

Quo Vadis Papua: Case Study of Special Autonomy Policies and Socio-Political Movements in Papua

**Quo Vadis Papua: Case Study of Special Autonomy Policies
and Socio-Political Movements in Papua**

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CHAPTER I
PAPUAN CONFLICT PHENOMENON AND SPECIAL AUTONOMY
IMPLEMENTATION

1.1. THE INEVITABILITY OF LOCAL AUTONOMY IMPLEMENTATION

It is inevitable for a country having extensive geographical conditions, large population, and diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds like Indonesia to implement local autonomy. Long time before the independence of Republic of Indonesia, decentralization had been practiced by the Dutch colonialists through local autonomy regulations as in *Reglement op het Beleid der Regering van Nederlandsch Indie* (Regulation on State Administration of the Dutch East Indies). Subsequently in 1903, the Dutch issued *Desentralisatie Wet*, which given the opportunities for governmental unit to manage its own finances. The administration was transferred to the councils in each local. However, in fact, the local governments nearly had no authority, only half of local councillors were appointed from the local and some were government officials. Local councils only entitled to issue local regulations for matters unregulated by the colonial government. The local council was completely supervised by the *Gouverneur-General* of the Dutch East Indies based in Batavia. In 1922, the Dutch government issued a new regulation on administration. Based on the provisions of S 1922 No. 216, the term *provincie* (province), *regentschap* (Regency), *stadsgemeente* (city) and *groepmeneenschap* (community group) was recognized. The autonomy system during Dutch era was only for the benefit of the colonizers, in order to avoid the local to interfere the colonialist exploiting Indonesia's wealth.

The development continued to Japanese era. In spite of only for 3.5 years occupation, (1941-1945) the Japanese government had made many fundamental changes. Local divisions during Japanese period were much more detailed compared to division during Dutch era. When the Japanese initially came into Indonesia, Japan divided the former Dutch colonies into three administrations, i.e. *Sumatra* in Bukittinggi, *Java* and *Madura* with based in Jakarta, as well as eastern territories, such as *Sulawesi*, *Kalimantan*, *Sunda Kecil*, and *Maluku*. In Java, Japan divided local government into several administrations, known as

Syuu (three Japanese administrations) comprising *Ken* (Regency) and *Si* (city). Japan did not recognize provincial and board system. The Local governments almost had no authority at all. At that time, the term local autonomy was generally confusing and even misleading. However, its administrative structure was more complete if compared to the Dutch government. The administrative structure consisted of: Commander of the Japanese Army, Japanese Military Officials, *Residen*, Regents, *Wedana*, Assistants of *Wedana*, *Lurah* or Village Heads, Village Heads, *RT* or *RW*, Heads of Households. The administrative system was then passed down to the Indonesian government after the proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945. In addition, during the old-order era, the government issued Presidential Decree No. 6 of 1959 and Presidential Decree of 1960 on local government. During such period, Indonesia only recognized one type of autonomous region that was divided into three levels of administration, namely: *Kotaraya*, *Kotamadya*, and *Kotapraja*.

During the New-Order era, the government issued Law No. 5 of 1974 regulating division of autonomous region into two administrations, i.e. Local Level I (Province) and Local Level II (Regency), and local autonomy implementation was focused on Level II (Regency). Local Development were conducted through a centralized approach (uniformed with all regions) and used "Top Down" model. This made local governments passive in developing and promoting their region. Since the local government had to wait for instructions and development programs were carried out by the central government, they could not pro-actively explore ideas, creations and potency to promote and prosper its local community. Within such era, the central government also tightened supervision over the local government as the realization of central government's roles. Along with that, there were recognized three types of surveillance, namely preventive surveillance, repressive surveillance, and general supervision.

Indonesian reforms momentum in 1998 had brought change and provided opportunity to all parties to restructure relationship between central and local governments, including local development concept, which the authority initially was more dominant in the central government (centralized), now transferred to the Provincial, Regency and Municipal Governments (decentralization) and

thereafter the concept of local autonomy was recognized. Accordingly, the Law No. 22 of 1999 was enacted, a law for regulating Local Government and Law No. 25 of 1999 on Revenue Sharing between Central and Local Government.

Through its development, local autonomy policy according to the law had amended to several revisions for avoidance of overlapping, as in Law No. 32 of 2004 and Law No. 33 of 2004 on Revenue Sharing of Central and Local Government, and the latest, Law No. 23 of 2014 on Local Government. It had purpose to give autonomy as extensive as possible for local to manage and regulate their governmental affairs beyond the central government. The local government was authorized to make policies on providing services, increasing the participation of initiatives, and empowering community for people welfare improvement.

The concept of development has long further historical background. For example, during Renaissance era (Brinton, 1981), new ideas began to emerge which yield to rationalism development and science and freedom (humanism) development afterward. The "modern" concept that led to science and technology development has subsequently brought industrial revolution which was accompanied by capitalism development. The development of modern concept and its civilization began to appear in Western Europe, then spread to other parts of European and American, and finally to the rest of the world. This industrial revolution in turn accelerates technology development supporting capitalism in European countries.

For European and North American community, this industry development is considered an ideal form of development that "must" be achieved by any countries outside Europe considered as underdeveloped. To come up with that, Western thinkers suggested modernization concept with the core of evolutionist, that society development start from simple forms to more complex ones. This optimistic view contains concept of "ethnocentrism", which is used as a model to pursue the progress achieved by Western countries as an ideal form. As a result, the term was emerged to distinguish between "modern" or developed countries (Western Europe) and underdeveloped countries, or also known as third world countries, most of which are in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This concept tends to left impression that "modernization", the process of transformation, a change in society with all its aspects, or a change in

production techniques from traditional to modern technique in term of industrial revolution (Schoorl, 1980) which is identical with "westernization", or a massive transformation process from underdeveloped countries to western orientations considered as advanced one. This condition lead public reactions in the third world, and therefore the term development is used, the change process made intentionally or planned, in a country to improve welfare through an approach based on socio-cultural conditions of its people to balance these perceptions gap.

