and is thereby formed. So, social orders relevant to the international realm are also incorporated in actors' habitus (Pouliot 2008).

4.2 Field

Bourdieu describes the social world like a geographer. Some people are on top, some are below, and some are in the middle. Someone from the top is not likely to marry someone from below (Bourdieu 1992a, 2005). This picture he compares

with the model of social classes which from his point of view is too static (Bourdieu 2005: 35). The social space can be divided into fields which call for a certain habitus. The Bourdieusian field is a social space in which actors compete for something specific. Examples of fields are: the art world, religion, the economy, and academia. The economic field functions ideally without giving sentiment a lot of space, rather as "*business is business"* (highlight in the original; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 127). In contrast to that, the art world specifically tries to not function on mere economic logic but is averse to that. Bourdieu describes a field as a net or a configuration of objective relations between positions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). That means these positions are taken by individuals, but they are not dependent on a specific individual. So, positions are objective, while dispositions are subjective. This is how habitus and field work together. The field structures the habitus that is the product of the incorporation of the immanent necessity of the field or an ensemble of fields. When the field logic of more than one field is incorporated, this can lead to a divided habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 161). Habitus structures the way the field is perceived by providing the necessary cognitive categories of understanding (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 161).

A field is a space in which a certain, distinct set of rules is at work. Actors in a specific field have to be able to speak a specific language and they need to have a certain culture (Bourdieu 1992a). It is comparable to a game, but in contrast to a real game, the field is not the product of a conscious creation. The field logic does not follow a set of fixed, codified rules. It functions through implicit regularities more than explicit rules (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). Actors who are involved in the social actions of a field, know how to play by being in the field and thus observing the other actors playing. The actors in a certain field are caught up in it and compete against other actors in the field, however brutally, because they believe in the logic of it (doxa) and the stakes involved (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 128).

Fields are dynamic social spaces that can be distinguished from another. Fields are comparable to systems in system theory, but they are not as static. A field is a distinct sphere of social forces with a distinct hierarchy of social positions (Fröhlich and Rehbein 2009b: 100). A field cannot be sharply demarcated; it is defined

as a structure of power. The actors who engage in a field are involved in a competition for positions and influence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). The results of competitions among each other shape the hierarchy in each field. In Bourdieu's view, this struggle is not necessarily conducted to gain financial advantages, because the stakes might be of a different kind. Actors try to enforce their interests against others. For this certain strategies are used (Joas and Knöbl 2004). The field has a certain structure, which is determined by power relations, objects of struggle, as well as the rules that are taken for granted in the respective field (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 29). It is "defined by the relationships that objectively link different positions around a given set of stakes" (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 32). A field comprises actors who have certain social positions and display certain dispositions which are somewhat determined through their *habitus*. The field is a place that is characterized by disputes about the structure of the field, about how the powers that are active in this field are configured. Holders of objective positions try to change the principle of how hierarchy is built in the field, so it promotes their subjective position. The strategies of the actors are dependent on their position in the field, i.e., the distribution of a specific kind of capital. Furthermore, the actors are dependent on their perception of the field, which is highly subjective from their position (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 132). Bourdieu describes specific types of dispute which occur in social fields: The established subjects will contest newcomers, as they see them as a threat to their position. On the other hand, newcomers are either orthodox or heretics, who will also contest each other over influence in and on the field (Schäfer 2013: 117). The access to fields is not always formally restricted (an example for formal restriction is the numerus clausus for access to studying in Germany), whereas most fields have implicit or institutionalized entrance barriers (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 131).

Subjects that are active in a field are not merely particles that move in reaction to outside forces. They are carriers of capital and in accordance with their pasts, have the inclination to preserve or overthrow the given distribution of capital, whereas not all people with little capital are revolutionaries and not all people with a much capital are conservative regarding the existing order in a field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 140).

It is said that through the construction of habitus and field, Bourdieu brought back temporality into sociological theorizing in contrast to structuralist and rationalist thought (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 171). This is realized through the habitus concept that always implies an individual's past, which works through their dispositions and strategies. Also, fields and their respective logic are subject to historical constellations.

In International Relations there is an active debate, whether e.g., diplomacy can constitute a field, because it follows very specific logics and functions differently to other social fields. Looking at diplomacy as a Bourdieusian field helps in analyzing international relations in a less state-centric way than it was traditionally done in IR (Villumsen Berling 2012). In discussing what diplomacy is, practice theoreticians come to diverse conclusions. It can be observed though, that diplomacy as a field is not constricted to state representatives negotiating treaties and resolutions. The practice theoretical take on diplomacy is more focused on practices: Who acts diplomatically? What does it mean to "do" diplomacy?

4.3 Capital

The concept of capital in a Bourdieusian sense goes way beyond its economic meaning of a stock of assets. Bourdieu identifies four forms of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital, which can be complemented by field-specific forms of capital (Bourdieu 1992c: 52). In each field, the forms of capital are ordered in a different hierarchy. Whether something can become effective in a field, depends on it being a possible weapon and a contested resource in the respective field. The question that is of relevance is, whether the actor possessing the resource can use it to exert influence or power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 128). One actor's accumulation of capital is the result of former competition for capital and the basis for future competition for it (Schäfer 2013: 89). Capital encompasses potential in a social sense. The capital theory by Bourdieu is based on the thought that a fundamental modus of the social is the fight about recognition in the sense of prestige or reputation (Bourdieu 1992a). Capital is always a form of labor, be it material or incorporated (Bourdieu 1992c: 49). The accumulation of capital, regardless of its form, takes time. It also can grow, produce profit, or reproduce itself (Bourdieu 1992c: 50). The hierarchy in fields is determined by the

capital that is central to each field and the distribution of it among the actors. Actors in a field compete for various goods that are at the center of different fields (Joas and Knöbl 2004). The distribution of the various forms of capital is the equivalent of the immanent structure of the social world, its inherent constraints which determine if practices can be carried out successfully or not (Bourdieu 1992c: 50). The contest in a field can center around the wish for honor or reputation which may or may not be convertible into financial gains (Joas and Knöbl 2004). Capital is connected to status. Bourdieu formulated a concept of honor and name that he calls symbolic capital (Fröhlich and Rehbein 2009: 135). Another form he presents is cultural capital, which he describes as the knowledge about the dominant culture in a given field.

Cultural capital can appear in three different forms: incorporated forms of cultural capital, objectified, and institutionalized forms. The incorporated form of durable dispositions in an organism which is bound to the body can be described as cultural capital (Bourdieu 1992c: 55). It cannot be passed on quickly from one individual to another, because 'have' has become 'be' at some point. It has become part of a person's habitus (Bourdieu 1992b: 56) and thus always carries observable traces. So, the way of speaking and acting will tell roughly the class background and maybe religion of an individual (Bourdieu 1992c: 57). Cultural capital which is passed on is often mistaken to be a legitimate talent or authority, which counts in markets that do not function strictly on an economic basis (Bourdieu 1992c: 57). Incorporated cultural capital which is passed on for instance from one generation to another, is the best hidden way of transmitting capital within a family or class (Bourdieu 1992b: 58). This is arguably the most important mechanism of social reproduction that Bourdieu shows. Cultural capital occurs as objectified e.g., in form of books, pictures, instruments, machines etc. (Bourdieu 1992c: 53). Whereas the acquisition of cultural objects requires economic capital, their use is bound to incorporated cultural capital. For example, the aesthetic of a picture can only be savored, if the cultural knowledge to do so is present in the individual in question (Bourdieu 1992c: 59). Cultural capital takes the form of institutionalized capital, for example academic titles (Bourdieu 1992c: 53). Academic titles produce a difference between the self-educated person who constantly needs to prove his or her qualification and the formalized status that is acquired through schools

(Bourdieu 1992c: 61). The latter produces a much higher level of credibility. The academic title exists independently from its holder and is a certificate for cultural competence that guarantees the holder a durable and legally protected conventional value that it transports (Bourdieu 1992c: 61).

Social capital consists of social relations or a social network that one has qua membership in a certain group. It functions merely based on belonging to a certain group of people (Bourdieu 1992c: 63). It can be used to get help when needed. Social capital requires a network of human relations which is sustained by regular contact, in which symbolic and material aspects are intertwined (Bourdieu 1992c: 64). It is a multiplying factor for other forms of capital which can be mobilized (Bourdieu 1992c: 64). This net of relationships is the product of conscious or unconscious efforts of individual or collective strategies to create or sustain social relationships that at some point offer an immediate benefit (Bourdieu 1992c: 65). Reproduction of social capital requires constant effort to sustain the social relationships in question, where mutual recognition is demonstrated (Bourdieu 1992c: 67).

Forms of capital are transformable at varying costs. Economic capital can be employed to gain the remaining forms of capital with transformational cost to produce the form of power that is relevant in each context (Bourdieu 1992c: 70). Economic capital might be the basis for all other forms of capital, but the other forms are not reducible to economic capital, because all other forms need to conceal their connection to economic capital (Bourdieu 1992c: 71). Also, the capital form(s) that is or are of importance differ(s) according to each field. For example, in the art world, arguably, cultural capital is more important than in the economic field. Even so, cultural capital might be convertible into economic capital (Bourdieu 1992c: 52). Whereas in industrialized societies rule is often engraved in the structure of the social setup, Bourdieu says for non-industrialized societies that relations of rule and domination must be marked more directly. This is done via symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1982).

Economic capital can be transformed into cultural capital at the cost of time. Cultural capital is a resource that is passed on first and foremost in the family, so the acquisition of cultural capital depends on the time resources of the mother or an-

other person to raise the child. The economic capital that exists to make it possible to take the time to pass on cultural capital is crucial in that respect (Bourdieu 1992c: 72). Also, to gain higher education, the time needs to be available in which the individual cannot earn money (Bourdieu 1992c: 73). The convertibility of the capital forms influences the strategies that actors choose to keep conversion costs low (Bourdieu 1992c: 73). The transmission of cultural capital, which is done mainly in private, is increasingly dependent on the confirmation of the educational system for its legitimacy (Bourdieu 1992c: 74). The arbitrary character of acquisition is obvious in the transmission of capital (Bourdieu 1992c: 74). The more the official transmission of economic capital is prevented, the more the clandestine circulation of capital in its various forms of cultural capital determines the structure of society. The education system, an instrument of reproduction with the special capacity to obscure its function, becomes increasingly important in that respect (Bourdieu 1992c: 75).

Only the truly embodied forms of capital (e.g., cultural capital in the form of education or the way of speaking) are, strictly speaking, part of the habitus of an individual (Bourdieu 1992c: 56). So, the convertibility of different forms of capital depends on the field in question as well as the kind of capital.

Generally, Bourdieu's capital theory makes clear that resources can be of incorporated and social kind and do not have to consist of weapons and money. This notion is especially of interest for International Relations. It was argued in International Relations that by looking at new forms of capital in settings of international relations, new kinds of important actors can be identified. It is argued that an understanding of capital can offer a more helpful understanding of resources than classical IR does (Villumsen Berling 2012). Trine Villumsen Berling describes how capital serves as a kind of key for the entry of new actors in the field. Jef Huysman for example shows how the NATO had to convert its military capital into humanitarian capital in the course of the Kosovo crisis (Huysmans 2002).

4.4 Implicit knowledge

The quote by Bourdieu that actors move like fish in water when they enter a field shows how he considers actors to acquire their knowledge. Keeping in mind that

the field represents the structural social conditions with objective positions and the habitus entails individual dispositions, the match of the two does not seem self-evident. Based on their life experience actors observe the other actors in the field and thus acquire knowledge of how the game is played. The actors know which social goods are at stake in each game, which can be power factors and decide on the actor's advancement. These are the capital forms (Bourdieu 1992d: 140). Bourdieu describes the perfect match of habitus and field which leads to smooth performance of practices in an oxymoron as *most frequent special case* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). So, in Bourdieu's view, the match of habitus and field which results in smooth social intercourse is the norm, and failure of which is the aberration. In Bourdieu's view, actors enter a field and learn how to move there and what is important and required quickly (Pouliot 2008). A mismatch between actor and field is not the norm but the exception in Bourdieu's writing.

Bourdieu calls this the coincidence of dispositions and positions. It is the sense of the game that the actor possesses by being in the game. Without the aim of the game ever having been explicitly mentioned, the actors know what to do and how to do it, independently from conscious reflection or discourse (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996). Instances like this show that Bourdieu is most interested in explaining social stability, which is in close connection to the reproduction of socially asymmetrical relations, i.e., relations of rule.

However, Bourdieu does account for habitus and field not matching. He mentions the example of people in Algeria who had a pre-capitalist habitus and who were unable to adapt to the now capitalist economic field. This example he mentions is that rapid historic change can leave individuals lost in a new world they do not understand (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 164). When the social world changes more quickly than the individuals, it can come to two reactions: adaptation and non-adaptation, revolt, and resignation, whereas Bourdieu claims that adaptation is the more frequent of the two (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 164). There is only a closed cycle of perfect reproduction of the social when the habitus and the conditions of its functioning are identical (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 164). That means that perfect reproduction of practices can only happen if the social environment does not change and thus challenge the habitus.

Practical sense is something that agents possess by being in the field. It is the synthesis between habitus and field because it means to know what would be common sense to be done in each situation (Pouliot 2008: 275). This can be described by a *sense of one's place* (highlight in the original Bourdieu 1992d: 141), which brings people of lower classes to stay in their places modestly and for people in higher classes to keep a distance and not mingle with the common people. These strategies can be completely unconscious and appear as timidity or arrogance. These social distances are inscribed into the actors' bodies (Bourdieu 1992d: 141).

Pouliot (2008) describes that the sense of one's place is extremely relevant in diplomacy. That means that informal, resource-based hierarchies are adhered to, because it is common sense to do in diplomacy, where dominance is not shown openly, and social intercourse is supposed to work smoothly. This relates to what Albrecht (1996) describes as asymmetries leading to self-censorship. The weaker actor in anticipatory obedience complies to the stronger actor's wishes. That is how the concept of implicit knowledge has a strong connection with relations of rule in International Relations.

4.5 Symbolic Violence

The Bourdieusian concept which can best make subtle forms of rule visible, is symbolic violence. It describes subtle forms of power, i.e., all forms of violence that do not include physical execution of any sort (Schmidt 2009). However, even if domination is based on forceful means – of weapons or money – it always also has a symbolic dimension (Bourdieu 2001: 220).

Bourdieu defines symbolic power as a power that exists to the extent that it succeeds in obtaining recognition. It is a power that has the power to conceal its true nature of violence and its arbitrariness (Bourdieu 1992e: 82). Symbolic violence is characterized by its operating on the symbolic level of meaning, the level of the self-evident and the normal. It leads to the internalization, obscuration and affirmation of social rule (Moebius and Wetterer 2011).

It is important to note that both sides, the superordinate and the subordinate, have to operate within the same system of meaning and values so that symbolic violence can be executed (Peter 2004: 49). This means that social actors and even the

subordinate themselves are connected in a relationship of accepted complicity to the effect that some aspects of social life are beyond critical examination, however repulsive and outrageous this very social system might be (Bourdieu 1992e: 82). The political submission is inscribed in the bodies, in the brains and in the posture of agents (Bourdieu 1992e: 82). Because dispositions are products of the incorporation of objective structures and expectations of individuals who tend to adapt to their chances, the existing social order seems natural and self-evident, even to those whom this order disadvantages most (Bourdieu 2001: 222).

Titles, such as titles of education of certain universities, certain clothing or even a certain form of speech or gesture, can be a symbol of power. Symbolic subordination therefore contributes substantially to economic exploitation (Bourdieu 1992d: 144). Bourdieu's definition stands in contrast to Weber who defines power as a dyadic relation, which includes "every chance to enforce one's will against resistance, regardless, on what this chance is based on" (Weber 2002: 28). Bourdieu would contend that such resistance will not appear if symbolic power is at play (Bittlingmayer and Bauer 2009: 119). Symbolic violence then means that an actor with few resources sees the world from the *perspective of the affluent* (ruling class) who have the power to decide in the first place which resource counts as valuable (Krais 1993: 232). The superordinate can shape the overall view so that it seems universal (Bourdieu 2001: 223), which means that symbolic violence completely blurs the view of one's own situation. It means the acceptance of arbitrarily set social demarcations and categories that are also connected to chances and livelihoods. For example, it seems natural and self-evident that academics should earn more than workers, even though this can be seen to be an arbitrary social norm (Bittlingmayer and Bauer 2009: 119).

Symbolic violence is a form of power that is exerted directly onto the body beyond physical enforcement – like magic (Bourdieu 2005: 71). The social world is taken for granted with all its relations of domination and hypocrisy. The social order of each period and each manifestation of social contingence is seen as the natural order of things by the superordinate group or class, as well as by the subordinate. Being born into a certain world makes people believe it is a world of common sense, because there is a pre-reflexive consensus about it (Bourdieu

2001: 221). In Bourdieu's view the superordinate are at the same time dominated *by their own rule*. The superordinate however possesses more capital in its relevant forms and can therefore employ it better to use their position against the subordinate.

4.5.1 The Term Symbolic Violence

Symbolic violence is a concept which is used for empirical research more than a fully systematized theory. This is the reason why Bourdieu's uses of symbolic violence and symbolic power, as well as domination are used synonymously (Moebius and Wetterer 2011). Therefore, in the following, the term symbolic violence will be used when describing the concept in Bourdieu's work.

4.5.2 Symbolic violence and language

Symbolic violence describes all forms of subtle execution of power which work, although primarily through language, through the bodily habitus, and the practical complicity of the dominated as well (Bourdieu 1992e). It is not a coincidence that people of lower classes believe that talent and diligence are rewarded while they are being removed from higher education (Bourdieu 1992e). Language serves not only as a system of expression, but simultaneously as a system of censorship. Language consists of things that are allowed to be said, but also those which are taboo to say or even think (Bourdieu 1992e). Hierarchies exist in reality and in peoples' heads. Even if they ceased to exist in reality, people would project them onto reality and thus make them exist again (Bourdieu 1992e). However, to unfold their magical effect, words must fall on fertile ground. Words only work with people who have the disposition to understand and believe them (Bourdieu 1992e: 83). The biological body and the social body of the superordinate and the subordinate are in complicity. This is the basis on which words unfold their effect, be they admonitions, warnings, or orders (Bourdieu 1992e: 83).

Acceptance of boundaries between the super- and the subordinate, which can evolve without their conscious knowledge, often takes the form of passion or feelings (love, admiration etc.) or physical emotions (shame, humiliation, timidity, anger etc.; Bourdieu 2005: 72). The disposition to submission, which is a product

of objective structures, results in “blaming the victim” mechanisms (Bourdieu 2005: 74).

At this point it becomes clear that when analyzing rule, it does not suffice to look at formalized structures. Because there are mechanisms like anticipatory obedience and symbolic violence, more subtle signs need to be readable as results of rule.

In societies that do not have a self-regulating market, no educational system, no juridical or state apparatus, relations of rule can only be reproduced through the continuous use of strategies, because they are not so deeply inscribed into objective structures (Bourdieu 2009: 357). In the case of the pre-capitalist society, relationships of rule develop through interaction of subjects, dissolve and are reproduced, whereas in capitalist societies they are mediated through objective and institutionalized mechanisms. These are secured by titles with an official character to blur their actual nature (Bourdieu 2009: 358). In Bourdieu’s view, basically, the rule structure of society is decided by its distribution of capital and the degree to which capital is objectified (Bourdieu 2009: 358). If the capital forms are sufficiently objectified, individuals do not need to work for their accumulation actively and consciously. This helps reproduce the social structure with its relations of rule and dependence (Bourdieu 2009: 358).

In interstate relations, formally all entities are equals. Simultaneously they stand in informal, resource-based hierarchical relation to each other. While the resource-based hierarchies are mostly not formally institutionalized, the way things are done is shaped by rituals and customs. However, lately, international relations have been increasingly shaped by non-state actors so that their kind of influence will also have shaped how international relations are done. Looking at International Relations works, we learn that hierarchies are also built by symbols such as certificates of higher education, habitus etc. analogous to national contexts. Merje Kuus writes for the EU that EU-diplomats remain in some way nationally shaped. Diplomats tend to be from families from the national elites (Kuus 2015: 6). At the same time there are EU-specific forms of social and symbolic capital (Kuus 2015: 5). So, habitus, field, and symbolic violence are seen to have a strong effect on social hierarchies between diplomats, also in the EU context.

For symbolic violence to become effective in international relations, there needs to be a common understanding of how symbols are to be interpreted – at least enough to enable a common understanding. It can thus be assumed that a *symbolic frame of reference* exists, which makes action in the international realm intelligible – also beyond diplomacy where rules and procedures are often set.

4.5.3 Male Domination

For Bourdieu, the prime example of symbolic violence is male domination which is imposed and endured. He calls this a paradoxical submission, which constitutes symbolic violence (Bourdieu 2005: 8). Regarding male domination, Bourdieu warns of danger that we were all brought up with cognitive and evaluative schemata that evolved under male domination. When contemplating the topic, there is the inherent danger that the scholar uses these schemata to research the subject (Bourdieu 2005: 14). That is one reason why Bourdieu uses examples from Algeria, where he conducted his ethnographic research. Symbolic violence also works in societies that are not as differentiated as those of contemporary Europe, such as the Kabyle society of the 1960s. For him, the Kabyle society is a paradigm example for the realization of Mediterranean traditions (Bourdieu 2005: 15). Bourdieu mentions that the system of classification of society, which constituted the complete world view at the time, was ultimately centered on the division of labor between genders (Bourdieu 1992a: 38). He describes how activities and properties were arbitrarily divided into male and female e.g., high/low, front/back, right/left etc. (Bourdieu 2005: 18). These categories that relate to connotations of sex, are presented as natural and objective. Therefore, the inherently dominating quality of some uses of them is imperceptible for actors who are subjected to them (Bourdieu 2005: 19).

The power of the androcentric view is that it presents itself as neutral and thus does not need to justify itself in legitimizing discourses (Bourdieu 2005: 21). The social order functions like a machine to ratify male domination, on which it is based: there is a strict division of labor in all tasks. Also, the space is divided into sexed spheres: the market is reserved for men, whereas the house is the domain of the woman (Bourdieu 2005: 22). In Kabyle society, the body itself is legitimation for the division of labor and all other attributions. If the dominated use cognitive

schemata that are the product of this very domination, then acts of understanding (Erkenntnisakte in the original) are acts of recognition, i.e., submission (Bourdieu 2005: 28). As an example of that which Bourdieu describes, is how the attributions of properties are used for the female sex organ which women then use to formulate a negative view of their sex (high/low, hard/soft, upright/bent, dry/moist) (Bourdieu 2005: 28). Bourdieu describes the socially accepted description of sex organs as social constructions that derive from the androcentric world view (Bourdieu 2005: 31). The socially constructed difference becomes the naturally appearing basis for the social perspective that created it in the first place (Bourdieu 2005: 23). For women, taking too much space is socially not acceptable. Neither with their bodies as such nor through gestures such as widening one's legs. The art of being female seems to be to become small and thus belittle oneself (Bourdieu 2005: 54). Female intuition is based on the necessity of the subjugated to anticipate the dominator's wishes to avoid punishment or trouble. They are much more susceptible to the tone of voice of others (Bourdieu 2005: 59). But because their mental processing systems evolved under male domination, including the negative prejudice about the female, they must confront them (Bourdieu 2005: 62).

Bourdieu describes that the sexual relationship seems to be a relationship of domination because of the fundamental differentiation between the male, active part, and the female passive part (Bourdieu 2005: 41). The social division of labor is not a necessity, dictated by the biological bodies and thus natural, but an arbitrary social construction of the bodies and their functions. Thus, male domination legitimizes a relationship of domination that it imprints on a biological nature that is itself a social construction (Bourdieu 2005: 45). Women often must use the weapons of the subjected which then reproduces stereotypes (Bourdieu 2005: 105). This can be called a self-fulfilling prophecy. Masculinity on the other hand is a concept that is relational and is constructed against femininity (Bourdieu 2005: 96). The gender hierarchy is the context in which words exude their performative power, especially insults (Bourdieu 2005: 178).

In the case of male domination, women use mental schemata which incorporate the power structures that they are subject to. This can lead to a systematic self-

devaluation even self-degradation (Bourdieu 2005: 65). The dominant and the subjected exist in a doxic accordance, in which the domination does not have to be justified. This is symbolic violence (Bourdieu 2005: 63f.). The male dispositions to dominate and rule on the other hand are also products of socialization. They are thus not natural (Bourdieu 2005: 90). Social identity is presented as biological fact and thus becomes habitus (Bourdieu 2005: 92).

Symbolic violence does not mean that it is not real or not to be taken seriously. Bourdieu considers that there are manifold ways in which women become victims of physical violence, are molested, hit, and exploited (Bourdieu 2005: 64). Bourdieu argues that structures of rule and domination are not ahistorical, but they are the product of relentless work of reproduction. Many actors participate to reproduce them: males who work with the weapons of physical and symbolic violence, institutions, families, the church, and the state (Bourdieu 2005: 65). Male domination was traditionally presented as a moral order, which was kept up by church, school, and other social institutions (Bourdieu 2005: 152).

In contemporary industrialized societies the self-evidence of the classic role model is fading due to changes in the situation of women, especially in the higher social classes, such as access to higher education and universities as well as paid work and thus the public sphere in general (Bourdieu 2005: 154). Nevertheless, formal equality obscures the effects of unfair selection processes and that women always have lower positions if conditions are equal (Bourdieu 2005: 159). Because women often have part-time jobs and because of other factors, they are often excluded from games of power and career perspectives (Bourdieu 2005: 160). Women seem to be divided from men by a negative symbolic coefficient (Bourdieu 2005: 161).

The descriptions of male domination make clear that there are strong parallels between social settings, such as the relationship between man and women and international relations in so far as formally, the entities are equal. But in practice, symbolic violence plays an important role in building hierarchies. Bourdieu writes about women what Albrecht (1996) writes about less powerful states; that they fall into anticipatory obedience and thus often no strong signs of resistance occur. Nevertheless, the researcher can try to find signs of symbolic violence by looking

for subtle traces of submission such as feelings or passions as mentioned above: feelings (love, admiration etc.) or physical emotions (shame, humiliation, timidity, anger etc.; Bourdieu 2005: 72). These can become perceivable in a person's utterances, posture, or in gestures.

4.5.4 Bourdieu and the State

In Bourdieu's thinking, the state is the most important entity when it comes to symbolic violence. In the following, the ontological and epistemic insights he offers and what they mean for International Relations will be outlined.

4.5.4.1 Ontological Considerations

In Bourdieu's view, the state is an ensemble of power fields in which there is competition for what Bourdieu, after Weber, calls the monopoly on the use of legitimate symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 143). The result is that in many social fields the state has the power to categorize and to therefore hierarchize between social groups.

The power fields of public administration produce the normative and logical consensus to be able to articulate political demands, exchange goods, and resolve social conflict (Dieluweit 2015). Depending on their position, members of the administrative field endeavor to enforce their view on the social world. In these conflicts, the parties invoke concepts of the common good. In Bourdieu's view, this is not the effect of rational thinking but of the actors' cognitive pattern that they habitualized and reproduced subconsciously (Dieluweit 2015). This entails the power to create a set of coercible norms in a certain national territory as general and generally valid (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 142). The state thus possesses a kind of meta-capital in that it has the power to define which other kinds of capital are relevant in social fields (Bourdieu 2014). Thereby the state constitutes a legitimate symbolic order (Dielutweit 2015). Bourdieu writes that what is generally called the state is a bundle of hidden principles of social order and physical and symbolic violence (Bourdieu 2014: 7). He gives the example of public holidays, which are decided by the state, therefore every personal memory is at the same time somehow entangled with it: "We find it at the very heart of our consciousness" (Bourdieu 2014). Systems of classification that structure daily

activities are thus penetrated and legitimized by the state (e.g., through defining measures and weight units; see Dieluweit 2015). Bourdieu further describes the state as

> […] a kind of principle of public order, understood not only in its evident physical forms but also in its unconscious symbolic forms, which apparently are deeply self-evident. One of the most general functions of the state is the production and canonization of social classifications (Bourdieu 2014: 9).

Not only are humans' daily lives structured by the state, but it also classifies society's members. He describes social categorization as something that is done by the state and symbolized through e.g. identity cards and pay slips (Bourdieu 2014). These categories, that basically make up the social hierarchy, help the state create a picture of social identity which is legitimate if not natural. People who live within the boundaries of a given society are obliged to acknowledge them, even if they do not agree with them (Bourdieu 2014). He sees schools as an important means of executing social stratification through distributing status and therefore producing social classification (Bourdieu 1994: 1). If people rebel against the educational system, this rebellion might be decided by the category by which they are classified. People with intellectual careers, Bourdieu claims, work in favor of upholding the illusion that the state can define legitimate identities (Bourdieu 2014).

Arguing in line with his concept of habitus, Bourdieu writes that systems of classification are internalized and reproduced subconsciously by society's members. Bourdieu is thus interested in the cultural aspects of the monopoly on violence of the state (Dieluweit 2015), i.e., how members of society act to uphold it and its seeming self-evidence.

State and society cannot be considered separately from each other. The administrative field has varying power to intervene in the other fields. Functions of the state are therefore not predefined but are negotiated in symbolic contests (Dieluweit 2015). Power that is executed in fields of the state can only become effective if the fields' dominating and arbitrary character is obfuscated. That is why rule is always dependent on a certain amount of recognition by the ruled. Thus, actors in the fields of public administration must declare that their interests are in line with the interest of the public (Dieluweit 2015; Bourdieu 2014b: 441).

4.5.4.2 Epistemic Aspects

Bourdieu follows a deeply constructivist argumentation by saying that the state is an entity, which exists purely because it is widely believed that it exists:

> This illusory reality, collectively validated by consensus, is the site that you are headed towards when you go back from a certain number of phenomena – educational qualifications, professional qualification or calendar. Proceeding step by step, you arrive at a site that is the foundation of all this. […] It is something that you cannot lay your hands on. […] [B]e careful, all sentences that have the state as subject are theological sentences – which does not mean that they are false, inasmuch as the state is a theological entity, that is, an entity that exists by way of belief (Bourdieu 2014).

In mentioning that the state's categories functioning is based on consensus among society's members, Bourdieu's take on it is like Gramsci's who says that hegemony works by creating a consensus. Bourdieu however describes the mechanisms through which this works by way of symbolic violence and practices. His theory can thus grasp the way power works in society in a more finely grained way than Gramsci.

Bourdieu writes that thinking about the state always includes a specific danger. It is the danger that the scholar is coopted by the state through adopting the categories of thought which are tightly bound to the state (Bourdieu et al. 1994). Bourdieu claims that most contributions to the discourse about the state thereby construct it (Bourdieu 1994: 2). He thus describes the state as being "unthinkable" (Bourdieu 2014: 3). That is why Bourdieu demands that scholars who try to think about the state are to question the assumptions made about the reality of it, and to question the assumptions in the thoughts of the scholar herself (Bourdieu 1994: 2).

4.5.4.3 Bourdieu's State Theory and International Relations

State centrism in International Relations is part of a wider picture in social sciences – of methodologic nationalism (Beck und Grande 2010). It means that the state is not only accepted as an ontological entity but also an epistemic one. The state is thus taken for granted and its nature, as the result of a contingent historic process, is obfuscated.

In the publication „Return of the Theorists "(2016), in which scholars have fictitious dialogues with IR theoreticians, Anna Leander interviews Pierre Bourdieu

posthumously. She makes him say that IR is susceptible to scholastic fallacy and hubris. Furthermore, she makes him say that through scholarly IR, the state is perpetuated with calamitous consequences such as ecological catastrophes, wars, and poverty (Leander 2016: 337). In the interview, Bourdieu accuses IR of taking the state for granted and therefore contributing to its power:

> The trouble with what you call scholarly IR is that it locks the door on this kind of critique of the state as an epistemological problem. It assumes the state. In the process it naturalizes and enshrines its monopoly on symbolic violence (Leander 2016: 338).

That is why Madsen makes the argument that not the transplantation of the concepts of Bourdieu's sociology into other disciplines makes his work fruitful, but to employ a reflexive sociology (Madsen 2011: 259). He calls this a "double reflexivity" regarding object and researcher:

> More generally, […] the main contribution of reflexive Bourdieusian sociology to international studies is providing a set of research tools [which] help rethink how the international no longer can be capture[d] with a set of categories derived from diplomacy and law but without ignoring the importance of these categories in international practices (Madsen 2011: 271).

Fundamentally, the attempt should be made to clear the researcher's thought of state-derived categories while simultaneously keeping them in mind as important structures of thought in practice. Whereas it seems logical to demand such, it seems problematic to be able to practice it. The researcher, being socialized in a specific national context, can hardly recognize every category that is derived from the state itself, when thinking about it. The only obvious way to cope with this is thus to continually scrutinize and critique one's own categories of thought. Other ways of ensuring the quality of research are discussed in Chapter 9.

If one extrapolates Bourdieu's work on the symbolic power of the state to international relations, it becomes clear that also in international settings and transnational conflict or other situation, systems of classification between humans exist, which are internalized and work tacitly. Symbolic violence could not work beyond national borders, if there were no common ground for interpretation of symbols, which others in International Relations have called *Lebenswelt* in a Habermasian reading (Deitelhoff 2006). Deitelhoff argues that in postnational governance more than in the past, a common ground exists which enables actors to work with persuasion rather than coercion, which she shows has happened in the insti-

tutionalization of the International Criminal Court (ICC; Deitelhoff 2006). This *Lebenswelt*, which makes 'convincing' possible, but simultaneously enables actors to execute symbolic violence, will henceforth be called *symbolic frame of reference*.

4.6 Bourdieu's Contribution to the Understanding of Rule

Bourdieu's work shows that the individual and society need to be analyzed together. This he does using the concept of habitus. Habitus as incorporated history makes it possible to analyze hints as to social order through the actions of individual actors. It also makes clear that grounds for super- or subordination are often incorporated in actors themselves. Bourdieu's work on 'field' expresses that rule and obedience can be guided by a tacit form of knowledge which makes actors know their sense of place, regardless of their position in society. Pouliot (2008) describes this knowledge of sense of place for diplomacy. That means that similar mechanisms work to build and reproduce hierarchies in international relations. Bourdieu's concepts also show that hierarchizing and rule are phenomena which are heavily dependent on symbols. Without decoding symbols, they cannot be understood. Bourdieu makes clear that social categories are socially constructed, but because actors are brought up with them, they use them against themselves even if it disadvantages them profoundly. Bourdieu shows that many of these categories are made by, entangled with, or reproduced by the state – so much so that he describes the state as the entity with the monopoly on symbolic violence. Thus, he urges the researcher to not take social categorizations constructed by state agencies for granted but to question them. This raises questions about the epistemic position of the researcher. If the researcher analyzes cases with actors from the same cultural background as her own, she runs the risk of taking categories presented for granted. If she looks at cases with actors from different cultural backgrounds, it might happen that her interpretations are not accurate[13].

Bourdieu's work shows that super- and subordination can be conducted without much empirical trace, because it often works through symbols, and resistance by

[13] The epistemic position of the researcher is further discussed in Chapter 5.5.

the subordinate can only be observed e.g., through resigned body language. Bourdieu makes clear that if the researcher wishes to reconstruct rule through resistance, she needs to be extremely sensitive to subtle expressions of rule as well as resistance. In a Bourdieusian understanding, rule can be executed by the mere formulation of categories, which is likely to be taken for granted by the subordinate. Also, even if the subordinate feels unhappy about their position, they are likely to comply with the rule they are subjected to, because it is what they were brought up with and what they are used to. The next chapter shows, how the researcher can analyze rule, which works through symbolic means, even if its expression is subtle.

5 Theorizing the Symbolic Dimension of Rule

As described above, for the analysis of relations of rule in International Relations, it is important to be able to make subtle forms of rule perceivable. For this, it is helpful to understand and conceptualize the symbolic dimension of rule.

To recapitulate the understanding of rule so far: In social sciences, rule has been described and defined in a vast array of ways. Some see rule as the consolidated form of power, others define it as a legitimate form of governance. Some call it domination and thereby imply illegitimacy. In a practice-theoretical view, rule is regarded to be a set of practices which consolidate (or consolidated) power. These practices are thought to be of a certain quality. Practices of rule are thought of as perpetuated

asymmetrical power relations of super- and subordination, which can have a socially controlling or inhibiting effect on certain actors. They can create obedience through the belief in the legitimacy of something or through practical constraint, coercion or violence.

Following Bourdieu's take on symbolic violence, in this work, every form of rule is said to possess a symbolic dimension. This means that even the most direct relations of violence (e.g., slave-master relations) work with symbols. Symbols are regarded to be a ubiquitous trait of social interaction. Following Bourdieu, it can be assumed that symbols not only contribute greatly to building social and political hierarchies but also to the challenging of these. If the researcher wishes to analyze a specific case regarding transnational rule, the in-depth analysis of the symbols at work seem to be a fruitful endeavor. Depending on the case, it could be

beneficial to look at resistance, or it could be more helpful to look at the symbolic dimension first because, for example, more subtle forms of rule are seemingly at play, which do not provoke resistance. It could also be possible that subtle forms of rule are at play which provoke resistance that is so subtle, it cannot be detected prima facie.

In the following chapter, derived from Bourdieu's work, it is described at which carriers of social meaning symbols of rule can be found, to make the symbolic dimension of rule detectable.

After discussing some basic assumptions of Actor-Network-Theory in Latour's reading, a theoretical instrument for the analysis of the symbolic dimension of rule is outlined and fleshed out. The symbolic dimension of rule can entail very subtle forms of rule, whereas there are symbols which are not subtle at all. The decapitation of international journalists by the 'Islamic State', which were broadcasted on Youtube, had a strong symbolic meaning but cannot be described as subtle (Carter 2014).

Anticipatory obedience in the case of steep asymmetry and the placing on rankings were mentioned as examples for subtle expressions of rule. Many more could most likely be identified in empirical research.

5.1 Manifestations of Symbolic Violence

Symbols can be understood as sign-like entities which encompass meanings, or activate meaning in the mind of the perceiving person (Hülst 1999). They can be word symbols or objects such as animals, plants, humans, body parts. Also, non-material objects can be symbols such as ghosts, social rites, pride etc. (Hülst 1999).

Dirk Hülst writes about symbols that they appear when meanings are supposed to be transferred that do not lie on the surface, which are hidden from the normal means of inspection by the senses. So, they are suitable to represent experience which is not directly available. Symbols encode these experiences with a specific meaning. That is why the meaning of symbols can only be grasped in some form of interpretive work. Their meaning needs to be somehow decoded (Hülst 1999).

To put it very simply, symbols hint at something under the surface, which cannot be perceived directly.

From Bourdieu's work we get an idea where symbolic violence can become manifest. Non-material symbols play an important role in distinguishing oneself from other classes. This could be college degrees, a 'good' taste in art, and formal positions. Symbolic violence can take the form of gestures or rituals (Schmidt and Woltersdorff 2008). But also material symbols can show symbolic violence, e.g. if the office chair of the superior is more expensive, higher, or more comfortable than the others', this is a clear sign of social hierarchy, enforced in the way of sitting down (Schmidt and Woltersdorff 2008). Whereas objects generally can be either natural or human-made, the human-made artifacts are more likely to fulfill a function of symbolic violence.

Looking at Bourdieu's work on symbolic violence, it becomes clear that it is a multifaceted concept. As symbolic violence is described to encompass every form of violence which does not entail physical execution, the empirical instances of it seem to be ubiquitous. As Bourdieu states that physical violence also has a symbolic dimension, one can say that it is omnipresent. Thus, analyzing Bourdieu's work regarding the different forms in which symbolic violence can become manifest, helps systematize the concept. Building on Bourdieu's work then, the symbolic dimension can be theorized.

5.1.1 Body

Habitus is arguably the most important of Bourdieu's concepts (Krais and Gebauer 2010). As in the habitus structures as well as agency become apparent, the structures are bound to become noticeable in the actions and self-presentation of an individual. Bourdieu writes that the body language of a dominated person can express said domination. This could be through a low gaze, hanging shoulders, dragging steps etc. These traits of somebody's body language could of course have different reasons, for example a case of death in her family. Also, it could be that the person in question suffers from clinical depression. It is also possible that the expressions of patriarchy, such as sexual harassment, interruption in communication, workplace discrimination, have left their traces in someone's habitus. A

case of death would of course be independent from relations of rule, but clinical depression could be a result of discrimination of some sort. Only seeing the person's way of carrying herself does not conclusively tell us the reason for her body language. Anyhow, it enables the researcher to formulate assumptions about the reasons for it and the responsible structures behind it. It is however important to realize that there is a big variety of possible interpretations and that the researcher can only think of the ones on which his former experience allows him to draw.

Body language as well as verbal language is culture dependent. This means that the same gesture can have different meanings in different settings. For example, in Germany, a person holding their hand out facing the floor and wagging their fingers in the direction of another person means "go away". In Japan, the same gesture means "come here". In the analysis of body language, this needs to be reflected. There are gestures though, which are understood internationally. The peace symbol, holding up one's index and middle finder, palm facing the addressee, is understood widely. This can be explained by enhanced communication between cultures as well as international media use via internet.

Diplomacy as it is understood nowadays has a predominantly Western origin. Neumann describes that from the 16th century onward, state to state diplomacy emerged out of a Christian myth that the world should be united in its belief in Christ. So if peace was threatened, diplomacy was the means necessary to achieve that goal or to make it more likely (Neumann 2010: 302). Neumann argues further that because of its Western heritage, diplomacy privileges people from that very context (Neumann 2010: 299). Neumann states that this does not have grave effects in practice, but the myth of European diplomacy as being uniquely peaceful blurs its entanglement with colonialism. So his main argument is that the Eurocentrism of diplomacy is less a practical problem than a problem of mnemonic practices (Neumann 2010: 300). People in diplomatic settings are thus likely to be familiar not only with the verbal expressions of the English language but also with non-verbal cultural meanings. The fact that in international politics actors have a symbolic common ground is entangled with former practices of power and rule. If this is so, symbolic violence is in the fabric of diplomacy and contemporary occurrences have a somewhat reproductive character. This *symbolic frame of refer-*

ence then builds the common ground, which is more than diplomatic culture. It is the common ground which makes it possible internationally to decode the symbols that appear in interpersonal interaction.

As described above, not only body language can be an expression of symbolic violence. For Kabyle society, Bourdieu describes that women are in the house, whereas men move freely in the market and in public spaces (Bourdieu 2005: 22). So, the mere whereabouts of a person can mark symbolic violence – or to be specific – the fact that she does not move in certain areas expresses symbolic violence.

A huge array of situations is conceivable in which symbolic violence is expressed through bodies. At times a look can be enough to intimidate another person. Tattoos as an artificial but integral part of the body for example can be a sign of belonging to a specific cultural group, of self-affirmation, being part of something, being hip. But it can be a sign of rebellion against one's parents or it can express some form of dissatisfaction with one's overall social situation, which then can be read as everyday resistance against society (Kang und Jones 2016).

So, the habitus of a person (expressed through their body) tells us something about them. It is far from unambiguous, what that may be. Certain assumptions can be formulated anyhow. To investigate assumptions about the individual in question, the researcher needs to find more information to narrow down the possible interpretations of a situation.

When the researcher wishes to analyze the body or bodies involved in a situation or performance of practice, she can look at many different factors. Facial expressions, gestures and even position of the bodies are of importance here. Neurological and psychological research suggests that the body movement of a person is deeply connected with cognitive, emotional, and interactive processes (Lausberg 2013: 13). Gestures, self-touch, posture and rest positions can be categories, which can be used for the analysis of body movements (Lausberg 2013). Bourdieu suggests that social order and rule are incorporated by actors. So, as "[b]ody movements are associated with implicit and explicit cognitive, emotional, and interactive processes" (Lausberg 2013: 20), analyzing body movements should

make it possible to infer to a certain degree, what kind of rule had been incorporated by the actors involved in a specific case. Of course, this is an indirect connection because rule does not show itself directly in actors but is mediated through displays of emotions and other habitual factors.

5.1.2 Language

Bourdieu writes that the most important site at which symbolic violence frequently becomes manifest, is language (Schmidt and Woltersdorff 2008). Not only what is said and written, but also how and if, are important aspects in understanding how symbolic violence works in language. According to Moebius and Wetterer (2011: 4), the sites where symbolic violence can be found most is in language, are relations of communication, schemata of perception, and thought.

A political example would be if in the United Nations someone calls another state underdeveloped. This utterance is then an expression of symbolically violating thought schemata. Examples of symbolic violence can be found in daily life as well. For example, when someone greets their boss and he does not answer even though he has clearly heard the greeting, this is a powerful example of symbolic violence.

This example shows that it is of grave importance that the two parties involved are engaged in the same practice and understand the actions of the other in roughly the same way. Only through the understanding of greeting as a mutual sign of recognition, does the missing answer gain meaning. In social situations generally and therefore diplomatic settings, symbolic violence presuppose a symbolic frame of reference, however minimal that may be.

Distinction is often expression of symbolic violence. When one group looks down on the other for not possessing certain goods and another looking down on said group for not having certain certificates of education, this is also an expression of symbolic violence. It happens on the mental level. Distinction can also show itself through body movements (including facial expressions) or postures.

5.1.3 Objects

In Bourdieu's work, objects such as certificates are depicted as symbolic violence through education. Also, certain items of clothing and accessories which are used to distinguish oneself from others, can be seen as expression of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 2002).

Many other examples are possible, however. A gun is a direct means of violence, but if it is not shot, it is only a potential executor of physical violence, so, it can be understood as a symbol of violence. At least the functioning of a gun needs to be known to decode the threat it poses. Most grown-ups would feel threatened by the sight of a gun, whereas small children will not, because they have not received the information about its danger yet, or they cannot yet process it.

A pair of glasses can be used to express intellectuality or seniority over others and thus work as a tool of symbolic violence. It is important to note, however, that the pair of glasses lying on the table with no apparent owner is not such an expression. So, it is often the interplay between body and object often gives the object a symbolic meaning.

5.1.4 Non-material Objects

Non-material objects can also be a carrier of symbolic violence. We can think of institutions being symbolically violating. Marriage is and was for a very long time an institution which excluded e.g. many homosexual people and can in this sense be regarded as a site of symbolic violence.

Another example is that of online bullying: The mere threat of being bullied online might shape the actions of school children in a certain way. The mere thought of it might cause them to dress, speak and act in a certain, conformist way. The internet then functions as a means of symbolic violence. This example however shows that while the cyberspace is non-material, the technology used, such as computers, smart phones and internet cables, are material objects. This example is helpful to distinguish between objects in the symbolic dimension and objects in the material dimension, which will be developed in chapter 6. The smartphone on which a school child is bullied does not have a strong symbolic meaning, but the technology as material has manifest implications for the well-

being of that child. The use of smartphones has made communication endlessly possible so that bullying at school now goes way beyond school gates or school hours. That being so, the smartphone has made school omnipresent and changed the dynamics of bullying at school profoundly (Schau Hin).

5.1.5 Carriers of Symbolic Violence

Summarizing the descriptions above, symbolic violence can occur anywhere, and it does occur constantly, if one sees it as a symbolic way of producing and reproducing hierarchy in any given context, as Bourdieu does.

As described above, actors engaging in the same practice need to have roughly the same frame of reference to understand each other's actions. It is important to note that the actions of people must be seen in the context of common practice to be able to be decoded. A single performance of a practice needs to connect with former practice in some way in order to be intelligible. Only if I know that a weapon can kill, will I decode the threat. I need to understand the meaning of a wave of the hand to be able to engage in greeting.

The various possible carriers of symbolic violence do not have to occur singularly, but actions which express symbolic violence can entail them all at once. If the mayor carries her glasses in a certain way, holds her head high, speaks in such a distinguished language that her colleagues are not able to follow, she clearly shows them, who the boss is. Through her formal position at the municipality (non-material object), through her gestures (body), through language use, and by carrying the glasses in a certain way (object and posture), she uses all possible carriers of symbolic violence to execute it.

Carrier of Social Meaning	Indicators of Symbolic violence
Body	• Gestures • Postures • Facial expressions • Whereabouts • Bodily performances • Display of certain emotions • Etc.
Language	• Threats • Being ignored (absence of language) • A style of expression (distinguished language) • Belittling someone • The dominated talking badly about themselves • Etc.
Objects	• Artifacts that symbolize education (certificates) • Artifacts which symbolize distinction (art, clothing) • Artifacts that stand for affluence (houses, cars) • Any kind of weapon • Money • Etc.
Non-material objects	• The non-material forms of (Bourdieusian) capital (social, symbolic, cultural) • Formal positions • Institutions • Values • Categorizations (e.g. in affluent and not so affluent, educated, not educated) • Etc.

Figure 3: Indicators of Symbolic Violence after Bourdieu

The descriptions above make clear that symbols are not universally understood, but they have a specific context, in which they need decoding. This is true for the involved parties as well as for the researcher.

5.2 Symbolic Interactionism's Contribution to the Symbolic Dimension

Symbolic interactionism is a micro sociological action theory predominantly shaped by George H. Meade (Joas and Knöbl 2013: 184). Bourdieu's work has some resemblance with symbolic interactionism in some respects, but Bourdieu differentiated himself from them, because he found the epistemic position of interactionists too near the researched. From his point of view they do not take the specific social environment into account sufficiently (Joas and Knöbl 2013: 529).

In this context, a basic understanding of symbolic interactionism helps understand how interaction by involved actors can be the basis for interpretation when analyzing the symbolic dimension of rule. In symbolic interactionism, interaction is always mediated by a symbolic interpretation. This includes the interpretation of the intention of others. This interpretive act is always influenced by factors which convey symbols, such as culture (Balzacq 2002; see figure below). Also, it is heavily influenced by the habitus of the person doing the interpretation, because they view the world through the lens of their socialization.



Figure 4: symbolic interactionism

For symbolic interactionists, the communication of the self with itself is decisive. Whereas Joas and Knöbl (2013) argue that this is the moment in which contingency of social interaction becomes apparent (203), Bourdieu would say that is exactly the moment in which the dominated use the categories of their dominators against themselves. At this point her habitus restricts the actions of the actor in so far as she acts in line with her past experiences. As ruling has become increasingly self-governing (Schlichte 2015b), it can be assumed that both views are right to a certain extent. Actor A acting on Actor B is basically free to do anything, but she will carefully not only interpret the actions of B, but also, her habitus will allow her to (consciously, half-consciously, or subconsciously) consider the hierarchy between them and the social context (field). She will use the available social

categories about A and B to assess her options of action (also consciously, half-consciously or subconsciously).

A central assumption of this work is that when analyzing performances, the researcher can reflect on the same factors and thus decode the symbols at work. The researcher needs to accept the reality presented to her by the researched (Latour 2007: 28) until strong counterevidence presents itself to her. Especially when analyzing the symbolic dimension of rule, there is a vast array of possible interpretations. The researcher needs to be especially cautious to use the symbols and interpretations presented by the researched. By trying to decode symbols the same way the researched do and by narrowing down the possible interpretations through empirical research, she can try and find out about the symbolic dimension of rule in a given case. That is how the interpretation of the involved actors can be corroborated or dismissed.

5.3 Following the Actor with Latour

In the following, some basic assumptions in Latour's work are going to be introduced to deduce the rationality behind the analysis of the symbolic dimension. For the analysis of the symbolic dimension of rule, some epistemic as well as ontological assumptions made by Latour are accepted and applied in this work.

Bourdieu and Latour have in common that they regard the researched as an actor on eye-level with the researcher and contend that the researcher should not impose their world view (Latour 2007: 265). However, Latour lines out in detail how the researcher can gain a very close, realistic, and fine-grained picture of the world of the researched. For the analysis of the symbolic dimension of rule, such an approach is useful, because it helps to gain a fine-grained impression of the performance or even the practice which is researched. Latour's reasoning is also instructive as to how the researcher can analyze micro-phenomena and infer from them macro-phenomena.

Latour (2007) lines out how Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) sees the social world. Firstly, he argues against 'social explanations' and says that explaining social phenomena with social phenomena is the wrong strategy (Latour 2007). In his view, it is necessary to regard the social as a connection between actors as op-

posed to a macro-phenomenon. Latour contends that concepts which try to understand the individual case by describing macro-phenomena such as secularization, choose the wrong direction. The 'big' can only be understood by understanding the 'small' first (Latour 2007).The assumption in sociology that societies secularize has obfuscated the fact that the opposite tendency is also true and religion becomes much more important in some contexts for a long time (Latour 2006). Latour outlines his stance that macro-sociological labels prevent the researcher making discoveries and gaining understanding.

Arguably the most important contribution of ANT to social theory is the symmetry assumption. It describes that humans and objects alike can be actors (Latour 1996: 369). The argument Latour makes is that humans without objects have no way of perpetuating relations of power. If a group of humans wants to stay in power over others without using objects, it would have to use force constantly, but the use of force without objects is fleeting in nature. Thus, power cannot be passed on or perpetuated in any other way effectively. He claims that without the use of objects to perpetuate asymmetries: "We were apes and apes we would have stayed" (Latour 2007: 128).

Latour also describes that in sociology traditionally the sociologist sees herself as more intelligent than the actor in the field. This kind of hubris Latour condemns and says that the researcher only needs to follow the actor to truly understand their actions and their views. This needs to be taken to be the truth, because it is the truth of the actor (Latour 2007: 28). The entry point into research - in an ANT point of view - needs to be controversy. From thereon it can be researched, how asymmetries can be perpetuated (Latour 2007: 36). In chapter 6, this work will go into further detail on ANT and Latour's work's contribution to understanding (transnational) rule.

5.4 Looking Down and Studying Up

Keeping Latour's work in mind, one can contend that it is of utmost importance that the researcher tries not to impose his interpretation of the world on the actor and thus distort the results. It is undeniably part of social science that the researcher is at the same time part of what is being researched (Latour 2007: 61). It

is not possible for her to have a truly objective view on the topic at hand, because she too comes with a specific history and thus habitus. Her first intuitions must be heavily influenced by her past experiences. In this work the notion of looking down and studying up is taken seriously. That means that not only is the single performance the entry point to research, but also it is suggested that the researcher takes one step back from the case she is looking at and merely describes what is happening as far as possible[14]. This can be systematically done by describing what the bodies of the actors are doing, the language they are using, the material and non-material objects they are using and invoking. Other researchers use similar methods when researching habitus. Davies analyzes body language as subtle manifestations of dispositions. In his study on habitus on the internet he considers institutional context as well as data received through interviews to receive normative interpretations (Davies 2015: 172).

For Bourdieu, an important concept to ensure the quality of research is reflexivity. He understands this as objectivizing the researcher herself in the research process as well as the context the research field offers (Bourdieu 2003). Because the researcher is situated in a certain historical context and position, she needs to be aware of her potential biases and be transparent about her position (Li 2015: 144). Bourdieu (1970) describes that it is important for the researcher to distinguish analytically between different levels of meaning. Using the example of interpreting the meaning of a painting, he states that a distinction needs to be made between the primary level of direct perception, i.e., the iconographic content of a picture and the secondary level of immanent meaning. On the secondary level, cultural symbols can be decoded (Bourdieu 1970: 127ff.). In Bourdieu's view it is the researcher's task to work through these levels either ascending or descending (Bourdieu 1970: 130).

By working in a Bourdieu-inspired, ANT-like manner of trying to merely describe (similar to describing the iconography of a picture), it becomes dramatically apparent to the researcher, how many actions in social interaction are based on sym-

[14] Depending on the case the researcher analyzes, the amount of data might be too big to observe it all. In that case, she will need to select the material, which already includes an interpretation. It is necessary for her to reflect on this and be aware of it.

bols. A wave of a hand is a symbol for a greeting and decoding it is already an interpretation on the side of the researcher. Even though smallest children can partake in that practice, it is and stays a symbolic performance of a practice, nevertheless. So, when looking at the symbolic dimension of rule, Bourdieu's insights into levels of meaning are revisited, renamed, and analytically dissected:

The first stage of analysis of the here developed "Practice Analysis on Rule" is the *factual stage*. The mere description of a greeting through hand waving would then be described as someone wagging their arm in the direction of another person. The second stage of analysis is the first stage of interpretation or what one would intuitively call a description, which it is of course not purely. The wagging of the hand on the factual stage can – on the first interpretation stage – be *interpreted* as a greeting. As described above, regarding symbolic violence, the researcher's interpretation does not have to be correct. That is why she regards all interpretations as tentative. Assumption a) could be formulated as: one person is greeting another. Assumption b): The arm wagging person is hot and thus waving air. Assumption c): The arm wagging person is driving away a wasp. By treating symbolic actions as what they are – worthy of interpretation – the researcher broadens his mind for possible explanations of a certain situation. When interpreting the observations, it is important to try and describe the possible interpretations. But because in some cases there is bound to be an indefinite number of interpretations, the most unrealistic ones might be left out. So, in the example this could mean that the wagging of the arm would only be interpreted as driving away a wasp, if a wasp was anywhere nearby. The first two stages take the performance itself into account and try to understand as much as possible about it from the available data on it. With every step of inference and interpretation the researcher needs to use more data either from the media, from academia, or other empirical material to corroborate some interpretations over others and to thus narrow down the number of possible interpretations.

Regarding academic interpretation, Bourdieu introduces the "double break" (Bremer and Teiwes-Kügler 2013: 99). The first break is with the everyday concepts of the involved actors. Bourdieu suggests taking a certain distance, to not uncritically accept the actor's world view and gain a distance from the social

world that the researcher himself inhabits. The second break is with his academic views, which might hinder the researcher to draw the right conclusions and to impose meaning onto the involved actors (Bremer and Teiwes-Kügler 2013: 99). The goal is therefore to take a distance and construct the subjective view of the actors (ibid.). Pouliot, in a similar vein, calls his methodological stance to international relations "Sobjectivism" (Pouliot 2007). He suggests that constructivist methodology should be inductive, interpretivist, and historical (Pouliot 2007). The presented tool fulfills these criteria by starting very inductively and step by step broadening its scope through interpretation. My epistemic stance is that the researcher should stay close to the researched as long as possible, but by taking increasingly more data into account should, in the next step, gain a certain distance from the actors' views. In the Practice Analysis of Rule, the researcher broadens the temporo-spatial scope of research, by making connections. She can thereby find aspects of the case that were not available prima facie. Also, by doing so, she can research a phenomenon, which is taken to be a macro-phenomenon through the lens of practice and stay true to practice theory's flat ontology.

Bourdieu's insights on levels of meaning (1970) are taken as a starting point for further dissecting. The mentioned 'level of immanent meaning' is divided into different stages of analysis, for the purpose of this book, which aim to interpret different aspects of the case at hand:

The third stage (Interpretation Stage II), which is called 'practice stage', is when the performance is put into the practice context. First, by looking at similar instances of the performance, the researcher can interpret which practice she is analyzing. By looking at the practice, of which the initial performance is part of, she can interpret whether the performance is part of *common practice* or if shifts have taken place. This is where the context-dependency of practice comes into play. Austin gives a very good example for this as: If I smash a bottle against a ship and loosen the moorings, and shout: "I name you Mr. Stalin" does not mean that I named the ship because firstly I might not have had the authority to do so and secondly, there might not have been a launching ceremony (Austin 1962: 23). This shows that practice can be actor-dependent, and it needs the right context to be effective. If the supposed naming of the ship is not done by the authorized per-

son or in the right context, it could be rather seen as an act of resistance or an expression of mental illness, also depending on the context. The researcher would need to gather empirical data to determine in how far the performance is at all part of a practice: In determining the practice at hand, comparing the performance at hand to common practice, concordance, and deviation from which, can become apparent. This can help the researcher find out more about the background of the performance. It sheds light on the context of the performance, and it shows how the performance connects with common practice. It can be assessed whether the performance can be interpreted more as reproductive (of social order) or as a sign of social change.

At the fourth stage, the researcher can – using more data and theory – try to formulate assumptions about the political implications of the specific performance or practice at hand. If the initial research started by analyzing a specific 'site'[15], the connections to other 'sites' can be analyzed to gain a bigger picture of the practice. That can mean either tracing the same practice over various sites, or it can mean analyzing the connections that the practice has with other practices. If the researcher uses 'crisis and controversy' as a starting point, after understanding the practice involved in Interpretation Stage II, the researcher can broaden her view and analyze multiple practices, which can have changed through the crisis. She can also extend the timeline to analyze how practices have changed other practices and what that means in the political context. If the entry point of research is 'following an object' the researcher can – after understanding which practice the initial performance is part of – follow the object through time or space. She can also compare the use of the object with the use of similar objects and try to understand the practice better. However, the interpretation stage III generally widens the picture by mapping the practice and by showing its connections.

On Interpretation Stage IV, the researcher can broaden his view even more by taking more connections into account, extending the geographic space and by extending the timeline of inquiry. So, he can comprehend the practice in its histori-

[15] These deliberations refer to the descriptions of praxiographic research strategies in Chapter 3.5.2.2.

cal context. It depends on the empirical case at hand and the information available which inferences can be drawn, which interpretations can be made and how well this can be done. Especially for the interpretation stages, it is important that the researcher stays true to practice theory's flat ontology and regards the political and historical context as networks of small instances. The steps of interpretation are deliberately formulated cautiously to prevent the theoretical preclusion of understanding empirical cases.

In this work, 'looking down and studying up' is interpreted as taking practice as the basis of thought, but first looking down to a single performance. It means removing as much interpretation as possible to then offer various likely possible interpretations. It means looking at various similar performances to make an informed judgement about which practice the performance is part of. Then comparing the performance to common practice to be able to trace social change. From a single practice, here, studying up means to make connections to other sites, times, practices, or objects to find out more about the political or even the historical context. How far down and how far up the researcher wishes to study, depends on the empirical case at hand. Not every step will be equally insightful for all possible empirical cases.

The Practice Analysis takes Bourdieu's insights on symbolic violence seriously and looks for indicators of rule in the carriers of social meaning - body, language, objects, and non-objects.

The Practice Analysis of Rule does not prescribe certain methods, because the empirical cases which could be studied analyzing rule are infinite. The general notion that participant observation is the most direct method and therefore favorable, applies to developed Practice Analysis. As there will be many cases, in which the researcher cannot trace performances and objects in real time, other methods need to be employed as they were described in Chapter 3.3.2.2.

5.5 Practice Analysis

Practice Analysis of Rule					
Stage of Analysis		**Body**	**Language**	**Objects**	**Non-Objects**
Performance	**Factual Stage**				
	Interpretation I (Interpersonal Stage)				
Practice	**Interpretation II (Common or Former Practice)**				
Context	**Interpretation III (Political Context)**				
	Interpretation IV (Historical Context)				

Figure 5: Practice Analysis

5.6 Practice Analysis of Rule

Using Bourdieu's work on symbolic violence and looking to Latour, a tool of analysis was developed to be able to infer what certain performances of practice look like and what they could mean. Bourdieu's concept of habitus shows very clearly that one person is never solely an individual, he also embodies the environment he grew up in and that surrounds him. So, if a situation or interaction can be analyzed at various stages, using different categories of analysis, it becomes possible to gain a deeper understanding of the symbols that are effective in each performance. The model makes the researcher view the same performance from various angles and thus enables her to take a distance. By first analyzing what is observable (or what is described in sources as to be observable), the researcher becomes aware that most perceptions about a situation are interpretations. The mere bodily movements, utterances etc. are to be registered. The next step then, is to infer which emotions might have been expressed or what the movements could have intended or meant. After this, the performance is connected to Practice. Then the political implication of which can be analyzed, using the background information the researcher has gathered in the meantime. Whenever interpreting (every other stage than the Factual Stage) the researcher should be careful to be aware that there is more than one interpretation which could be correct, so he should account for them. Focusing on the bodies of the actors, then language, then objects, and lastly non-objects allows for different symbolic entities to expose their symbolic efficacy. The analysis of the symbolic dimension enables the researcher to encounter deeper layers of reality which can hint at relations and contexts of rule. To be able to infer about rule, after the analysis of symbols, the researcher needs to reflect whether they simply convey social understanding or if there is a display of power or control. Keeping in mind the insights about rule as perpetuated

asymmetrical power relations of super- and subordination, which can have a socially controlling or inhibiting effect on certain actors. Rule can work through the belief in the legitimacy of something or through practical constraint, coercion or violence.

This means that following criteria[16] need to be considered when analyzing the symbols in the performance, which is studied:

5.6.1 Indicators for the Symbolic Dimension of Rule

Criterion	Possible Indicators
Asymmetry	• Actors display strength or weakness • Data suggests asymmetry based on position or resources • Appropriation of grain, taxes, and labor • Anticipatory obedience is displayed
Super- and subordination	• Actors display signs of power struggle or controversy • Humiliation, deprivilege, insults, assaults on dignity
Social control	• Contingency of certain actors is minimized • Room for action is minimized
Inhibition	• E.g. body reactions such as display of emotions • Body language (hanging shoulders, lowered gaze etc.)
Legitimacy	• Approval of measures which minimize contingency
Practical Constraint	• Actors display or verbalize that measures which minimize contingency are necessary or without alternative
Coercion	• Actors are made to approve of measures which minimize contingency • Through money or withdrawal of such • Threat of physical violence
Violence	• Physical violence through weapons • Or bodies

Figure 6: Criteria for Rule

[16] Some of these indicators are taken from Scott 2005, some from Daase and Deitelhoff 2014 and 2015. Others are deduced from the literature on symbolic violence. This list is not exhaustive. At this point, it can only serve as a suggestion of criteria to consider deduced from the literature, because it will be exactly the objective of future research on transnational rule to find out, what it is and what makes it observable.

5.6.2 Practice Analysis of the Symbolic Dimension of Rule

Stage of Analysis		Body	Language	Objects	Non-Objects
Performance	**Observation**	Who is involved? How are the involved bodies moving?	What is being said? How is it said? Which intentions do the actors claim to have? What is not being said/ omitted?	Do objects play a role in the performance? Which objects do? How are they used?	Which non-objects play a role? How do the actors refer to the non-objects?
	Interpretation I (interpersonal level)	Does this show anything on the emotional level? What does this mean for the interpersonal relationship(s)? Can an asymmetry between the actors be inferred? What other interpretations are possible?	What do the utterances say about the actors' emotions? What do the utterances say about their relationship?	Do the objects used symbolize anything? Can they be used as a means of distinction? Do the objects used have an inhibiting effect on any actors?	What do the non-objects in the performance symbolize? Can the non-objects function as a means of distinction? Do the non-objects used have an inhibiting effect on any actors? Are categories, rankings, differentiations between humans used as means of social control?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	Which practice does the performance refer to?	Which practice do the utterances refer to?	Which practice do the objects refer to?	Which practice do the non-objects refer to?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	Considering the contemporary political context, what can be inferred to be happening considering the body (disruptions, reproduction)?	How do the utterances reflect on the contemporary political context (disruption, reproduction)?	How do the used objects reflect on the contemporary political context (disruption, reproduction)?	What do the non-objects reveal about the contemporary political context?

	Interpretation IV (historical context)	Considering the historical context, what can be inferred to be happening regarding bodies (disruptions, reproduction)?	How do the utterances reflect on the historical context (disruption, reproduction)?	How do the used objects reflect on the historical context (disruption, reproduction)?	What do the non-objects reveal about the historical context?

Figure 7: Practice Analysis of the Symbolic Dimension

The questions inserted into the table of the Practice Analysis of the symbolic dimension of rule are example questions, which are deduced from the symbolic indicators of rule. These were derived revisiting the literature on rule. These questions serve as examples of what the researcher can ask herself when conducting research guided by the Practice Analysis of Rule. By analyzing symbols in bodily movements, language, in the form of objects, and non-objects in the case at hand, and by conducting research by looking down and studying up, the researcher can obtain a finely-grained picture of the symbols at play. By taking the indicators for the symbolic dimension of rule into account, she can be especially sensitized to the symbol's inhibiting and restricting side and therefore decode them in their quality as the basis of a practice of power.

6 Resistance as a Dimension of Rule

As outlined above, resistance can be regarded as an important indicator for rule. In this work rule and resistance are seen to stand in such an important relationship to each other that the one needs to be discussed in connection with the other. It is, however, difficult to define which practices, or performances of practices can count as resistance.

> For a social science attuned to the relatively open politics of liberal democracies and to loud, headline-grabbing protests, demonstrations and rebellions, the circumspect struggle waged daily by subordinate groups is, like infrared rays, beyond the visible end of the spectrum (Scott 1990: 183).

The quote by James Scott wants to draw attention to forms of resistance which are not easily identified as such. It shows that if the researcher wishes to reconstruct rule through resistance, she needs to be especially sensitive when it comes to subtle forms of resistance.

The following Chapter outline, in how far resistance constitutes a valuable dimension for the research into the quality of rule. To do that, first, Bourdieu's work is scrutinized for insights about resistance and its possible connection to rule. After that, Daase and Deitelhoff's take on the connection is described, because they suggest the reconstruction of rule through resistance and thereby offer a central argument in this work. Later, selected sociological works are going to be consulted to gain a better understanding, especially of everyday forms of resistance. Eve-

ryday resistance is described as subtle forms of resistance which occur outside official political contexts. Albert and Bourdieu both describe bodily reactions to rule, such as gestures or posture, as possible indicators of rule. Everyday resistance describes the same reactions as a specific form of resistance. Subtle forms of resistance are suspected to stand in some kind of relationship to subtle forms of rule and thus need special attention. Subtle forms of rule and resistance might both be overlooked in research. This Chapter seeks to make them perceivable and researchable and thus gives everyday resistance special attention. At the end of the Chapter Butler's work is outlined as her work on subversion and iterabiliy can be read as practice-theoretical contributions to the discussion on resistance (Schäfer 2013). A practice-theoretical view is offered on how analyzing resistance can be executed in a way that can lead to deeper understanding of the connection to rule than previous approaches.

As rule in international relations can be called under-theorized, the relationship between rule and resistance in international relations can also only be called under-researched. One can assume that rule and resistance stand in some relationship to one another, but it is not exactly clear, what kind of relationship that is. Daase and Deitelhoff have initiated an extensive research project to understand said relationship (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014). They state that rule and resistance are inextricably intertwined and refer to each other. Daase and Deitelhoff contend that resistance is always part of rule:

> Rule as institutionalized power has the tendency to marginalize resistance, through the production of legitimacy and voluntary obedience; yet resistance stays a necessary part of rule, whether it is executed in the most subtle way or through brute force (translation M.H.; Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 132).

In this Chapter, the goal is not to develop an exhaustive answer to the question, in which relationship rule and resistance stand to each other (causal, constitutive, or otherwise). The goal is to argue why resistance constitutes a valuable dimension of the research on transnational rule and to outline some theoretical corner stones for research.

The assumption in this work is more an epistemic one than of an ontological nature. It may or may not be the case that resistance is always present when rule is at work. Resistance should, however, be reflected on when one intends to research

relations of rule. Even if, at first glance, the affected seem to be submitting to a certain form of rule, it is probable that resistance arises in some form. Reconstructing rule through obedience does not seem to be a practical endeavor, because obedience hardly leaves observable traces in the social world. Obedience means that power can be executed without hindrance and thus the rule at play looks legitimate. Rule becomes observable especially when it needs to be executed vis-a-vis resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 121).

6.1 Resistance in Bourdieu's work

To be able to answer the guiding question of this work, what Bourdieu's contribution to an understanding of transnational rule can be, this Chapter first looks to Bourdieu to understand resistance as a dimension of rule.

6.1.1 Neoliberalism

Towards the end of his life, Bourdieu was preoccupied with critiquing neoliberalism's consequences for societies (Bourdieu 1999; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999). Looking at Bourdieu's work on neoliberalism promises to make his opinion on what resistance is clear and how his view can benefit the research on it.

Bourdieu himself was not only an academic, but gradually became one of the most outspoken intellectuals of his time (Bourdieu 1999). Bourdieu's attitude changed during his life. At first, he thought that intellectuals should not get involved in politics. Later he criticized that very opinion as escapism (Schwingel 1995: 8). He fiercely criticized neoliberal politics as conservative restauration for destroying important sociopolitical accomplishments of the 19th and 20th century (Schwingel 1995: 8). He writes in *Gegenfeuer: Wortmeldung im Dienste des Widerstands gegen die neoliberale Invasion* that people who are lucky enough to be studying contemporary society should use the weapons of science to tackle the questions of our time (Bourdieu 1999: 10). This book he saw as an appeal to do so. Bourdieu sees the withdrawal of the state from many areas that traditionally were its responsibility as a problem caused by neoliberalism: public housing, TV and radio, public schools, hospitals etc. (Bourdieu 1999: 17f.). He thus sees neoliberalism as the reason for the welfare state being eroded, and work relations becoming increasingly aggressive and hostile (Bourdieu 1999: 11). The ruling

class is always characterized by a certain distance to the rest of society. This is marked by certain practices and through a specific habitus. Whereas skiing used to be an aristocratic practice, it became popular to ski for the masses. This is when the upper classes started skiing away from the usual routes (Bourdieu 2005b: 39).

Bourdieu says that knowledge about the mechanisms of social determination through habitus and field enables the individual to distance itself from it. Being aware of the structural determination of dispositions makes it possible to change them. Whereas the individual's first inclination to act which arises from the habitus is impossible to change, the following however, it can change. Active reflection enables the individual to overcome the overlap of position and disposition to a certain extent (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996: 170).

Bourdieu sees reflection as a way of avoiding the deterministic side of one's habitus, whereas he acknowledges that changing one's habitus is extremely difficult and takes a lot of time. This he describes using the concept of the hysteresis effect (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996; King 2000: 427). He thus pleads to intellectuals to get involved in public discourse. They should be part of a critical counter power which should be characterized through disrespect for any form of power, may it be sponsors or bureaucrats, political organizations or mass media (Steinruecke 1992). He contends that the mass media is producing a discourse (he means the neoliberal discourse) which is so powerful because of its unanimity, which needs to be disrupted to lose its symbolic power (Bourdieu 1999: 15). This discourse is shaped by private companies being hailed and private interests encouraged (Bourdieu 1999: 18). He criticizes that everyone is supposed to justify everything with economic reasoning, even though most politicians are not very proficient in economics (Bourdieu 1999: 21). The neoliberal discourse has produced an environment in which the individual is responsible for itself and collective responsibility is fading. This makes it possible to blame the victim (Bourdieu 1999: 23).

Bourdieu seems to stress the intellectual side of resistance and the role of the intellectual in social change so much because he sees this historical period as especially challenging: The ruling class justifies their rule through professional expertise and sometimes even science. In Bourdieu's view, the contemporary ruling class prides itself on talents that only they have (Bourdieu 1992a). This is why

only social science that tries to uncover the hidden side of power can help unmask illegitimate forms of power and rule (Bourdieu 1992a).

6.1.2 Resistance through Socio-Analysis

In Bourdieu's view, the role of sociology is to uncover the hidden mechanisms of symbolic violence and help develop means against them. This would be linguistic alertness and critique of language (Bourdieu 1992e; Steinruecke 1992). For him, a true democracy is not possible without a true counter-power. In his view, intellectuals must be part of that (Bourdieu 1999: 25). So, for Bourdieu resistance means doing socio-analysis and becoming enabled to critique the social and political conditions of society. It means to uncover the hidden. Intellectuals should help do that by making suggestions instead of preaching eternal truths (Steinruecke 1992).

Bourdieu however criticizes Marxist and feminist traditions for putting too much hope into realization. Realizing one's situation does not automatically mean that one can change one's ways. Only through repetitive exercise, similar to an athlete, can the inscriptions in the body be rewritten for a permanent transformation of the habitus (Bourdieu 2001).