The term "underdeveloped" also bring problems, considering the term "less developed/underdeveloped" is not clearly defined. Since in reality many countries categorized as underdeveloped can actually control social conflicts effectively. While the modern state reached its peak crisis during the second world war, when atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Consequently, the term "developing" is chosen, which can be interpreted as technological undeveloped. In spite of difference in terms between "modern" or "undeveloped", apparently the people policies in Asia, Africa and Latin America are incapable to face the Western greed (Western Europe and America) in exploiting natural resources with expensive modern technology to maximize profits. For that reason, people in underdeveloped countries strive to empower themselves with development in broader sense than just using advanced technology.

Under development terminology, to achieve the expected progress, Western model does not always to be lean on. Developing countries can develop models or modify existing model, so as to customize to socio-cultural conditions of local community. If modernization only emphasizes on technological aspect, in fact development has a broader meaning due to involving physical and non-physical (social and cultural). In reality, the application of technology always affects the elements of non-material culture.

Under gradual development planning mechanism as set out in the National Long-Term Development Plan (RPJPN), to be implemented for twenty years, the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) which applies for five years, and the Short-Term Development Plan (RPJPP) which applies on an annual basis, National development in Indonesia has been running since 1969. The achieved target is to improve all Indonesian people's welfare. Through "Development Trilogy" approach focusing on economic growth, stability and

equity aspects. It implies that under rapid economic growth, it is expected community social development and its culture, coupled with social justice, political democracy and cultural freedom can be accelerated. Thus, it is certain that economic growth will speed up community development and culture supporting steady economic development.

In consideration of above, any term used for development process is strength and innovation in every aspect of life. This process starts from the application of advanced technology bringing changes in primary production system, which in turn changes main production system from subsistence to fulfilling market needs will affect social interaction model and requires social institutions and cultural values development as its frame of reference.

Social development that is rapid and hits every aspect of life is unavoidable, and invites pro and con reactions in society. No exception to Indonesia, which is very diverse and multicultural. The development excess, for some communities, is considered as source of problems, especially for those who are unable to take benefit, due to socio-cultural factors as well as geographical conditions. For that reason, to accelerate development in an area or to carry out large-scale development requiring special skills, a development model should be created using a project approach. Before the project is implemented, development planning should be made first both on a macro and micro scale. In this way, it can be said that the project is the most concrete manifestation of policy, especially development planning policies. This means that a project is part of the implementation of government policies for development.

For two decades of special autonomy in Papua (2001 – to date), it was recognized that there were a highly rapid change, which created impression that the success of special autonomy could be only measured by a number of physical projects and autonomy funds disbursed to Papua. The factors of human sacrifice in the process of special autonomy were considered reasonable, which served as a "cost" that must be paid for the successful of special autonomy. In other words, socio-cultural factors had been ignoring in implementing special autonomy. Lastly, the definition of welfare only reflects to the physical and nominal aspects, as measured by increase in national per capita income as growth indicator for achievement. This implies that the satisfactory of autonomy implementation was only measured from nominal and physical aspects.

Along with this, there are indigenous Papuan people in certain areas affected by development, especially communities are close to or evicted by the project. They see the project as a burden, due to many changes are not ready to be accepted. Moreover, for the evicted, the burden will be far heavier because they are not only receiving physical impact, but they must develop adaptation model in a new environment which is obviously not easy and capable of causing problems. Prime example for that is as experienced by Amungme people (Mimika Regency-Papua Province). This occurred related to the unsuccessful community relocation project performed by PT. Freeport (PT. Freeport and Cenderawasih University, 1999:55).

Aside from the economic, social, cultural and psychological impacts i.e. stress, revealed from research made by Cenderawasih University, the people in Babo Regency, Teluk Bintuni Regency has also affected by social impacts, such as changes in social patterns among neighbors, decreased in harmony level in population and the more complex social roles of community. (BP Migas and Cenderawasih University, 2001: 45). Similar findings were also found by Sariyun in his research on the impact of LNG construction project in 1996 on traditional communities in North Aceh Regency, which also bring social conflict impact; both among indigenous people, indigenous people with immigrants, and among immigrants.

These three researches prove that the closer physical distance to the center of development activities, the more changes will occur. It is caused by the increasing intensity in market economic activities brought by development activities are stronger and greater than the power lies within subsistence or local market agricultural economy. These very rapid changes are perceived as heavy pressure for indigenous Papuans who are unable to take benefit. Failure to adapt will make them easily to conduct radical movements or to remain silent to hide.

Moreover, there are untouched and undissolved issues as the part of special autonomy process such as:

1. unfinished Provincial Regulation and Special Local Regulation (*Perdasi* and *Perdasus*) as the mandate of Law Number 21 of 2001 which has to be drafted by *Majelis Rakyat Papua* (MRP) in two provinces to regulate the basic rights of Papuan indigeneous people, to implement democracy, to respect human

rights (*HAM*), to enforce law supremacy and to provide equal position, rights and obligations for citizens.

2. Central government's inconsistency in implementing special autonomy in Papua, especially on special powers distribution and the cash flow regulated in the Law on Special Autonomy for Papua is considered only as lip service due to no legitimacy and legalization.
3. The unclear and non-comprehensive explanations on Special Autonomy Law implementation to be executed by government regarding power distribution for the Provincial and Regency/City Governments has created ambiguity and bias to such regulation. This creates confusion for local governments, either provincial or Regency/city levels in Papua and West Papua. Further, they have referred to the national applicable regulations on the implementation of local governments, i.e. Law Number 23 of 2014, with the portion of power as regulated in the Special Autonomy Law.
4. Conflict of interest and power among the elites in Papua. This condition has connection with the assumption that Special Autonomy fund are provided free of charge by the government to local governments and Papuan people considered it as compensation for Papua's natural resources exploited and controlled by the government, so it can be used freely without any obligation.
5. There are findings made by the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) with regard to the transfer of large amounts of Special Autonomy funds by corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) practices in the execution of public fund management and Special Autonomy-based programs. There is also a conspiracy to allocation and violation of funds through "non-accountable" channel using direct cash assistance (BLT) and self-management activities to foundations, NGOs and social groups. Those under legal investigation (the elite and papuan people) intimidate to leave the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia
6. The government administration and development in Papua Province: fails to fulfill the sense of justice, so it makes impossible to achieve people's welfare, fails to promote law enforcement, and fails to respect the human rights for Papua Province, in particular Papuan people, including non-supported system of local government as seen from the quality of human resources

7. the lost of “mutual trust” among Papuan people and Central Government, arising from unresolved violation of Human Rights (HAM) occurred in the past and intimidation of Papuan people, has created deep disappointment so that they seek alternatif to separate from NKRI.
8. Hard Papua's topographic and demographic conditions. These factors are considered to have a unique character, especially to population distribution and small number of indigenous peoples as well as dislocation potency by residents who are categorized as migrants, especially those living in coastal areas and the downtown as well as center of government activity. This fact needs to be studied as a factor influencing the Special Autonomy.