For Bourdieu, it is a militant action to lend power to heretic speech which is not part of the doxa. He calls academia inherently heretical and paradox. The social problem being that heretic speech can hardly be understood. Thus, the illegitimate, heretic, heterodox speech needs to be strengthened from within academia (Bourdieu 1992d: 136). Bourdieu claims that sociology is not worth an hour of work if it remains expert knowledge reserved for experts (Bourdieu 1992d: 137).

Generally, he proposes a politics of autonomy so that every individual can express their experiences her- or himself in their own given language, instead of letting people represent them (Steinruecke 1992). This becomes possible by extending education and by more people accumulating cultural capital (Steinruecke 1992). Social change from Bourdieu's viewpoint is something that becomes possible if central institutions of everyday life are reformed (e.g. school), because this might lead to changed dispositions (Steinruecke 1992).

Bourdieu calls for the critical intellectual to fight against academics who work in favor of the doxa, whom he calls doxosophers (Bourdieu 2005f: 158). In *La misère du monde* Bourdieu criticizes typical state-bureaucratic surveys as being more interrogations than violence free communication. For Bourdieu they prescribe what the surveyed is supposed to see as a problem, so the result is always what the interviewer wanted to hear (Fuchs-Heinritz and König 2011).

Bourdieu describes in *Gegenfeuer* how rationalism has always been used as a pretext to degrade others in international settings. Western universalism he depicts as an example of imperialism. The defense of reason for him should be to defend it against those who use it as a pretext for abuse of power (Bourdieu 1999: 37). On this point his argumentation is very much in line with postcolonial theory.

Bourdieu's reasoning is that socio-analysis and the uncovering of thought patterns constitutes a way of resisting rule. He criticizes neoliberalism and similar to postcolonial theories, neocolonial logics and their consequences. Like postcolonial theory, Bourdieu's reasoning has the problem that thought patterns are hard to detect and therefore to research. Anyhow, the uncovering of thought patterns does not suffice for a more comprehensive analysis of resistance.

6.2 Bourdieu's Contribution to Resistance as a Dimension of Rule

Bourdieu is interested in understanding the workings of symbolic violence in various fields of society. His main interest is to explain how social hierarchy is reproduced (Reckwitz 2004). He poses following questions: Why do not more people resist the norms and rules of society and why does society appear stable. Bourdieu hence looks at the stabilizers of social order and not so much at drivers of change (Schäfer 2013). Arguably, resistance is a driver of change or at least attempts to be.

Bourdieu's contribution to a practice-theoretical understanding of resistance is that the researcher always needs to reflect on her epistemic position and her role in society. In Bourdieu's reading some researchers contribute to the doxa and thus to categories which enhance symbolic violence. In his view, academia can help question relations of rule and help changing practice. Generally, Bourdieu's take on resistance is focused on the question what the intellectual can contribute to

resistance. Whereas the questions concerning the researcher are important, for this work, it is more important to gain an understanding of resistance in wider society. How can one view resistance? How can an understanding of resistance help understand rule? For the elaboration of these questions, Bourdieu's work is not sufficiently comprehensive.

6.3 Resistance in Daase and Deitelhoffs' Work

Daase and Deitelhoff suggest the reconstruction of rule through resistance. By doing so they stand against the many social theories which were heavily influenced by Weber and his understanding on legitimate rule. They state that making legitimacy a defining characteristic of rule makes it difficult to research rule. They contend that it is due to Max Weber's definition of rule as legitimate that legitimacy is still seen as a defining characteristic of rule (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014). If rule is considered legitimate and the affected obey without defiance, it is difficult to find empirical traces of said rule. Whereas, if resistance appears, this helps identify instances of rule. Also, they assume that the resistance can help reconstruct the rule at play in a certain instance. They say that rule becomes apparent, where it must prevail against contestation. Their view is that it becomes comprehensible precisely through its contestation (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017).

6.3.1 Opposition and Dissidence

The contestation of rule can take various forms. Daase and Deitelhoff differentiate between resistance in opposition and dissidence. They say that the difference between the two is whether the resisting party uses practices which conform or do not conform to the rules of the given order (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 133). They make the distinction to become able to assess if changes in the quality of the rule have taken place. A form of resistance can change from dissident to opposing and vice versa. From this, the researcher might be able to interpret what this means for the rule at play.

This distinction between opposition and dissidence is helpful if the researcher can already guess which system of rule the resisting party is defying. If forms of rule are at play which are more difficult to grasp, and if the researcher does not know yet which kind of rule the resisting party is referring to, it is difficult to decide if

they conform to the rules or not. An example would be of workers who defy their bosses by working slowly, meeting outside work, talking badly behind their supervisor's back, and plan to form a trade union. Depending on the larger context, this could be considered a perfectly normal process or a rebellious act which could be punished severely. These processes can be circumscribed as infrapolitics, which has an unofficial character. Nevertheless, not all infrapolitics are dissident, because many infrapolitical practices arguably do not break the rules.

Thus, in this work, resistance is seen as a set of practices which need to be analyzed looking at the context. Holding up signs for example, only constitutes a demonstration in the right context. Even though starvation is itself very unfortunate, it only becomes a hunger strike in the right context. Hunger strikes are used by agents who know these systemic contexts well and support their strikes with powerful other practices such as writing and globally distributing material over the internet (Felcht 2014).

6.3.2 Examples of transnational rule in Daase and Deitelhoff's Work

Daase and Deitelhoff (2017) use India's dissidence against the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as one empirical example of the interplay between resistance and rule. They contend that the indefinite extension of the NPT was an important factor in India's decision to test nuclear war heads (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 137). India had seen the NPT as discriminatory. The nuclear taboo constitutes a social hierarchy which India did not see as legitimate. The indefinite extension then gave India the impression that the nuclear states wanted to indefinitely establish their own nuclear power, so that is why, in Daase and Deitelhoff's view, India decided to test nuclear weapons themselves (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 137f.).

Another example they use is transnational civil society resistance against globalization and international organizations, which are seen to foster globalization, thus causing the income gap to grow and lead to poverty. To answer the growing resistance against global financial institutions deliberative fora were institutionalized, which were supposed to diffuse the resistance (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 140). The invitations to the fora were selective, which meant more radical groups were not included and activists were only allowed to ask questions which fitted

the rationality of the financial institution regarding specific topics in very little time (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 141).

Daase and Deitelhoff claim that the reconstruction of rule through resistance allows the researcher to identify relations of rule which are often overlooked in classical approaches (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 142). They say that in other approaches institutions are not discussed from the aspect of power and are seen as legitimate organizations, and that relations of super- and subordination are thus overlooked (ibid.). Their work is helpful for the analysis of transnational rule, because it opens up the perspective of resistance being a reliable indicator for rule. They show that from resistance inferences about rule can be made. Also, by describing the connection between dissidence and opposition, they show how resistance can change (Daase and Deitelhoff 2017: 134). Daase and Deitelhoff conclude that the objective form of rule itself cannot sufficiently explain the form resistance takes, because actors make their own subjective judgments about the situation which determine their actions. How they make decisions is at the center of understanding the choice between opposition and dissidence and the diversity of resistance and rule (Daase und Deitelhoff 2017: 142).

Another way in which change in rule can become perceivable can be if the resistant practices change from infrapolitical to open or vice versa. The distinction between opposition and dissidence makes sense when the system of rule is clear. The researcher can infer about the rule at hand and whether overstepping of system boundaries can be determined. The distinction between infrapolitics and open resistance on the other hand makes sense when system boundaries are not clear. If resisters perceive more pressure, they might turn to more covert practices of resistance. If they feel safer in comparison to earlier points in time, they might resist in more public ways. This is how the researcher can infer from changes in openness of resistance.

6.4 Selected Insights into Resistance from Social Science

As mentioned, for the reconstruction of rule through resistance, it is important to understand subtle forms of resistance. For this, it is helpful to look to sociology

and other social sciences that have accounted for everyday forms of rule. The Dictionary of Human Geography defines resistance as:

> The opposition to domination in words, thoughts, and/or actions. In human geography, resistance generally has political connotations. It can describe a range of overt actions, including strikes, occupations, protests, direct action, and more organized forms such as social movements (see environmental direct action; Castree et al. 2013).

While resistance is commonly associated with opposition to something, in social science there are schools that account for covert acts of resistance or even subconscious acts of resistance. In the social sciences generally though, there is no consent about what resistance is. The minimal consensus on resistance seems to be that "activity occurs in opposition to someone or something else" (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). It is said that in sociology, the main strands of looking at resistance are macropolitical forms and micropolitical forms, i.e. everyday resistance (Hynes 2013: 559).

Hollander and Einwohner have categorized the literature on resistance and found that modi of resistance can differ (e.g. material, symbolic). Moreover, the scale, the target, and the direction/goal of resistance can differ greatly. They describe resistance to be either political or identity-based (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). Certain practices such as demonstrations or armed attacks are generally acknowledged as resistance. Hollander and Einwohner state that marches, picketing and the building of organizations are regarded to be traditional ways of resisting. Symbolic ways of resisting can be talking, the use of a specific language, staying silent or breaking the silence. "Perhaps the most commonly studied mode of resistance is material or physical, involving the resisters' use of their bodies or other material objects" (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). These descriptions show that for assessing whether a practice can be seen as part of resistance, the context is decisive. Talking can be the most harmless action when it happens in a break between two seminar sessions. If it is performed in a minute of silence at the General Assembly of the United Nations, it can be regarded as a defiant act.

Vinthagen and Johansson categorize more finely and identify three main representatives associated with strands of theory of resistance: Karl Polanyi, Antonio Gramsci and James C. Scott (Vinthagen und Johansson 2013: 12). Gramsci writes about counter-hegemony, Polanyi about counter-movements and Scott about in-

frapolitics (Vinthagen und Johansson 2013: 12), highlighting different spheres of society. Of these, infrapolitics is especially interesting for the purpose of this book which is to make rule researchable through the reconstruction of resistance, may it be subtle or not.

6.4.1 Everyday Forms of Resistance

This work is especially interested in the study of subtle forms of rule and resistance because they are not as easily detected as their more obvious counterparts. That is why this chapter focuses heavily on everyday forms of resistance.

James C. Scott developed the concept of everyday resistance in his work on peasant politics in South Asia. He describes that traditionally, in all social sciences, resistance is regarded to be collective political action. This view however overlooks a vast array of important practices of resistance which are not declared, do not operate in the open, and do not constitute political action in the common sense. He says that subordinate groups mostly use everyday forms of resistance and their study helps understand important political practices (Scott 1989: 33). "Everyday resistance is *quiet, dispersed, disguised or otherwise seemingly invisible*" (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013: 3). De Certeau describes this by using the expression 'tactics':

> The space of a tactic is the space of the other. […] It does not have the means to *keep to itself* [highlight in the original] at a distance, in a position of withdrawal, foresight, and self-collection: it is a maneuver "within the enemy's field of vision" […]. It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow.[…] In short, a tactic is the art of the weak (de Certeau 1988: 37).

Slow working, pretending to be sick, wearing 'inappropriate' clothes and hairstyles at work, stealing from one's employer for example have been said to be acts of resistance. This is contested in the sociological literature (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). Whereas public resistance is interested in symbolic gains, everyday resistance wants de facto gains, which erode relations of domination (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013: 5). James C. Scott also calls everyday politics *infrapolitics*. The term implies that, like infrared beams, infrapolitics stay hidden from the observer's eyes for a long time (Scott 2005: 65). The second meaning he gives the expression is that infrapolitics is the cultural and structural prerequisite for more open forms of resistance (Scott 2005: 66). Scott's theorizing builds on the as-

sumption that systematic subordination leads to a wish to talk or strike back at the superordinate (Scott 2005: 67). According to Scott, seeming obedience is often acted or staged. This leads to a hidden transcript, a specific way of speaking to one's peers, which is not understandable for the superordinate (Courpasson and Vallas 2016: 3). Scott argues that hidden transcripts are a condition for practical resistance and not a substitute for it. Hidden transcripts, and therefore infrapolitics, develop where open opposition seems impossible (Scott 2005: 70). Scott's definition of resistance is:

> Class resistance includes *any* act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are *intended* either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis these superordinate classes (highlights in the original, Scott 1985: 290).

Scott claims that even the smallest acts of resistance can lead to social change, if they are placed at the right time, and especially if they aggregate. For example, mass scale tax evasion can threaten the state, even if carried out by peasants. Scott describes petty acts of resistance as snowflakes, which under the right conditions can cause an avalanche (Scott 2005: 70). Communication about discontent and networking need to happen before open acts of resistance can take place. Some form of coordination is necessary. Scott claims that between quiescence and revolt there is a vast array of (infra)political practice which needs to be considered (Scott 2005: 71). As open political debate is the historical exception, not the rule, most humans are and were subjects who need to operate through infrapolitical means. Infrapolitical organization includes then not so much official political organization, but more familial, friend- and networks of kin and community.

> If formal political organization is the realm of elites, (for example, lawyers, politicians, revolutionaries, political bosses), of written records (for example, resolutions, declarations, news stories, petitions, law suits), and of public action, infrapolitics is, by contrast, the realm of informal leadership and nonelites, of conversation and oral discourse, and of surreptitious resistance (Scott 2005: 72).

Arguably subtle forms of rule can provoke subtle forms of resistance. It can be assumed that because they do not appear as open forms of resistance, everyday forms of resistance often go unnoticed. That is why looking closely at actions can help identify subtle forms of resistance in any given setting. Scott (2005: 71) systematizes forms of domination and how, in his view, they relate to forms of resistance, which can be helpful for empirical research:

	Material domination	Status domination	Ideological domination
Practices of domination	Appropriation of grain, taxes, labor, etc.	Humiliation, deprivilege, insults, assaults on dignity	Justification by ruling groups for slavery, serfdom, caste, privilege
Forms of public declared resistance	Petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, land invasions, and open revolts	Public assertion of worth by gesture, dress, speech, and/or open desecration of status symbols of the dominant	Public counter-ideologies propagating equality, revolution, or negating the ruling ideology
Forms of disguised, low profile, undisclosed resistance, INFRAPOLITICS	Everyday forms of resistance, e.g. poaching, squatting, desertion, evasion, foot-dragging, Direct resistance by Disguised resisters, e.g. masked appropriations, threats, anonymous threats	Hidden transcript of anger, aggression, and disguised discourses of dignity e.g. rituals of aggression, tales of revenge, use of carnival symbolism, gossip, rumor, creation of autonomous social space for assertion of dignity	Development of dissident subcultures e.g. millennial religions, slave "hush-arbors", folk religion, myths of social banditry and class heroes, world upside-down imagery, myths of the "good" king or the time before the "Norman Yoke"

Figure 8: Domination and Resistance

Figure 8 shows that a vast array of practices can be interpreted as resistance when seen in the context of everyday resistance.

In this work, everyday forms of resistance are generally accepted as such, because they can be read as an expression against rule. Also, they can have a transformative effect, even if it might be slow and hardly perceptible. Generally, scholars of everyday resistance make the point that these practices can lead to gradual change

of social norms and thus be a powerful tool, even if overlooked by the mainstream media and academic discourse. Also, the change from infrapolitical to open practices of resistance or vice-versa can tell the researcher something about the form of rule at play, similar to the differentiation between dissidence and opposition. If protests move from the public sphere back to more hidden areas, this can mean that execution of rule has taken place, or that the rule at hand managed to make the protests look illegitimate. Both would create empirical data, which could be researched in the remaining dimensions of rule.

Bayat critiques Scott's model of everyday resistance and says that it constitutes a "Brechtian mode of class struggle and resistance" and is not adequate to describe the practices of urban poor in the Third World. He says that Scott contributes greatly to the discourse but portrays the urban poor as merely defensive against "the encroachments of the 'superordinate' groups" (Bayat 1997: 56). He contends that they are not hidden, quiet and mostly individualistic but often loud and collective (Bayat 1997: 56). Bayat contends that in comparison to other social groups, the disenfranchised do not act out of political consciousness but out of material necessity for survival and dignity (Bayat 1997). Bayat observes that through globalization on the one hand a process of integration, and on the other a process of exclusion and informalization have taken place. These have caused an increase in members of marginalized groups such as unemployed, casual laborers, and street children. He proposes a new theoretical view on activism in these groups which he calls a "quiet encroachment of the ordinary" (Bayat 2000). This means that the disenfranchised in the Third World carry out atomized, at times even collective action without clear leadership, in order to better their lives and to achieve "molecular" changes (Bayat 1997: 57). These forms should be taken into account when researching resistance and rule.

Johanssen and Vinthagen (2016) formulate a theoretical and methodological account of everyday resistance and thus attempt to systematize existing accounts. They state that:

> (1) everyday resistance constitutes a *practice* (not a certain consciousness, intent or outcome); (2) it is historically *entangled* with (everyday) power (not separated, dichotomous or independent); (3) Everyday resistance needs to be understood as *intersectional* with the powers that it engages (not one single power relation); and (4) it is *heterogeneous and*

> *contingent* due to changing contexts and situations (not a universal strategy or coherent form of action (*all highlights in the original*; Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 418).

Johanssen and Vinthagen state that the research on everyday resistance is not developed far enough to present a precise and systematized account yet. They suggest four dimensions however which can be used for the research on everyday resistance: repertoires of everyday resistance they see as a term that encompasses forms, techniques etc. The concept of repertoire is supposed to describe the acts of resistance as being intertwined with a specific configuration of power which does not have to be state power but has a historical context (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 421). The second dimension is the relationship of actors. They use Einwohner and Hollander's approach and categorize between the actor, the target and the observer (further explained below). Social interaction of these agents defines resistance (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 422). The third dimension they utilize is spatialization. Spatialization means that resistance is always situated somewhere, and may it be cyber space (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 425). As an example for spatialization, they mention that women gaining weight can be understood as resistance against male objectification, because then women take up more space than is designated for them (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 426). The fourth dimension they outline is temporalization which means that time is always an important factor when it comes to resistance. Resistance just as any other social interaction is situated in time and space and has a social context against which it is read (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 427). Scott identifies "foot dragging" as a practice of everyday resistance, by lowering the worker's pace of work. Johansson and Vinthagen call this "time theft" (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 428).

In a Foucault-inspired view on power, power is always productive. Resistance itself can be seen as a form of power. Resistance can be defensive or proactive, which is important in this context (Juris and Sitrin 2016: 34). This is something which is seldomly reflected in existing works on resistance. This differentiation might also be enlightening in the research on resistance and its relation to rule, because it alters the view on resistance necessarily being a reaction to executions of rule.

Scott argues that infrapolitical practices are chosen if the subject(s) have (has) a subaltern status and no access to the political field. This, however, does not have

to be the case. Marche shows that in the case of graffiti as an infrapolitical practice in San Francisco, many of the individuals exercising the practice are artists with high levels of cultural capital (Marche 2016: 336).

Everyday resistance has its conceptual problems. It is hard to find because it operates covertly, also, the researcher might label too many empirical phenomena "resistance" when applying the category of everyday resistance. It would lose its analytic power if applied too inclusively (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013: 3). Nevertheless, it is an important concept when it comes to understanding transnational forms of resistance, which are often not easily detectable and public. By choosing infrapolitical means, agents can (intentionally or unintentionally) address even global issues. When analyzing transnational resistance, multiple layers of rule need to be considered (which are the result of social construction). Examples of this are transnational, national, and local context just as much as social intersections such as gender, ethnicity, and sexuality. Even if a resister is addressing her employer, she might be implying more systemic issues of globalization simultaneously.

6.4.2 Recognition of Resistance

In the sociological discourse on resistance it is contested, who needs to recognize resistance for it to be valid to be called resistance (Hollander and Einwohner 2004).

Power or opportunity are absolute prerequisites for resistance to be able to be carried out if it is supposed to be organized and visible. Hollander and Einwohner contend that "powerless people rarely have the resources or opportunity to resist openly against their superordinate, and thus massive protest movements are 'flashes in the pan' (Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 539ff.). According to them, everyday acts of resistance can go unnoticed by the powerful. There are techniques of hiding the intent of the action. They put it thus: "[…] recognition depends in part on the goals of the resisters. Some resistance is intended to be recognized, while other resistance is purposefully concealed or obfuscated (Hollander und Einwohner 2004: 540). Chapter 6.4.3 is going to describe the involved ac-

tors regarding resistance and the implications for academic discourse in more detail.

6.4.3 Intent to Resist

It is contested whether the resisters themselves need to consciously, intentionally, engage in behavior that defies the superordinate in order to constitute resistance (Hollander und Einwohner 2004: 542). Some say that the view needs to be held by the resistant party that oppression exists. Also, they argue that the wish to defy it is a prerequisite for resistance and an action intended to do something against the perceived oppression (Leblanc 1999: 18). Scott also argues that intent is a prerequisite for resistance.

Other authors say that it is hard or even impossible to find out if an actor has the intent to resist or not. Making intent a prerequisite for resistance limits the scope of cases unnecessarily. Assessing intent is even more difficult if the resister and the researcher do not have the same cultural background. Depending on the cultural context, an act can be completely in line or resistant (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). Aihwa Ong describes the lives of Malay factory women in her study "Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline" (Ong 2010). As tactics to leave their workplace some women would pretend to have 'female problems' or go to the prayer room (Ong 2010: 203). Mass hysterias occurred which at times let production of companies come to a halt (Ong 2010: 204). Even though the women clearly showed protest against working conditions and male domination, there was no explicit intent to resist (Courpasson and Vallas 2016; Ong 2010).

In a Western country, if a group of students decided to change their pub, for the youngest member of the group to speak up and make a suggestion would be a normal process. In Japan however, this would be considered rude and upsetting the harmony of the group. So cultural circumstances make an enormous difference, if an act is considered resistant or not, and if intent can be assumed or not.

Summarizing, it can be said that there are three different authorities who can recognize resistance as resistance: The resister themselves can consciously engage in resisting behavior (with intent), whereas this can go unnoticed by all other parties. The target of the resistance can recognize that an action is resistance without any

other party recognizing it. An observer from outside, the researcher e.g., can also recognize that an action can be read as resistance, even if the resister and the target do not recognize it as such. Hollander and Einwohner call this externally-defined resistance (Hollander and Einwohner 2004).

As this work seeks to explore ways of analyzing (transnational) rule, it sees resistance as given, when one agent of the involved understands it as such. The analysis of Practice Analysis of Rule beyond the Stage I goes so much deeper and takes so many more aspects into account that the researcher can still change his mind in an informed manner if resistance is at play in a certain performance. Scholars have plausibly explained why intent is not a necessary condition for resistance to occur, so in this work, intent is treated as one important criterion for resistance but not as a necessary condition. So, if the resister, the addressee, or the observer recognize resistance, an act is tentatively considered resistance for which intent can be a strong sign.

6.4.4 Transnational Practices of Resistance

Transnational resistance is not a new phenomenon, as Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow show in their seminal work "Contentious Politics" (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 1). They start their book with the anecdote of Thomas Clarkson, who as a student had written an essay on slavery and who was appalled by what he had found out. He claimed that slavery should be ended. He then started to organize his friends, wrote a vast number of letters, and began the anti-slavery movement. Tilly and Tarrow explain that the techniques they used back then might seem old-fashioned to us now, but in the same way as today, the movement then began with a claim (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 1).

A prominent example of contemporary transnational resistance is the anti-globalization movement, which was said to shake the foundations of IR theorizing (Eschle and Maiguashca 2005). Louise Amoore writes in "The Global Resistance Reader" (2005) that in the 1990s and 2000s intensifying processes of globalization have led to various counter-movements (Amoore 2005a). Theorizing those is especially challenging, because they comprise of such varied sets of practices that they cannot just be reduced to a common denominator:

> Global resistance is, by its nature, an ambiguous, amorphous concept that derives its multiple meanings from concrete contexts – from peoples, places, images, sounds and voices (Amoore 2005a: 2).

Global resistance is issued by individuals, groups, left and right, working on various issues, such as gender, debt and development, environment, and social issues (Amoore 2005b). Even though it is not a unified movement with one speaker, Eschle argues that there is a movement involved, when activists themselves interpret their situation to be thus and they participate in a collective identity formation process (Eschle 2005: 32).

Resistance against globalization found strong expressions in the past. The so called "Battle of Seattle" is seen as the culmination of a process which had been going on for some time (Rucht 2013: 81). It is describes as a turning point (Levi and Olsen 2000), a symbol for the world's discontent with globalization: In the year 1999, demonstrations against the WTO meeting in Seattle took place. The meeting had the purpose of increasing neoliberal trade policies. Ten thousands of protestors had gathered to block the way of delegates to the conference venue (Wood 2012: 14). The demonstrations became increasingly violent, shop windows were smashed, and the police arrested hundreds of activists and used teargas and pepper spray (Wood 2012: 5). In the end, the Ministerial meeting on trade was postponed and the demonstrators claimed victory (Bergsten 2000: x). Seattle was a noticeable expression of the anti-globalization movement, which challenges the system of interstate diplomacy through its resistance (Adler-Nissen 2014: 658) and thus international politics more generally. The collapse of the WTO talks was attributed to the heightened awareness of citizens about their affectedness by international trade and investment agreements, which strengthened corporate power and weakened sovereignty and political autonomy (Gill 2005: 150).

Even though street protests are very symbolic and expressive, the anti-globalization movement also engages in practices such as lobbying, media relations and building alternative political fora for exchange (Bleiker 2005: 196). In a globalized world, if an actor or entity wishes to attract attention, it is necessary to communicate and network beyond national borders to become effective (Boehme and Walk 2002: 19). Part of the anti-globalization movement are the meetings of the World Social Forum as an attempt to build a transnational democratic forum

(Wahl 2002: 179). The World Social Forum was started in 2000 and was the product of four different developments: "anti-colonial struggles, socialist and communist movements, parallel NGO forums to the UN conferences of the 1990s and the more recent alter-globalisation movement" (Caruso 2016: 410). One can say that the World Social Forum is a highly organized manifestation of activism against globalization. Zürn (2018) sees counter-institutionalization as an important form of contestation of international and transnational authority (Zürn 2018: 254).

Another prominent example of transnational resistance is that of the Ogoni against Shell in Nigeria. Between 1958 and 1993 the transnational corporation 'Shell' had extracted raw oil in Nigeria. The environment in Ogoni land suffered immense consequences from the oil extraction. The eco system as well as the livelihoods of the local population were severely harmed in the process (Obi 2005). The example shows that many layers of rule and resistance can be intertwined and play an important role simultaneously. States are omnipresent, so also in cases which have a strong transnational aspect, states may be involved as important actors.

Gender is an issue which plays a role in transnational resistance. Women are not so much involved in traditional international politics, but often organized in transnational groups, e.g. global environment and feminist groups (Peterson and Runyan 2005: 226). Women are especially engaged in antiwar and peace movements, revolutionary, economic and ecology movements (Peterson and Runyan 2005). Peterson and Runyan claim that women who challenge masculine leadership styles often move outside state structures and are thus less visible (Peterson and Runyan 2005: 226). The globalization or deterritorialization has arguably led to identity formation which increasingly transcends national borders. That is why transnational movements are often discussed in the context of identity politics, such as women's movement, ecological movements, ethnic, gay and lesbian movements:

> Identity-based movements are seen not only as generating new, non-territorial political identities, but also as representing a distinct type of politics which revolves around cultural and lifestyle issues rather than the class and material interests understood to be at the root of older, worker's movements and more recent 'anti-globalisation' activism (Maiguashca 2005: 117).

Johansson and Vinthagen demand that research on resistance always needs to take intersectionality into account, implying four different intersections: gender, sexuality, class and ethnicity (Johansson and Vinthagen 2016: 432). As described above, resistance is often directed against e.g., globalization and patriarchy. Resisters will often (openly or covertly or even unconsciously) address multiple layers of rule.

Recent examples of open transnational resistance are the Occupy-movement (Rohgalf 2014: 31) and the Arab Spring (Balint et al. 2014: 9). The Arab Spring is the prime example when it comes to protest forms being transferred to cyber space (Erdmann 2014: 157). Exchange and coordination were then conducted on social media like Facebook. Internet is depicted as space for symbolic protest, whereas one can say that by exchanging grudges and discontents as well as organizing via internet, the protestors were practicing everyday resistance, before the protests became public and open. Laudani observes that contemporary rule is evasive. Whereas rulers in ancient times were found in monumental buildings, which could be physically attacked, nowadays this is not so easy. Because of their experience with protests against world summits, these now take place in hardly reachable, remote places (Laudani 2013: 151). Nowadays in the physical space it can be difficult to threaten institutions themselves, because rule is so much more fluid, civil disobedience also increasingly becomes an (electronic) flow – i.e. "hackerism" (Laudani 2013: 151).

From the works on infrapolitics or everyday resistance, one can learn that the undercurrents of spectacular outbursts of resistance such as demonstrations or riots are everyday practices. Especially when it comes to everyday resistance, it will not be possible to determine prima facie, if it is transnational resistance in the sense that it addresses a transnational form of rule. At times, people will at first sight be protesting or showing discontent regarding their working conditions, but if the researcher analyzes said conditions, they will closely be linked to the globalized division of labor. A prominent example of this was the suicide series of workers at Foxconn in South China around 2010. Ten workers had ended their lives by jumping from roofs of the company buildings (Wurzel 2017). At first glance, one could say that if a person kills himself, this can be caused by psycho-

logical and strictly individual reasons. Because it was so many people committing suicide, public attention was drawn to the cases and the conclusion was that the working conditions and the pressure on each worker was so high that consequently some of them committed suicide. When a Taiwanese company produces parts for mobile phones for Western companies in South China, the economic relationships between said companies and China, as well as the Western states that are home to the companies, come into the picture. Suicide can be read as an act of everyday resistance, in this case against one's employer. When the bigger picture comes into view, it can also be read as resistance against unequal trade relations, which favor powerful states in globalized times. Even though the suicides of the workers did not address the global issues, these issues are deeply entangled with the issues on the surface.

Transnational resistance is perceivable threefold. It can consist of transnational groups who address political topics (which are likely but not necessarily transnational) or it can mean that individuals or groups of people address transnational political issues. Also, it is perceivable that individuals or groups address an international or transnational organization. That means that the resister, the addressed topic, or the addressee can be transnational to constitute transnational resistance. If the researcher is interested in studying transnational rule, a possibly fruitful starting point would be to look for cases, in which either resister, topic or addressee are transnational. These cases arguably increase the chance of finding transnational rule. An empirical case can of course be transnational in only one of the mentioned criteria or in all (Daphi und Deitelhoff 2017: 307).

For this work, the transnationality of rule is not a necessary condition for it to be of interest for research. Transnational resistance is regarded a special case of the broader phenomenon. Arguably though, transnational forms of resistance are more relevant and interesting to the discipline of International Relations than their counterparts confined to national borders. However, seemingly national forms of resistance often implicitly address transnational forms of rule as further described in Chapter 6.7.

6.5 Butler's Work on Resistance

In the following, Butler's take on resistance is outlined. Butler's concept of subversion can be read as a specific practice-theoretical concept of resistance which works with subtle means. Her concept of subversion looks at a specific form of everyday resistance and sets it into context with the notion of iterability, which will be fleshed out in Chapter 8. Butler's concept of subversion shows how everyday resistance can change social norms and is therefore an important form of resistance to keep in mind when researching the topic.

Butler describes a phenomenon of resistance which can be regarded as an important driver of social change – subversion. In this chapter, the basic assumptions of her work are outlined. Then, her take on subversion is described to be made fruitful for the analysis of resistance in international relations.

6.5.1 Repetition of the Social

Butler's most important thesis is that sex as well as gender are social constructs. She arrives at this conclusion by saying that subjects do not have a fixed inner identity, but that identity is constituted by iterative actions by these subjects. These past actions then consolidate in subjects. This can consequently look like a coherent identity from the outside (Schäfer 2013: 208). However, it is important to note that the subject is not completely free to conduct any action possible. It is restricted by the consolidated action of subjects that came before his or her time. This is how, in Butler's view, social norms develop. As this repetition of the social is always in process, there is potential for shifts.

Action always refers in some way to past action, so it is to be seen in a context of practice. At the same time, action can never be repeated completely identically, because either the actors are different or at least the temporal context has changed. What in Butler's work is called 'citationality' (Mills 2003: 259), opens the door for change in her work. Actions which can be put into context of practices are necessarily citations of former actions but – as described above – not identical. This leads to gradual social change, which is omnipresent in Butler's works.

6.5.2 Subversion

Generally, the meaning of the term subversion is that people try to covertly change an existing order or government by employing various methods (Cambridge Dictionary 2018b).

Butler describes subversion regarding gender norms. She states that drag understood as gender parody makes clear that gender is constructed and shows that it is precisely the original which is actually constructed. Parody then becomes a strong method of critique. Parody itself is not subversive, but it becomes subversive when it causes a shift. This is dependent however on context and reception (Schäfer 2013: 215). Butler states that drag was supposed to be an example for "reality-effects [that] can plausibly be produced through reiterated performance" (Butler 2006: 255). Drag was not supposed to be her primary example, but *an* example.

In "Bodies that Matter" she uses the example of hurtful language being utilized and reinterpreted by the affected. This then constitutes a subversive act. For example, whereas the terms gay, queer, lesbian etc. were used to defame people, they are now used by the communities themselves. Butler says that by copying and exaggerating the discursive convention, it reverses it and exposes its hateful quality. The convention then loses control over the defaming strategies it originally employed (Butler 1997: 319). Even if the subject tries to undermine the norm subversively, it is dependent on the norm in that it always refers to it (Butler 2006: 285). For Butler, subversion does not need to be intentional. It can happen unwittingly (Butler 2006: 257). She prefers the term subversion, because in her view it carries the notion of agency whereas resistance does not in the same way. For her, resistance simply shows the defying attitude of a subject (Butler 2006: 258).

Butler's concept of subversion is helpful for the study of resistance from a practice-theoretical point of view because her concept draws on the repetitiveness of the social. Her take on shifts of social norms through the change of practice can help making subtle forms of resistance easier to study.

In "Vulnerability and Resistance" (2016) Butler and others discuss how the concept of vulnerability is associated with passivity and paternalism with agency

(Butler et al. 2016). They argue this to be the mainstream conception of vulnerability in this context. Whereas it is correct that women are on the whole more vulnerable than men, it is always risky to claim vulnerability, because it might be construed as helplessness and provoke protection from others (Butler et al. 2016). This is not only relevant when discussing feminist topics. As soon as demonstrators use their bodies to stand in for a certain issue, they become vulnerable to state authorities, risking being arrested or even being hurt (Butler 2016). However, vulnerability precedes the kind of vulnerability that comes with exposure when resisting. Certain reasons to resist, such as poverty, make people vulnerable. So in that sense, vulnerability becomes a source of activism (Butler 2016). Butler calls public assembly an instance where people act as agents and are exposed at the same time (Butler 2016). For the research on resistance, it is important to keep in mind that the categories of agency, strength, and weakness are highly ambiguous and need extremely careful analysis and interpretation.

6.6 Resistance, Power and Rule

To summarize, in this work, an extensive definition of resistance is accepted, as presented in Hollander and Einwohner (2004). Resistance is seen to be existent when an actor claims resistance, when an actor consciously resists a perceived form of power, and when an actor engages in practices which can be described as resistance against a form of rule.

Resistance is seen to be always in a complex dynamic with some form of (likely consolidated) power (Daase and Deitelhoff 2014). Resistance as a phenomenon does not necessarily suffice as an indicator, if said form of power *constitutes a form of rule*. Singular resistance could be a sign of a more fleeting form of power, which cannot be called rule. The distinction between power and rule can only be made when other factors are considered. In the case of this work, the distinguishing factor is the dimension of iterability, which is described below. That means as a preliminary conclusion can be formulated: *Resistance is a reliable indicator for power. Resistance* can *serve as an indicator for rule.*

The common understanding about power and rule is that there needs to be a form of power that resistance addresses. Simmel wrote in 1950 that the desire for dom-

ination only develops to break the resistance that the subject might feel and want to act out. So the mere potential for resistance can be said to cause executions of rule (Courpasson and Vallas 2016: 7). They therefore imply each other even if there are no empirical traces of them. That is why rule and resistance need to be considered as inextricably linked. That is how resistance can be proactive. Resistance can be executed against something which has not found a strong empirical expression yet, but which subordinates the resister enough for them to become active.

In this work, everyday forms of resistance (based on Scott's understanding; 2005) are considered subtle forms of resistance, which can tell the researcher a lot about the form of rule at play. It can be assumed that infrapolitics occur when rule is so harsh that open resistance seems impossible, or the cost of which seems too high. It can also be assumed that infrapolitics occur to the contrary, when the overall impression exists that a form of rule is legitimate and the resister does not feel free to resist openly because of peer pressure or other reasons. The impression of legitimate rule on the other hand can be a product of subtle practices of rule.

That means the analysis of the form practices of resistance take, can give the researcher hints on the kind of rule which is at play in a given case. A concept which opens the view on resistance and rule, starting from concrete practice, can then focus on transnational practices of resistance and rule through its open conceptualization. For a more comprehensive picture on the ruling side, however, the context of these practices needs to be studied intensely. This can be done by analyzing the different suggested dimensions of rule in this work.

6.7 Analyzing Resistance as a Dimension of Rule

If the researcher wishes to analyze transnational forms of rule which go beyond the institutionalized forms, like international organizations, by reconstructing it through resistance, it will be important to also be able to identify forms of resistance which are not obvious at first glance. That is how everyday resistance and international relations are closely connected:

> To begin, one must analyse politics at the level of dailiness, especially at the level of an individual's identity formation. At first sight, such an inquiry seems of little relevance to the more grandiosely perceived domain of global politics. Yet, in an age of globalization,

> where space becomes increasingly annihilated by time, the sphere of dailiness always already contains the global within it. To theorise this domain of dailiness, and the individual's place within it, is thus a crucial prerequisite for understanding adequately how dissent and human agency are operative in contemporary global politics (Bleiker 2000: 187).

In order to better understand the complex relationship between rule and resistance, Bleiker suggests changing the researcher's focus from the major historical events to the small performances of practice which bring a cross-territorial changes of values which may seem slow and insignificant (Bleiker 2000: 200). In the following, a suggestion is made, how this is possible.

It can be assumed that emerging forms of resistance will increasingly be performed in cyberspace and thus play out geographically scattered (Laudani 2013). That is why for the analysis of resistance it will be necessary to not only look beyond national boundaries but also to look beyond geographical ones altogether.

If the researcher works on a case in which it is not obvious prima facie if rule is at play and no resistance is openly perceivable, the question might arise, which side is the resistant and which is the resister. The researcher then first needs to find asymmetries, e.g., in resources, in options of action, and available means of expressing opinion. She then needs to look for signs which indicate relations of super- and subordination[17].

Cases which seem as if rule could be at play, will most likely involve different actors with different interpretations of the situations. The researcher needs to be cautious not to take sides until convincing evidence to corroborate one side's viewpoint is found. Another difficulty could be that the ruling party can present more corroborating material because it is the superordinate and has more resources. The researcher must therefore not make judgements based on the amount of material available, regardless of the side presenting it. In the PAR methodology, she would have to let the different views stand aside each other equitably until she can make empirically well-founded judgements.

[17] This would mean finding indicators for an inhibiting effect or minimizing of contingency for at least one actor. Indicators for possible practices of power are presented throughout the book. How exactly they translate into inhibiting effects for actors must be left to empirical research. It cannot be anticipated theoretically.

6.7.1 Indicators for Resistance

In the following, the insights from Chapter 6 are used as an analytic framework to give possible indicators of resistance. Resistance is carried out by bodies, using objects and language, and referring to non-objects. This means that resistance can be analyzed analogously to the symbolic dimension. So, after presenting the possible indicators for resistance, the Practice Analysis is presented applied to resistance as a dimension of rule.

	Indicators for Resistance
Body	• Public Assembly • Demonstrations • Blocking of buildings or landmarks with one's body • Poaching • Squatting • Foot-dragging • Hair style, tattoos • Etc.
Language	• Political speeches against a ruling entity or some form of rule • Silence (e.g. when football players are supposed to be singing the national anthem) • Resolutions • Singing (e.g. Gospels) • Hidden transcripts of anger • Discourses of dignity • Etc.
Objects	• Posters, banners, buttons, flags and other objects used at demonstrations • Ripped clothes (in formal settings) • Headscarf (depending on context) • Iconography (e.g. Ché Guevara) • Etc.
Non-material objects	• Dissident subcultures • Anonymous threats • Flash mobs • Internet • Counter-institutionalization • Etc.

Figure 9: Indicators for Resistance

6.7.2 Practice Analysis of Resistance as a Dimension of Rule

Stage of Analysis		Body	Language	Objects	Non-Objects
Performance	**Observation**	Which bodily movements are executed? Are bodies being hindered in their movement? How do actors interact? In which space do the actors move?	Is resistance claimed in utterances? Is resistance claimed in writing? Are documents of resistance formulated, e.g. resolutions? Is resistance recognized by the resister, the addressee or the observer? Do the resisters claim intent to resist?	Which objects are used in the performance?	Which non-objects do the involved parties refer to?
	Interpretation I (interpersonal stage)	What can be inferred from the bodily movements? What do they say about the relationships between the actors?? Can the movements be interpreted as techniques of resistance? Is bodily vulnerability used to resist?	What can be inferred from the utterances or the writing of the involved parties? Do the parties partake in spreading rumors and badmouthing? If yes, in which context? Is language used to subvert norms?	Are typical objects of resistance being used, such as posters, banners, flyers, buttons? What can be inferred regarding resistance from the objects used? Does the use of objects break the social norm (s)?	Do non-objects like flash mobs, dissident subcultures or anonymous threats occur? What can be inferred from the non-objects referred to? Can intersectionality be assumed? Can the performance be traced back to a hidden transcript? Can a dissent subculture be

		Can subversive acts be interpreted? Can resistance be classified as proactive or reactive?			inferred from the performance?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	What can be said about the performance regarding bodily movements when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?	What can be said about the performance regarding language when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?	What can be said about the performance regarding objects when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?	What can be said about the performance regarding non-objects when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	Can resistance be assumed from the bodily movements? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice?	Which inferences can be made to the political context from the language used? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice regarding language?	Which inferences can be made to the political context from the objects used? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice regarding objects?	Which inferences can be made to the political context from the non-objects referred to? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice regarding non-objects at play?
	Interpretation IV (historical context)	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the bodily movements?	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the language used?	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the objects used?	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the non-objects referred to?

Figure 10: Practice Analysis of Resistance as a Dimension

7 The Material Dimension of Rule

In chapter 6 it was outlined how resistance can contribute to an understanding of transnational rule and how to analyze it. So far, the symbolic dimension and resistance as a dimension were described as important factors when analyzing rule. Whereas symbols can already entail materials, there are specifically material aspects to rule, which are not covered by the symbolic dimension. Whereas the object in question can be the same in both dimensions, looking at it from a symbolic or analyzing it from a material point of view can offer differing insights. Therefore, in this chapter, the material dimension of (transnational) rule is developed and outlined.

In the following chapter, it is described in which way materiality constitutes a dimension of rule in this work. First, Bourdieu's work is scrutinized for this aspect. After that, works from Science and Technology Studies are used to argue the materiality of the social, especially rule as a social phenomenon. In Chapter 4, Actor-Network-Theory was introduced briefly to develop the tool of analysis, because it relies heavily on the epistemic stance of that school. Here, ANT is used to formulate a view on material aspects of society. Mainly Latour's work is consulted as representative for ANT, as he is seen to be the leading figure of ANT and his works offer important insights into the epistemology and the ontology of ANT. Later in the chapter it is discussed, how materiality can be seen as an important dimension in International Relations. At the end of the chapter, the PAR is extended to encompass the material dimension.

In realist works, resources - such as military and financial resources - are treated as the main source of power in international relations. In this way of thinking, one state uses its resources to make others do that they would otherwise not (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 40). Other schools have critiqued this way of looking at international relations by declaring that other factors apart from 'realist' power variables have an influence on international relations. Barnett and Duvall argue that therefore all other schools of thought in International Relations have neglected the study of power (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 41). Scholars like Barnett and Duvall and Daase and Deitelhoff have begun to change this in different ways.

It has been acknowledged in sociology that material objects play a formative role in the development of identity. Mead for example describes that objects have a formative effect on humans' identities and the maintenance of which. Also, for humans they present a stable environment, which is important for a stable self. When growing up, touch and use of objects is essential for humans. She describes the self's relation with the physical world as a social relation (McCarthy 1992: 215). Latour claims that power is not a resource a person or institution *possesses* but is relational and performative. He claims that power is not a cause of collective action but rather its consequence (Latour 1986: 271). This follows his general view that society is not a monolithic bloc, which can explain actions on the micro-level. On the contrary, it is everyday actions and practices which are the essence of society, which build it every day anew. In this instance, Latour argues in a very practice-theoretical sense. He also sees power as an effect, not a good. Realists and Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars have in common that they argue that mere social interaction does not make actors powerful, but that actors interact with objects (i.e. resources in realism) to gain and execute as well as maintain power. Latour's main argument in this matter is that mere social interaction cannot make power relationships stable:

> As long as it is simply social skills that are brought in, one does not get a society more stable and more technologically advanced than that of baboons or the chimpanzees. The only way to understand how power is locally exerted is thus to take into account everything that has been put to one side – that is, essentially, techniques (Latour 1986: 277).

Latour explains that this notion is an expansion of the Foucauldian argument that power is not a possession of the powerful, but exercised through micro-practices diffused through techniques to discipline others and keep control (Latour 1986: 279). So, in Latour's reading power is performative and it can only solidify to become rule using technology.

In this work, resources per se are not seen as a sole explanatory source of power. However, the importance of material resources - and especially technology - in the building and reproducing of relations of power is acknowledged. That is why the connection between materials and power is outlined here as it is seen in STS. A praxeological view on this connection is fleshed out and made fruitful for International Relations. The attempt is made to formulate a view which can reconcile diverse views on the subject.

Scholars of Science and Technology Studies (STS) do research on how objects change social life. In this regard, especially technical objects are of interest. STS scholars argue that society and technology are not to be discussed separately. They form a seamless entity (Bijker, Wiebe, E. et al. 2012; Wajcman 2002). With the development and spread of information technology in the 20th and 21st centuries, it is argued that human action is greatly determined by technology. Technological installation ceases to be mere parts of human surrounding, they become a guiding source of human practice: "Technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components. They are both socially constructed and society shaping" (Hughes 2012: 45). As such, technology can have grave consequences on power constellations: People working in technology companies can shape society by inscribing rules into the technology and thus shape the way it is used. Governments can listen in on citizens' private conversations much more easily than they could in the past due to better technological access. The more prescriptive and invasive technology becomes in social life, the more questions about power need to be asked in that respect. To develop an understanding of the material dimension of rule, the influence of technology on human practice and power needs to be reflected. STS is a discipline in sociology that wants to adapt sociology in such a way that it becomes able to grasp the specific nature of technology and the intertwinement of human practice with objects (Latour 2007; Callon 1986a). Thus, adding an STS inspired understanding of materiality to Bourdieu's understanding can help understand the material dimension of rule.

7.1 Bourdieu's Contribution to the Material Dimension of Rule

The aspect in Bourdieu's work concerning materiality which is most important, is the incorporation of knowledge and of experience in a human's habitus. Bourdieu is not so much concerned with the meaning of objects in daily life (Hillebrandt 2004). In his work, objects are part of the objectified history of a given society. They form the context in which social interaction takes place, so they are analytically secondary. As part of objectified history, objects are used as a means of distinction between social actors and are therefore used to hierarchize society (Schulz-Schaeffer 2004).

7.1.1 Bodies Matter

As described above (Chapter 4.1), Bourdieu argues that a person's life experience is inscribed in a person's body language, posture, i.e., the habitus of a person. Also, some forms of capital are embodied (Chapter 4.3). For this, Bourdieu is praised by some feminist theoreticians, because he makes clear that mere reflexion cannot spur rapid change, but that dispositions are deeply rooted in humans' bodies through the habitus. Other theories of reflexive change in contrast seem "disembodied and disembedded" (McNay 1999; 95). And as described above, habitus change requires a lot of effort. Cultural capital, such as skills are stored in a person's body. Inscribed in the habitus, acquired knowledge is used mostly unreflexively in practice. It is in the habitus that Bourdieu's argument about the materiality of the social materializes predominantly.

In his work, there is no sociality without actors involved in practice guided by practical knowledge which is incorporated and expressed in the habitus of said actors. The anchoring of the social in Bourdieu's work thus functions in human bodies (Reckwitz 2004), whereas in ANT the anchoring of the social happens predominantly in artifacts.

7.1.2 Distinction through Objects

In "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste" (1984) Bourdieu describes cultural objects and how they are used as a means of setting oneself apart from others. In this context he mentions cars as an example of distinction through technology. Rocamora (2002) describes that Bourdieu categorizes bourgeois consumption (seeking distinction) and petty bourgeois consumption based on pretension. These dispositions he describes as "antagonistic and complementary" (Rocamora 2002: 345). To put it in simple terms, the Bourgeoisie tries to distance themselves from the rest of society and the rest of society emulates their practices. As soon as some former bourgeois practice becomes common practice, the Bourgeoisie needs to come up with something new, to keep up the social distance (Rocamora 2002; 345). In this way, distinction is a way of building and perpetuating social hierarchies and is thus an important phenomenon.

These days surely “Apple” products or fancy headphones, used to listen to music in public, would be high on the same list. Technological devices are thus used as a means of self-presentation and status symbol. In a village, the farmer with the biggest truck might get the most social credit (Eigner and Kruse 2001: 102). For STS, this is true but at the same time not so important, because it is interested in the specific entanglement of technology with social practice beyond distinction. However, to understand materiality as a dimension of rule, distinction is an important aspect. Arguably in all settings of social life, clothing, accessories, cars, personal computers etc. are used to distinguish oneself from others and to claim affiliation to a certain social class or group or to simply display wealth. If, as assumed, distinction is ubiquitous, it will be relevant in many cases that relate to transnational rule.

7.1.3 Objects as Cultural Artifacts and Objectified History

Bourdieu is criticized by various scholars for not taking aspects of materiality into account more thoroughly (Lenger and Rhein 2018: 177; Rocamora 2002).

Hillebrandt also critiques Bourdieu for not paying enough attention to materials in social life. He describes that in Bourdieu’s work, there are two kinds of history: incorporated history (habitus) and objectified history (Hillebrandt 2004). The subject finds itself in a certain environment, which includes manifold objects. During its lifetime, it learns to act on its environment and use the objects. It incorporates the knowledge of how to use the objects correctly and what social effects the execution of certain practices including and excluding objects has for the subject. This knowledge becomes manifest in the subject’s habitus. The objectified history on the other hand are the artifacts the subjects find. They are the product of former execution of practices. One can say that in Bourdieu’s work, the objectified history builds the framework for practices which are carried out by subjects (Hillebrandt 2004). So, there is a rather clear distinction between the social and the material, whereas the material can be seen as secondary from Bourdieu’s point of view.

Power relations, especially ones the researcher would call relations of rule, can be extremely lasting and appear solid. However, in the 2010s a single individual human being can become just over 100 years old, if they are very lucky. Even

though habitus is probably passed onto the next generation, predominantly by parents, it is to a certain extent fleeting. Materials such as buildings can last a very long time if they are maintained properly. Technology can be used to allocate masses of resources, but through technological progress, can become obsolete extremely quickly. Whereas objects made of plastic take hundreds of years to decompose (Umweltbundesamt 2017), they break very quickly at times. These examples show the ambiguity of reproduction and change regarding human and non-human entities in society. Thus, in this work, habitus and personal properties as well as non-human objects are seen as potentially stabilizing factors of social orders which should not be played against each other. As Bourdieu's view stressing the habitus as a human factor was outlined extensively, in the following STS and especially ANT are described in order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of human and non-human actors in the building of relations of rule.

7.2 Science and Technology Studies

Traditionally Science and Technology Studies were especially interested in researching the social interaction in laboratories. Their guiding question was how humans interacted with machines and other materials to produce – at times revolutionary – scientific knowledge. They found that

> […] though science and technology develop in some measure apart from the rest of the world, they are neither detached nor fundamentally different in their nature from other activities (Callon 1986b: 20).

Science and Technology Studies theorists contend that in sociology there is an obliviousness to technology which can be traced to the founding days of the discipline. For strategic reasons, the social needed to be reflected independently from the technological. Sociology needed to show that it is an important discipline separately from disciplines which focus on natural science and technology. The human factor needed to be stressed to be able to make this argument (Rammert 1998). In sociology, interest has increased in understanding technology as part of the social as nature and technology started to hybridize, e.g., mouse clones or softbots, which sociologists tried to understand as participants in social reality (Burri 2008: 270). Some criticize Latour for not focusing enough on hybrids, despite the fact the mere use of the term might reproduce the divide between society and nature, which is not in the interest of ANT. That is why also the term quasi-

object is used (Roßler 2016: 22ff.). STS scholars argue that looking at the world through a social, a technological, political, and economic lens leads to limited understanding of how society really works, i.e., as an interplay between human and non-human actors. Only if the networks of actors are analyzed as a whole, can processes be understood comprehensively. STS studies come to the conclusion that a coproduction of materiality and sociality can be assumed (Burri 2008). They analyze the effect of technology on social factors. STS is also interested in effects of social interaction on technology. Regarding the scientist and her object, Pickering shows that they influence and shape each other in the research process (Pickering 1993). So, the objects themselves play a vital role in the production of scientific knowledge. MacKenzie and Wajcman on the other hand demonstrate that the development of technology is fundamentally shaped by social interaction and the social context it evolves in (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999). Technological contingencies are decided upon by social interaction, much more than mere rational technological necessities: "In this way, technology is a socio-technical product, patterned by the conditions of its creation and use" (Wajcman 2002: 351). That means that technological progress can only be explained through the mutual influence of human agent and object, neither through mere social interaction, nor the mere workings of non-human objects.

7.2.1 Actor-Network-Theory

Hilmar Schäfer, who works on practice theory, states that ANT is at the fringes of practice theory but can nevertheless offer important insights into the material dimension of the social (Schäfer 2013).

7.2.1.1 The Symmetry Principle

In STS, Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) is a specific case. ANT-theorists argue that humans and objects are equally equipped with agency and thus should be considered equitably. That is why in ANT academics speak of actants instead of actors (Burri 2008).

In "Wir sind nie modern gewesen" (2008) Latour critiques the concept of modernity, because it builds on an inherent difference between nature and society, which does not exist in his view. He describes various instances, in which human and

non-human entities are intertwined. He writes about embryos, the AIDS virus, global warming, microchips, and forest fires and describes how human actors are involved in these issues (Latour 2008: 8). In Latour's view, the nature of society cannot be understood if the distinction between society and nature is continued in the thinking of social scientists. It should be acknowledged that the hybrids between objects and humans are nearly everything which populates the social space (Latour 2008: 65). That is why Latour claims that we were never modern (if modernity is understood as a distinction between nature and society or culture; Latour 2008: 64).

The symmetry principle was seen as a provocation by the wider academic community (Schäfer 2013: 251), whereas in ANT, it is not said that objects and non-objects have the same properties and qualities, it is claimed however that they should be considered equally as agents in social constellations (Schäfer 2013: 257). ANT is interested in heterogenous non-human-human networks. ANT wants to show how new constellations of humans and non-humans shape society, and how in a fluctuating world, asymmetries can still be established that seem rock-solid, and nearly natural (Latour 2007).

7.2.1.2 The social as a type of connection

In ANT, the 'social' is not a certain matter which can exist independently from individual actors, which can be explained by other social factors[18]. In Latour's understanding, the 'social' is a type of connection, which exists and ceases to exist between actors (Latour 2007). These connections he calls associations. Latour claims that to develop macro-phenomena which are supposed to explain micro-phenomena is the wrong strategy in sociology. Understanding small instances can help explain the bigger (Latour 2008: 34). Nevertheless, he says that there is no real difference between micro and macro phenomenon. From an ANT point of view, the different levels of analysis were formulated oblivious to the manifold material connections between individual human beings (Latour 2001: 249). So he

[18] Latour criticizes about what he calls the 'sociology of the social' that the independent variable is substituted with something social, so the explanation becomes useless. In his opinion, the social cannot explain the social, other factors need to be taken into account (Latour 2008: 23).

argues that there is no sudden leap between micro and macro if one follows the actor and takes material agents into account (Latour 2001).

Latour explains that in contemporary societies things change so rapidly that sociology needs to be able to keep track of these changes. For that, a theory is needed which is flexible and open enough. That is why ANT is focused on innovation. It looks at new constellations of actors, which can consist of humans and non-humans, for a better understanding of how society works. He calls ANT an instrument for the measurement of innovation (Latour 2007). When tracing associations of actants, the aberration, the creation of a new connection, is called translation in ANT. Translation means that an actor enrolls another actor and thus produces a change to the initial situation (Latour 1996: 34). This way of studying the world makes ANT an interesting approach to analyze innovation and change in social contexts.

7.2.1.3 Methodological Assumptions

Latour argues that the researcher makes a mistake, if she classifies the actor. In so doing she is analyzing a priori as individual, class, organization etc. In social life, groups of actors are in flux and boundaries are always drawn anew. So to decide what kind of actor is acting based on theoretical knowledge narrows the researcher's view unduly and thus should be avoided (Latour 2007). This is called actor centrism in this work (see Chapter 3.3.1.1).

Latour takes Ethnomethodology as a positive example of how to go about research. They simply report what is happening. That means that the reality of the researched is taken seriously. The researcher needs to be sensitive to the meta-language of the researched (Latour 2007). That is why, in an ANT view, quality of research can be measured by deciding if the actor's or the researcher's view is the more important for the report (Latour 2007). In ANT, the written products of the findings are called reports to show the empirical, as well as their meticulous, character which is supposed to stay close to the researched.

In Latour's view, controversies are a good place to start research, because when it comes to building groups, there is always controversy, which is easy to find. In controversies about new groups, groups speak, groups opposed to that group are

identified, to stabilize group boundaries, resources are activated – and experts with their statistical and intellectual properties are mobilized (Latour 2007). Groups can only exist through continuous work. Groups of humans and non-humans do not exist per default, but they are a product, which requires energy and constant upkeeping:

> Groups speak, counter-groups are identified; in order to make group boundaries more durable, resources are used; and experts with their statistical and intellectual equipment are mobilized (Translation M.H.; Latour 2007: 57).

Building groups is hard work (Latour 2010: 89). The building of new groups and associations leaves traces in the empirical world, which can be researched, to which ANT wants to offer the means to.

7.2.1.4 Micro to Macro phenomena

Current social theory is criticized for not being able to relate micro-level action to macro phenomena (Granovetter 2003: 323). In ANT, micro-phenomena are analyzed to maybe be able to infer from the findings and understand the bigger picture, whereas ANT researchers would always warn against the use of 'big labels' and containers of thought, because they are inflexible and overlook too many empirical details. First, the actors are followed, and their actions are described. The view of the analyzed is taken as the truth as long as possible in the research process, which Law calls the principles of impartiality and symmetry (Law 2011: 2). Latour claims that if the researcher feels the need to formulate a macro phenomenon, the description of the network is simply not detailed enough (Latour 1991: 130). Bueger also argues that considering the divide between micro and macro as an ontological one is wrong (see Chapter 3.5.2). They need to be reflected, especially when researching IR cases, as they play an important role in practice. Their constructed nature though needs to be reflected upon in research. It can be part of the enquiry to analyze how they are socially constructed (ibid.).

An example of a concept which transcends the divide between micro and macro is Karin Knorr Catina's "Global Micro Structures" (2005). She describes networks of terrorists which include "forms of connectivity and coordination that combine global reach with microstructural mechanisms that instantiate self-organizing principles and patterns (Cetina 2005: 214). So, a concept which would at first

glance be described as a macro phenomenon (global terrorism) can be described as a network of small instances. This is the general strategy this work suggests using.

As ANT views objects as possible agents which can influence outcomes of social interaction greatly, the approach offers a theoretical framework which can analyze networks of humans and non-humans without drawing too many conclusions in the process. In ANT, association of heterogenous transmitters are followed, so ANT theoreticians are not only interested in who and what partakes in action, but also, how social order evolves (Schäfer 2013: 271). The durability of social order is not taken for granted, but it is the very phenomenon which is extraordinary to ANT theorists and needs to be explained:

> For sociologists of the social, order is the norm while change, deterioration and creation are exceptions. For sociologists of associations, the norm is performance and the phenomenon which is an extraordinary exception, which needs to be explained is stability for a longer duration and on a big scale. As if background and foreground were interchanged (Latour 2007).

To summarize, ANT seeks to take the reality of the researched seriously and not exude hubris. It is interested in explaining empirical phenomena by analyzing networks of human and non-human actors and how they interact with each other and use intermediaries to exert long-distance control.

7.2.1.5 Empirical examples used in ANT

ANT was and is used to analyze a wide range of cases is many subdisciplines of social science. As ANT studies stay extremely close to the actor, empirical examples seem heterogeneous and somewhat disparate. If ANT scholars analyze heterogeneous empirical cases and hardly make interpretations, this is self-evidently the case. For the purpose of this work, the heterogeneous empirical cases serve as an impulse for facets of the social world to be fruitfully analyzed using an ANT view. As in the other dimensions, an open approach is favored over theoretical smoothness.

Wajcman describes how the interplay of the human and technology shapes society in the view of Science and Technology Studies:

> STS studies show that the generation and implementation of new technologies involve many choices between technical options. A range of social factors affect which of the technical options are selected. These choices shape technologies and, thereby, their social

> implications. In this way, technology is a socio-technical product, patterned by the conditions of its creation and use (Wajcman 2002: 351).

There are manifold empirical examples of this described in the literature. According to historical record, Robert Moses, highway engineer for New York in the 1920s built bridges particularly low without any technical reason for it. Moses did so to discourage busses from taking the routes. As stated by his biographer, the cause for this was Moses's social class and racial bias. His motivation was to keep the poor and black people, who would have to take public transport, out of a particular beach (Law 1991a). For Law this is a clear example of social engineering. This shows clearly how social norms are inscribed in objects.

Callon describes how humans and scallops interacted in the St. Brieuc Bay in an attempt to breed scallops there. The example is used to show how three researchers worked to "impose themselves and their definition of the situation on others" (Callon 1986a: 196). Callon shows, how translation works from one actor to another to align them. He also notes, however, that translation is never complete and there is the possibility of failure (Callon 1986a: 196). This example shows that in an ANT view, alignment is a state of equilibrium and a form of rule, as actors were aligned, and controversy stopped.

Law describes for Portuguese colonialism that its vast effects are only understandable when looked at from a technological, economic, political, social and natural point of view (Law 1986b). Specific techniques of navigation, shipbuilding, economics and the employment of skilled workers all played together to make the Portuguese quest successful. Law summarized the materials used for long-distance control as "documents, devices and skilled people" (Law 1986a: 245). This example shows the aspect of how actors necessarily need to employ specific materials to be able to exert their power.

These examples show that to understand consolidation of power, the material dimension always needs to be reflected on. Rule is built and maintained in heterogeneous networks. Tracing performances and practices of power, involving human and non-human actors seems a fruitful method of analysis. Following networks of actors and materials and connecting them with effects they might have

had in other places and times, makes the material dimension especially valuable for the analysis of power.

7.2.1.6 ANT, power, and rule

For an understanding of ANT's view on rule, it is important to describe what agency means in this context. Law describes an agent as:

> a structured set of relations with a series of (power) effects; I am saying that those relations are embodied in a series of different materials; and I am also saying that, as a matter of empirical fact we are also likely to find that they are in some measure strategically (or multi-strategically) organized (Law 1991: 173).

So, in contrast to Bourdieu, who would say that an agent is an individual human being including its incorporated and habitualized history, Law says that an agent is a point in a network of various materials, objects, persons or even animals. It is especially this picture of heterogeneous networks that makes ANT useful for this work. Even when looking at single bodies or objects, the researcher needs to think of the actor as embedded in multifaceted and heterogeneous networks. In modern societies, power is not executed continuously and shows its face in various shapes and forms. Latour argues that without the use of objects, power cannot be durable and cannot work over long distances and time periods. As mentioned, if power relies on human interaction, it is fleeting. Power and rule are results of interactions (Latour 2007. 2008). The crucial argument in ANT is that power cannot be maintained if there is no extended use of objects involved.

> The stifling exertion of power, the enormous asymmetries, the abyss of inequalities are seen as products of human interaction, which can only evolve with the help of objects (Translation M.H.; Latour 2007: 109).

In ANT, power is seen as "an effect of sets of variegated and differentially successful strategies to enroll others rather than a cause of that success" (Law 2011: 5). This means that power is not a capacity of an individual actor but more something that evolves in practice. That is why, from an ANT perspective, power can be researched by analyzing practice. Law looked at experimentalists who conducted pharmacological experiments and observed the researcher handling "potentially unruly resources with the aim of simplifying these and reducing them to docile figures on a sheet of paper" (Law 2011: 1). In his writings, he comes to the conclusion that there are three kinds of resources which can be used for long distance control: natural objects, people and inscriptions (Law 2011). Law argues

that materials need to be mobile and durable if they are to exert long distance control. Law argues that translation needs to take place between resources that are fleeting, such as gestures, and resources that are more durable and mobile, such as paper (or nowadays computers). Inscriptions serve as a means of conservation. Moreover, materials have to be used in the right context (Law 2011: 33f.). From an ANT perspective then, rule as consolidated power relations which are asymmetrical might seem natural and given, but they are the product of human and non-human interaction and they need to be maintained by interaction. Regarding rule, Latour states the following:

> The social world is shaped by asymmetries, hierarchies, and inequalities. It resembles the rugged landscapes of a high mountain region; […] it seems to weigh as heavy as the pyramids and therefore seem to limit individual action so much that society seems like a specific entity sui generis (Latour 2007: 109)

Callon explains:

> Science and technology lie at the heart of social asymmetry. Thus technology both creates systems which close off other options and generates novel, unpredictable and indeed previously unthinkable options (Callon 1991: 132).

So, for the study of rule this means that interaction between human and non-human actors need to be studied to infer which objects are used in which way to exert control. The point is not, however, that humans are not important in keeping up power relations, but that human interaction without the consideration of materials being used does not account for (relatively) stable power relations or their duration over long periods of time and space. Callon categorizes four types of intermediaries that are used, which pass between actors and that define their relationship with each other: Literary inscriptions, i.e. texts, technical artifacts, human beings and money and money-like currency (Callon 1991: 135). He argues that texts, especially scientific ones form a network among each other, because they refer to each other (Callon 1991: 136). Technical objects include extensive inscriptions on use and thus predefine and limit humans' action (Callon 1991: 137). Like Bourdieu, Callon describes embodied skills as an important factor in understanding power. However, because skills cannot be understood without the right context, the description of skills always implies their context (Callon 1991: 138). Money also forms a network of roles around itself by making actors do certain things in certain contexts to obtain it (Callon 1991: 138). Callon claims that society can be best understood by understanding the inscription of intermediaries: "I

want to say that *actors define one another by means of the intermediaries which they put into circulation"* (Highlight in the original; Callon 1991: 140).

In this work, rule is understood as perpetuated asymmetrical power relations. So, it is closely linked to questions of stability of the social. Latour puts it thus:

> For a long time, social theory has been concerned with defining power relations […], but it has always found it difficult to see how domination is achieved. […] I argue that in order to understand domination we have to turn away from an exclusive concern with social relations and weave them into a fabric that includes non-human actants, actants that offer the possibility of holding society together as a durable whole (Latour 1991: 103).

Latour's view is that a state of rule is achieved when actors and points of view are aligned. Durability of social assemblage is achieved with non-human actants, which are used. An instability of actors and shifting views of observers mean that a situation is in a state of negotiation and so not stable. But regardless if what Latour calls a state of stability and thus domination is achieved or not, the analytic tools do not change: "It is as if we might call technology the moment when social assemblages gain stability by aligning actors and observers." (Latour 1991: 129). For Latour, rule is an effect of networks in which actants align and thus minimize contingency. In his view, a state of rule is a stabilized network. Basically, ANT wants to be able to show movement of different entities in society. The aim of which is to make the regularity and calming down of movement researchable. The settling of movement amounts to the alignment of entities which requires a lot of work. It is seen as the phenomenon worthy of explanation, not the movement of entities. This is how ANT defines a state of rule. By taking a stance heavily influenced by ANT, this work looks at small instances and infers a macro-phenomenon. By analyzing small instances of the social world, a fine-grained view on rule becomes possible. Moreover, the development, sustaining, and fading of relations of view thereby becomes researchable.

7.2.2 ANT and International Relations

As the origin of ANT was the scientific laboratory and was primarily concerned with the production of scientific knowledge and technology, its focus is somewhat specific. That is the reason some argue that it cannot or not very easily be applied to cases in international relations (Barry 2013).

ANT is not at the core of International Relations theory, but it is used to stress the materiality of the social.

> In contrast to other IPT [International Practice Theory] approaches, ANT foregrounds attention to details, and produces often the microscopic types of analysis. It is especially useful if one is interested in [an] emerging phenomenon and wants to put more emphasis on the role the [of] the material in shaping the international (Bueger and Gadinger 2014: 49).

This has been done in various ways. Maximilian Mayer shows how the framing of climate change has discursively turned from a linear, rather subtle threat, to one that does not follow a linear path and is thus unpredictable and regarded as a security issue. This he argues following the network of materials and humans intertwined with various scientific and political contexts. Mayer states that the symmetry principle helps analyze hybrid cases more adequately and to overcome the dualism between nature and society which ANT rejects (Mayer 2012). Peer Schouten shows that a priori assumptions about the ontological nature of security and insecurity hinder research on security. He uses airport security at Amsterdam Airport as an example for this. He shows "how security actors perform security by enrolling, assembling and translating heterogeneous elements into stable assemblages that can be presented as definitive security solutions or threats" (Schouten 2014: 23).

Bueger and Gadinger state that ANT studies are useful in helping IR focus more on materiality. But as ANT studies tend to research technical artifacts and their entanglement in social processes, they are likely to neglect the body and its distinct connection to practice (Bueger und Gadinger 2014: 74).

Generally, ANT can be seen as delivering important insights into the meaning of the material for the social world, including the international. At the same time, strictly sticking to the vocabulary and the focus of ANT, the scope of the topics which are researched well is limited:

> International relations is marked by enduring blockages and intransigent obstacles, zones in which translation is contested, ambiguous and problematic. It follows, as I have suggested throughout, that actor-network theory cannot simply be applied to international relations, but must be adjusted and reconfigured in response to the problems that the field itself poses (Barry 2013: 429).

To summarize, it can be said that ANT cannot be applied to international relations without any adaptation or reflexion. On the other hand, ANT offers interesting and enlightening methodological insights: it reminds the researcher to not draw

conclusions too quickly and interpret the situation at hand. ANT strongly reminds the researcher that mere social interaction could not explain longstanding relations of rule, which arguably also exist in international relations. So, material objects and especially technology must account for existing and evolving patterned power relations to a much larger extent than the discipline IR generally accounts for. These insights are of great value for the research of rule in international relations. Therefore, this work argues, it is of great value to always reflect on the material dimension when analyzing rule in international relations.

However, arguably the greatest contribution of ANT for this work is that it makes rule (considered a macro phenomenon) researchable through various micro instances. In this work, the view is taken that rule can be considered an interplay of power practices, which involve heterogeneous networks of human and non-human actors. These can be geographically and temporally scattered. To be able to trace long-term and long-distance social control, this work looks to ANT. By following the actor, objects, and / or practices, transnational rule becomes a researchable phenomenon.

7.2.3 Materials in International Relations

This chapter gives examples on how the use of materials, such as information technology, has influenced international relations. However, it cannot be comprehensive. It serves the purpose to strengthen the argument that the material dimension needs to be considered when analyzing rule in international relations in the era of globalization. As described above, ANT leads to heterogeneous results and can therefore present a disparate empirical picture. This work does not regard this a disadvantage of the approach.

It is acknowledged in IR that science and technology play a vital role. This is the case especially in environmental issues such as climate change, and ozone depletion, as well as security issues such as weapons proliferation and the development of radioactive as well as biological and chemical weapons (Krige and Barth 2006: 1). In this work, I argue that technology plays a role in international relations, which is at times much subtler than when the policy field in question is directly linked to issues of science and technology.

Johan Galtung described in the 1970s that technology carries within it a code of structures of inequality. In his view, technology helps greatly in forming a center and a periphery. In his findings, technology contributes to neocolonial structures. He depicts the West as the technological center and describes that because the technological invasion of other cultures is now non-physical, these structures are not perceived as such. Nevertheless, in his view "technology constitutes a structural-cultural invasion" (Galtung 1979: 277). Whereas ANT scholars would question the structures somewhat separate from human and object, the overall argument is in line with ANT literature: Technology is a vital aspect when it comes to gaining and perpetuating power. As the development of technology is research-intensive and research on the other hand is capital-intensive, the global race for developing new technology can be assumed to have some kind of negative impact on the global income gap (Galtung 1979). This argument is in line with realist reasoning that material distribution and power are inextricably linked.

The emergence of the internet as a widely used medium has changed international relations in certain ways. Hansel defines the cyberspace as a global space for interaction which emerges through the connection of computer networks and uses the electromagnetic spectrum to generate, save and exchange data (Hansel 2013: 34).

The field of IT has opened a new way of governance on the global level:

> Governance is collectively enacted by the design of technology, the policies of private companies, and the administrative functions of new global institutions like ICANN and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), as well as national laws and international agreements (Musiani and DeNardis 2016: 4).

So called cyber wars are fought, cyber dissidents defy state power, and virtual communities transcend state boundaries (Hansel 2013: 11). The use of the internet has changed patterns of interaction in international relations. It is argued that the internet has three basic effects on international relations:

> [First, i]t multiplies and amplifies the number of voiced and interests involved in international policy-making, complicating international decision-making and reducing the exclusive control of states in the process; [second,] it accelerated and frees the dissemination of information, accurate or not, about any issue or event which can impact on its consequences and handling; [third,] it enables traditional diplomatic services to be delivered faster and more cost-effectively, both to one's own citizens and government, and to those of other countries (Westcott 2008: 2).

So, it can be said that the internet has made the discourse about international relations more inclusive, more voices are heard, more channels have opened, and traditional diplomatic channels can also reach more people more easily than before.

Cyberconflict, which has evolved over the last decades is also an increasingly important topic in international relations (Karatzogianni 2006). Der Derian describes that information technology (IT) has changed the general perception of the world. Using the internet as a source of information, the discourse has become much more image-based and has accelerated markedly. Because of IT many world events are recorded and thus change the way they are remembered by the public. IT itself can even trigger world events (Der Derian 2003: 444f.).

Donald Trump's use of Twitter can serve as a good example of how the materiality of information technology influences practice. To put it in ANT vocabulary, the rule the technology imposes (inscription) of only having 140 characters at one's disposal[19], means Twitter can have a vast effect. It is impossible, however rhetorically skilled, to flesh out a political message in 140 characters. The possibility to get a message out to the public with no extra cost or much effort, however, must be compelling. It is discussed whether Trump's practices, e.g., using Twitter to announce foreign policy decisions impulsively has had norm changing effects on norms of diplomatic communication and the non-discrimination norm. Scholars come to the conclusion that this has not yet happened, but the danger exists, especially as the responsible actor is a powerful one (Panke and Petersohn 2017). These empirical examples have shown that especially IT has influenced the way international relations work greatly. Therefore, the influence it has on empirical cases of (transnational) rule should not be underestimated when conducting research.

7.3 The Complex Relationship between Practice and Object

In Bourdieu's work, the materiality of the body is stressed and the materiality of the physical world around those bodies is somewhat underdetermined. In contrast,

[19] Twitter has since changed the number of characters the users have at their disposal in one tweet. It is now 280 characters that can be used (Sulleyman 2017).

in ANT approaches, materials are in the focus and human actants are looked at, but not so much as possessing a specific quality when researching interaction with objects. ANT theorists do not deny that there are differences between humans and objects, such as the possession of intentionality, but they do not want to focus on those to make a point. The symmetry principle is useful for strengthening the position of materials in sociology. On the other hand, it blurs important differences between humans and non-humans.