Failure to adapt and issues occurred for almost two decades as mentioned above considered as the inconsistency of Central Government to implement special autonomy in Papua and so make them easily triggered for radical movements or keep silent to hide a problem. It is undeniable that special autonomy management using project approach has brought an accelerated physical development that the result may be quantitatively measured. In the meantime, development on human or instrumental aspect to support special autonomy with qualitative measures such as spiritual, socio-cultural and political welfare are still left behind, especially related to mental and a mindset in line with development demands. In other words, there is imbalance of progress both in the physical and non-physical development, or inharmony between them. Moreover, there is a tendency of the implementation of special autonomy has "failed" due to ignoring the human aspects.

As a consequence, only few communities can see, feel and take the opportunity of special autonomy to seek for success without social control, while the majority of other indigenous people remain in a worrying condition, and even it get worse in unequal competition. Therefore, since economic development is initially aimed at pursuing growth, community socio-cultural insufficient to take benefit has brought disappointment to most indigenous Papuans who are less able to face today globalization.

Examples of community protests related to project development are the construction of Container Port in Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta), the construction of Kedung Ombo Reservoir in Central Java, the construction of Nipah Reservoir in Madura, construction plan of Lake Lindu Hydroelectric Power Plant in

Central Sulawesi, and many similar cases. These protests were carried out in various ways, from attacks on security officers (Police and Army), vandalism, mass demonstrations and complaints to government and people's representatives (Regional People's Representative Council /Papuan People Assembly).

The rapid social changes in project surrounding area, which is originally a remote area, have caused various conflicts in the community, especially between migrants and indigenous people. Moreover, the environmental impacts arising from the project have made the indigenous Papuan people dissatisfied both to project and to certain groups, and create a belief that only by various social movements, the relationship between community, government and project can be improved. Apart from that, there are people who are compromised, not opposed but conform to the changes.

Description on quantitative development protests occurred in Papua, both in Papua and West Papua Province is illustrated in the table below:

Table.1 Type of Cases occurred and committed by Papuan People during Special Autonomy

No.	Cases Occured	2002 - 2007	2008 - 2013	2014 - 2019	2020 - 2021
1.	Separatist Disturbance (Armed Criminal Group) of OPM	15	20	35	60
2.	Delivering Political Aspirations/protest to policy occurred in Papua/West Papua	75	82	95	110
3.	Delivering Political Aspirations/protest to policy occurred in Jakarta/cities outside the Papua and Overseas	10	25	30	50
4.	Committing Human Rights Violations	25	35	40	45
	Total	125	162	200	265

Source: Processed from any sources

In the notes compiled by the writer from various sources, both from the security apparatus (Police, Indonesian National Armed Forces) and Human Rights Commission above, it is identified that there has been protests escalation carried out by most of indigenous Papuan people, both in peaceful and violence manner for a period of almost twenty years (2002 - 2021) of special autonomy implementation in Papua. It demonstrates that development through special

autonomy in Papua cannot run to the maximum and fails to bring prosperity for majority of indigenous Papuan people and therefore the plan to implement second Papuan special autonomy is widely opposed by community. Delivering political aspirations mentioned above shows that the seeds of conflict have grown and is very potential to continue with protests.

Development projects with many social problems may occur not only in Indonesia, but also in other countries. Slightly similar case to mining project in Mimika Regency is copper mining in Papua New Guinea. Research conducted by Conyers (1984: 132-133) concluded that large-scale mining projects can and naturally cause a lot of social problems, particularly for local communities. Meanwhile, Koentjaraningrat (1993:433) considers that regional development which focused on projects and implemented with wisdom concept and funds from top (government and companies), almost always lead to negative reactions because within the process they have changed the customs and patterns of life as their guidance in their social life.

From case findings and studies results mentioned above, it can be identified that the project or policy does not always bring blessings to local community, and consequently are widely opposed by community. Opposing efforts are carried out in various ways, from peaceful demonstrations (demonstrations/peaceful actions), to violent protests, even reform or revolution movements. In Papua case, indigenous movement can extend to social movement in collaboration with various political powers in the Papua. The effect can obviously affect the Central Government's policy concerning the position of two provinces in Papua, with small protests on special autonomy. This phenomenon is very interesting to be studied, due to paradox between the ideal and reality in society. The community that have to or is proud of special autonomy take different stand, either by openly challenge or remain in miserable. In the future, this research will be useful to create local autonomy model upholding "community prosperous" or avoiding human sacrifice for development.

Actually, Policies toward them have been started, through the issuance of Law Number 22 of 1999 on Local Government and Law Number 25 of 1999 on Revenue Sharing between Central and Local Government. These two laws are known as the Local Autonomy Laws, which the first was issued in the

reform era. Because the first-mentioned Law grant broad authority to local for conducting government upon initiatives and aspirations of their people, to the extent within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Autonomy is fully granted to Regency/City to enable services for community more effective and democratization process smoother. Meanwhile, Law Number 25 of 1999 supports the local autonomy implementation through a balanced fund allocation between central and regional governments. Local who have a lot of natural resources will receive greater fund allocation than the other local or central government.

In the autonomy era, a more equitable fiscal system has been designed, as an effort to create local independence. Local governments and communities are empowered by granting of broad powers to explore and develop their potential area for the welfare of their people. The lower-layer communities are motivated to participate in their area development to the maximum at their own initiative. The government will facilitate good public participation and to absorb political aspirations through strengthening the role of the Local People's Representative Council (DPRD).

1.2. SPECIAL AUTONOMY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO AVOID THE RISK OF NATIONAL DISINTEGRATION

Papua existed as one of provinces in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia for more than five decades. Initially, local government administration in Papua was treated similar to other regions in Indonesia, based on regulation on national administration, as described above. However, the regulation was deemed failed to accommodate the specificity of culture and customs of Papuan people, both in government and development administration in Papua and made the condition of community in poverty and left behind. It oftentimes led Papuan people to demand for independence or disintegrate from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

In response to Papuan people's aspiration, in 2001 the Government issued Special Autonomy Policy in Papua Province by issuing Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua in conjunction with Law No 35 of 2008 regarding Special Autonomy for Papua Province. It was in line with the mandate of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia stating "The Indonesia's territory is divided into large and small region, with the governmental

structure as determined by law, and taking into account and upon consultation between the state government and the original right in special territory. Therefore, the basis underlying for the Special Autonomy policy is aimed at realizing community's welfare by providing services closer to the community, encouraging democratization process and extending public participation, strengthening capacity and responsibility of local administration to resolve local problems with all potencies and creativities of local administration, and in association with the aim of maintaining and even strengthening national integration. In Indonesia, there are at least 4 (four) provinces granted by Special Autonomy rights, i.e. Aceh Province, DKI Jakarta Province, Yogyakarta Province, and Papua Province. However, if compared to some of the regions above, the local autonomy in Papua Province is quite different, since Special Autonomy to Papua represents an important and fundamental political agreement and respond to Papuan people's aspirations and pressures to leave the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia.

This ground may not be exempted to review the progress of Special Autonomy in Papua. Special Autonomy Law for Papua is a set of rule or policy made by the Central Government to promote every developmental aspect within four main priorities, such as economic, education, health and infrastructure. Philosophically, this Special Autonomy policy is made for Papua's harmonization with other regions in Indonesia as well as a step to protect the basic rights of the Papuan indigeneous people, that since integration with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia have neglected and marginalized. In other words, wealth and prosperity as much as possible for Papuan indigeneous people.

In line with Local Autonomy proposed by Van Houtten: the Autonomy generally accepted and applied to all regions, and Special Autonomy or as called as asymmetric decentralization, that has intention to give specific treatment for certain regions in order to obtain stronger coherence/national unity since specific problems can be resolved peacefully and agreed upon by all parties. Important matter set out in Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy Policy for Papua in conjunction with Law No. 35 of 2008 are as follows: *First of all*, the decentralized Government implementation, *secondly*, basic rights protection for Papuan indigeneous people, *thirdly*, democracy and democratic maturity,

fourthly, ethics and morals respect, *fifthly*, respect for Human Rights, *sixthly*, rule of law, *seventhly*, respect for pluralism, *eighthly*, equal positions, rights and obligations distribution for citizens is realized by the establishment of Papuan People's Assembly (MRP). Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua is one of achievements for social and political movement in Papua.

1.3. THE GRANTING OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY STATUS AND SOCIAL PROTEST

The phenomenon of granting of Special Autonomy status to Papua leading to protests is an indication for the absence of public support to Special Autonomy in Papua that is crucial to be studied since the reality is in contrast to the purpose itself. The purpose of granting the Special Autonomy is to give prosperity to Papuan people and prevent disintegration. Thus, theoretically the community should give their support. On the other hand, empirically, after almost two decades the granting of Special Autonomy status in Papua is objected or protested due to causing problems to Papuan people.

In brief, the protests only relate to economic motives, especially welfare gap. However, there is possibility of another motive or protest arising from planning and implementation does not pay attention to the social aspirations of Papuan people, or they fail to conduct feasibility study, need assessment and social impact assessment. Based on research study performed by social researchers as described above, it can be viewed that development including Special Autonomy implementation may lead to the following social problems:

1. Development can lead social change faster than the community's capability to adapt to such changes, so it can cause social tension.
2. Many development policies, especially physical projects, are not socially "feasible" and thus bring more negative risks and impacts than the expected positive outcomes or benefits for the community.
3. Creating conflicts among groups, inter-generations or between people and government led to disturbances to social harmony, and in turn can tightening national unity or become a stepping stone to separate from the state.
4. Development policy include physical projects in certain location, along with new technologies and values which oftentimes impair local community's social environment or old traditional values. Consequently, the old values are

no longer followed, while the new values have not been fully accepted and therefore create a value crisis.

5. Creating social gap, especially between migrants and indigenous people living near the project, so that it can lead mass violence due to social inequality.
6. Causing material or economic losses to the surrounding community, due to improper process or insufficient compensation.
7. Creating life uncertainty for communities affected by policy of physical project development, due to relocation to a new place which cannot definitely improve their quality of life who have sacrificed for the project.
8. For the evicted, it may cause depression or suffering either psychologically or physically.

Social problems arising from a policy (physical project) through Special Autonomy implementation may be occurred at initial stage of policy (physical project) of special autonomy is implemented or planned. The general problem, while planning or preparing for Special Autonomy implementation, is that not all parties having political views in contrast with the Government were invited for dialogue to redress misunderstanding of integration Papua's history with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, so lacking in socialization for Papuan indigeneous people. Meanwhile, after such development policy is implemented, the problem arises due to environmental impact adversely to community. The environment may be physical (natural environment) and non-physical, changed social life.

In addition, the other arising problem comes from Central Government's inconsistency in implementing the mandate of the Special Autonomy Law for Papua as a whole. Finally, the target of granting Special Autonomy that was supposed to bring greatest happiness and prosperity to Papuan people only brings misery, suffering, anxiety or dissatisfaction, thus motivating them for the following reaction: filing protest, or mobilizing community resistance movements against the implementation of Special Autonomy and its extension plan.

The study of the ongoing protest includes social movements study, because it represents action movements, and social movements to protest development policy through Special Autonomy implemetation in Papua are a specific type of movement found in Papua. Although the protests are similar, but in Papua and

West Papua are difference in characteristics since it last for a long time and have developed to "organized" movement as well as having a wide network, beyond the territorial scope of Special Autonomy.

Discussing about the relationship between the center and local government within the framework of a unitary state like Republic of Indonesia is very exciting for study. The practical problem is the unavoidable conflict of interests. Within the concept of a unitary state, it is clear that the Central Government is always controlling various governmental affairs so that the authority will be within its hand. The authority given by the center to the local is very limited.