Up until now, most technological artifacts work in the way they were programmed and only in that very way. The rules they follow are 100% inscribed in their setup. Humans are also socialized in a specific way and they come with a genetic code. Individual human action cannot be reliably predicted yet. It is not yet clear if this is due to an unidentifiable quality such as character or the lack of oversight over influencing variables on a human being. However, there is some element of creativity in the habitus of humans (Joas 2009).

So basically, when analyzing social interaction or performance, it is important to analyze material objects as important participants, which influence practice. Some level of agency should be accredited to material objects in human interaction. At the same time, it is important to consider the human as a specific species that has the freedom to change materials and their use and to reprogram them according to their needs. That is not yet possible vice versa.

7.3.1 The Paradox of Unrealized Power

In Chapter 2.2.1.2, the paradox of unrealized power was described. Therefore, it is only briefly summarized at this point.

In the Realist school of International Relations resources are paramount in understanding how power works. The more resources a given party has (e.g., military, or financial) the more powerful they are. At the same time, to Realists it was not understandable, why the most powerful party was not always the prevailing party in controversy and conflict. It was said that resources are not as fungible as generally assumed. That means that the USA's military power may not be useful to a great extent in the climate negotiations. The resource 'weapon' in this example, is not fungible enough for the USA to exert its 'resource power'.

7.3.2 Power in Practice

Practice theory can contribute to understanding the fungibility problem. As described in chapter 3.4, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) consider competence as an intervening variable, when it comes to determining the outcome of negotiations by assessing resources.

The work of Bruno Latour also shows that the mere possession of a material resource does not suffice when it is supposed to unfold an effect. The material object and a human entity must come together and become a new agent. He describes that a weapon per se is not dangerous, neither is a civilian terribly dangerous, but in combination, the 'weapon-civilian' might be (Latour 1996: 32).

Moreover, in negotiations military power is important, but it draws on resources which are not used at that given point in time. The USA e.g., does not point its nuclear weapons at Tuvalu at the UNFCCC conferences. So, resources can be active or passive. If e.g., the USA uses its financial resources at the UNFCCC to get Tuvalu to vote for something they propose, funds act as an active resource and can arguably have a more direct effect. There is a difference, if a resource (material) has direct or indirect influence on a given situation. This difference needs to be considered in theory.

Law argues that human and material need to come together in the right context to perform practice successfully (Law 2011) and also to produce power effects to agents' advantage. This means that a *competent body* and *functioning, active material* need to come together *in the right context* to successfully perform practice.

7.4 A Material View of Social Order and Rule

The descriptions above make clear that an ANT influenced view on the empirical world will be much different to other works on topics such as power, rule, and social order. Instead of calling for the abolishment of the concept of society, which could be the case when arguing strictly on the micro level, Latour argues for a shift in perspective when it comes to the research on power.

> Does this mean we have to deny the existence of an overarching society in order to do away with the notion of power? Not exactly, but we have to shift from an ostensive to a performative definition of society (Latour 1986: 272).

From an ANT point of view, there is no single theoretical explanation, how the alignment of actors which corresponds to the solidifying of power relations in former chapters, comes about. It is something that happens in practice. Human and non-human actors which are embedded in networks, circulate intermediaries such as texts, technical artifacts, humans and money and thus produce a power effect, i.e., the alignment of actors and opinions. When negotiation ceases, and conditions seem calm and clear, from an ANT point of view, this is a state of rule.

Rauer describes that societies heighten public safety by social norms such as the categorical imperative as well as through the building of material and technical installations, which have rules inscribed (Rauer 2012: 82). This notion can be generalized to the stabilizing of society. Whereas human interaction is shaped by social norms, these or similar norms (Callon 1986a, 1986b) are incorporated in technical and other material installations. This is how society is patterned and thus stabilized.

Burri suggests a view that integrates Bourdieu's praxeological work and Latour's ANT to a certain extent. She calls it sociotechnical rationality:

> Sociotechnical rationality is anchored in social actors and institutions as well as in material objects and systems. As dispositions of thought, perception and interaction they are inscribed in non-human entities and social institutions (Translation M.H.; Burri 2008: 276).

Burri (2008), departing from Bourdieu's praxeology describes three logics which are at play in practice: The practical logic, which means that individuals know what to do from being in the field and the reflexive logic, which enables actors to understand the doxa and to decide if they go along with it. To these two logics she adds the object logic, which encompasses inscribed knowledge such as social categorizations. Also, it entails calls to certain action and programs which guide and restrict action (Burri 2008: 280ff.) Lastly, technical installations seem to increasingly have dispositions to act themselves (Burri 2008: 281f.), guided e.g. by logarithms.

For this work, it is important to find a way of looking at human as well as non-human actors as capable of producing power effects. The interplay of humans and non-humans can lead to a solidification of power relations, which can be described as a form of rule.

ANT contributes significantly to an understanding of rule, which can be made fruitful for International Relations. It shows that following human and non-human actors, practices and connections between actors can be researched. Long-distance and long-term social control that aligns actors, can be traced by doing so. ANT delivers intermediaries that are employed to produce those effects. By analyzing which actors employ which intermediaries with which effects in more distant times and spaces, the material dimension of rule can be well researched.

7.5 Analyzing the Material Dimension

Looking at the material dimension of rule, human agent, material object and context need to be analyzed. Arguably, it can be assumed that if one of these elements changes, practice either ceases to be successful or changes. This is how practice theory can contribute to an understanding of social change more generally. From a practice-theoretical point of view, this is how mere reproduction stops and gradual or immediate changes are initiated.

The Practice Analysis for the material dimension of rule includes the material aspects of bodies derived from Bourdieu's work and insights from ANT on objects and the human-object relationship.

Even though bodies and objects are most important in the analysis of the material dimension, the carriers of symbolic meaning, language and non-objects are included in the analysis. For the fine-grained analysis, it is important to be able to distinguish between aspects that present themselves directly or through means of language, may it be utterance or document. Moreover, even though e.g., inscriptions are inscribed in objects, they are important to the material dimension in an abstract sense and therefore will be categorized as non-objects.

7.5.1 Indicators for the Material Dimension of Rule

	Indicators
Intermediaries	• Texts • Technical artifacts • Documents • Money
Other action guiding objects	• Signs • Guidebook • Handbook • Rulebook • Charta • Infrastructure, e.g., speed bumps, traffic lights etc.
Social Effects of object use	• Inscriptions for guiding the use of objects • Social control being executed using objects • Distinction through possession or employment of objects • Performances of structuring and ordering
Localization	• Long-term used • Long-distance use • Remote effect of use (Use in one place has an extensive effect elsewhere)

Figure 11: Indicators for the Material Dimension

7.5.2 Practice Analysis of Material Dimension of Rule

Stage of Analysis		Bodies	Language	Objects	Non-objects
Performance	**Observation**	What bodily movements are performed?	Do the actors discuss the used materials?	Are objects at play, which are integral part of the performance? How are the objects used? Is there and interplay of body and objects? Do the objects act independently?	
	Interpretation I (interpersonal stage)	What can be interpreted regarding the actors' personal history (habitus)? What competencies do the actors display? Which kind of stored knowledge can be inferred? Are intermediaries (texts, technical artifacts, money and humans) used to enroll others? In which way are intermediaries used?	Do the utterances of the actors indicate inscriptions? Do the utterances of the actors indicate social distinction through objects? Do the utterances of the actors indicate social control? Do the utterances of the actors indicate practices of structuring and ordering? Do the utterances of the actors indicate objects, which have a stabilizing	Which objects can be said to be employed as active resources? Are objects used as means to social control? Does the object in connection with the actor generate a new kind of agent? Can objects in the background influence the performance as passive resource?	Do the objects carry inscriptions guiding actors' performance? How much and in which way do the inscriptions inhibit the actor's freedom to act (social control)? Are objects used as means of distinction against other actors or social groups? Are objects used for performances of structuring? Are objects used for performances of ordering? If so, how?

		Do the intermediaries serve the function of aligning actors?	effect on asymmetrical relationships? Which? How?		Are objects used which have a stabilizing effect on asymmetrical relationships? Which? How? Are the objects used long-term? Are the objects used over long distances? Is the effect of the object use remote (performance including object in one place has a disproportionate effect elsewhere)?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	What practice are the actors likely involved in? Is the interplay of body and object in accordance to common practice?	Do the utterances of the actors involved indicate practice, which involves objects?	Are the objects used in accordance to common practice? Can change be deduced from comparing the performance to common practice?	Are the inscriptions, mechanisms of distinction, practices of structuring and ordering, and/or stabilizing effect through object use part of common practice? If they differ, how do they differ?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	What can be inferred for the political context regarding material bodies?	Can the utterances of the actors tell the researcher something about the political context through utterances or documents?	Can a disruption or gradual change be interpreted, taking the political context into account regarding objects?	What can be learned for the political context regarding non-objects?
	Interpretation IV (historical context)	What can be inferred for the historical context regarding bodies?	Can the researcher learn something about the historical context from the utterances or documents?	Can a disruption or gradual change regarding objects be interpreted, taking the historical context into account?	What can be learned about the historical context regarding non-objects?

Figure 12: Practice Analysis of the Material Dimension

In the material dimension, it also makes sense to describe the factual level as exhaustively as possible, before interpreting the situation. As described above, International Relations cannot operate without the use of macro-concepts, because the actors in international relations employ them. So, staying in a micro-perspective would ignore many important empirical aspects, which would be obfuscated or overlooked. Hence, inspired by ANT, also in this dimension, the researcher can broaden her view by using increasingly more empirical and theoretical work to cautiously interpret the situation at hand. The example questions in the PAR in the material dimension of rule open the perspective of a socio-technical rationality, which then becomes easier to research. The material aspect of the bodies involved as well as the material objects employed are supposed to show the power effects this very interplay can cause. If in a hypothetical case e.g., a group of people located in different countries coordinates itself via internet to commit attacks on public transport via drone, these practices could be traced by following the actors through time and (cyber-)space and analyzing the effect they produce through their performances (if access to data was given). The interplay of actor and technology could be brought into connection with an effect of power. If the researcher concludes that they are resisters, their utterances can be interpreted to infer the form of rule at play. For a deeper understanding the symbolic dimension and iterability should also be analyzed. However, to assess if this constitutes a new practice or not, the researcher can use the Practice Analysis as a guide to find similar practices and compare them. It will then be possible to a greater extent to interpret change in practice.

By looking at the broader context, the tool makes it possible to better discuss, whether a performance is part of common practice. Change can thus be assessed or even analyzed. The analysis of the context also makes it easier to discuss wherther the involved actors could be aligned, i.e., if consolidation of power can be said to have taken place. (For a more comprehensive assessment of consolidation see Chapter 8). That is how the Performance Analysis of Rule can be able to open a perspective on rule.

8 Iterability

In the former chapters, the symbolic dimension of rule, resistance as a dimension and the material dimension of rule were developed and outlined. They are indicative mainly of power. In this chapter, iterability is described as a praxeological dimension of rule, which shows, how consolidated a form of power is at a certain point. In this work, rule is considered to be a solidified, temporally and geographically more extensive form of power with a subordinating effect on some actors. Iterability can shed some light onto the complex relationship between rule and resistance. If performances of certain practices become more iterable, it can be suspected that performances become less iterable for the opposing or resisting party. It can be suspected that it is case-dependent if they occur repeatedly. However, through the study of iterability the analysis of the state of consolidation of a certain type of power in each case becomes more feasible. Iterability can be deduced from Butler's work as a performative concept, which can indicate if power (or resistance) can be executed repeatedly. In the following chapter, first Bourdieu's work is consulted for the aspect of iterability. Then, Butler is read as a practice-theoretician and her insights on iterability are described. A general understanding, drawing on further works on the subject (especially Schäfer), is fleshed out. After outlining thoughts on iterability's meaning for power and rule, important aspects of the study of iterability are presented. Further, its connection with the other three dimensions of rule is described. At the end of the chapter, indicators for iterability and example questions for the Practice Analysis are given. Iterability completes the Practice Analysis of Rule.

8.1 Bourdieu on Iterability

Bourdieu does not specifically thematize iterability as a concept, however, repetition is implied in his praxeological works as an important feature of the social. Actors with a specific habitus move in a field in positions, drawing on their dispositions, which make them act in a certain way. They hierarchize the group by ranking specific capital, which is of varying value, depending on the field (see Chapter 4). By copying other actors, the actor knows, how to move in the field. The implication in Bourdieu's body of theory is that actors move by routine,

which is the reason why social inequalities are so persistent (Reckwitz 2004: 41). Bourdieu's take on repetition thus stresses the reproduction of the social. Schäfer (2013) describes that practice theoreticians can be placed on a scale between 'stressing social reproduction' and 'stressing social change'. Judith Butler can be placed on the opposite end of said scale in contrast to Bourdieu. Butler paints a picture of an in-built tendency toward unpredictability to highlight the changeability of social order (Reckwitz 2004: 41).

This work seeks to understand social reproduction and change, which stand in an ambiguous relationship to each other. Even during a crisis, which is seen as a phase of extreme social change, actors connect in some way with existing practices, even if they change some of them. Moreover, in times of relative social stability gradual change occurs, because at least time goes by and contexts change. Change and stability are equally important to consider when looking at practice. That is why Butler's conception of iterability is presented next, to then develop a more balanced conception with Schäfer (2013), which can imply social change and stability equitably.

8.2 Butler's account of iterability

In Judith Butler's understanding, a performative act is based heavily on verbal conventions. It is successful if it connects to former successful verbal conventions and quotes those (Schäfer 2013: 213). If a performance is to be successful, it chooses from a set of verbal conventions which have worked traditionally, and quote these to provoke a specific kind of effect. In Butler's view, performances could not be successful if their citationality was not obvious. This is why in weddings and other ritualistic practices, the same kind of utterance is repeated such as: I declare you.. (Butler 1993: 124). Conventions receive their power through *sedimented repeatability* (Butler 1993: 124). By quoting former practice, a performance becomes intelligible. This is how practice connects with former practice. Butler attributes some meaning to intention as a driving force for action, but she refutes it as *the* driving force. She claims that the power behind words becoming action does not lie in the intention of the subject but in the convention that the subject quotes and utilizes. At the same time though, a speech act always includes the possibility of resistance and defiance. Because it is never possible to control

fully how a speech act is being understood, it always carries the danger of failing. That is why iterability in Butler's understanding is a highly ambiguous concept, which defies determinism of any kind (Villa 2012: 34). The potential to change can be circumscribed as "repeating differently" (Bell 1999) and thus causing a shift in meaning or understanding. Butler intends this as a critique of Bourdieu's work, who considers language to be a means of reproducing social inequality and from Butler's point of view thinks it too statically (Villa 2012: 152). This shows that language can simultaneously be used to reproduce the social and to change it. For Butler, it is important to stress the possibility of change in that respect. However, the embeddedness of the speech act in society becomes clear in her concept of citationality. A successful speech act is always a quote (Villa 2012: 30). The speech act connects with former practice by a conscious or unconscious understanding of social norms by the actor, who then uses conventions in the way of common practice or changes the use slightly or significantly. Speech acts always connect with former discourse and thus refer to the past of society in some way or they would not be understood.

Through the citationality of practice, Butler shows that the *possibility of acting* is a condition for the subject to act. In this way, her concept includes a view of individual acts that encompasses an understanding of social norm, which precedes the individual. Only if society offers the right *context* and enables the individual to cause an effect with an utterance, this utterance will be successful. Butler's understanding of iterability is helpful for this work because it opens the view to change more than Bourdieu's concept has. On the other hand, Butler's work is very focused on discourse, whereas a more comprehensive practice-theoretical view seeks to take bodily practice and bodily practice including objects (or increasingly practice of objects), into account to a greater extent.

8.3 A General Understanding of Iterability

It was mentioned above that successful practice requires three elements: a competent actor, useful devices, and the right context. It is the context that ultimately decides if a performance has an effect in a way the actor intended (if there was an intention), if the performance fails to achieve its goal, or if the performance leads to change.

Reckwitz worked out that many practice theories count on routine to explain how actors unreflexively can act in accordance with former practices (Schäfer 2016b: 138). Schäfer reflects on this and takes the example of weddings and claims that marrying as a practice cannot be based on routine, because arguably nobody marries often enough to get routine in doing it. So, there must be a different explanation for the compatibility of actors with practice. Schäfer (2016b) explains that practice theories imply the repetition of practice. And because marrying is repeated by so many people all over the planet, it becomes common knowledge how to marry, without one actor necessarily gaining routine (Schäfer 2016a). In the specific case of marrying, the mechanism would be of actors copying other couples who have married before and carrying out their own wedding in that or a similar fashion. So, practice is repeated not the same but slightly differently.

So, in Schäfer's view, not routine is the practice-theoretical concept that is the basis of practice, but repetition.

When looking at social order, sociology has been preoccupied with the question of reproduction versus social change for a long time. Schäfer claims that the concept of iterability can encompass the reproduction of the social as well as its transformation (Schäfer 2013; 2016). Practice theory generally, but especially Bourdieu, are being criticized for stressing the aspect of social reproduction to the disadvantage of social change. Such an understanding would mean that exact reproduction is the product of practices which can be described with the formula a=a (Schäfer 2016a). The context of the performance of a practice has necessarily changed though, because at the very least, time has passed. This changed context indicates a slight change which can be describes with a=a' (Schäfer 2016a). To show the temporal aspect of this, Waldenfels expresses it thus: a^{t}- a^{t+1}. Repetition excludes complete difference to previous acts, but also complete sameness (Waldenfels 2001: 6). Waldenfels summarizes the paradox of repetition as "Wiederkehr des Ungleichen als eines Gleichen" (Waldenfels 2001: 7), which means the return of the same, which is not the same. For example, winter comes every year, but it is not *the same* every year. If the same symphony is played for centuries, one can assume that the way it sounds gradually changes over time. The music might stay the same, whereas the musicians and the instruments change. In art and

music, the paradox connection between uniqueness and ritualistic repetition is discussed (Zenk 2013: 67). Events which are so drastic that they change society must be remembered in rituals so that the collective trauma can wear off (Zenk 2013: 67). If these events were not unique in some way, they would not provoke a ritualistic repetition of commemoration. At the same time, they can be categorized with other events of a similar kind. The attacks on the World Trade Center 2001 can be seen as unique, especially because of the political reaction they provoked in the aftermath. At the same time though, they can be categorized as a large-scale terrorist attack like the 2003 Mumbai attack or the 2002 attack on the Dubrowka theatre by separatists from Chechnya (Snetkov 2007).

To put it in general terms, events are always unique, because at least time has changed. At the same time, practice always connects with other practices and can only be understood in a specific context. This is how repetition includes reproduction and change. It is important to note however, that change can be so gradual that it may look like complete reproduction from the outside. Schäfer describes iterablity as repetition without an original, which always includes change (Schäfer 2016a). He claims that practice theory can build on an understanding of repetition which does not have to include a bias towards routine and stability (Schäfer 2016a).

He describes that practices are repetitive. This means that they can be looked at as a circulating repertoire that subjects can connect with (Schäfer 2016a). Also, practices are repeated. They can only stay intelligible if they are performed to a certain degree. “The cultural availability, the pre-reflexive understanding of practice and its competent performance are inextricably connected in the process of repetition” (translation M.H. Schäfer 2016a). Practices are repeatable. They can be performed in new contexts, which means that change is an integral part of repetition. If A cites the same poem in the same reading group at the same time in the same room B every week, she would be citing it in a very similar, but not the same context, because even if the same group members come every week, their experiences outside the group will have changed said members ever so slightly. This example shows that exact repetition must be impossible and at the same time, complete

change would make practice unintelligible for actors and can therefore also be regarded impossible.

“The intelligible performance and the understanding of practice are dependent on former repetitions; and contemporary repetition of practice retains its meaning and opens up room for future citations of this very practice” (translation M.H.; Schäfer 2016a). Through the study of iterability the researcher can analyze the action area for all actors involved and thus determine if power seems consolidated and thus can be described as rule. Also, by studying iterability, the researcher can trace changes of power relations, especially if he compares the iterability of practice at different points in time. These insights are going to be further elaborated below.

8.4 Iterability, Power and Rule

In chapter 2, Popitz’s view on power and rule was described. Popitz (1992) sees power as something that can lead to an event once and never again (situational power). The highest form of power for him is the most institutionalized form of power, the state with a monopoly on the use of force. In his understanding there is a fluent transition between power and rule, which he circumscribes with five steps of institutionalization (see chapter 2.1.4).

If the slave can overwhelm his master and try to flee once, situational power can be assumed. The slave took the master by surprise and used a situation to execute power. After such an incident though, the master will make sure to execute his rule more fiercely and situations in which the slave can try to flee, will decrease. This shows that situational power can be considered to be iterable merely to a small degree.

Popitz (1992) describes institutionalization as the positionalizing of power. That means that the possibility of passing power on to a different actor is a sign of power having become rule. This is so because the position has become powerful regardless of the person and their characteristics holding it. This can be seen as a form of iterability, as a performance of practice becomes much more iterable if transferred between different individual actors.

If rule is understood as the institutionalized, consolidated form of power, that means that *practices which exude social control, or have an inhibiting effect on certain actors* (see chapter 3.4) must be *repeatedly executable*. The assumption is made in this work that if an entity can repeatedly carry out practices that inhibit others - especially in a spatially and temporally extended fashion - this constitutes rule.

Schäfer describes that questions of social reproduction of power relations have to be addressed - from a praxeological standpoint – starting with heterogenous relations and concrete mechanisms of stabilization of repetition in space and time (Schäfer 2016a).

For a specific understanding of repetition in connection with power, repetition of practice is relevant, because it might show that power is repeatedly executed, which would indicate a form of rule. At the same time, power is not constantly executed, especially not in differentiated capitalist societies in which many forms of rule are executed symbolically. This means that the factor *potentiality* needs to be reflected. Therefore iterability, not repetition is seen as a dimension of rule in this work. Iterability in this work is understood as the umbrella term for repetition and potential repetition. If a practice *can* be performed repeatedly which has an inhibiting effect on certain actors, this can be regarded an indicator for rule. By determining the iterability of practice, the researcher becomes able to analyze the probability of a certain practice having the status of an execution of a form of rule. Ideally, for this, the ability to act is assessed for all actors involved in the empirical case to be studied.

8.5 Important Aspects of Iterability

In Chapter 7 it was described that for practice to be successful, the right subject needs to connect with the right material in the right context. If one of these factors changes from one performance to the next, this can lead to a failure of practice or to change of said practice. That means, it is of utmost importance to study each factor when analyzing iterability.

8.5.1 Personal and Interpersonal Aspects of Iterability

Iterability is closely linked to the actors involved. It can evolve through properties of an individual actor or it can be a sign of positionalizing and therefore an interpersonal matter.

From Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) one can learn that practice needs a competent actor to be conducted. Also, if the actor does not have the authority to perform a certain practice, it is likely to fail. This could cause social change of some kind. This is what Butler describes as a subversive act (Butler 1997). That means important conditions of successful practice can be deduced from practice theory, which directly relate to the involved actor(s). They need to be equipped with the necessary competence or authority. Cases are perceivable in which both are necessary, or only one. If the foreign minister of a country needs to negotiate a difficult treaty, she needs diplomatic skills as well as the necessary authority to do so. To name a ship, an actor needs mainly authority, because to throw a bottle against a ship does not involve skills beyond a minimum of physical and mental fitness. To play a video game for example, means the actor needs to know how to play it but does not need much authority beyond the access to the necessary technology and the game itself. Iterability can thus be based on personal qualities and properties. If one entity possesses certain properties (e.g., competence and/or authority), he/she/it can carry out the practice repeatedly.

If the researcher seeks to assess if a practice of power is an instance of rule, she needs to look closely at the actors involved. From Popitz (1992) she has learned that positionalizing of power is an important indicator for rule at play. That means that power needs to be transferable and not bound to specific incorporated qualities of a specific individual. If rule is seen as a network of power practices which work to uphold a certain social order, it is important to assess if power practices merely look alike, or if they are in some way connected. If the individual actor who performs a power practice changes, this can mean that the practice is iterable interpersonally, which would be a strong sign for a form of rule. It can, on the other hand, mean that the power practice fails. The third possibility is that the power practice changes its meaning completely. That is why the analysis must include the study of the power effects.

As rule is understood as connected, iterable power practices, it is important to analyze closely whether different individuals form an entity. If they do not, the researcher needs to assess of which kind the connection between them is to be able to determine if power practices executed by them can be part of the same picture of rule. In cases in which the ruling party is obvious, this sort of study is not necessary. In cases, however, in which it is not clear if rule is at play, the actors involved need to be studied to find out if they are affiliated to the same institution or if they have common qualities or demographic characteristics. These commonalities can be treated as hints that rule may be in play. These must then be closely analyzed in the empirical context in which they are situated. If the actors conducting iterable power practices are affiliated to the same institution, this makes it easier to assume rule than if they merely have characteristics in common. In this case, the researcher needs to analyze carefully if this can be seen as a form of rule by this particular group of people.

8.5.2 Material Aspects of Iterability

If the material to perform a certain practice is missing, the actor will not be able to perform the practice in its common form. If the actor for example wishes to send his boss an email on the weekend but has no computer to hand and is not able to borrow one, he cannot write an email. Whereas if he has a mobile phone with him, a charged battery and cell phone reception, he can decide to write his boss a text message. But as text messages have a different cultural meaning than an email, a sense of urgency and maybe even intimacy could be interpreted. In this example, the geographic whereabouts are important, as they determine, if the employee can use his technical equipment. At the same time, the cultural context surrounding the use of the technical equipment is equally important for the successful performance of the practice ‘contacting one’s boss on the weekend’. Also, an integral part of the relevant context is the interpersonal relationship between the employee and the boss to determine if a text message would be an appropriate form of contact on the weekend. The practice ‘contacting one’s boss on the weekend’ is thus heavily dependent on the right (technological) material, the cultural (the assessment if the weekend is the right time to contact one’s boss) and interpersonal context (assessment if the boss would appreciate a contact approach from exactly that

employee). With the right material the practice can be performed. With the right material and the right context, it will be performed successfully and with the right material and the wrong context, it will be carried out most likely unsuccessfully. For the practice to be performed successfully iterably, the material and the context need to be right repeatedly.

8.5.3 Context and Iterability

It has been mentioned manifold times that the context of a performance often decides if a practice can be conducted successfully or not. At this point, it is interesting to discuss, what exactly this means.

8.5.3.1 Temporal Aspects of Iterability

If the researcher takes the basic laws of physics for granted, he needs to assume that time passes. That means, between one performance and the next, some time has elapsed. Thus, by nature, if analyzing iterability, this implies an important temporal aspect. Even if all other aspects stay stable, time has passed, and some external factors will have changed. The question whether a practice can be carried out in the future depends in part on how much time has passed – this depends on the dynamic of the case at hand. If the researcher looks at a crisis to analyze changing power practices, she can assume that change is rather rapid and therefore choose a short timeframe for her analysis. If she looks at a relatively stable case, she could broaden the scope of her analysis in bigger steps to make connections between different points in time.

8.5.3.2 Spatial Aspects of Iterability

Taking the notion of long-distance and long-term social control as an important description of possible forms of rule from ANT, the researcher understands that the space which power practices extend over, can be an important indicator, as to whether they can be considered iterable. The strategy of following an object (Bueger 2014) is a helpful strategy of showing connections of power over manifold sites, i.e., which are geographically scattered and thus not obviously connected. When it comes to space, in the 21st century it is important to note that this encompasses the geographic space as well as cyberspace. Myriad cases are perceivable in which both forms of space are crucial to analyze.

The guiding question for the analysis of space is thus: Can the same power practice be carried out over manifold sites by the same entity or by connected entities? If the same power practice is carried out by many actors in various places, which are completely remote from each other and have no connections to each other, the researcher could assess a tendency in society, but not exactly a form of rule which is at play. If for example, globally, young people started cyber-bullying their classmates, the researcher might assess a change of the practice 'bullying', but he might not assess a form of 'cyber-bully rule' at high schools. On the other hand, by looking for connections between instances, the researcher could find out that globally the same social subgroup commits cyber bullying. The researcher could assume that some sort of rule is consolidating or that it is the expression of other forms of rule and analyze the case more deeply under that aspect.

8.5.3.3 Culture

To be able to analyze practices of power, the researcher always needs to reflect on the cultural meaning of practice in a specific case. That is why it is more challenging to analyze power which is situated in a cultural context that the is not so familiar with. All aspects of iterability, competence, authority, interpersonal transferability, materials, time, and space have different cultural meanings in differing contexts. That means that the researcher needs to actively reflect on that factor in her interpretations of the performances and practices at hand. This will be further discussed in Chapter 9.2.1.3.

To summarize, if a practice of power can be performed iterably depends on various factors. It depends on the actor's competence and authority, on the right material(s), the right time and space. Also, to determine if the practice of power constitutes a form of rule, it is important to assess if the practice can be carried out between interchangeable actors and if it can be transferred. However, to determine if rule is at play it is important to note that the practice does not have to stay static. It might undergo changes because of shifts of one or more aspects of iterability and still work effectively. That means that to study rule, the researcher needs to analyze the practices of power, determine if any of the aspects of iterability have changed, if the practice has changed, and if the power effect has changed accordingly, and in which way. Only by analyzing the iterable power effect can the re-

searcher determine if rule is at play. The question the researcher needs to keep in mind studying iterability is: Can the same entity carry out the same power practice over an extended time and space with the same effect?

Conditions for Iterability					
Actor		**Material**	**Context**		
			Time	**Space**	**Culture**
competence	interpersonal transferability	availability	point(s) in time	distribution	adequacy
authority		functionality	frequency	spatial connection(s)	
		adequacy	duration		

Figure 13: Conditions for Iterability

8.6 The Connection between Iterablity and the Other Dimensions

For a praxeological analysis of rule it is important to understand each dimension of rule in each case separately, but it is equally important to put them in relation to each other to grasp the bigger picture. As mentioned above, the outlined dimensions of rule overlap and it is important to reflect on their connection. This is especially true for iterability, as iterability describes a phenomenon of frequency and dynamic. It can be looked at as modus of social practice or action. Therefore, it can influence the other dimensions extensively. The iterability of a symbol, a material or resistance influences greatly in how far the researcher can think of them as signs for rule. That is why in the following, iterabilty is discussed in connection with the other three dimensions of rule.

8.6.1 Iterability and Symbols

As outlined in chapter 5, objects, living beings, or non-objects can be symbols for rule and be used as a means of executing rule. If the researcher wishes to deduce the quality and intensity of a form of rule from the prevalence of a symbol, she can study how often it occurs. She should find out how long it has been used and where it is used to understand the spatial and temporal distribution of it. She needs to find out, which actor uses it and in which way. She can find out how iterable that symbol is and if she can draw conclusions about the quality of rule from the

self-declarations of the involved parties in that case.

At times, the use of certain symbols can be suppressed by the opposing party. Also, symbols can be used subversively and secretly. Small rainbow buttons, e.g., are used as symbols of identification between members of the LGBTQ community (Wolowic et al. 2016). They can be understood as a means of identity and for group formation, they can however also be understood as symbols of resistance against the heteronormativity of mainstream society. To a certain degree, conclusions could be drawn on how open to the LGBTIQ community a society is by determining how prevalent the rainbow button is worn and how actors themselves view them, or if the symbol has been replaced by another and if so why.

8.6.2 Iterablity and Resistance

I argue that for an understanding of resistance, iterability is a vital aspect. If in a hypothetical case an actor (individual or collective) claims to be resisting against some form of rule only once, this either means that the claimed form of rule is not so strong after all to motivate resistance more persistently. It can also mean that the form of rule is so violent or absolute that it makes resistance impossible. In the latter case it would be possible to find traces of repression, violence, or persecution in part of the ruling entity. This could then be analyzed in the symbolic and material dimension.

For a comprehensive understanding of rule in a specific case, the iterability of practice needs to be reflected in connection with the assessment of whether a party is resistant or not. In the empirical work therefore, the researcher needs to find out if any party claims to be resisting and / or ruling. The starting point for this would be to analyze self-declarations. If these are inconclusive, she would look at the employed practices and resources employed to find clues as to which side is which. If the conflict were symmetrical, the researcher would likely assess controversy but not necessarily rule.

Iterability of practice(s) on the side of the superordinate indicates rule understood as consolidation of power. Regarding iterability of the resistant party, there is a conundrum. Whereas the existence of resistance indicates rule, the more iterable practices on the part of the resistant party are, the consolidation of the form of rule

at hand can be questioned. A fairly recent example for this would be the repeated attacks by the Christian-Social Union (CSU) on Chancellor Merkel, which have finally (not monocausally but substantially) weakened her position in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU; Rothenberg 2018).

This connection cannot however be considered automatic. Empirical cases are conceivable in which rule goes relatively unharmed by resistance, even though the resistant practices are iterable. One could mention the repeated resistance against neoliberal globalization by various actors, whereas it seems to continue relatively unharmed even after the financial crisis of 2008 (Nullmeier 2018).

In empirical research it is important to analyze which practices are at play. The researcher needs to analyze which practices can be tolerated and endured by the ruling side, and which practices weaken it or provoke a response. So, theoretically if resistance exists, rule can be assumed. The tendency can be formulated that the more iterable resistance is, the more effect it has on the ruling side. It can also be assumed that the more iterable practices of rule are, the less iterable resistant practices become. Beyond this, empirical research is necessary to determine relationships of resistance and rule.

In cases in which power seems consolidated, actors seem aligned, and the discourse has practically come to a hold, the researcher can try to analyze the resistant side, if perceivable, to find out about the form of rule at play. Some forms of rule can seem consensual, but by scrutinizing it for resistance the researcher might find that this is not the case.

8.6.3 Iterability and Materiality

If the researcher accepts the insights from ANT, materials contribute greatly to the consolidation of power to rule, especially technical ones. In the study of rule however, it is important to discuss whether the studied materials can be used iterably or not. This is dependent on the right context and a competent user, as these are the conditions for successful practice.

If an upcoming nuclear power possesses the right materials to build a nuclear bomb, it needs the right scientists as well who are willing and able to build the bomb. If said nuclear power faces sanctions from the world community which

would starve the population, one could say that arguably the right context does not exist to fulfill the goal of the practice ‘building a nuclear bomb’.

If a militia group manages to conquer territory, but because of attacks by the government, resources such as weapons, oil, food, and water become scarce, it becomes more difficult to carry out certain practices such as coercing the population into avoiding certain areas and move to others. Surveillance might become much more difficult. Therefore, keeping the territory and consequently the newly established form of rule will become increasingly difficult.

The understanding of the material dimension can contribute to a realist view on material resources through the materiality of bodies with their habitus and the working of power in heterogeneous networks. Whereas realists tend to analyze material resources’ quantity, Bourdieu and ANT-inspired analysis will look for performances, which make materials effective or not. This enables the researcher to conduct a fine-grained power analysis of material resources, which help understand the fungibility problem.

8.7 Analyzing Iterability as a Dimension of Rule

In the following, iterability will be presented as a dimension of rule. Analogous to the other chapters, possible indicators for iterability are formulated, although the Practice Analysis of iterability as a dimension differs from the other dimensions. In the first column, the general take on iterability can be studied. In the next columns the iterability of the symbolic dimension, of resistance, and of the material dimension are made analyzable. Whereas the other dimensions indicate practices of power, iterability indicates their consolidation. Therefore, it is best discussed in connection with the other dimensions.

8.7.1 Indicators for Iterability

	Possible Indicators
Factual	• Actual Repetition by the same individual • Repetition by individuals from the same entity • Repetition by individuals, which are connected
Conditions	• The needed competence is available • The needed authority is available • The interpersonal constellation is right • The needed materials are available and functional • Timing is right • The cultural setting is right • The surroundings ascribe the right meaning • Transferability between entities
Hypothetic	• There are no apparent reasons why the performance should not be repeatable • The reasons for repeatability overweight the reasons against repeatability • Extensive effort is made to make it repeatable • The actors, the materials, and the context are considerably stable • There are good reasons why the actors and the materials can perform in a different context • There are good reasons why different actors can perform using the material in a specific context • There are good reasons, why the actors can perform in that context using different materials

Figure 14: Indicators for Iterability

8.7.2 Practice Analysis of Iterability as Dimension of Rule

Stage of Analysis		Performance Generally	Symbols	Resistance	Materials
Performance	**Observation**	Which bodily movements can be observed? Which objects are involved? Which utterances are made? Which non-objects referred to?	Which bodily movements can be observed? Which objects are involved? Which utterances are made? Which non-objects referred to?	Do the actors claim resistance? Which actors claim resistance? What justifications do they use for claiming resistance?	Which actors use which materials in which way?
	Interpretation I (interpersonal stage)	Does the performance in question happen more than once? How often does it occur? How far does the performance reach geographically and temporarily? Which factors contribute to it being iterable? Which factors contribute to its restriction?	Do the people or objects display a symbolic meaning? How prevalent is the symbol in the performance? How distributed is it spatially and temporarily? Does the bodily performance or the performance including objects result in long distance social control? Which meaning is attributed to the symbol by the actors? Can the symbols in question be read as symbols of rule? If so, why? Are alternative interpretations possible?	Can the practice be interpreted to be of a defiant kind? Why and in how far can it be said to be defiant? Does the defiant performance occur more than once? How often does it occur in the case in question? How far is the defiant performance's reach spatially and temporarily? Can the resistance in question be said to be iterable? Does the iterability of the resistance allow assumptions about its strength?	Are the materials used more than once? How often are the materials used in this way? Does the context allow the same use of the materials in the same way? How far reaching is the use of the materials in the performance and in the case in question? Can the use of the materials be called iterable? If not, which factor (competent actor, use of material or context) has changed?