In the above context, the Central or National Government is positioned themselves to the highest position, and have full power for day-to-day administration, and no governmental affairs is delegated by the constitution to smaller government units (in this case the locals or provinces, Regencies/cities). The Central Government (national) can delegate many functions (to delegate authority) to cities, Regencys, or local government units. However, this delegation is only regulated by law drafted by the central parliament (in Indonesia, *DPR-RI*), and is not regulated in the constitution (in Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution), and the delegation of authority can be revoked at any time.

C.F. Strong states that the essential features of a unitary state are: *first*, the sovereignty of the central people's representative council. *Second*, there are no other sovereign bodies. Government power in unitary form may be exercised on a gathered and centralized basis so as to the affairs of state are controlled under the hands of the Central Government and all government authorities are exercised in a single centralized government, or by the central along with its organs located/distributed in such local. The distributed organs exercising the Central Government' authority within the local, according to Bagir Manan, is recognized as deconcentration (*centralisatie met de deconcentratie*), where all authorities to administer local government, including organs' authority to make laws and regulations is based on or highly dependent on Government (central). The Central Government also has the authority to delegate some of its functions to the local based on autonomy rights. This is known as decentralization, but the ultimate power remains in the hands of the Central Government

In general, world modern countries today can be classified into 2 (two) forms, i.e. federal states (*federal states, bondstaat, bundesstaat*) and unitary

states (*unitary states, eenheidstaat*). In terms of number and distribution, countries follow the two systems seems to be relatively balanced. This shows that one system does not tend to be dominant compared to other systems. Nevertheless, the number of unitary states is empirically much more than federal states.

Smith as cited by Azfar et.al remarked that a unitary state can devolve important affairs, so it will create a new form of state such as semi-federal (*quasi-federal arrangement*). In some extent, this model is both in uniform/symmetrical nature and asymmetrical. Samples of this quasi-federal arrangement model are Philippines and Indonesia. The Philippine government gave extensive autonomy to Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera (1989), but maintained a symmetrical form for the other regions. Similarly in Indonesia which grant Special Autonomy (asymmetrical) to Aceh and Papua Provinces, but applied a symmetrical system to other regions (except Jakarta as the State's Capital and Yogyakarta Special Region). This condition is also known as asymmetric decentralization.

The above facts generate understandings that no single decentralization and deconcentration model are uniform among countries, even within inter-state under same model. Customarily, a country implements decentralization and deconcentration simultaneously, while implementing a model of decentralization at the same time. In this way, an asymmetric *decentralization* tends to be a good option. This option is rationable considering the fact in a country (even in unitary form), each region has no symmetrical characteristics, potencies, historical background, or political setting. For this reason, a different regulation will constitute a reasonable requirement.

The asymmetric decentralization concept was constructed from asymmetric federation concept introduced by Charles Tarlton in 1965. According to Tillin, there are two types of *asymmetric federation*, i.e. *de facto asymmetry* and *de jure asymmetry*. The first one refers to inter-region differences in area, economic potential, culture and language, or differences in autonomy, representative or authority systems arising from such characteristics. Meanwhile, the second one is a product of the constitution consciously designed to achieve certain objectives. This relates to the allocation of authority in

different extent or the granting of autonomy within certain policy area for specific regions.

The potential of *asymmetric decentralization* according to Syarif Hidayat is higher than in a unitary state, meanwhile in a federal state general model tends to be implemented such as Decentralized Autonomy. In the meantime, in the unitary state, autonomy variant may be provided to local includes three possible types, i.e. Extensive Autonomy, Relative Autonomy, and Special Autonomy. If several types of autonomy are implemented at the same time, the *asymmetric decentralization* will exist.

Table 2. Comparison between Decentralization and Special Autonomy Model in Federal and Unitary State

Form of State	Decentralization	Local Autonomy
Federal	separation of powers (division of power / authority)	Full Autonomy
Unitary	Division / Distribution of powers (Division of power/authority)	- Extensive Autonomy - Limited Autonomy - Special Autonomy

The facts show that a federal state may be highly centralized, such as Malaysia, but a unitary state such as China has a relatively high degree of decentralization. Nevertheless, there is a trend in both forms of state, namely the pendulum movement of the political system more directed to strengthening decentralization and authority and responsibility balance in state and governmental administration. This has led to demand for minimizing interference or central authority, as set out in a deconcentration framework. The pendulum movement of decentralization has a different speed and variation in each country, which promote to asymmetrical decentralization construction.

1.4. PAPUAN PEOPLE’S REACTION TO THE EXCESS OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY

This study focuses on the reactions of Papuan indigeneous people following development policy through special autonomy, including physical project including introducing foreign culture elements and bring change in environment in broad sense meaning. Moreover, the policy is a compromised political policy of Central Government to avoid national disintegration. Generally, people are unaware that the application of advanced technology

which tends to exploratory and expansive does not only bring changes in natural environment, but it may bring the worse one, changes in the socio-cultural environment that can be a force for reform.

In fact, the problem after the implementation of development policy through Special Autonomy in Papua seems significant and not affected the fundamental aspects required by Papuan people. In general, this condition is not realized by policy makers to provide supporting instruments for Special Autonomy or blue-print scenario as well as approaches sensitive to culture and conflict to anticipate potential turmoil of reformation movement. Reformation always leads to pro and contra, where the counter reactions may arise in the form of rebellion, riots, and attacks or in wait for *Ratu Adil* to carry out social movement.

So far, the studies on the excess implementation of Papuan Special Autonomy are more focused on social impacts namely the direct impact from physical project development and policy implementation. This means, researchers has created findings in a form of identification of the problems faced by the community, especially for the negative impacts. Their descriptions ceased on the subject what the community experience during the research or the ongoing social changes, but did not explain how is the reaction of community to the problems or reaction to the ongoing social changes. In fact, public protests often lead to backfire for development itself, including Government policies implementation (sustainable Special Autonomy) since uncontrolled social actions can damage development outcomes within a short time and thus impair Central Government's trust to Papuan people. Developments at a large cost can be ruined instantly if the community initiates undirected protests or vandalisms, as recently occurred.

According to studies result carried out by multiple researchers, a fundamental question arises related to the explanation of social reality itself. Since the identification of social problems cannot be explained theoretically for the existing reality. In fact, in term of science, theory plays important role to explain reality. This issue was discussed by Habermas (1984: xii) by questioning three basic interrelated questions: metatheory-related, methodology and empirical questions.