				Can assumptions be made about the form of rule the resistance is addressing?	
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	Has the performance changed? How does it relate to common practice? Can the performance be called iterable? Why?	Is the symbol part of common practice? Has the common practice regarding the symbol changed over time? Has the iterability of the symbol changed over time?	Is the resistant performance part of common practice? Has the resistant quality of this performance changed over time? Has the iterability of this resistant performance changed over time?	Is the use of the material in line with common practice? Has the use of the material changed over time? If so, how? Has the iterablity of this use of materials changed over time?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	What can be said about the political context, deducing from the performance(s)?	Contrasting the occurrence of the symbol with common practice, can something be deduced about the political context?	Contrasting this performance of a resistant practice with common practice, can something be deduced about the political context?	Contrasting the use of materials in this performance with common practice, can something be deduced about the political context?
	Interpretation IV (historical context)	What can be said about the historical context, deducing from the performance(s)?	Contrasting the occurrence of the symbol with common practice, can something be deduced about the historical context?	Contrasting this performance of a resistant practice with common practice, can something be deduced about the historical context?	Contrasting the use of materials in this performance with common practice, can something be deduced about the historical context?

Figure 15: Practice Analysis of Iterability as a Dimension

9 Toward a Practice-Theoretical Framework on Rule in IR

In the following, the insights gained in this work are outlined. It is first summarized how rule is seen in this work and what that means for an overall understanding of social order. After briefly discussing the 'symbolic frame of reference', the contributions of this work to the discourse on rule in IR are outlined. After that, the Practice Analysis of Rule (PAR) is recapitulated. It is also discussed in depth how the Practice Analysis on (Transnational) Rule can be applied, and how the quality of the research can be ensured when conducting research using it. At the end of the chapter, contributions of this book to the discourse on praxiography in IR are described.

9.1 Ontological Insights about Power and Rule

Even though practice theory is at times criticized for being blind to power (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014) and too focused on local events (Adler and Pouliot 2011), the consulted praxeological works have contributed to a better understanding of power and rule. Because each theoretician is implicitly interested in different empirical phenomena (Reckwitz 2004), this work argues for looking at different strands of theory in a combined fashion. Therefore, various empirical dynamics can be implied by theorizing – stabilizing and destabilizing effects of practice on social relations.

By formulating the concept of symbolic violence, Bourdieu delivers an understanding of symbolic forms of power and rule which become manifest in bodies, objects, language, and non-objects. If it becomes manifest in bodies, it can be perceived e.g., through submissive behavior on behalf of the subordinate. It can manifest in utterances of submission or self-oppression. It can be perceived as arrogant or condescending behavior on the part of the superordinate. In Bourdieu's work, objects form the objectified history of society. They are furthermore used by actors to distinguish themselves from others. By means of symbolic violence, actors can execute rule indirectly, i.e., without the use of force (see Chapter 4.5).

The bodily reactions to symbolic violence, which Bourdieu describes, are similar to what Scott terms infrapolitics (2005). Bodily practices like foot-dragging, de-

sertion, evasion, and aggression, he describes as infrapolitics (see Chapter 6.4.1). This means that there is an extensive overlap of bodily reactions to symbolic violence and everyday forms of resistance in each theory. Even though symbolic forms of power and rule can be very open and obvious, e.g., a threat with a gun, they also can be very subtle. Arguably such subtle forms of symbolic rule do not spark resistance, or they provoke resistance which is subtle itself. This is where infrapolitics comes in. Also, if the form of rule is extremely suppressing and violent, infrapolitical means will be sought out. Scott states that only in democracies where opinions can be discussed in the open, forms of resistance such as demonstrations can be regarded as the way of doing things. In other forms of government this is not easily possible and infrapolitical means much more self-evident (Scott 2005). This is where the symbolic and resistance as a dimension intersect. This is where it is important to note that understandings on resistance generally differ. Some contend that the resisting party needs to have the intention to resist (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). In that case the researcher can look at self-declarations of the involved parties and assess if there is resistance. If the researcher sees the conduct of defiant practices as resistance in the case of infrapolitical practices, she might contend that bodily expressions (e.g., foot-dragging, evasion, desertion etc.) are simultaneously symbolic reactions to rule as well as resistance. This very much depends on the empirical case at hand.

Open and direct forms of resistance will rely heavily on material objects to execute practices of resistance, because as Latour states, power will always stay somewhat fleeting if it relies merely on interhuman interaction. Materials employed for practices of resistance can be signs and signboards, uniforms, disguises, weapons, pamphlets etc. This is how resistance and the material dimension intersect. Both resistance and rule need to employ materials and enroll human agents to achieve their objectives. By following the human and nonhuman actors (objects), networks of actors and practices can be analyzed. Thereby, effects of long-distance, long-term social control can be traced. For example, by means of practice tracing, the connections between practice and effect can be traced and thereby causality analyzed. By looking at which intermediaries are employed, and which actors are enrolled, effects in remote times and places can be perceived. If

these practices lead to an effect of social control and alignment of actors, from a material point of view, the researcher will speak of a state of rule.

Whether a practice can be carried out repeatedly depends heavily on the materials used in each case and whether the actors and the context allow the performance of power to be repeated. This is how iterability connects with the material dimension. By determining, if practices of power can be carried out iterably, the researcher can interpret how consolidated a form of power is, and whether it can therefore be called rule.

9.1.1 Practice-theoretical Understanding of Rule

The definition presented by Daase and Deitelhoff was taken as an entry point into formulating an understanding of rule above, which can make it more easily researchable. They

> define rule as asymmetrical power relations that are institutionally perpetuated, i.e. structures of super- and subordination that distribute life chances and chances of influence, which minimize options for action effectively, regardless if these structures are primarily of socio-cultural, economic or military nature (Translated M.H.; Daase and Deitelhoff 2015: 304).

This definition makes clear that in relations of rule there is a super- and a subordinate party in perpetuated power relations. So, this understanding is relational. Rule cannot exist per se, it needs a counterpart. Moreover, rule must have an inhibiting or socially controlling effect on some actors by minimizing options for action. It is important to note that life chances are distributed through relations of rule. That means that rule does not only entail symbolic subordination, but also concerns the material basis of the subordinated. This definition's strong suit is that it shows the inhibiting side of rule without making legitimacy or illegitimacy a defining characteristic. Additionally, it does not tie the existence of rule to a monopoly on violence, which arguably exists, if at all, in nation states. This understanding can be fruitfully complemented by insights from practice theory.

From practice theoretical understandings of power, we have learned that power means practices with effect (Watson 2017). However, Watson argues that especially practices with *inhibiting effect* should be studied, which is in line with the objective of this work. From ANT one can deduce that rule means long-distance and long-term social control of actors (Law 1986). To these general notions on

rule, the practice-theoretical understanding developed in this book adds the insights gained from theorizing the four dimensions of rule (symbolic, resistance, material and iterability). From Bourdieusian practice theory, the notion of the 'competent body' can be extracted, which implies that bodily practices are carried out by actors who know the field and know how to act according to the field (Pouliot 2008). These actors enter a consolidating or consolidated relation of rule and will find the practical knowledge of how to conduct practices of power repeatedly in the respective field. From Bourdieu we learn that power and consolidated power work through symbols (Schmidt 2009). Gestures, objects, or even non-objects can be used to exude meaning of super- and subordination. Resistance can be regarded an indicator for rule as one can learn from Daase and Deitelhoff (2014, 2015, 2017). Looking to ANT, it becomes clear that material and especially technical objects can be used to inhibit certain actors' options for action and freedom. At the same time, objects can be used to directly enforce compliance. If the practices of power in the symbolic, material and resistance as a dimension are consolidated, they can then be studied in connection with iterability.

The reflections on the theories outlined and the conceptual work done in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 has resulted in the following practice-theoretically informed understanding of rule, which is sensitive to *how* rule manifests empirically and *how* it works:

Rule comprises of durable asymmetrical power relations of super- and subordination, enacted in iterable practices *with (long-distance and long-term) socially controlling or inhibiting effect on certain actors, may it be executed by competent bodies, encrypted in symbols, indicated by resistance, or inscribed in or executed by material objects. Rule can work through creating the belief in its legitimacy or through practical constraint, coercion or violence.*

A practice-theoretical understanding of rule draws attention to the performative side of rule. Rule is not a structure detached from agents. This understanding presents rule as something which is carried out *by someone* and *something, somewhere*. It shows that rule, even if it is not executed in the form of physical violence, presents some form which is likely to be empirically perceivable and thus researchable. This practice-theoretical understanding enables the researcher to see

rule as an empirical phenomenon which is not defined by its legitimacy or lack of which. On the other hand, it does not depend on resistance against a specific form of rule becoming perceivable either to make it analyzable.

The research on rule is challenging, even if it allows for the reconstruction through resistance. In some cases, resistance will be barely noticeable, if noticeable at all. In those cases, the analysis of the other dimensions can be effective. Moreover, the reconstruction of rule through resistance is challenging because it needs to uncover the implicit knowledge which agents act upon. In this work, iterable practices of power are not considered to be based on conscious decision. To the contrary, practices are often conducted out of a sense of necessity or unreflective imitation of other actors. So, if rule does not function any differently to other practices, the research on it poses the same challenges as praxiography generally, which Bueger claims are challenging but manageable (Bueger 2014).

9.1.2 A Practice-theoretical View on Social Order

In the chapters above, many aspects were discussed which draw on practice theory's take on social order. From the theorizing above, this work's view on social order is outlined to paint a bigger picture of how the developed view on rule fits into an understanding of social order, its stability and possible change.

9.1.2.1 Stability and Change of Social Order

In Chapter 3 the basic questions of social theory were introduced, posed by Joas and Knöbl (2004): What is social action? What is social order? And what drives social change? In this work, these issues are considered the theoretical frame, in which the theorizing is positioned. As discussed above, rule and resistance stand in certain relationships with stability and change. Stability and change can thus be regarded as important hints as to the form of rule at play in a certain case.

Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence is designed to explain primarily social reproduction and therefore implies stability of practice. Resistance by nature implies instability because it seeks change. Materiality implies stability, because, as Latour points out, materials are used to make social relations stable (Latour 2008). Butler's understanding of iterability on the other hand implies change through repetition. Thus, by making rule researchable through four different dimensions

which encompass different implications regarding stability and change, a balanced conception could be formulated[20]. This work wishes to present rule as something that is built by (temporo-spatially extending) practice, which can stay stable, but which can also be eroded gradually or abruptly.

If the researcher is interested in questions of rule, she will naturally be interested in questions of stability and change. As pointed out manifold times, rule is an enduring asymmetrical power relation which is extended temporally and spatially. Thus, the researcher cannot find out much if she merely analyzes one point in time, because it can only show a section of a bigger picture. The stabilizing of social relations will be of interest to the researcher because this characterizes rule. In this case, the study of stabilizing practices is of interest. Also, the researcher will be interested, if the kind of rule in her case undergoes a change and/or if even the super- and subordinate party change positions. Especially studies that focus on crisis as an entry point into research will be interested in continuity and change of practice in reaction to the crisis.

The practice-theoretical picture of social order can be described thus: In this practice-theoretical view, practice is the most important analytical focus point. Practice is made up of repeated single performances of practice. Social order is produced and reproduced in and through practice. Societal actors and formed groups of actors can get into conflict about which social order is desirable and who should profit from it. The group winning this dispute consolidates social relations in their favor and minimizes contingency and freedom of action for the subordinate. Through practices of structuring and ordering, the ruling side can reproduce such relations and thus shape the social order which exists merely in embodied and objectified form. The dominant group employs symbolic meanings and materials iterably to reproduce their favored order. Nevertheless, the possibility and probability of resistance exists. If resistance becomes perceivable, the dominant group most likely employs more humans, materials, and symbols to confront the resisting side, and thus rule becomes easier to notice. Rule is considered to be

[20] Even though the theories the dimensions were deduced from encompass these implications, in this work they are considered more ambiguous. This ambiguity is discussed below.

iterable practices to build and reproduce the social order the superordinate group favors. In this practice-theoretical understanding, rule and social order are closely connected to each other, but they are not identical.

From this practice-theoretical point of view, it is vital to keep in mind that actor, material, and (temporo-spatial) context determine the course of practice. It is through practice that social change occurs. Schäfer (2013) worked out that some practice theories favor stability and others change. He thus formulated 'repetition' as the concept, which could include both tendencies equitably. Even when society reproduces relatively undisturbed, time passes. So even if the same actors using the same artifacts to carry out the same practice, incremental change will occur, because the context of this very practice will have changed in some way. Not to mention that the actors involved will have passed at some point and the artifacts used will likely not be the same at some point in the future. So, even if some factors stay stable, the cultural meaning is likely to change. Aside from this, there is also the possibility of sudden change through crisis. Then especially practices change because the former practices will have stopped working. In that case also, practices will connect with former practice in some way, even if the change is comparatively rapid. Therefore, practice always implies stability and change simultaneously.

This work seeks to take both dynamics equally into account. As mentioned, Bourdieu is constantly criticized for being too focused on explaining social stability and the reproduction of society (Moebius 2011: 65; Schäfer 2013). Arguably his concepts are more useful to explain social stability than social change. Looking at symbols separately from Bourdieu's work, however, a different picture appears. When symbols are an expression of a certain type of rule, they do possess a stabilizing quality. The more complex a social system is, the more it needs to rely on symbols as carriers of social meaning, including super- and subordination. Symbols can at the same time be closely connected to social change. Resistance movements use symbols to show their resistance and to mobilize more resisters. Nowadays many hashtags become symbols of resistance, but also objects. The umbrella became a well-known symbol in the protests against the "831 decision" in 2014, which restricted the voting rights of Hongkong citizens (Hume and Park

2014). Also, it is perceivable that if symbols are changed or used in a different context, they might be a means of criticism of existing rule. It is thus important to note that symbols can have a stabilizing and a destabilizing effect in social settings.

Resistance intuitively provokes the association of instability. On the whole, resistance can be destabilizing if it seeks to overthrow an existing form of rule and possibly with it an installed social order. Furthermore, if the means employed are of a violent kind, this can have a destabilizing effect. Nevertheless, not all forms of resistance go that far. Arguably, there are forms of resistance in which the resisting party is not even aware of its resistance. In some cases, a form of rule might even justify resistance by accepting system-conform resistance (opposition) e.g., the inclusion of the most relevant opposing parties in democratic parliaments. In some cases, therefore, resistance can have a stabilizing effect. So, even if resistance is associated with instability, it is important to keep its ambiguity in mind, when researching it.

Materials are in many contexts used to stabilize power relations through technical installations to effect long-term and long-distance social control. If, however, the actor(s) or the context changes, the material can lose its power in a former practice of power. Also, material objects can be used to destabilize an existing order and thus work against stability. Materials thus also need to be regarded as ambiguous regarding their stabilizing and destabilizing quality.

Iterability of practice implies that practice does repeat but at the same time it is conceptualized that it is open to changes and shifts in meaning through change of actor, material, and/or context. If practices of power are iterable, this consolidates power. However, if practices of resistance are iterable, this might weaken power.

Arguably, the developed Practice-Theoretical Framework on Rule in International Relations displays sensitivity to reproduction and change of social order equally. When using the Practice Analysis on Rule, the researcher can be sufficiently sensitive to reproduction and change of rule as well as resistance. The theories developed from future research using the Practice Analysis of Rule in IR will consequently be able to take both dynamics into account equitably.

9.1.2.2 Social Order and the International Sphere

In parts of this book, the international sphere was not treated very differently to national social orders, even though the international is characterized by some particularities.

In International Practice Theory, the international sphere is largely looked at as a social order characterized by practices. By analyzing workings of international organizations and multilateral settings (for example Pouliot 2011; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, Adler-Nissen 2014, Villumsen Berling 2012) these works seek to draw some theoretical generalizations beyond the immediate local context. Arguably, diplomatic settings are important to produce the international social order, because practices of structuring and ordering are carried out there, life chances are often decided upon, and freedom of action is inhibited. For the analysis of transnational forms of rule therefore, they are an interesting entry point.

Up until now the nation state is the only sphere where a monopoly on violence is claimed. That means that internationally, rules cannot be enforced in the same way as nationally. That is why diplomatic settings are so important for overall international relations. Nevertheless, official diplomacy is not the only perceivable political setting which is important for international relations. Transnationally active NGOs, TNCs, social movements, groups, and individuals can have a vast effect on international relations, be it as super- or subordinates. This is true, especially in the digital age. That is why it is argued in this book that it is important to analyze practices which seem to be everyday practices as they are potentially relevant to international relations. At the time of writing, it can already be anticipated that transnational political power struggles will increasingly play out online. It is of utmost importance to prepare the theoretical and methodological tools to analyze emerging relations of super- and subordination as well as rule and resistance.

9.1.3 Symbolic Frame of Reference

In practice theory, the basis for social action and interaction is practical knowledge (Pouliot 2008). In practices which produce and reproduce relations of super- and subordination – as in other practices – this must be the case. The sym-

bolic frame of reference describes the common understanding between humans who live in the 21st century which evolved through historic interaction among humans. This work does not wish to relativize cultural differences. It seeks to point to the fact that in relations of super- and subordination a minimum understanding of the meaning of the actions of the other side must be existent, or the interaction could not take place. The symbolic frame of reference is the basis for the symbolic interpretation necessary for that. It can be assumed that rule and resistance are sets of practices guided by implicit, practical knowledge. If this is so and if a frame of reference, however slim, is a prerequisite, it means that an overlap of implicit knowledge is most likely to exist. By researching the practices and explicit knowledge of one side and of the other, the researcher should aim to understand what common implicit knowledge the ruling and the subordinate party share, because it should be an important basis for this relation of super- and subordination. Supposing that super- and subordinate share implicit knowledge about their relationship, this could be described as the implicit rationale of that form of rule. If an implicit understanding between the two sides can be discovered, this common implicit knowledge is most likely the source of symbolic violence. This is how obedience is evoked without having to be explicitly demanded. Therefore subordinating beliefs are held by the subordinate – the implicit knowledge is widely shared, even if it is not justified. This means that if there is no resistance which is empirically noticeable, the researcher should try and find the shared implicit knowledge by looking to the other three dimensions.

9.1.4 Contributions to the Discourse on Rule in International Relations

The presented work wishes to contribute to the discourse on rule in International Relations by drawing attention to the practical side of super- and subordination. Based on insights from practice theory, rule is looked at as set of practices that are carried out without necessarily being based on intention or conscious decision. Often actors are born into, or enter, existing relations of super- and subordination which they then are likely to take for granted. This entails drawing on implicit knowledge which super- and subordinate must share to a certain extent to make practices of super- and subordination possible without making them explicit. This book is interested in how rule becomes manifest and therefore researchable, in-

stead of being interested in its normative status as legitimate or illegitimate. In the presented practice-theoretical understanding, rule is an empirical phenomenon which can be perceived by analyzing it in four dimensions: the symbolic dimension, resistance as dimension, the material dimension and iterability as a dimension.

This practice-theoretical view on rule looks at it as performances of power as the smallest entities which become rule through iterability. Rule is looked at as heterogeneous networks of actors who employ other actors and objects in practices of power to produce long-distance and long-term effects of social control. By presenting rule as practices which are carried out in a certain way and employing certain objects and actors, this work has contributed to the discourse on rule in International Relations thus making transnational rule as a phenomenon more tangible.

9.2 Methodological Considerations

In the following, methodological considerations are discussed, starting with the Practice Analysis of Rule. It is recapitulated, how it works, and how it can be used for the research on rule. After that, it will be discussed, how it can help research specifically transnational forms of rule. At the end of Chapter 9, the contributions of this work to the discourse on praxiography are outlined.

9.2.1 The Practice Analysis of Rule

In this work, rule is considered to consist of iterable power effects which are caused by networks of power practices, which can be traced by the researcher. The Practice Analysis of Rule is an analytic tool which can be used by the researcher to analyze performance to find practices of power which can be considered iterable over long periods of time, and possibly vast spaces. Using the Practice Analysis of Rule should enable the researcher to analyze emerging forms of rule and long-standing fully consolidated, as well as waning, forms of rule. It enables the researcher to look at rather local as well as temporo-spatially widespread forms of rule.

Drawing mainly on Bourdieu's work on symbolic violence, the symbolic dimension of rule was theorized. Looking at symbols is most important when no obvious forms of resistance emerge. This can mean that rule is absent, or that resistance or rule are so subtle that resistance does not become perceivable prima facie. For these cases, the analysis of the symbolic dimension is vital. From Bourdieu's body of theory, the symbolic carriers of meaning were deduced, i.e., body, language, object, and non-object (See Chapter 5). In these carriers, symbolic violence, but also other symbols become apparent in social interaction. Drawing on Bourdieu's work and Latour's insights from ANT, the rationale was developed to look at these carriers following various stages. At the beginning of the analysis, a single performance of practice is the focus and therefore entry point into hypothetical empirical analysis. Later, the performance is interpreted as part of a practice. Lastly performance is reflected on in the context of the practice. This practice is then put into context with other practices. This is how the analysis stays true to the praxiographic strategy of 'looking down and studying up' (Bueger 2014). The strategy of passing through various stages of analysis is designed to enable the analysis of macro phenomenon – rule – in very small instances. Doing so, the researcher can stay true to the notion from ANT of 'following the actor' (Latour 2007). 'Studying up' entails taking more empirical data and academic work into consideration with each step.

The first stage is the so-called factual stage. It makes room for the researcher to make descriptions as purely as possible. That means that the factual stage seeks to leave out any interpretation (as far as possible) and thus to show how much of social life consists of interpretation. From symbolic interactionism one can learn that social interaction consists of actors decoding each other's symbolic meaning. As this step is taken by the actors involved, the researcher can try and take the same step at stage two, which is the Interpretation Stage I. The researcher can make various interpretations of the performance, of which she keeps the most likely and dismisses the unlikely. Interpretation Stage II is the Practice Stage. Here, the performance is interpreted as part of a practice. Also, by contrasting the performance (or even practice) with common practice, the researcher can analyze whether noticeable change has taken place. By broadening the temporal and spatial scope of the analysis, and therefore taking more information into account, the

researcher can make connections between the studied practice and other practices to be able to draw conclusions about the political context (Interpretation Stage III). By broadening especially the temporal scope even more, the researcher might be able to draw conclusions on the historic context of the studied practice (Interpretation Stage IV).

The Practice Analysis of Rule is open enough to enable the researcher to use the three suggested strategies by Bueger (2014) for empirical analysis of practice. It can be used in connection with specific sites or crises as entry points into empirical analysis. Furthermore, it allows for the researcher to follow an object, a concept or a specific performance.

Resistance also becomes predominantly apparent in bodies, language, objects, and non-objects. As resistance similarly works in large part through symbols, the Practice Analysis can be used to study resistance in performances. Indicators for resistance were deduced from theory and presented. These indicators were then used to formulate example questions for each carrier of social meaning and through each stage from the factual stage to the historical context.

Whereas in the material dimension symbolic meaning is not as important as in resistance, it can also be studied using the Practice Analysis of Rule. The most important aspect here are bodily interactions with objects or the workings of objects themselves, but utterances of actors can be important, if they refer to material uses or inscriptions. Also, humans acting on material objects, or material objects having effects on human agents, can lead to non-objective meaning.

The symbolic dimension, resistance and the material dimension can be used to study practices of power. Each of these dimensions can tell the researcher something about the way actors act to produce power effects. They can also help study practices of resistance or even practices of subordination. By extending the temporal and spatial scope of analysis, the researcher can broaden her view on each dimension and gather first information about the state of consolidation of practices of power.

To fully determine the consolidation of practices of power, iterability is studied in the last step. In the dimension of iterability, the researcher looks at indicators for

iterability and conditions for iterability of practice. She finds out inter alia, if the actors are capable, authorized, and interpersonally able to carry out the practice. This analysis the researcher further extends temporo-spatially. In this step, first the performance that is used as an entry point is specifically analyzed. Afterward, the iterability of each dimension can be studied using the Practice Analysis of Rule.

9.2.1.1 Overview of the Practice Analysis of Rule in IR

The Symbolic Dimension of Rule

Stage		Body	Language	Objects	Non-Objects
Performance	**Observation**	Who is involved? How are the involved bodies moving?	What is being said? How is it said? Which intentions do the actors claim to have? What is not being said/ omitted?	Do objects play a role in the performance? Which objects do? How are they used?	Which non-objects play a role? How do the actors refer to the non-objects?
	Interpretation I (interpersonal level)	Does this show anything on the emotional level? What does this mean for the interpersonal relationship(s)? Can an asymmetry between the actors be inferred? What other interpretations are possi-	What do the utterances say about the actors' emotions? What do the utterances say about their relationship?	Do the objects used symbolize anything? Can they be used as a means of distinction? Do the objects used have an inhibiting effect on any actors?	What do the non-objects in the performance symbolize? Can the non-objects function as a means of distinction? Do the non-objects used have an inhibiting effect on any actors?

		ble?			Are categories, rankings, differentiations between humans used as means of social control?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	Which practice does the performance refer to?	Which practice do the utterances refer to?	Which practice do the objects refer to?	Which practice do the non-objects refer to?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	Considering the contemporary political context, what can be inferred to be happening considering the body (disruptions, reproduction)?	How do the utterances reflect on the contemporary political context (disruption, reproduction)?	How do the used objects reflect on the contemporary political context (disruption, reproduction)?	What do the non-objects reveal about the contemporary political context?
	Interpretation IV (historical context)	Considering the historical context, what can be inferred to be happening regarding bodies (disruptions, reproduction)?	How do the utterances reflect on the historical context (disruption, reproduction)?	How do the used objects reflect on the historical context (disruption, reproduction)?	What do the non-objects reveal about the historical context?

Resistance as a Dimension of Rule

Stage of Analysis		Body	Language	Objects	Non-Objects
Performance	**Observation**	Which bodily movements are executed? Are bodies being hindered in their movement? How do actors interact? In which space do the actors move?	Is resistance claimed in utterances? Is resistance claimed in writing? Are documents of resistance formulated, e.g. resolutions? Is resistance recognized by the resister, the addressee or the observer? Do the resisters claim intent to resist?	Which objects are used in the performance?	Which non-objects do the involved parties refer to?
	Interpretation I (interpersonal stage)	What can be inferred from the bodily movements? What do they say about the relationships between the actors??	What can be inferred from the utterances or the writing of the involved parties? Do the parties partake in spreading rumors and badmouthing? If yes, in which context?	Are typical objects of resistance being used, such as posters, banners, flyers, buttons? What can be inferred regarding resistance from the objects used?	What can be inferred from the non-objects referred to? Can intersectionality be assumed? Can the performance be traced back to a hidden transcript?

		Can the movements be interpreted as techniques of resistance? Is bodily vulnerability used to resist? Can subversive acts be interpreted? Can resistance be classified as proactive or reactive?	Is language used to subvert norms?	Does the use of objects break the social norm (s)?	Can a dissent subculture be inferred from the performance?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	What can be said about the performance regarding bodily movements when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?	What can be said about the performance regarding language when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?	What can be said about the performance regarding objects when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?	What can be said about the performance regarding non-objects when contrasted with common or former practice? (Continuity or disruption?) Are former practices cited? Changed?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	Can resistance be assumed from the bodily movements? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice?	Which inferences can be made to the political context from the language used? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice regarding language?	Which inferences can be made to the political context from the objects used? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice regarding objects?	Which inferences can be made to the political context from the non-objects referred to? Can open or everyday resistance be assumed, if the performance is contrasted with common practice regarding non-objects at play?

	Interpretation IV (historical context)	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the bodily movements?	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the language used?	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the objects used?	Which inferences can be made to the historical context from the non-objects referred to?

The Material Dimension

Stage of Analysis		Bodies	Language	Objects	Non-objects
Performance	**Observation**	What bodily movements are performed?	Do the actors discuss the used materials?	Are objects at play, which are integral part of the performance? How are the objects used? Is there and interplay of body and object(s)? Do the objects act independently?	
	Interpretation I (interpersonal stage)	What can be interpreted regarding the actors' personal history (habitus)? What competencies do the actors display? Which kind of stored knowledge can be inferred? Are intermediaries (texts, technical artifacts, money	Do the utterances of the actors indicate inscriptions? Do the utterances of the actors indicate social distinction through objects? Do the utterances of the actors indicate social control? Do the utterances of the actors	Which objects can be said to be employed as active resources? Are objects used as means of social control? Does the object in connection with the actor generate a new kind of agent?	Do the objects carry inscriptions guiding actors' performance? How much and in which way do the inscriptions inhibit the actor's freedom to act (social control)? Are objects used as means of distinction against other actors or social groups?

		and humans) used to enroll others? In which way are intermediaries used? Do the intermediaries serve the function of aligning actors?	indicate practices of structuring and ordering? Do the utterances of the actors indicate objects, which have a stabilizing effect on asymmetrical relationships? Which? How?	Can objects in the background influence the performance as passive resource?	Are objects used for performances of structuring? Are objects used for performances of ordering? If so, how? Are objects used which have a stabilizing effect on asymmetrical relationships? Which? How? Are the objects used long-term? Are the objects used over long distances? Is the effect of the object use remote (performance including object in one place has a disproportionate effect elsewhere)?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	What practice are the actors likely involved in?	Do the utterances of the actors involved indicate practice, which involves objects?	Are the objects used in accordance to common practice?	Are the inscriptions, mechanisms of distinction, practices of structuring and ordering, and/or stabilizing effect through object use part of common

		Is the interplay of body and object in accordance to common practice?		Can change be deduced from comparing the performance to common practice?	practice? If they differ, how do they differ?
Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	What can be inferred for the political context regarding material bodies?	Can the researcher interpret something about the political context through utterances or documents?	Can a disruption or gradual change be interpreted, taking the political context into account regarding objects?	What can be learned for the political context regarding non-objects?
	Interpretation IV (historical context)	What can be inferred for the historical context regarding bodies?	Can the researcher learn something about the historical context from the utterances or documents?	Can a disruption or gradual change regarding objects be interpreted, taking the historical context into account?	What can be learned about the historical context regarding non-objects?

Iterability as a Dimension

Stage of Analysis		Performance Generally	Symbols	Resistance	Materials
Performance	**Observation**	Which bodily movements can be observed? Which objects are involved? Which utterances are made? Which non-objects referred to?	Which bodily movements can be observed? Which objects are involved? Which utterances are made? Which non-objects referred to?	Do the actors claim resistance? Which actors claim resistance? What justifications do they use for claiming resistance?	Which actors use which materials in which way?
	Interpretation I (interpersonal stage)	Does the performance in question happen more than once? How often does it occur? How far does the performance reach geographically and temporarily?	Do the people or objects display a symbolic meaning? How prevalent is the symbol in the performance? How distributed is it spatially and temporarily? Does the bodily performance or the performance including objects result in long distance so-	Can the practice be interpreted to be of a defiant kind? Why and in how far can it be said to be defiant? Does the defiant performance occur more than once? How often does it occur in the case in question?	Are the materials used more than once? How often are the materials used in this way? Does the context allow the same use of the materials in the same way? How far reaching is the use of the materials in the performance

		Which factors contribute to it being iterable? Which factors contribute to its restriction?	cial control? Which meaning is attributed to the symbol by the actors? Can the symbols in question be read as symbols of rule? If so, why? Are alternative interpretations possible?	How far is the defiant performance's reach spatially and temporarily? Can the resistance in question be said to be iterable? Does the iterability of the resistance allow assumptions about its strength? Can assumptions be made about the form of rule the resistance is addressing?	and in the case in question? Can the use of the materials be called iterable? If not, which factor (competent actor, use of material or context) has changed?
Practice	**Interpretation II (common or former practice)**	Has the performance changed? How does it relate to common practice? Can the performance be called iterable? Why?	Is the symbol part of common practice? Has the common practice regarding the symbol changed over time? Has the iterability of the symbol changed over time?	Is the resistant performance part of common practice? Has the resistant quality of this performance changed over time? Has the iterability of this resistant performance changed over time?	Is the use of the material in line with common practice? Has the use of the material changed over time? If so, how? Has the iterablity of this use of materials changed over time?

Context	**Interpretation III (political context)**	What can be said about the political context, deducing from the performance(s)?	Contrasting the occurrence of the symbol with common practice, can something be deduced about the political context?	Contrasting this performance of a resistant practice with common practice, can something be deduced about the political context?	Contrasting the use of materials in this performance with common practice, can something be deduced about the political context?
	Interpretation IV (historical context)	What can be said about the historical context, deducing from the performance(s)?	Contrasting the occurrence of the symbol with common practice, can something be deduced about the historical context?	Contrasting this performance of a resistant practice with common practice, can something be deduced about the historical context?	Contrasting the use of materials in this performance with common practice, can something be deduced about the historical context?

Figure 16: Overview of the Practice Analysisof Rule

9.2.1.2 Applying the Practice Analysis of Rule

This chapter describes the usefulness of the Practice Analysis of Rule in the first part and in the second describes a possible hypothetical research process using the PAR. The PAR is a suggestion as to how rule can be studied focusing on practice. The methods and the example questions proposed are not exhaustive. They reflect what is described in the practice-theoretical literature about power and rule and inferences therefrom.

The Practice Analysis is a tool derived primarily from practice theory. It proposes a research strategy for the study of rule. It can be used for the analysis of performances in any social field. The tool itself is not constricted to be applied to cases in international relations. The Practice Analysis is more *a sociological tool, designed to be applied to cases in international relations*. Despite its particularities, this tool treats the international as a social space comparable to others to be able to avoid certain theoretical biases (state centrism and actor centrism). I hope that the researcher will be able to treat empirical particularities of the international realm as such when they occur in her research. As mentioned above, in international relations, states and other macro labels are important, whereas in research, it is important not to impose them onto the researched. Using the Practice Analysis allows for that, there is no need for precautions regarding particularities of the international.

The Practice Analysis of Rule allows for the hypothetical researcher to look very far down – to performance. By taking increasingly more information and data into account, she can broaden her view of the case and extend the temporo-spatial scope of analysis. Thus, she can uncover networks of objects, agents, concepts, and practices, which are conducted to produce and reproduce relations of super- and subordination and are inhibiting for some actors. The PAR makes the researcher aware of the vast amount of interpretation made in practice and in research. The endeavor is to enable the researcher to interpret, using the empirical data at hand. It invites him to interpret cautiously and incrementally.

That is why the Practice Analysis is an extensive tool offering various dimensions in which various carriers of social meaning can be studied on several levels. Theorizing praxiographic research on rule, these steps all seem important. In empirical

research however, it might become obvious that one or two dimensions are not important, so the researcher is at liberty to leave the research on them aside. As described above, there might be cases in which e.g., resistance does not occur openly. Especially then, however, it could prove to be fruitful to study resistance as a dimension of rule, because in this work, it focuses especially on infrapolitical means of resistance. The usefulness of the study of the dimensions of rule will have to be assessed in research practice. Because iterability studies the state of consolidation of power, as a minimum, one dimension of rule should be studied in connection with its iterability to determine if rule could be at play.

This work looks at rule as a network of consolidated power practices, which can be traced through time and space. The Practice Analysis of rule is thus interested in enabling the researcher to conduct such tracing. The PAR works through detailed analysis at the start and careful interpretations by extending the scope of analysis.

A hypothetical researcher who is interested in studying transnational rule is most likely to have a specific research interest. That means she will be interested in e.g., a certain organization, crisis, or object. This research interest will be the point of orientation in conducting the analysis. Depending on her research interest and on how extensive her prior knowledge about the case is, she can choose to analyze either resistance as a dimension or the symbolic dimension first. She can then choose a performance which seems representative for said research interest. This performance is then analyzed in-depth using the PAR. In the next step, she assesses, which practice the performance can be interpreted to be part of. By comparing the performance to other performances or otherwise ascertained common practice, she can find out, in how far the performance can be considered in line with common practice or whether a shift can be observed. By assessing reproduction or change of practice, she can try to make inferences on the form of rule, because the form e.g. resistance takes, reflects to some extent on the form of rule (e.g. opposition – dissidence; public – infrapolitical). After reflecting on the practice, the researcher can follow the object of her research interest which can be an object, a concept, or a performance, through time and space. By tracing the network of power practice and by connecting it with its power effect in a more re-

mote time and space, she receives a comprehensive picture of the case. By assessing the power practice's temporo-spatial scope and by researching its iterability as far as possible, the researcher can ascertain, whether transnational rule is at play.



Figure 177: Logic of the PAR

The presented work suggests a methodology which allows for a wide in-case scope and contingent, context-dependent generalizations. Price and Reus-Smit put it thus: "[…] rejecting the pursuit of law-like generalizations does not entail simultaneous rejection of more contingent generalizations" (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 275). When it comes to generalizability of practice research, Pouliot states that it is of importance to define scope conditions "in the thick, interpretive, and endogenous sense of capturing the boundaries of the symbolic systems that allow practices to generate effects" (Pouliot 2015: 251). Pouliot calls generalizations, removed from the local context of practice, 'mechanisms'. These are so abstract that they are independent from their empirical context and can further be applied to other cases in order to find out the scope of their usefulness (Pouliot 2015: 252). Pouliot describes that practice theoreticians have often analyzed discursive practices and abstracted them to mechanisms including "breaking, terror, linking, othering, [and] yoking […] (Pouliot 2015: 255)"

For research using the Practice Analysis of Rule this means that from contingent, context-dependent generalizations in the case at hand, the researcher can abstract to formulate mechanisms. When conducting further research, mechanisms abstracted from Practice Analysis research on Rule in IR can serve as a heuristic when conducting further research on rule. That is how IR researchers can contribute to IR theory-building by conducting research using the Practice Analysis of Rule.

9.2.1.3 Ensuring the Quality of Research

The Practice Analysis of Rule is a guide for qualitative research which is designed to direct the researcher through the many steps of interpretation to draw empirically well-grounded conclusions on rule in a specific case. In the following, the tools available to ensure the quality of research using the Practice Analysis of Rule will be discussed. Some measures to ensure the quality of research have been discussed throughout the work, i.e., first observing before interpreting, staying as close to the researched as long as possible, making interpretations based on empirical (if available, if not other) material, reflecting on one's own epistemic position, and reflecting on cultural differences to the researched. If the researcher needs to interpret material, which is the case in reconstructing rule through resistance, there is a risk of the researcher reproducing her habitus, which leads to biases in research.