On the metatheoretical level, the problem is related to rationality growth in modern life, at which the framework for action theory is developed. On the methodological level, the problem lies on gaining access to domain of symbolic objects through “understanding”. Meanwhile, on the empirical level, the question is: whether and in what term the modernization of a society can be described from the point of view of cultural and social rationalization.

Among the three problems above, the research is stressed on the "empirical" aspect as the basis for building theory especially if it relates to Habermas's opinion, containing a question mark about the meaning of modernization from the point of view of rationality culture, which is totally different in the Western world and in very traditional societies such as in Papua. According to Habermas, the rationalization process related to modernity in developing countries was made through development, in line with Habermas' view, has given rise to a crisis in today's society within the term "colonization of the world of life" (Habermas, in Hardiman, 1993: 170-171). The occurred social problems and accompanied protests are not apart from this process showing that there is a hidden weakness behind development mainstream stressing to capitalistic improvement. The progress is measured by per capita income and physical facilities, without considering the inner aspects or human morality. Figures may be deceptive since statistic-based progress always fails to reflect prosperity. Protests occurred against major policies are one of indicators that "progress" is not always correlated with justice or happiness. Perhaps, for certain people who are the victims of this policy will mean the opposite.

This research is more directed to the arising social movements as a reaction to negative impact on a policy due to social dimension abandonment in the development planning process. Reaction to social movements is selected as the subject of study, since it is clearly seen as the ongoing sociological phenomenon and characteristic phenomenon of social change. It is supposed that the arising of social problems in the form of protests has connection with the policies and development planning exercised on a "linear" and "top down" basis. In order to change them into interactive/participatory planning (in a macro context), this research needs to reveal the factors causing anomaly from the proper process. The case study in Papua is an example of “anomaly” since development through special autonomy is followed by social movement, from simply mass

mobilization to an organized movement. Therefore, this study is related to the form of social movement as a reaction to development policy.

This social phenomenon is interesting to be in-depth studied through research, given that there are two cultures with very different characteristics. The Central Government as the holder of the supreme power clearly has a "noble goal" in prospering, protecting its people and maintaining the sovereign of its territory through development (project) policies implementation.

Meanwhile, the surrounding community (Papuan indigenous people), want for prosperity, being trusted (to be masters in their own country) and treat equally as citizens by the Central Government. In addition, Papuan indigenous people still appreciate fully traditional culture emphasizing on calmness, living together with nature, reciprocal principle and very distinctive culture is the custom of tribal wars. If they relate to the social conflict in Papua with war tradition of the indigenous people, it is not difficult to find relationship between the tradition of war (warrior society) and prolonged social protest. Protest is an expression of conflict, so it can be interpreted that, if the protest continues, the conflict still exists and unresolved. This problem draws researchers to conduct a study focused on the following four main questions:

1. Why is there a perception that Special Autonomy in Papua "failed"?
2. Who has considered either that Special Autonomy as "failed" or as "successful"?
3. How the opinion of "failure" on Special Autonomy can lead to a social movement?
4. What is the appropriate strategy for Special Autonomy policy to Papua in the future?

1.5. THE BENEFIT OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY STUDY

The purpose of this study is to answer the four research questions above, with the hope that if the reason and causes for long protests can be answerable, development conflicts result from the implementation of decentralization policies and Special Autonomy for Papua in the future can be prevented or minimized. Moreover, if the process of protest developed to social movement can be explained, it is obviously can give contribution to sociology, especially

from the point of view of development theory sourced from political anthropology study.

Another vital part is the urgency of study for input and providing considerations to address and resolve Special Autonomy problem in Papua for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs acting as a formulator, catalyst and evaluator for domestic governmental administration and Special Autonomy in Indonesia. Considering the deadline for the first period of Special Autonomy is twenty years upon it was granted will end in December 2021.

Actually, the ongoing protests are an indicator that society is more critical and responsive to change and have a higher consciousness to get involved and enjoy the development outcome. Sustainable development can be achieved if the community gives their full support, and it can be obtained if they can enjoy the benefits both economically and socially. Therefore, the phenomenon of protest cannot be belittled or underestimated. If this is the case, then development and welfare will of the target and violates the sense of justice.

On practical perspective, this research is essentially to give explanation on social phenomenon that is within sociological concept called as a social movement, both from the internal structure, the process building relations with political movements and their influence on government policies. In that way, we will be able to understand the meaning of social movements for certain communities, in other words able to explore people's will, which in turn to be significant for more optimization of benefit from the granting of Special Autonomy status to Papua. For this reason, supporting efforts are needed to the unavoidable change with the greatest level of awareness and approval as well as participation to the greatest possible extent. Accordingly, it is necessary to minimize as much as possible the loss incurred by local community and to increase the profit for the local community as extensively as possible.

From the academic point of view, this research intends to develop existing theories, which is building theories from the bottom, without eliminating the existing theoretical framework. If researcher tries to develop new theories without regard to the existing theories, then he will be lost in direction. In step with the existing theory of social movements, the researcher tries to make categories, to view whether protest movements against development through


Special Autonomy can be classified as a form of social movement or not. The reference is characteristics inherent to social movements in general. If the general characteristics are found, the protest movement can be grouped into a social movement, and if it is none, there is no social movement. If there are some characteristics exist, it is potential that a "new social movement" will develop or lead to another movement.

In Indonesia, research on social movements is still relatively rare, and for such reason, the focus of the study is aimed at the rural community movement with a "*mahdiism*" model, a movement to accelerate or in wait for *Ratu Adil*. Examples for this writing are found in the article entitled "*Banten Peasant Rebellion*" and "*Ratu Adil*" written by Sartono Kartodirdjo. The characteristics of this movement are sporadic, disorganized, led by religious leaders (or identify themselves as such) and carried out by rural communities.

According to this fact, the researcher believes that research on social movements in Papua affected by development through Special Autonomy implementation can enrich the sources of sociological development in Indonesia. If previous research regarding study of project development impact and its social changes, the present research is focused on in-depth study, i.e., the community's response or reaction to ongoing social changes and its effects on Government policies change in politics, development and administration sector. Therefore, the structure of this research among the existing one can be described as follows:

Figure 1

**The position of existing research among former researches
Special Autonomy for Papua**



The above figure shows that this research has purpose to deepen or complement the results of existing studies, using qualitative approach. Most of researches were conducted to social impacts or estimated social impacts on a project, while this research is aimed at social reactions to Special Autonomy in Papua, especially the negative one. The negative and positive impacts in question are seen from the perspective of the local indigenous people.

1.6. CASE STUDY FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH

1. Reasearch Approach: Qualitative

Determination on qualitative research type is not only defined as method selection that is focused on qualitative data and analysis, but it also has a philosophical foundation underlying certain paradigm about the method. Method selection is not an easy work, since it relates to basic assumptions about social theory. Qualitative researchers have made they're

on recommendation for not using natural science approach in studying society (Bryman & Burgess, 1999: xi).

If the quantitative approach is developed by positivists, then the qualitative approach is developed by hermeneutic philosophers. Hermeneutics is a type of philosophical science for the last three or four decades which has been the subject of discussion in social sciences debates. As stated by Wuisman, there are two problems serving as the source of approach, i.e: 1. the most appropriate method for social science; and 2. the principles of philosophical science underlying the social sciences. In consideration of discussion on two problems, there is a view that hermeneutics is the most appropriate epistemological foundation to confirm type of scientific knowledge, which should be developed both in the social sciences and the types of research methods for such knowledge. The type of this scientific knowledge is interpretive knowledge, and a suitable method for constructing interpretative knowledge based on *verstehen*, a way of developing knowledge utilizing human ability to put himself and his mind into another people's situations and conditions, in order to understand their thoughts, views, feelings, ideals, aspirations, motives and desires (Wuisman, 1996:49).

There are several terms used by experts in terminology of qualitative research methodology such as: naturalistic paradigm, symbolic interaction, ethnomethodology, humanistic, and hermeneutic, all of which are under the umbrella of phenomenology (Muhajir: 1989:27). As mentioned by Muhajir, in term of ontological and axiological, phenomenology is considered interpretable to various methodologies in one qualitative research paradigm. A starting point to define the boundaries of sociology as well as to establish the epistemological foundation for the social sciences lies in the method. If natural science is "nomological", aimed at providing "explanation" for making laws as in the natural sciences, then social science is "hermeneutical", which aims to provide comprehensive and in-dept "understanding" about the phenomena serving as the object of study (Wuisman, 1996:50).

2. *Research Design: Case Study*

In essence, social movement study is a type of study related to conflicts reality occurs in society. There are social movements arising from conflict,

class or tension, and there are also from desire of changes to existing condition. However, social events arising from movements are generally caused by conflicts between one group and another or between the rulers and its people. Conflicts, which the phenomenon can be identified by the rising of social movements or other collective behavior, cannot be explained by a linear model due to many variables in it. Therefore, research on social movements led to conflict and potential complex social relationships requires specific analysis and in-depth research, a type of research accommodating to these needs is qualitative research

Case Study is one of frameworks or research design generally or widely used in qualitative research. As a Research Design category, Case Study may not be specified in terms of accuracy and generalization. Although those aspects are debatable, nevertheless, if we refer to experts' definition for qualitative methods, it seems clear that the comprehension on meaning, process and construction as discussed by symbolic interactionist, ethnomethodology and practical ethnography are lead to the determination of specific objects. This can only be performed by case study research.

There are several Case Study options to be followed by researchers, as mentioned by Ragin (1994: 93-103). The procedures for qualitative research as mentioned by Ragin emphasis on three models, i.e: analitic induction, theoretical sampling, and study of single case.

1. *Analitic Induction* means research aimed at finding similarities or universalities and constructs general categories, by providing strict term or concepts used in research. Researcher compares the arising events or cases to be sorted in several categories.
2. *Theoretical Sampling* means research aimed at deepening the understanding of the object being studied, as well as making generalizations. This study was conducted by comparing the object of study with the results of similar research, and then looked for similarities to make generalizations or develop theory.
3. *Study of Single Case* means research to make interpretation on proper facts. Interpretation and fact is “*double fitted*”, an interinfluence condition between researcher's interpretation and facts. A different interpretation is conducted based on a different frame, so as to give several methods in

adding data for researchers to explore the interconnection of ideas through different "frames".

In connection with study on social movements in Papua, the single case study model is more suitable to be applied since it is specific, where the event is related to the status of Special Autonomy. In addition, the nature of the Social Movement is operated according to its own logic, out of general reality. For the clarity, it is necessary to interpret the phenomenon using the "frames" of people existing in such movement or society.

Thus, the analysis integrity to this research is site "environment" where the opinions and movements arise, which includes the environment of local government and community groups affected by the effect of Special Autonomy. In addition to describing the portrait of internal movement, the researcher also intends to examine the interaction between Special Autonomy and the community.

3. *Research Steps Case Study*

The study of social movements is related to forms of conflict, so that specific analysis model is required through Case Study.

A study of policy implementation is related to a form of policy implementation leading to satisfaction and dissatisfaction on policy implementation, so that a certain analytical model is required through Case Study. In this respect, Lofland (196: 21) defines special procedures out of four steps in conducting case study below:

- Selecting case or cases to be researched.
- Broadly thinking about data collection type for case or cases.
- asking social science questions about data.
- Answering above questions from sociology and political anthropology position.

Subject to the above explanation, researcher has taken the following research steps:

Step one, the researcher selects the most relevant case according to the needs, especially the possibility to develop theory and its data availability, i.e Papua case, where the Special Autonomy policy is enforced.

Since only one case selected, the researcher is enabling to identify life aspects of social movement comprehensively. If associated with Lofland's opinion,

this is a pre-condition for case study research. The second requirement is the collected data for the case is wide and varied. The researcher considers Papua case fulfill the requirement, since the problems occurred in the area are very complex, where aspects of social culture, economy, politics, security and globalization are interacting with each other in traditional community life. The third requirement recommended by Lofland is case study research must be qualitative and more sociologically oriented. One of characteristics of qualitative research is to construct hypotheses based on facts found in the field, and not testing hypotheses pre-determined by researchers before field research.

Step two: Data sources and type of method.

Secondary data analysis is obtained from published materials. The social movements study has many sources on “secondary analysis” or “synthesis research”. By referring the authors’ framework, secondary analysis can be performed by collecting information on social movement aspects and questions utilized for new analyzes from the available data. Therefore, the researcher must show the following attitudes:

- 1) Attempt to take neutral position.
- 2) Collect information from the opposing organization.