It is important for the overall quality of research to reflect on the quality of the research *process* as well as the quality of the *results* (Breuer et al. 2019). These are discussed for the Practice Analysis of Rule consecutively. Above the epistemic positions of Latour and Bourdieu were outlined and a position of this work indicated (see Chapter 5). This work takes the stance that the researcher needs to immerse herself in empirical material about the case to come close enough to the researched to reconstruct their implicit knowledge. Simultaneously, she needs to be able to distance herself from it, if she wants to generalize, however context dependent that may be the case. The Practice Analysis of Rule is formulated in a way that the researcher can get as near as possible to the researched. The researcher even uncovers interpretations which would go unnoticed, by attempting to produce pure observations. From this very close epistemic position she incre-

mentally moves away. Thus, throughout the research, passing the different stages, she slowly takes steps back from the researched in her epistemic position. By broadening her temporo-spatial view on the case and by taking increasingly more information into account, she will gain a distance to the position of the researched. Therefore, she can avoid buying into inaccurate interpretations of the involved actors and attempt a more 'objective' view on the case.

Especially when the researcher wishes to conduct research on rule, she will find material which is contradictory. She will most likely find various views on the same topic by different actors. This has advantages and disadvantages. It makes it uncomplicated for the researcher to distance herself from the world view of one party, if she equally immerses herself in material about and by other parties. At the same time, analyzing contradictory material makes it arduous to draw the right conclusions. Arguing with Latour, she should let various interpretations stand aside each other until she finds compelling evidence which corroborates one interpretation. If that does not happen, the researcher can produce a thick description in an ANT-like report and not take sides.

Steinke (2000) formulates core criteria to ensure the quality of qualitative research. She contends that *intersubjective plausibility* and therefore *transparency* is at the heart of ensuring the quality of qualitative research (Steinke 2000). That means that the researcher, when applying the Practice Analysis of Rule needs to document the research process transparently. This includes understandings on the matter at hand before engaging in research. It entails the documentation of the research methods and context. Documentation must also include the rules of transcription, the data analysis as well as decisions and problems in the research process. Moreover, criteria the work is supposed to fulfil are to be made transparent (Steinke 2000: 325). *Reflexivity of the researcher* then is an important criterion for evaluating the quality of the research on transnational rule. The researcher needs to reflect on her social position and reactions to the research process, especially when entering the field. The existence of a relationship of trust between the researcher and the researched is also seen as an important indicator for good research (implying direct contact; Steinke 2000: 331).

In ensuring the quality of research, *exchange among colleagues* can be an important means. The researcher can discuss the many steps of interpretation of the Practice Analysis in groups to ensure their plausibility and transparency of data. Peer Debriefing – discussion with a colleague who is not involved in the topic – can also be used to this end (Steinke 2000: 326). If the researcher is concerned about e.g., intercultural bias, she might seek exchange with a colleague or multiple colleagues from different cultural backgrounds to ensure the plausibility of her interpretations. The theories she develops need to be sufficiently *empirically anchored*, which she can achieve by presenting ample *empirical evidence* for them (Steinke 2000: 326). As the Practice Analysis of Rule is an openly formulated, variable methodology, the researcher can and needs to combine it with different research methods. It can be also combined with a *codified research processes* to subject the research to set rules. She can combine the Practice Analysis with codified methods, e.g., Grounded Theory, which can be transparently controlled (Steinke 2000: 326). Grounded Theory is a standardized method of qualitative research in which the research process proceeds iteratively and, on each stage, theoretical saturation is aimed at (Breuer et al. 2019: 9). The combination of Grounded Theory and the Practice Analysis seems fruitful. The basic attempt to get to an unbiased view is made in the Practice Analysis as well as in Grounded Theory, whereas the latter includes many techniques to do so (Breuer et al. 2019: 9). Using the Practice Analysis of Rule, with each stage of analysis the researcher collects more data and draws first conclusions. She will be likely to build categories after each step. The Practice Analysis allows for an iterative research process which can aim to produce theoretical saturation on each stage of analysis. The combination of the Practice Analysis with Grounded Theory seems possible, because no extensive epistemic hinderances exist to render it impossible. If it is viable however, only empirical research can find out conclusively.

Indication is an important criterion to ensure the quality of qualitative research (Flick 2011: 513). Regarding qualitative research this means reflecting on what the objective of the research is, and which methods are appropriate to research it. The guiding question for research needs to be appropriate to achieve the very objective of research (Flick 2011: 513). That means for the application of the Practice Analysis that when operationalizing it in a specific case, the researcher needs

to reflect intensely whether the methods she uses will serve the overall objective to receive data that can help her assess whether (transnational) rule is at play. The application of the PAR, however, might render it necessary to enter into empirical research after each stage of analysis *with different methods*, because the researcher will not be able to operationalize once at the beginning and stick to the plan, because intense reconstruction is necessary. The research using the PAR is characterized by a high level of contingence. Thus, an iterative style of research is highly recommended.

In qualitative research, *triangulation* is also regarded as a way of ensuring validity of the results. This is often achieved by using manifold methods on the same object. Data triangulation combines data from different sources, while investigator triangulation includes different observers or interviewers. Theory triangulation means that the same object is looked at from various theoretical points of view, whereas methodologic triangulation means using various sub-methods or methods (Flick 2012). As was described above, the reconstruction of practice very much depends on the use of multiple methods for practical but also substantial reasons (see Chapter 3.5.2.2). Whereas discourse analysis can work solely with text, practice analysis tries to use direct observation or obtain visual material to be able to interpret from bodily movements, as not only discursive practices are relevant. Praxiographic works approach the material from different angles, because this makes it easier to reconstruct the implicit knowledge of the researched.

After developing theories using the Practice Analysis on Rule, the researcher can choose from various means of ensuring the quality of her results. The researcher can validate her theory by *discussing it with the researched* if the case allows it (Steinke 2000: 329). Steinke describes the developed theory's *test against reality* as further validating its worth[21]. In the case of praxiography though, more likely analytic generalizations are deduced which cannot be tested as such. Rather, their

[21] As described above, this depends on the kind of theory produced by research conducted with the Practice Analysis on Rule. If empirical generalizations are derived, Steinke's suggestion would further validate the theory. If analytic generalizations are made, the theory is not per se tested against reality, but its usefulness is assessed for a wider range of cases and would be thereby further validated.

usefulness for ordering empirical reality and understanding the world constitutes their value (Pouliot 2015: 251).

After developing theory on transnational rule, the researcher can further attempt to assess its *scope*. This can be done by looking at very similar and different cases (Breuer et al. 2019) and finding elements, conditions, etc., which are important for transnational rule. Also, negative cases can be searched for[22] (Steinke 2000: 330). The developed theory on transnational rule should be examined regarding its *coherence*. That means that the researcher needs to be transparent about contradictions in the data and interpretations that she draws from this (Steinke 2000: 330). The developed theory on transnational rule needs to be *relevant* and it needs to *contribute to the academic discourse* (Steinke 2000: 330).

The Practice Analysis is an extensive tool that allows for a fine-grained analysis of (transnational) rule. However, its application requires extensive empirical research which will most likely exceed the scope of a single academic paper. An individual researcher could conduct research using the Practice Analysis of Rule for a dissertation with the goal of contributing to the theory building on the topic. A group of researchers could work on various cases and ensure the quality of the research by discussing the steps of interpretation for each case, which would contribute to validating the interpretations. Analyzing multiple cases might reveal differences and commonalities, which could help assess the scope of the formulated theories. Also, by applying the Practice Analysis on Rule, the tool itself could be revised and its analytic applicability could therefore be strengthened.

9.2.2 The Practice Analysis and Transnationality of Rule

In Chapter 2.2.4 it was described that the contemporary world order is best characterized as a heterarchy with different centers of powers. By studying instances of transnational rule, this theoretical metaphor can be fruitfully complemented

[22] A negative case could be one, in which two entities are in conflict, but no consolidation takes place. If no patterns of super- and subordination evolves, the researcher could describe it as conflict or controversy, but not rule. The researcher can then compare cases, in which transnational rule is existent and cases, in which no transnational rule is to be found and see if there are different mechanisms at play, which can be theorized.

with careful generalizations on practices of rule from various geographic regions and policy fields. This is how the use of the Practice Analysis of Rule can contribute to further theory-building on rule in International Relations.

The Practice-Theoretical Framework on Rule in International Relations, which encompasses the ontological insights derived from practice theory as well as the Practice Analysis of Rule is primarily an analytical tool for the understanding of practice, power, and rule. Nevertheless, its conceptual openness allows the researcher to work through indicators of power and simultaneously follow performances, practices and objects through various sites and points in time. Therefore, even if the researcher chooses a case which seems constricted to national boundaries, with increasing globalization, she will likely discover transnational relations in the power network she is studying. I argue that the more the researcher broadens the temporo-spatial scope of analysis, the more transnational connections will appear in the empirical cases analyzed.

To use the Practice Analysis specifically as a tool for transnational rule, the researcher can deliberately choose a case in which geographically remote sites are involved. The researcher can choose to analyze a case in which practices are carried out which have a transnational or even global reach. She can choose to study a transnational network or an international organization of which she suspects that transnational rule might be executed. The researcher can choose a crisis as an empirical entry point that concerns an international or a supranational collective such as the EU, to understand more about transnational rule. The researcher can follow an object that travels beyond national borders per se, such as Tweets, to understand more about transnational practices with potentially power consolidating effect.

Even though the Practice Analysis of Rule seeks to prevent state centrism as an inherent characteristic of the tool, it allows for research on interstate power and rule that realists are traditionally interested in. The researcher can conduct research on cases involving state actors and study hierarchy producing and reproducing practices in diplomatic settings. As outlined above, it can also be used to study the practices in international organizations, e.g., how hierarchies between diplomats emerge. The PAR can be used to show how rules and norms can be

established through practice, which is often at the center of liberal and constructivist research and theorizing. The Practice Analysis of Rule can serve as a tool for the analysis of so-called broad hierarchies, i.e., social forms of rule, which are often of interest to critical scholars. By studying various instances of power practices and analyzing the demographic features and other similarities between actors, the researcher can research social forms of rule, such as race-, or gender-based forms, or newly emerging forms with a transnational component. That is how the Practice Analysis of Rule allows for research on official, codified forms of transnational rule but also on informal or identity-based forms of transnational rule – and it can help identify intersections of the two.

By offering a broad framework, the Practice Analysis of Rule enables the researcher to conduct inter-paradigmatic research. It allows for prioritization by the researcher as to which aspects of rule he might be interested in and which empirical case can serve his research interest. It allows for small-scale research and for theoretical generalization and abstraction.

9.2.3 Contributions to the Discourse on Praxiography in IR

This work seeks to contribute to the discourse on rule in International Relations, by making rule better researchable by outlining a possible research strategy for hypothetical cases from international relations. Also, by synthesizing practice-theoretical understandings on power and rule, I wish to further the discussion on power and rule in practice theory. However, arguably this work contributes most to the understanding of the research on practices of power and its consolidated form – rule. Therefore, this work can be considered a contribution especially to the discourse on praxiography in International Relations.

This work formulates a concept which makes it possible to look right down and study right up and is therefore in accordance with works drawing on practice theory and works on praxiography (Bueger 2014). This work wishes to make rule analyzable without using the traditional levels of analysis (micro, meso, and macro) as categories, but to let the empirical case decide which levels are of importance. By conceptualizing openness to all kinds of actors, this work seeks to prevent actor centrism. There is a tendency in social science to deduce what kind of rule is at

play in a case by the perceived nature of the involved actors. This can be prevented by the use of the PAR. This work argues that not the involvement of transnational actors per se makes a case of transnational rule. The transnationality of iterable practices of power is something which needs to be assessed by analyzing practices and not interpreted by focusing on the assumed quality of the actor.

The addressee problem describes the opposite problem of actor centrism: If the researcher needs to take the interpretation of the actors involved for granted, this can become especially difficult when they invoke ghosts, zombies, gods, or other entities, whose existence can be neither denied nor corroborated. In this case, the Practice Analysis of Rule offers ample opportunity to find counterevidence and prove the involved party wrong and draw opposing conclusions *based strictly on empirical evidence*.

By looking at a single performance of a practice from different angles, the analysis enables the researcher to filter the important symbols, hints of resistance, material aspects, and assess the performance's iterability. These perspectives enable the researcher to draw conclusions about the practice in general (shifts and breaks or continuity). It draws attention to various carriers of social meaning, where symbols of rule can become effective and ways in which they can do so. It also enables the researcher to draw conclusions about the form of rule that the practice and the analyzed performance are part of. The Practice Analysis allows the researcher to analyze one performance thoroughly and in-depth. It also allows him to make inferences by taking steps back from the performance and by taking more empirical or other information into account. The Practice Analysis thus follows Latour's rule that the researcher should stay near the researched and follow their point of view as long as possible. It nevertheless takes Bourdieu's insight equally seriously not to buy into the world view of the researched completely by taking a distance from it.

By analyzing bodily movements as well as language, object use, reference to non-objects and by looking at common practice and context, the Practice Analysis of Rule calls for a method-mix which can range from ethnography, video analysis, discourse analysis, content analysis, media analysis to historical methods. When assessing common practice, it is of utmost importance to adjust the methods to the

case at hand. Only by going back in time, or by finding similar performances, can the common practice be assessed. By extending the analyzed timeline and spatial sites, the researcher can then extend the network of analysis and interpret insights into the political or even historical context while staying true to practice theory's flat ontology. The Practice Analysis of Rule can prevent state centrism and actor centrism by focusing on practice. It can help the researcher avoid the addressee problem by guiding her toward insightful empirical material.

Through its conceptual openness, The Practice Analysis of Rule makes the tracing of transnational networks of objects and practices possible while focusing on power and power effects. Adding reflection on iterability then enables the researcher to make thoroughly informed judgements about the state of consolidation in each case – and thus if rule is at play.

10 Conclusions

This chapter outlines the starting point for the theorizing of this book and the guiding questions for it are recapitulated. After describing the theoretical lacuna this book has addressed, the overall argumentation of this work is outlined. Finally, the book's contribution to International Relations will be described.

In recent decades, it has become apparent that structured relations of power do not only occur in the confined spaces of nation states but also beyond them – in international relations. The recent academic discourse has thus changed accordingly. For many decades, the anarchy assumption was dominant, meaning that in nation states rule exists and beyond that, states among themselves are not ordered in any way, as formally all states are equals. Recent International Relations has focused more on the informal side of international power relations and named them hierarchies, heterarchy, and many more (which were described in Chapter 3). Existing works on transnational rule have stayed rather on an abstract level, which is why Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) suggest reconstructing rule through the empirical analysis of instances of resistance. They, following Foucault's reasoning, argue that where there is resistance, there is rule. This book has taken this assumption as a basis for further theorizing and observed that the relationship between rule and resistance is so complex that the method of reconstructing rule through resistance needs to be further developed. Reconstructing rule through resistance by taking the statements of the involved parties as a basis can be problematic. It can mislead the researcher e.g., if the statements are false or invoke gods or other entities, whose existence cannot be proven (addressee problem see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the reconstruction of rule through empirical analysis of resistance can prove challenging if resistance does not become observable because of its subtleness. In Bourdieu-based International Relations it is frequently observed that especially in diplomatic settings subtle executions of rule are prevalent (see Pouliot 2016). It has also been observed that anticipatory obedience is a phenomenon of rule in

international relations (Albrecht 1996) that can go completely unnoticed, because it arguably does not leave any empirical traces. It can have grave consequences, nevertheless. To account for subtle forms of rule and resistance is crucial for the reconstruction of rule through empirical research on resistance.

The aim of this book was thus to create a concept which could make obvious and subtle forms of resistance *and* rule analyzable. Therefore, the guiding question was formulated, how a practice-theoretical approach based on Bourdieu's theory could contribute to an understanding of rule in International Relations. Toward this end, the sub question was asked, how rule in International Relations could be researched practice-theoretically.

Anderl, Daase, Deitelhoff et. al. (2019: 290) state regarding the reconstruction of rule through empirical research on resistance, that methods are needed that stay near to the actor, make the relationship between rule and resistance describable, and include a theoretical perspective as well as historical depth. This describes the theoretical lacuna which I have begun filling in this book by creating the Practice AnalysisR. The argumentation that led to its development is outlined in the following.

In Chapter 2 I have argued, with Popitz, that social sciences could define rule more fluidly by describing it as the consolidated form thereof. In Popitz's understanding, power and rule exist on a scale. The weakest form of power he calls 'situational power' and as the strongest form of rule he describes the monopoly on the use of force. By describing earlier phases of consolidation as rule, the monopoly on the use of force ceases to be a defining criterion for rule. I described various theories of the main schools of International Relations to deduce their position on rule. Realist schools conceptually exclude rule in international relations and were not helpful for an understanding of rule in that respect. By stressing the material dimension of power in international relations on the other hand, they have contributed an important aspect. Complementing an understanding of power with a practice theoretical view can contribute enormously to the understanding of rule

in international relations. Liberal works often have the tendency to name forms of rule through international organizations as authority and interpret these as legitimate. Therefore, their take on iR is too narrow for an understanding needed in this book. On the other hand, liberal works draw attention to structured executions of power through international organizations, which constitute important empirical cases for the study of transnational rule. Critical works often describe structured forms of power executions as illegitimate and therefore also implicitly enter research with a normative judgement, which is not in accordance with the approach of this book. Nevertheless, they draw attention to important empirical phenomena such as hierarchies, hegemonies, and long-standing asymmetries such as the North – South divide. From the practice-theoretical point of view developed in this book, one can summarize that the classical International Relations works draw attention to important empirical phenomena for the research of transnational rule. However, they enter empirical research using macro phenomena as epistemic starting points. The ANT-inspired epistemic position taken in this book is that macro phenomena should be the interpretation at the end of a research process, not its starting point. By making careful, small inferences, the researcher will be more open for the complexity of resistance and rule than if she assumes macro phenomena from the start. The same is true for normative judgements about a form of rule. The performances in an empirical case should be analyzed with an open mind, without naming the interactions either domination or authority, as this will narrow the researcher's view of the case. The stance of this book is that normative judgements about power and rule should be the very last step of the research process, based on empirical inferences, and carefully reflected.

In Chapter 3 it is described that practice theory's strong suit is that it accounts for action being guided by implicit knowledge, not conscious decision based on rationality. It therefore considers subconsciously, or half-consciously, executed forms of rule in its theorizing. However, practice theory is often described as blind to power. Especially the inhibiting forms of power were not adequately considered in theorizing. Watson (2017) contends that practice theory needs concepts

that can consider long-distance and long-term social control in theorizing, which is what the PAR intends. It was described next in the chapter, that methods for the research of practice exist in IR – called praxiography. Considering the dominance of practice-theoretical accounts in IR though, praxiography is discussed surprisingly little. At the end of the chapter, I conclude that if practice theory describes power as 'practices with effect', practice tracing is a suitable method to utilize to connect practices with their effects on *other actors* in *other places*, and *times*.

In Chapter 4 the work of Bourdieu was outlined. Based on these deliberations, later in the Chapter, the structure of the Practice Analysis of Rule was developed using Bourdieu and Latour's epistemic reasonings.

In the chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, four practice-theoretical dimensions were formulated based on Daase and Deitelhoff (2014) and Schäfer (2013), who has described aspects of different practice theories as relevant to the study of power. By doing so he has offered a useful preselection of what I describe as dimensions in this work. The symbolic dimension was formulated based mainly on Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence. Looking at the symbolic dimension enables the researcher to detect indicators of rule where no obvious executions of which can be observed. The analysis of the symbolic dimension is useful for the research on subtle forms of rule, but also for the research of the symbolic dimension of obvious forms of rule. Resistance was formulated as a practice-theoretical dimension of rule based on Schott (2005) and Butler's work on subversion (2006). Especially infrapolitics was described as everyday practice of resistance which can be subtle, such as talking, walking slowly, or other gestures as expressions thereof. The analysis of the form the resistance takes in a case allows for interpretation about the form of rule at play. Subtle forms of resistance such as infrapolitics e.g., could be a sign for subtle forms of rule. They could however point to a violent and/or far-reaching form of rule. For this, the researcher would presumably find corroborating empirical material. The material dimension was developed drawing on Actor Network Theory, mostly works by Latour (inter alia 2007). The material di-

mension draws attention to the manifestation of rule in objects, material infrastructure, and networks of objects and humans. Lastly, iterability was described as a practice-theoretical dimension of rule based mainly on Butler's work on citationality and iterability (1993). Iterability is understood in this work as an indication if a form of power *can* be executed repeatedly. It opens the perspective not only for repetition of practice, but for repetition including potentiality. In this way, iterability is a practice-theoretical measure of consolidation of a form on power. Based on these four dimensions a definition of rule was developed, which is open enough to serve as a heuristic for the research on transnational rule:

Rule comprises durable asymmetrical power relations of super- and subordination, enacted in iterable practices *with (long-distance and long-term) socially controlling or inhibiting effect on certain actors, may it be executed by competent bodies, encrypted in symbols, indicated by resistance, or inscribed in or executed by material objects. Rule can work through creating belief in its legitimacy or through practical constraint, coercion, or violence.*

In the same chapters, the Practice Analysis of (Transnational) Rule was developed as a method for the research on rule. The PAR allows the researcher to research a case (possibly in International Relations) and study its symbolic dimension, resistance, material dimension and iterability. Through that, the researcher will become able to draw theory-guided, informed interpretations about the rule at hand, especially if she widens the temporo-spacial scope of her analysis in the research.

The structure of the PAR takes one single performance of practice as an entry point and widens the scope of analysis in 4 subsequent steps. First, the researcher moves from mere observation to careful interpretation. After that, common practice is researched. The comparison of the performance at hand and the common practice will enable the researcher to draw inferences on stability and change of practice. By widening the temporo-spatial scope of analysis, the researcher becomes able to make interpretations about the political and the historical context. By conducting this research in the four above-mentioned dimensions, she can

make interpretations about the form of rule at play in a case. Another possibility the PAR offers is to analyze manifold performances of the same practice to widen the scope of analysis. By guiding research of resistance and rule along the timeline of a specific empirical case, the PAR offers the opportunity of researching resistant and ruling practices.

The PAR offers an extensive and open guideline for the research on rule (in IR), which stays near the actors as long as possible. It enables the researcher to analyze transnational networks of actors, materials, and techniques and technologies, and to thereby make interpretations of the form of rule at play. By making iterability the indicator for consolidation, the PAR can make the development of a form of rule, its perpetuation as well as the waning of rule, perceivable. The extent of this work has not allowed for the empirical application of the PAR. However, future research will examine its usability in practice. When the PAR is used to research cases of transnational rule, it will have contributed to the theorizing on rule in International Relations. Moreover, by using the PAR for empirical research, academia will further develop and adapt the PAR to research practice.

The PAR is an extensive research tool, which requires many steps of empirical analysis. This is the case because it wishes to make a complex phenomenon – transnational rule – researchable. The research on rule in a practice-theoretical way requires conceptual as well as normative openness as well as the possibility of making careful inferences. This openness invites scholars from various schools of thought to use the PAR as it is open for a variety of research interests. The researcher can study a realist-inspired topic such as the practices that make material resources effective in negotiations. She can analyze, in a liberal fashion, through which practices international organizations manage to be seen as legitimate authorities. She could also analyze through a critical lens, through which practices asymmetries in international relations are produced or reproduced. As described above, not in all cases all perceivable data is available. So, for some cases, some levels of analysis the PAR offers, are not practical. Furthermore, different empiri-

cal cases call for different foci in research, so not all dimensions need the same attention in all empirical cases. Through application, the PAR could be divided into more parsimonious accounts, by using specific parts of it for a specific class of cases. This streamlining, however, is not possible solely through theoretical deliberation. The PAR can be described as a modular offer for the research on rule, which is at the same time theory-guided and empirically sensitive. The analysis of rule guided by the PAR allows for the study of intensity and form of resistance and rule. Thereby it allows for careful interpretations about the form these phenomena take in a specific case. It can thus make the relation between resistance and rule describable with historical depth and a theoretical perspective.

By developing a practice-theoretical tool for the analysis of rule in International Relations, I have contributed to the practice-theoretical literature, which has been critiqued as being power-blind. This work has taken the epistemic position in practice theory seriously and developed a tool which stays true to a flat ontology and encourages thick description. Through the study of small instances, it enables the researcher to make interpretations about a macro phenomenon – rule.

By intensely reflecting on methods of researching power practices and by developing the PAR, this book has contributed to the upcoming discussion on praxiography in International Relations.

Lastly, by theorizing the reconstruction of rule through resistance in International Relations, I have contributed to the discourse on rule in International Relations. By offering a method to research rule by reconstructing resistance, research on the topic can become more theory-led, fine-grained, and take a broader perspective on empirical cases.

References

Adler, Emanuel; Pouliot, Vincent (Eds.) (2011b): International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2013): Introduction. In: Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (Ed.): Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR. London, New York: Routledge, 1–24.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (2014): Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy. The Struggle between National Foreign Services and the EU's External Action Service. In: *Review of International Studies* 40 (04), 657–681.

Adler-Nissen, Rebecca; Pouliot, Vincent (2014): Power in Practice. Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya. In: *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (4), 889–911.

Albert, Mathias; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Zimmermann, Lisbeth (2018): Private Regulierung und öffentliche Ordnung in der Weltgesellschaft. In: Albert, Mathias; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Hellmann, Gunther (Eds.): Ordnung und Regieren in der Weltgesellschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 381–400.

Albrecht, Ulrich (1996): Internationale Politik. Einführung in das System internationaler Herrschaft. München, Wien: Oldenbourg Verlag.

Al-Istrabadi, Feisal; Ganguly, Sumit (Eds.) (2018): The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications. Regional and International Implications. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Allen, Amy (1998): Rethinking Power. In: *Hypatia* 13 (1), 21–40.

Amoore, Louise (2005a): Global Resistance - Global Politics. In: Louise Amoore (Ed.): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge, 1–12.

Amoore, Louise (Ed.) (2005b): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge.

Anderl, Felix; Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole et. al. (ed.) (2019): Rule and Resistance. Beyond the Nation State. Contestation, Escalation, Exit. London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Anderl, Felix; Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole et. al. (2019): Conclusion: Approaching Rule and Resistance. In: Rule and Resistance. Beyond the Nation State. Contestation, Escalation, Exit. London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 279–292.

Anderl, Felix; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Hack, Regina (2019): Divide and Rule? The Politics of Self-Legitimation in the WTO. In: Anderl, Felix; Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole et. al. (ed.) (2019): Rule and Resistance. Beyond the Nation State. Contestation, Escalation, Exit. London, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 49–68

Andersen, Morten Skumsrud; Neumann, Iver B. (2012): Practices as Models. A Methodology with an Illustration Concerning Wampum Diplomacy. In: *Millennium* 40 (3), 457–481.

Anter, Andreas (2012): Theorien der Macht. zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag.

Austin, John Langshaw (1962): How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baldwin, David A. (1979): Power Analysis and World Politics. New Trends versus Old Tendencies. In: *World Politics* 31 (2), 161–194.

Baldwin, David A. (2013): Power and International Relations. In: Carlsnaes, Walter; Risse, Thomas; Simmons, Beth A. (Eds.): Handbook of International Relations. Los Angeles, London: Sage, S. 273–297.

Balint, Iuditha; Dingeldein, Hannah; Lämmle, Kathrin (2014): Protest, Empörung, Widerstand. Zur Analyse von Auflehnungsbewegungen. Eine Einleitung. In: Balint, Iuditha; Dingeldein, Hannah; Lämmle, Kathrin (Eds.): Protest, Empörung,

Widerstand. Zur Analyse von Auflehnungsbewegungen. Konstanz und München: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 9–18.

Barnett, Michael; Duvall, Raymond (2005): Power in International Politics. In: *International Organzation* 59 (1), 39–75.

Barry, Andrew (2013): The Translation Zone. Between Actor-Network Theory and International Relations. In: *Millennium* 41 (3), 413–429.

Bartlett, Christopher A.; Doz, Yves; Hedlund, Gunnar (Eds.) (1991): Managing the Global Firm. London, New York: Routledge.

Bayat, Asef (1997): Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the 'Informal People'. In: *Third World Quarterly* 18 (1), 53–72.

Bayat, Asef (2000): From `Dangerous Classes' to `Quiet Rebels'. Politics of the Urban Subaltern in the Global South. In: *International Sociology* 15 (3), 533–557.

Beck, Ulrich; Grande, Edgar (2010): Jenseits des methodologischen Nationalismus: Außereuropäische und europäische Variationen der Zweiten Moderne. In: *Soziale Welt* 61 (3), 187–216.

Bell, Vikki (1999): On Speech, Race and Melancholia. An Interview with Judith Butler. In: *Theory, Culture and Society* 16 (2), 163–174.

Bennett, Andrew; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (Eds.) (2015a): Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bennett, Andrew; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2015b): Process Tracing. From Philosophical Roots to Best Practices. In: Bennett, Andrew; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (Eds.): Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–38.

Bergsten, C. Fred (2000): Preface. In: Schott, Jeffrey J. (Ed.): The WTO after Seattle. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, ix–x.

Bially Mattern, Janice (2011b): A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations. In: Adler, Emanuel; Pouliot, Vincent (Eds.): International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 63–86.

Bigo, Didier (2011): Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations. Power of Practices, Practices of Power. In: *International Political Sociology* 5 (3), 225–258.

Bijker, Wiebe, E.; Douglas, Deborah G.; Hughes, Thomas Parke; Pinch, Trevor (eds.) (2012): The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, London: MIT Press.

Bittlingmayer, Uwe H.; Bauer, Ullrich (2009): Herrschaft (domination) und Macht (pouvoir). In: Fröhlich, Gerhard; Rehbein, Boike (Eds.): Bourdieu-Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 118–124.

Bleiker, Roland (2000): Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bleiker, Roland (2005): Seattle and the struggle for a global democratic ethos. In: Eschle, Catherine; Maiguashca, Bice (Eds.): Critical Theories, International Relations and "the Anti-Globalisation Movement". The Politics of Global Resistance. New York: Routledge, 195–211.

Boehme, Nele; Walk, Heike (2002): Einleitung. Globalisierung von unten: Transnationale Netzwerke in Aktion. In: Walk, Heike; Boehme, Nele (Eds.): Globaler Widerstand. Internationale Netzwerke auf der Suche nach Alternativen im globalen Kapitalismus. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992a): Die feinen Unterschiede. In: Steinruecke, Margareta (Ed.): Pierre Bourdieu. Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 13-30.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992b): Rede und Antwort. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992d): Was anfangen mit der Soziologie? In: Steinruecke, Margareta (Ed.): Pierre Bourdieu. Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 127-148.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992e): Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht enthüllen. In: Steinruecke, Margareta (Ed.): Pierre Bourdieu. Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 81-86.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1992c): Ökonomisches Kapital - Kulturelles Kapital - Soziales Kapital. In: Steinruecke, Margareta (Ed.): Pierre Bourdieu. Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 49-81.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1970): Zur Soziologie der symbolischen Formen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1982): Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1984): Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre (1999): Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldung im Dienste des Widerstandes gegen die neoliberale Invasion. Frankfurt am Main: Büchergilde Gutenberg.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2001): Meditationen. Zur Kritik der scholastischen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2002): Distinction. a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2003): Participant Objectivation. In: *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 9 (2), 281–294.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2005): Die männliche Herrschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2009): Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis. auf der ethnologischen Grundlage der kabylischen Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre (2014): On the State. Lectures at the Collège de France 1989-1992: Polity.

Bourdieu, Pierre; Wacquant, Loic J.D. (1996): Reflexive Anthropologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Bourdieu, Pierre; Wacquant, Loic J.D. (1999): On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason. In: *Theory, Culture and Society* 16 (1), 41–58.

Bourdieu, Pierre; Wacquant, Loic J.D.; Farage, Samar (1994): Rethinking the State. Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. In: *Sociological Theory* 12 (1), 1–18.

Bremer, Helmut; Teiwes-Kügler, Christel (2013): Zur Theorie und Praxis der "Habitus-Hermeneutik". In: Brake, Anna; Bremer, Helmut; Lange-Vester, Andrea (Eds.): Empirisch arbeiten mit Pierre Bourdieu. Theoretische und methodische Überlegungen, Konzeptionen und Erfahrungen. Weinheim and Basel: Beltz Juventa, 93–129.

Breuer, Franz; Muckel, Petra; Dieris, Barbara (Eds.) (2019): Reflexive Grounded Theory. Eine Einführung in die Forschungspraxis. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

Bröckling, Ulrich; Krasmann, Susanne; Lemke, Thomas (2011a): From Foucault's Lectures at the Collège de France to Studies of Governmentality. An Introduction. In: Bröckling, Ulrich; Krasmann, Susanne; Lemke, Thomas (Eds.): Governmentality. Current Issues and Future Challenges. New York, London: Routledge, 1–34.

Bröckling, Ulrich; Krasmann, Susanne; Lemke, Thomas (Eds.) (2011b): Governmentality. Current Issues and Future Challenges. New York, London: Routledge.

Brühl, Tanja; Debiel, Tobias; Hamm, Brigitte; Hummel, Hartwig; Martens, Jens (ed.) (2001): Die Privatisierung der Weltpolitik. Entstaatlichung und Kommerzialisierung im Globalisierungsprozess. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz und Nachfolger.

Buckel, Sonja; Fischer-Lescano, Andreas (2007a): Einleitung. In: Buckel, Sonja Fischer-Lescano, Andreas (Eds.): Hegemonie gepanzert mit Zwang. Zivilgesellschaft und Politik im Staatsverständnis Antonio Gramscis. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 11–18.

Buckel, Sonja; Fischer-Lescano, Andreas (2007b): Hegemonie im globalen Recht - Zur Aktualität der Gramscianischen Rechtstheorie. In: Buckel, Sonja Fischer-Lescano, Andreas (Eds.): Hegemonie gepanzert mit Zwang. Zivilgesellschaft und Politik im Staatsverständnis Antonio Gramscis. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 84–104.

Bueger, Christian (2014): Pathways to practice. Praxiography and international politics. In: *European Political Science Review* 6 (03), 383–406.

Bueger, Christian; Gadinger, Frank (2007): Reassembling and Dissecting: International Relations Practice from a Science Studies Perspective. In: *International Studies Perspective* 8 (1), 90–110.

Bueger, Christian; Gadinger, Frank (2014): International Practice Theory. New Perspectives. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bueger, Christian; Gadinger, Frank (2018): International Practice Theory. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan.

Buneé, Jutta; Toope, Stephen (2011b): International Law and the Practice of Legality. In: Adler, Emanuel; Pouliot, Vincent (Eds.): International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 108–136.

Burri, Regula Valérie (2008): Soziotechnische Rationalität. Praxistheorie und der 'Objektsinn' von Artefakten. In: *Soziale Welt* 59, 269–286.

Butler, Judith (1993): Für ein sorgfältiges Lesen. In: Benhabib, Seyla; Butler, Judith; Cornell, Drucilla; Fraser Nancy (Eds.): Der Streit um Differenz. Feminismus und Postmoderne in der Gegenwart. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 122–132.

Butler, Judith (1997): Körper von Gewicht. Die diskursiven Grenzen des Geschlechts. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Butler, Judith (2006): Afterword. In: Armour, Ellen, Schneider, Rebecca, Susan St.Ville, Karen Trimble, Alliaume Teresa, J. Hornsby, Amy Hollywood (Eds.): Bodily Citations. Religion and Judith Butler. New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press, 250–263.

Butler, Judith (2016): Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance. In: Butler, Judith ; Gambetti, Zeynep; Sabsay, Leticia (Eds.): Vulnerability and Resistance. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 12–27.

Butler, Judith; Gambetti, Zeynep; Sabsay, Leticia (2016): Introduction. Butler, Judith; Gambetti, Zeynep; Sabsay, Leticia (Eds.): Vulnerability and Resistance. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1–11.

Callon, Michel (1986b): The sociology of an Actor-Network. The case of the Electric Vehicle. In: Callon, Michel; Rip, Arie; Law, John (Eds.): Mapping the Dynamics of Science in the Real World, 19–34.

Callon, Michel (1986): Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation. Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay. In: Law, John (Ed.): Power, Action and Belief. A New Sociology of Knowledge? London, Boston, and Henley: Routledge & Keagan Paul (Sociological Review Monograph, 32), 196–223.

Callon, Michel (1991): Techno-economic Networks and Irreversibility. In: Law, John (Ed.): A Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology and Domination. London, New York: Routledge, 132–164.

Cambridge Dictionary (2018b): Subversion. American. Online <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/subversion>, checked 05.01.2018.

Carter, Chelsea J. (2014): Video shows ISIS beheading U.S. journalist James Foley. Online <https://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/index.html>, checked 02.11.2018.

Caruso, Guiseppe (2016): The World Social Forum and Global Resistance. The Trajectory of an Open Space. In: Courpasson, David; Vallas, Steven (Ed.): The SAGE Handbook of Resistance. Los Angeles, London: Sage, 407–426.

Castree, Noel; Kitchin, Rob; Rogers, Alisdair (2013): Resistance. In: Castree, Noel; Kitchin, Rob; Rogers, Alisdair (Eds.): Oxford Dictionary of Human Geography.

Certeau, Michel de (1988): The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Cetina, Karin Knorr (2005): Complex Global Microstructures. In: *Theory, Culture & Society* 22 (5), 213–234.

Cornut, Jérémie (2017): Diplomacy, agency, and the logic of improvisation and virtuosity in practice. In: *European Journal of International Relations* 24 (3), 712–736.

Costa, Cristina (2015): Academics Online. Fighting for a New Habitus. In: Costa, Cristina; Murphy, Mark (Eds.): Bourdieu, Habitus, and Social Research. The Art of Application. London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 151–166.

Courpasson, David; Vallas, Steven (2016): A Critical Introduction. In: In: Courpasson, David; Vallas, Steven (Ed.): The SAGE Handbook of Resistance. Los Angeles, London: Sage, 1–28.

Cox, Robert (1983): Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. In: *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12 (2), 162–175.

Cox, Robert W. (1995): Critical Political Economy. In: Hettne, Björn (Ed.): International Political Economy. Understanding Global Disorder. Halifax: Fernwood Books, 31–45.

Cos, Robert (2005): Gramsci, Hegemony and Interntaional Relations. An Essay in Method. In: Amoore, Louise (Ed.): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge, 35-47.

Daase, Christopher (2018): Institutionalisierte Informalität. Ein Governance-Modus für ungewisse Zeiten. In: Albert, Mathias; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Hellmann, Gunther (Eds.): Ordnung und Regieren in der Weltgesellschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 309–326.

Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole (2014): Zur Rekonstruktion globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand. Working Paper 1. In: *Projektzusammenhang Internationale Dissidenz an der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt*.

Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole (2015): Jenseits der Anarchie: Widerstand und Herrschaft im internationalen System. In: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 56 (2), 299–318.

Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole (2017): Opposition und Dissidenz in der Weltgesellschaft - Zur Rekonstruktion globaler Herrschaft aus dem Widerstand. In: Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Kamis, Ben; Jannick, Pfister; Philip, Wallmeier (Eds.): Herrschaft in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 121–150.

Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Kamis, Ben; Pfister, Jannik, Wallmeier, Philip (Eds.) (2017): Herrschaft in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Daphi, Priska; Deitelhoff, Nicole (2017): Protest im Wandel? Jenseits von Transnationalisierung und Entpolitisierung. In: Daphi, Priska; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Rucht, Dieter; Teune, Simon (Eds.): Protest in Bewegung? Zum Wandel von Bedingungen, Formen und Effekten politischen Protests: Nomos (Leviathan Sonderband, 33), 306–322.

Daphi, Priska; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Rucht, Dieter; Teune, Simon (Eds.) (2017): Protest in Bewegung? Zum Wandel von Bedingungen, Formen und Effekten politischen Protests: Nomos (Leviathan Sonderband, 33).

Davies, Huw (2015): Young People and the Web. Understanding Their Engagement with Online Information through the Concept of Habitus. In: Costa, Cristina Murphy, Mark (Eds.): Bourdieu, Habitus, and Social Research. The Art of Application. London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 167–182.

Deitelhoff, Nicole (2006): Überzeugung in der Politik. Grundzüge einer Diskurstheorie internationalen Regierens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Der Derian, James (2003): The Question of Information Technology in International Relations. In: *Millennium* 32 (3), 441–456.

Dieluweit, Dirk (2015): Pierre Bourdieu: Über den Staat. Vorlesungen am Collège de France 1989–1992. Eine Rezension von Dirk Dieluweit (Gewalt, Macht, Herrschaft). Online <https://soziologieblog.hypotheses.org/8283>, checked 20.01.2017.

Donnelly, Jack (2009): Rethinking political structures. From 'ordering principles' to 'vertical differentiation' – and beyond. In: *International Theory* 1 (01).

Donnelly, Jack (2017): Beyond Hierarchy. In: Zaracol, Ayse (Ed.): Hierarchies in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 243–265.

Eagleton-Pierce, Matthew (2012): Symbolic Power in the World Trade Organization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eigner, Swantje; Kruse, Lenelis (2001): Wahrnehmung und Bewertung von Technik. Was ist psychologisch relevant? In: Rohpol, Günter (Ed.): Erträge der Interdisziplinären Technikforschung. Eine Bilanz nach 20 Jahren. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 97–108.

Ellner, Steve (2008): The Hugo Chavez Phenomenon. Anti-imperialism from Above or Radical Democracy from Below? In: Rosen, Fred (Ed.): Empire and

dissent. The United States and Latin America. Durham: Duke University Press (American encounters/global interactions) 205–228.

Erdmann, Julius (2014): Symbolischer Protest im Internet. Über die Aktualität des Protestbegriffs angesichts internetbasierter Handlungsformen mediatisierten Widerstands. In: Balint, Iuditha; Dingeldein, Hannah; Lämmle, Kathrin (Eds.): Protest, Empörung, Widerstand. Zur Analyse von Auflehnungsbewegungen. Konstanz und München: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 157–171.

Eschle, Catherine (2005): Constructing 'the anti-globalisation movement'. In: Eschle, Catherine; Maiguashca, Bice (Eds.): Critical Theories, International Relations and "the Anti-Globalisation Movement". The Politics of Global Resistance. New York: Routledge, 17–35.

Eschle, Catherine; Maiguashca, Bice (ed.) (2005): Critical Theories, International Relations and "the Anti-Globalisation Movement". The Politics of Global Resistance. New York: Routledge.

Felcht, Frederike (2014): Die Waffe Mensch. Hungerstreik im globalen Kontext. In: Balint, Iuditha; Dingeldein, Hannah; Lämmle, Kathrin (Eds.): Protest, Empörung, Widerstand. Zur Analyse von Auflehnungsbewegungen. Konstanz und München: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 209–224.

Fetscher, Iring (1976): Grundbegriffe des Marxismus. Eine lexikalische Einführung. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe.

Finnemore, Martha; Barnett, Michael (1999): The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. In: *International Organization* 53 (4), 699–732.

Flick, Uwe (2011): Qualitative Sozialforschung. Eine Einführung. Reinbeck: Rowohlt.

Flick, Uwe (2012): Triangulation in der qualitativen Forschung. In: Flick, Uwe; Kardorff, Ernst von; Steinke, Ines (Eds.): Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch. Reinbeck: Rowohlt, 309 - 318.

Foucault, Michel (1977): Der Wille zum Wissen. Sexualität und Wahrheit 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft.

Foucault, Michel (2005): Schriften in vier Bänden. Dits et Ectrits. Band IV. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Fröhlich, Gerhard; Rehbein, Boike (Ed.) (2009a): Bourdieu-Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler.

Fröhlich, Gerhard; Rehbein, Boike (2009b): Feld (champ). In: Fröhlich, Gerhard; Rehbein, Boike (Eds.): Bourdieu-Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 99–103.

Fuchs-Heinritz, Werner; König, Alexandra (2011): Pierre Bourdieu. Eine Einführung. Konstanz, München: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.

Galtung, Johan (1979): Towards a New International Technological Order. In: Morehouse, Ward (Ed.): Science, Technology and the Social Order. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 277–300.

George, Alexander L.; Bennett, Andrew (2005): Case Studies and Theory Building in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gill, Stephen (1995): Theorizing the Interregnum. The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s. In: Hettne, Björn (Ed.): International Political Economy. Understanding Global Disorder. Halifax: Fernwood Books, 65–99.

Gill, Stephen (2005): Toward a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a moment in the New Politics of Globalisation. In: Amoore, Louise (Ed.): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge, 150–157.

Graeber, David (2015): The Utopia of Rules. On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy. Brooklyn, London: Melville House.

Granovetter, Mark S. (2003): The Strength of Weak Ties. In: Hechter, Michael; Horne, Christine (Eds.): Theories of Social Order. A Reader. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Guilhot, Nicolas (2005): The Democracy Makers. Human Rights and the International Order. New York, Chichester: Columbia University Press.

Guzzini, Stefano (2011b): Power. In: Adler, Emanuel; Pouliot, Vincent (Eds.): International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 78–91.

Guzzini, Stefano (1998): Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy. The Continuing Story of a Death Foretold. London, New York: Routledge.

Guzzini, Stefano (2013): Power. In: Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Ed.): Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR. London, New York: Routledge, 78–92.

Guzzini, Stefano; Neumann, Iver B. (Eds.) (2012): The Diffusion of Power in Global Governance. International Political Economy meets Foucault. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Habermas, Jürgen (1998): Die Postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Hansel, Mischa (2013): Internationale Beziehungen im Cyberspace. Macht, Institutionen und Wahrnehmung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Herborth, Benjamin (2014): Challenging Anarchy? Outlines of a Critical Theory of World Society. Diss. Frankfurt am Main: Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe Universität Frankfurt am Main.

Hillebrandt, Frank (2004): Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Materialität. Überlegungen zu einer Praxistheorie der Technik. In: Ebrecht, Jörg; Hillebrandt, Frank (Eds.): Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis. Erklärungskraft, Anwendung, Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 19–46.

Hollander, Jocelyn A.; Einwohner, Rachel L. (2004): Conceptualizing Resistance. In: *Sociological Forum* 19 (4), 533–554.

Hopf, Ted (2017): Change in International Practices. In: *European Journal of International Relations* 24 (3), 687–711.

Hösler, Joachim (2012): Vom Traum zum Bewusstsein einer Sache gelangen– Analyse und Kritik von Macht und Herrschaft durch Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels. In: Imbusch, Peter (Ed.): Macht und Herrschaft. Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien und Konzeptionen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 55–71.

Hughes, Thomas Parke (2012): The Evolution of Large Technological Systems. In: Bijker, Wiebe, E., Deborah G. Douglas, Thomas Parke Hughes und Trevor Pinch (Eds.): The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 45–76.

Hülst, Dirk (1999): Symbol und soziologische Symboltheorie. Untersuchungen zum Symbolbegriff in Geschichte, Sprachphilosophie, Psychologie und Soziologie. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.

Hume, Tim; Park, Madison (2014): Understanding the symbols of Hong Kong's 'Umbrella Revolution'. CNN. Online <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/30/world/asia/objects-hong-kong-protest/index.html.>, checked 01.03.2019.

Hurd, Ian (1999): Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. In: *International Organzation* 53 (2), 379–408.

Huysmans, Jef (2002): Shape-Shifting NATO. Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis. In: *Review of International Studies* 28 (3), 599 - 618.

Huysmans, Jef (2006): The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, migration and asylum in the EU. London, New York: Routledge.

Hynes, Maria (2013): Reconceptualizing resistance. Sociology and the affective dimension of resistance. In: *The British journal of sociology* 64 (4), 559–577.

Imbusch, Peter (Ed.) (1998): Macht und Herrschaft. Sozialwissenschaftliche Konzeptionen und Theorien. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.

Joas, Hans (2009): Die Kreativität des Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Joas, Hans; Knöbl, Wolfgang (2004): Sozialtheorie. Zwanzig einführende Vorlesungen. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Johansson, Anna; Vinthagen, Stellan (2016): Dimensions of Everyday Resistance. An Analytical Framework. In: *Critical Sociology* 42 (3), 417–435.

Jonas, Michael; Littig, Beate; Wroblewski, Angela (Eds.) (2017): Methodological Reflections on Practice Oriented Theories. Cham: Springer.

Juris, Jeffrey; Sitrin, Marina (2016): Globalization, Resistance, and Social Transformation. In: Courpasson, David; Vallas, Steven (Eds.): The SAGE Handbook of Resistance. Los Angeles, London: Sage, 31–50.

Kang, Miliann; Jones, Katherine (2016): Why do People get Tattoos? In: *Contexts* 6 (1), 42–47.

Karatzogianni, Athina (2006): The Politics of Cyberconflict. Oxon, New York: Routledge.

Keck, Margaret E.; Sikkink, Kathryn (1999): Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. In: *International Social Science Journal* 51 (159), 89–101.

Kelsen, Hans (1944): Peace through Law. Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press.

Keohane, Robert O. (1984): After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O.; Nye, Joseph S. (2001): Power and Interdependence. New York: Longman.

King, Anthony (2000): Thinking with Bourdieu against Bourdieu. A 'Practical' Critique of the Habitus. In: *Sociological Theory* 18 (3), 417–433.

Klein, Margarete (2015): Russland - Wohin steuert die ehemalige Weltmacht? In: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Ed.): Informationen zur politischen Bildung/izpb – Internationale Sicherheitspolitik (2), 44–47.

Klein, Martin (2018): Nord-Süd Konflikt. Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon. Online <https://wirtschaftslexikon.gabler.de/definition/nord-sued-konflikt-38513/version-261935>, checked 01.10.2018.

Koloma Beck, Veit, Alex (2015): Widerstand und Herrschaft in der Weltgesellschaft. In: *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 22 (1), 103–116.

Krais, Beate (1993): Geschlechterverhältnis und symbolische Gewalt. In: Gebauer, Gunter; Wulf, Christoph (Eds.): Praxis und Ästhetik. Neue Perspektiven im Denken Pierre Bourdieus. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 208–250.

Krais, Beate (2004): Soziologie als teilnehmende Objektivierung der sozialen Welt. Pierre Bourdieu. In: Moebius, Stephan; Peter, Lothar (Eds.): Französische Soziologie der Gegenwart. Stuttgart: UKV Verlagsgesellschaft.

Krais, Beate; Gebauer, Gunter (2010): Habitus. Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag.

Krause, Peter (2018): A State, An Insurgency, and a Revolution. Understanding and Defeating the Three Faces of ISIS. In: Al-Istrabadi, Feisal; Ganguly, Sumit (Eds.): The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications. Regional and International Implications. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 223–246.

Krell, Gert (2009): Weltbilder und Weltordnung. Einführung in die Theorie der Internationalen Beziehungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Krige, John; Barth, Kai-Henrik (2006): Introduction. Science, Technology, and International Affairs. In: Krige, John; Barth, Kai-Henrik (Eds.): Global Power Knowledge. Science and Technology in International Affairs: The History of Science Society (Osiris, 21), 1–24.

Kuus, Merje (2015): Symbolic power in diplomatic practice. Matters of style in Brussels. In: *Cooperation and Conflict* 50 (3), 368–384.

Lake, David A. (2009): Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.

Lake, David A. (2017): Laws and Norms in the Making of International Hierarchies. In: Zaracol, Ayse (Ed.): Hierarchies in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17–43.

Latour, Bruno (1986): The Powers of Association. In: Law, John (Ed.): Power, Action and Belief. A New Sociology of Knowledge? London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Keagan Paul (Sociological Review Monograph, 32), 264–280.

Latour, Bruno (1991): Technology is Society Made Durable. In: Law, John (Ed.): A Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology and Domination. London, New York: Routledge, 103–131.

Latour, Bruno (1996): On Actor-Network Theory: A Few Clarifications. In: *Soziale Welt* 47 (4), 369–381.

Latour, Bruno (2001): Eine Soziologie ohne Objekt? Anmerkungen zur Interobjektivität. In: *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 11 (2), 237–252.

Latour, Bruno (2005): Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to Actor Network Theory. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Latour, Bruno (2006): Die Hoffnung der Pandora. Untersuchungen zur Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Latour, Bruno (2007): Eine neue Soziologie für eine neue Gesellschaft. Einführung in die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft.

Latour, Bruno (2008): Wir sind nie modern gewesen. Versuch einer symmetrischen Anthropologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Latour, Bruno (2010): Das Parlament der Dinge. Für eine politische Ökologie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Laudani, Raffaele (2013): Disobedience in Western Political Thought. A Genealogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lausberg, Hedda (2013): 2. Empirical Research on Movement Behaviour and its Link to Cognitive, emotional, and Interactive Processes. In: Lausberg, Hedda (Ed.): Understanding Body Movement. A Guide to Empirical Research on Nonverbal Behaviour. With an Introduction to the NEUROGES Coding System. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 13–52.

Law, David (2011): On Power and its Tactics. A View from the Sociology of Science, 1–38. Online <http://www.heterogeneities.net/publications/Law1986OnPowerAndItsTactics.pdf> checked 01.03.2019.

Law, John (1986a): On the Methods of Long-Distance Social Control. Vessels, Navigation and the Portuguese Route to India. In: Law, John (Ed.): Power, Action and Belief. A New Sociology of Knowledge? London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Keagan Paul (Sociological Review Monograph, 32), 234–263.

Law, John (Ed.) (1986b): Power, Action and Belief. A New Sociology of Knowledge? London, Boston and Henley: Routledge & Keagan Paul (Sociological Review Monograph, 32).

Law, John (Ed.) (1991a): A Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology and Domination. London, New York: Routledge.

Law, John (1991b): Power, discretion and strategy. In: Law, John (Ed.): A Sociology of Monsters. Essays on Power, Technology and Domination. London, New York: Routledge, 165–191.

Leander, Anna (2016): Interviewing Pierre Bourdieu (1930 - 2002) about Pierre Bourdieu and International Relations. In: Lebow, Richard Ned; Schouten, Peer (Eds.): The Return of the Theorists. Dialogues with Great Thinkers in International Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 337–343.

Lemke, Thomas (2001): 'The birth of bio-politics'. Michel Foucault's lecture at the Collège de France on neo-liberal governmentality. In: *Economy and Society* 30 (2), 190–207.

Lemke, Thomas (2009): Die politische Theorie der Gouvernmentalität. Michel Foucault. In: Brodocz, André; Schaal, Gary S. (Eds.): Politische Theorien der Gegenwart I. Opladen, Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 467–498.

Lenger, Alexander; Rhein, Philipp (2018): Die Wissenschaftssoziologie Pierre Bourdieus. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Levi, Margret; Olsen, David (2000): The Battles in Seattle. In: *Politics and Society* 28 (3), 309–329.

Li, He (2015): Moving to the City. Educational Trajectories of Rural Chinese Students in an Elite University. In: Costa, Cristina; Murphy, Mark (Eds.): Bourdieu, Habitus, and Social Research. The Art of Application. London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 126–166.

Lukes, Steven (1983): Macht und Herrschaft bei Weber, Marx, Foucault. In: Matthes, Joachim i.A. der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie (Ed.): Krise der Arbeitsgesellschaft? Verhandlungen des 21. Deutschen Soziologentages in Bamberg. Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag, 106–120.

MacKenzie, Donald; Wajcman, Judy (ed.) (1999): The Social Shaping of Technology. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Madsen, Mikael Rask (2011): Reflexivity and the Construction of the International Object. The Case of Human Rights. In: *International Political Sociology* 5 (3), 259–275.

Maiguashca, Bice (2005): Globalisation and the 'politics of identity'. IR theory through the looking glass of women's productive rights activism. In: Eschle, Catherine; Maiguashca, Bice (Eds.): Critical Theories, International Relations and "the Anti-Globalisation Movement". The Politics of Global Resistance. New York: Routledge, 115–135.

Marche, Guillaume (2016): Grafitti As Infrapolitics. A Study of Visual Interventions of Resistance in San Francisco. In: Courpasson, David; Vallas, Steven (Eds.): The SAGE Handbook of Resistance. Los Angeles, London: Sage, 336–350.

Marshall, Gordon (Ed.) (1994): The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Martin, Lisa L. (1992): Interests, Power, and Multilateralism. In: *International Organzation* 46 (4), 765–792.

Mayer, Maximilian (2012): Chaotic Climate Change and Security. In: *International Political Sociology* 6 (2), 165–185.

McCarthy, E. Doyle (1992): Toward a Sociology of the Physical World. George Herbert Mead on Physical Objects. In: Hamilton, Peter (Ed.): Section Three. Mead and Social Behaviourism. London, New York: Routledge (George Herbert Mead: Critical Assessments, 3), 215–229.

McCourt, David M. (2016): Practice Theory and Relationalism as the New Constructivism. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 60 (3), 475–485.

McNay, Lois (1999): Gender, Habitus and the Field. Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity. In: *Theory, Culture and Society* 16 (1), 95–117.

Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-1995): The False Promise of International Institutions. In: *International Security* 19 (3), 5–49.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.

Mérand, Frédéric (2010): Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense. In: *Security Studies* 19 (2), 342–374.

Mills, Catherine (2003): Contesting the Political: Butler and Foucault on Power and Resistance. In: *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 11 (3), 253–272.

Moebius, Stephan (2011): Pierre Bourdieu. Zur Kultursoziologie und Kritik der symbolischen Gewalt. In: Moebius, Stephan; Quadflieg, Dirk (Eds.): Kultur. Theorien der Gegenwart. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften / Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH Wiesbaden, 55–69.

Moebius, Stephan; Wetterer, Angelika (2011): Symbolische Gewalt. In: *Österreich Z Soziol* 36 (4), 1–10

Mol, Annemarie (2002): The Body Multiple. Ontology in Medical Practice. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Morgan, Patrick M. (2011b): The Practice of Deterrence. In: Adler, Emanuel; Pouliot, Vincent (Eds.): International Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 139–174.

Morgenthau, Hans Joachim (2006): Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Random House.

Morisse-Schilbach, Melanie (2007): Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke, London 1977. In: Kailitz, Steffen (Ed.): Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Murphy, Craig N. (2004): International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850. Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press.

Musiani, Francesca; DeNardis, Laura (2016): Governance by Infrastructure. In: Musiani, Francesca; Cogburn, Derrick L.; DeNardis, Laura; Levinson, Nanette S. (Eds.): The Turn to Infrastructure in Internet Governance. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 3–24.

Neumann, Iver B. (2005): To Be a Diplomat. In: *International Studies Perspectives* 6 (1), 72–93.

Neumann, Iver B. (2007): "A Speech That the Entire Ministry May Stand for," or: Why Diplomats Never Produce Anything New. In: *International Political Sociology* 1 (2), 183–200.

Neumann, Iver B. (2010): Euro-centric Diplomacy. Challenging but Manageable. In: *European Journal of International Relations* 18 (2), 299–321.

Neyer, Jürgen (2004): Postnationale politische Herrschaft. Vergesellschaftung und Verrechtlichung jenseits des Staates. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Neyer, Jürgen (2013): Globale Demokratie. eine zeitgemäße Einführung in die internationalen Beziehungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Nicolini, Davide (2012): Practice Theory, Work and Organization. An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nullmeier, Frank (2018): After Failure. A Second Stage of Neoliberalism. Social Europe. Online <https://www.socialeurope.eu/after-failure-a-second-stage-of-neoliberalism>, checked 03.11.2018.

Obi, Cyril I. (2005): Globalization and the Local Resistance. The Case of Shell Versus the Ogoni. In: Amoore, Louise (Ed.): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge, 318–327.

Ong, Aihwa (2010): Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline. Factory Women in Malaysia. Albany: State of New York University Press.

Online Etymology Dictionary (2018a): Domination. Online <https://www.etymonline.com/word/domination#etymonline_v_13923>, checked 31.08.2018.

Online Etymology Dictionary (2018b): Rule. Online <https://www.etymonline.com/word/rule#etymonline_v_16625>, checked 01.03.2019.

Onuf, Nicholas (2014): Rule and Rules in International Relations. Lecture at the Cluster of Excellence: The Formation of Normative Orders. Ringvorlesung. Goethe University Frankfurt. Frankfurt am Main, 5th February 2014.

Onuf, Nicholas; Klink, Frank F. (1989): Anarchy, Authority, Rule. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (2), 149–173.

Ortner, Sherry B. (1984): Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties. In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26 (1), 126–166.

Panke, Diana; Petersohn, Ulrich (2017): President Donald J. Trump. An agent of norm death? In: *International Journal* 72 (4), 572–579.

Peter, Lothar (2004): Pierre Bourdieus Theorie der symbolischen Gewalt. In: Steinruecke, Margareta (Ed.): Pierre Bourdieu - Politisches Forschen, Denken und Eingreifen. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 48–73.

Peterson, V. Spike; Runyan, Anne Sisson (2005): The Politics of Resistance. Women as Nonstate, Antistate, and Transstate Actors. In: Amoore, Louise (Ed.): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge, 226–243.

Pfister, Jannick (2017): Protest Policing als transnationale bürokratische Herrschaft. In: Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Kamis, Ben; Jannick, Pfister; Philip, Wallmeier (Eds.): Herrschaft in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 95–120.

Pickering, Andrew (1993): The Mangle of Practice: Agency and Emergence in the Sociology of Science. In: *American Journal of Sociology* 99, 559–589.

Popitz, Heinrich (1979): Prozesse der Machtbildung. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) (Recht und Staat, 362/363).

Popitz, Heinrich (1992): Phänomene der Macht. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Pouliot, Vincent (2007): “Sobjectivism”. Toward a Constructivist Methodology 51 (2), 359–384.

Pouliot, Vincent (2010): International Security Practice. The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pouliot, Vincent (2011): Diplomats as Permanent Representatives. The Practical Logics of the Multilateral Pecking Order. In: *International Journal* 66 (3), 543–561.

Pouliot, Vincent (2015): Practice Tracing. In: Bennett, Andrew; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (Eds.): Process Tracing. From Metaphor to Analytic Tool. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 237–259.

Pouliot, Vincent (2017): Against Authority. The Heavy Weight of International Hierarchy. In: Zaracol, Ayse (Ed.): Hierarchies in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 113–134.

Pouliot, Vincent; Cornut, Jérémie (2015): Practice theory and the study of diplomacy. A research agenda. In: *Cooperation and Conflict* 50 (3), 297–315.

Pouliot, Vincent; Mérand, Frédéric (2013): Bourdieu's Concepts. In: Adler-Nissen, Rebecca (Ed.): Bourdieu in International Relations. Rethinking Key Concepts in IR. London, New York: Routledge, 24–44.

Price, Richard; Reus-Smit, Christian (1998): Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism 4 (3), 259–294.

Rammert, Werner (1998): Technikvergessenheit der Soziologie? Eine Erinnerung als Anleitung. In: Rammert, Werner (Ed.): Technik und Sozialtheorie. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 9–28.

Rauer, Valentin (2012): Interobjektivität: Sicherheitskultur aus Sicht der Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie. In: Daase, Christopher; Offermann, Philipp; Rauer, Valentin (Eds.): Sicherheitskultur. Soziale und politische Praktiken der Gefahrenabwehr. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 69–91.

Reckwitz, Andreas (2002): Toward a Theory of Social Practices. A Development in Culturalist Theorizing. In: *European Journal of Social Theory* 5 (2), 243–263.

Reckwitz, Andreas (2003): Grundelemente einer Theorie sozialer Praktiken. Eine sozialtheoretische Perspektive 32 (4), 282–301.

Reckwitz, Andreas (2004): Die Reproduktion und die Subversion sozialer Praktiken. Zugleich ein Kommentar zu Pierre Bourdieu und Judith Butler. In: Hörning, Karl H. (Ed.): Doing Culture. Zum Begriff der Praxis in der gegenwärtigen soziologischen Theorie. Bielefeld: Transcript, 41–52.

Ringmar, Erik (2014): The Search for Dialogue as a Hindrance to Understanding. Practices as Inter-Paradigmatic Research Program. In: *International Theory* 6 (01), 1–27.

Rocamora, Agnès (2002): Fields of Fashion. In: *Journal of Consumer Culture* 2 (3), 341–362.

Rohgalf, Jan (2014): Die Empörung der 99%. Zum politischen Narrativ von Occupy Wall Street. In: Balint, Iuditha; Dingeldein, Hannah; Lämmle, Kathrin (Eds.): Protest, Empörung, Widerstand. Zur Analyse von Auflehnungsbewegungen. Konstanz und München: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, 31–46.

Rosenau, James N.; Czempiel, Ernst Otto (Eds.) (1992): Governance without Goverment. Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roßler, Gustav (2016): Der Anteil der Dinge an der Gesellschaft. Sozialität - Kognition - Netzwerke. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Rothenberg, Christian (2018): Die 7 Episoden von Merkels Machtverlust. Online <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/niedergang-einer-kanzlerin-die-7-episoden-von-merkels-machtverlust/23119516.html?ticket=ST-1928298-NBaATc53rMNaACvfZmZ2-ap1>, checked 03.11.2018.

Rucht, Dieter (2013): Globalisierungskritische Proteste als Herausforderung an die internationale Politik. In: Zürn, Michael; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias (Eds.): Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 61–83.

Rupert, Mark (2009): Antonio Gramsci. In: Edkins, Jenny; Vaughan-Williams, Nick (Eds.): Critical Theorists and International Relations. London, New York: Routledge, 176–186.

Schäfer, Hilmar (2013): Die Instabilität der Praxis. Reproduktion und Transformation des Sozialen in der Praxistheorie. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft.

Schäfer, Hilmar (2016a): Praxis als Wiederholung. Das Denken der Iterabilität und seine Konsequenzen für die Methodologie praxeologischer Forschung. In:

Schäfer, Hilmar (Ed.): Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm. Bielefeld: Transcript (Sozialtheorie), 137 - 159.

Schäfer, Hilmar (ed.) (2016b): Praxistheorie. Ein soziologisches Forschungsprogramm. Bielefeld: Transcript (Sozialtheorie).

Schatzki, Theodore; Knorr Cetina, Karin; Savigny, Eike von (Eds.) (2001): The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. London, New York: Routledge.

Schatzki, Theodore R. (2001): Introduction. Practice Theory. In: Schatzki, Theodore; Knorr Cetina, Karin; Savigny, Eike von (Eds.): The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory. London, New York: Routledge, 1–14.

Schau Hin: Cybermobbing - Terror im Netz. Online <https://www.schau-hin.info/informieren/extrathemen/cybermobbing.html>, checked 05.01.2018.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (1998): Macht und Herrschaft in Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen. In: Imbusch, Peter (Ed.): Macht und Herrschaft. Sozialwissenschaftliche Konzeptionen und Theorien. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 317–332.

Schindler, Sebastian; Wille, Tobias (2015): Change in and through Practice. Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War. In: *International Theory* 7 (02), 330–359.

Schlichte, Klaus (2012): Der Streit der Legitimitäten. Der Konflikt als Grund einer historischen Soziologie des Politischen. In: *Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung* 1 (1), 9–43.

Schlichte, Klaus (2015a): Herrschaft, Widerstand und die Regierung der Welt. Zur historischen Soziologie internationalisierter Politik. In: *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 22 (1), 113–127.

Schlichte, Klaus (2015b): Cubicle Land - Bürokratie und Demokratie in der Regierung der Welt. In: Martinsen, Renate (Ed.): Ordnungsbildung und Entgrenzung. Demokratie im Wandel. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 175–197.

Schlichte, Klaus (2017): Max Weber in Mosambik. Bürokratische Herrschaft in der Weltgesellschaft. In: Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff, Nicole; Kamis, Ben; Pfister, Jannick; Wallmeier, Philip (Eds.): Herrschaft in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 73–95.

Schmidt, Robert (2009): Symbolische Gewalt (violence symbolique). In: Fröhlich, Gerhard; Rehbein, Boike (Eds.): Bourdieu-Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 231–235.

Schmidt, Robert; Woltersdorff, Volker (2008): Einleitung. In: Schmidt, Robert; Woltersdorff, Volker (Eds.): Symbolische Gewalt. Herrschaftsanalyse nach Pierre Bourdieu. Konstanz: UKV Verlagsgesellschaft, 7–24.

Schouten, Peer (2014): Security as controversy. Reassembling security at Amsterdam Airport. In: *Security Dialogue* 45 (1), 23–42.

Schulz-Schaeffer, Ingo (2004): Technik als altes Haus und geschichtsloses Appartement. Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Praxistheorie Bourdieus. In: Ebrecht, Jörg Hillebrandt, Frank (Eds.): Bourdieus Theorie der Praxis. Erklärungskraft, Anwendung, Perspektiven. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 47–68.

Schwingel, Markus (1995): Pierre Bourdieu. Zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag.

Scott, James (1989): Everyday Forms of Resistance. In: *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4, 33–62.

Scott, James (1990): Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Scott, James C. (1985): Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Scott, James C. (2005): The infrapolitics of subordinate groups. In: Amoore, Louise (Ed.): The Global Resistance Reader. London, New York: Routledge, 65–73.

Sending, Ole Jacob; Neumann, Iver B. (2006): Governance to Governmentality. Analyzing NGOs, States and Power. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 50 (3), 651–672.

Seth, Sanjay (Ed.) (2013): Postcolonial Theory and International Relations. A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge.

Sharp, Paul (2004): The Idea of Diplomatic Culture and its Sources. In: Slavik, Hannah (Ed.): Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy. Malta, Geneva: Diplo Foundation, 361–380.

Sidanius, Jim; Pratto, Felicia (2001): Social Dominance Theory. An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Sklair, Leslie (2001): The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford, Malden: Blackwell Publishers.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2004): A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Snetkov, Aglaya (2007): The Image of the Terrorist Threat in the Official Russian Press: The Moscow Theatre Crisis (2002) and the Beslan Hostage Crisis (2004). In: *Europe-Asia Studies* 59 (8), 1349–1365.

Spindler, Manuela (2007): Robert O. Keohane/ Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition Boston 1077. In: Kailitz, Steffen (Ed.): Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 205–209.

Steinberg, Guido (2015): Transnationaler Terrorismus. In: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Ed.): Informationen zur politischen Bildung/izpb – Internationale Sicherheitspolitik (2), 17–22.

Steinke, Ines (2000): Gütekriterien qualitativer Forschung. In: Flick, Uwe; Kardorff, Ernst von; Steinke, Ines (Eds.): Qualitative Forschung. Ein Handbuch. Hamburg: Rohwolt, 319–331.

Steinruecke, Margareta (1992): Vorwort. In: Steinruecke, Margareta (Ed.): Pierre Bourdieu. Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg: VSA Verlag, 7–11.

Suderland, Maja (2009): Hysteresis (hystérésis). In: Fröhlich, Gerhard; Rehbein, Boike (Eds.): Bourdieu-Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 127–129.

Sulleyman, Aatif (2017): Twitter Introduces 280 Characters to All Users. The Independent. Online <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/twitter-280-characters-tweets-start-when-get-latest-a8042716.html>, checked 07.09.2018.

Thomas, Stefan (2020): Ethnographie. Eine Einführung. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

Tilly, Charles; Tarrow, Sidney (2007): Contentious Politics. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.

Tömmel, Ingeborg (2007): Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 1984. In: Kailitz, Steffen (Ed.): Schlüsselwerke der Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 202–205.

Umweltbundesamt (2017): Verrottet Plastik gar nicht oder nur sehr langsam? Online <https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/service/uba-fragen/verrottet-plastik-gar-nicht-nur-sehr-langsam>, checked 27.07.2018.

Villa, Paula-Irene (2012): Judith Butler. Eine Einführung. Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag.

Villumsen Berling, Trine (2012): Bourdieu, International Relations, and European security. In: *Theory and Society* 41 (5), 451–478.

Vinthagen, Stellan; Johansson, Anna (2013): "Everyday Resistance": Exploration of a Concept and its Theories. In: *Resistance Studies Magazine* (1), 1–46.

Wahl, Peter (2002): Globalisierungskritik im Aufwind: Zu den Bedingungen des Erfolgs der globalisieurngskritischen Bewegung. In: Walk, Heike; Boehme; Nele (Eds.): Globaler Widerstand. Internationale Netzwerke auf der Suche nach Alternativen im globalen Kapitalismus. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 175–183.

Wajcman, Judy (2002): Addressing Technological Change: The Challenge to Social Theory. In: *Current Sociology* 50 (3), 347–363.

Waldenfels, Bernhard (2001): Die verändernde Kraft derWiederholung. In: *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 46 (1), 5–18.

Walt, Stephen M. (1987): The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, New York: Corness University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theory of International Politics. Boston, Burr Ridge: McGraw Hill.

Watson, Matt (2017): Placing Power in Practice Theory. In: Hui, Allison; Schatzki, Theodore R.; Shove, Elizabeth; Watson, Matt (Eds.): The Nexus of Practices. Connections, Constellations, Practitioners. London, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 169–182.

Weber, Max (1972): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Weber, Max (ed.) (2013): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Soziologie. Unvollendet 1919-1920. Unter Mitarbeit von Knut Borchardt, Edith Hanke und Wolfgang Schluchter. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy is what States Make of it. The Social Construction of Power Politics. In: *International Organization* 46 (2), 391–425.

Wendt, Alexander (1994): Collective Identity Formation and the International State. In: *The American Political Science Review* 88 (2), 384–396.

Wendt, Alexander (2003): Why a World State is Inevitable. In: *European Journal of International Relations* 9 (4), 491–542.

Westcott, Nick (2008): Digital Diplomacy: The Impact of the Internet on International Relations. Oxford Internet Institute (Research Report, 16). Online <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1326476>, checked 11.09.2017.

Wohlforth, William C.; Little, Richard; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Kang, David; Jones, Charles A.; Tin-Bor Hui, Victoria; Eckstein, Arthur; Deudney, Daniel; Brenner, William L. (2007): Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History. In: *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2), 155–185.

Wolowic, Jennifer M.; Heston, Laura; Saewyc, Elizabeth; Porta, Carolyn; Eisenberg, Marla (2016): Embracing the Rainbow. LGBTQ Youth Navigating "Safe" Spaces and Belonging in North America 58 (2), 1.

Wood, Lesley J. (2012): Direct Action, Deliberation, and Diffusion. Collective Action after the WTO Protests in Seattle. New York, Ontario: Cambridge University Press.

Wurzel, Steffen (2017): Nach Selbstmord-Serie bei Foxconn. Arbeitsbedingungen nicht grundlegend verbessert. Online <http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/nach-selbstmord-serie-bei-foxconn-arbeitsbedingungen-nicht.766.de.html?dram:article_id=391484>, checked 17.05.2018.

Zaracol, Ayse (Ed.) (2017a): Hierarchies in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zaracol, Ayse (2017b): Theorising Hierarchies. An Introduction. In: Zaracol, Ayse (Ed.): Hierarchies in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–14.

Zenk, Martin (2013): Wiederholung — Eine grundsätzliche Kategorie nicht nur der Musik. In: *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 70 (1), 66–83.

Züger, Teresa (2017): Digitale Dissidenz. Digitale Evolution des zivilen Ungehorsams in internationalen Herrschaftsstrukturen. In: Daase, Christopher; Deitelhoff,

Nicole; Kamis, Ben; Pfister, Jannick; Wallmeier, Philip (Eds.): Herrschaft in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 179–199.

Zürn, Michael (2013a): Politisierung als Konzept der Internationalen Beziehungen. In: Zürn, Michael; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias (Eds.): Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 7–35.

Zürn, Michael; Ecker-Ehrhardt (Ed.) (2013b): Die Politisierung der Weltpolitik. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag.

Zürn, Michael (2018a): A Theory of Global Governance. Authority, Legitimacy and Contestation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zürn, Michael (2018b): Contested Global Governance. In: *Global Policy* 9 (1), 138–145.

Zürn, Michael; Binder, Martin; Ecker-Ehrhardt, Matthias (2012): International authority and its politicization. In: *International Theory* 4 (01), 69–106.