This step is taken by researcher by using various research reports, studies from religious figures or independent papers obtained from various seminars addressing Special Autonomy Papua issue and its implications on community social setting and nature. The researcher tries to take neutral position by considering the actions motive of the movement actor from their point of view and compare to the affected various variables.

Step three: Asking main question.

In studying social movement, there are fundamental aspects to be identified, formulated as research questions or aspects to be studied. It is started by filing 7 (seven) main questions in the following aspects:

1. Belief (ideology, doctrine).
2. Organization.
3. Causes of movement.
4. People motive to join movement.
5. Strategy used for achieving goals.

6. Reaction/response to movement.

7. Effects of movement.

Step four: Answering questions from sociological position.

To answer questions from a sociological position, the steps to be taken are as follows: the researcher file general questions called as "generic propositions". In this context, researcher tends to follow practical ethnographic approach in which the discourse will serve as focus and "generic proposition". The intended discourses are topics widely discussed or become the subject of daily conversation, both within the indigenous population, the government environment, practitioners and non-governmental organizations. Therefore, the research site is not geographically limited to Papua Province and West Papua, but direction where the actors are situated. This procedure by Gubrium (1999) called by Gubrium as "talk method". Researcher will jump into the real world to identify facts and figures conceptualizing or shaping the real world. It is conducted by listening to daily conversations on various occasions or events to gather as much as possible information.

4. Research Site

This research is situated in Papua, i.e. Papua and West Papua Province, provinces implementing Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province, under the following reasons:

- Special Autonomy for Papua and West Papua Province, initially seen as an compromise to overcome various security conflicts occurred in Papua and resulted in demand to separate with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia or petition for full independence. When compared to other protest movements, the movement was lasting for long duration and fluctuating in its existence. Since the movement is still ongoing, and the actors are still exist, the collected data will be more accurate
- The movement development in Papua is unique. This can be seen from the changes in movement form, from physical mass movements at the presence of Special Autonomy, to an organized movement, or even affiliated with certain political movements, when the Central Government was weak.
- Papuan people is relatively closed, influencing by modernization process from the presence of migrants living in Papua using modern technology

- The return of younger generation of Papuans who have studied outside the Papua has brought many changes and modernization among papuanpeople. This means, there is an interesting cultural “leap” to be observed, which may affect the attitudes and behavior of the local community
- During Special Autonomy in Papua, there are two different reactions whether in Papua or West Papua Province. Papua Province is very reactive, and West Papua Province is compromised. This situation is interesting to be studied for identifying the factors behind such differences.

5. *Scope of Research*

❖ *Social Movement*

Social Movement is a form of collective behavior of people moving either informally, organized or dedicated. Generally, social movement focuses on social or political issues by performing, refusing, or promoting for social change.

The term "Social Movement" was initially introduced in 1848 by German Sociologist, Jerman Lorenz Von Stein in his book entitled "Socialist & Communist Movement since Third French Revolution ". At that time, the Social Movement was massive and arisen from disagreement or disapproval to unpopular Government policies. Labour and Socialist Movements in the 19th Century are examples of classic prototypes for social movement depending on political vehicles in the form of organizations or parties. After the Second World War, there was a change during reform period called Post-War Period, characterized by various social movement triggered by expression freedom for people and demand for rights called as "Democracy".

To get a complete picture of social movements according to Lofland's view. There are seven main questions required to be studied in the following aspects such as: belief, organization, causes, participants, strategies, reactions, and effects (Lofland, 1996: 99). Lofland's concept is explained in the following details:

- Belief, generally defined as "something taken as truth". In the context of movement study, definition on something taken as truth is used to challenge reality. Those included in beliefs construction are as follows: ideology, doctrine, views, expectations, and frameworks, insights and

perspectives. In light of this definition, the questions to be followed-up are as follows:

- What reality do they question/challenge?
- Who is considered as opponent and who is considered as role model?
- Total or partial change in social order.
- At individual or “super individual” level (politic, economic, culture).
- Organization means a method in which people having common “view” are managed / directed to achieve goal. The main questions to be asked are as follows:
 - How people to be organized/ method of organizing?
 - How is decision-making process (centralized / decentralized)?
 - Is there job description within Movement's organization?
 - What are criteria to determine the assignee?
 - How to manage people to do their jobs?
 - How is the organization funded?
 - Is the organization for temporary or permanent?
- Causes, means variables affecting on social movement. The main questions to be asked are as follows:
 - How is the social movement started / established?
 - When is the movement established?
 - Why is the movement arisen? Theoretically, there are 17 affected variables i.e:
 1. Change and social gap.
 2. Political opportunity.
 3. State’s intervention to community life.
 4. Wealth (causing economic deprivation)
 5. Geographical concentration.
 6. Collective identity.
 7. Injustice perceptions.
 8. Inter-group solidarity.
 9. Legitimacy crisis.
 10. Lowered dominant group’s control.
 11. Focus on crisis.
 12. Population synergy.

13. A leader.
14. Communication network.
15. Network integration among potential maker.
16. Favorable situation for potential maker.
17. Unifying capability.

- Joining / Participation, means membership within the lowest to the highest meaning. The main questions to be asked are as follows:
 - Why do people want to join movement?
 - How far is their participation in the organization?
 - How does the organization socialize follower?
- Strategy means ways or methods for performing action in order to achieve goal. The main questions to be asked are as follows:
 - What efforts to be taken to achieve movement goal?
 - What are the main objectives in each strategy used?
 - In the pursuit of goal, is it emphasize on social institutions change (*societal manipulation*) or by transforming people's heart and mind (*personal transformation*)?
 - Is the strategy open or closed (openly or secretly)?
 - Using frontal or successive strategy?
 - Is their "Stand" declared politely, or through demonstration or violence?
 - What the tactics mechanism used for target group: persuasion, negotiation or coercion?
- Effect, means response or reaction from the outsider to social movement. Related aspects for this consist as follows:
 - Ruler reaction.
 - Elite reaction.
 - Media reaction.
 - Inter social movement reaction.

6. Informant and Respondent

The information collection in this study was made by placing two kinds of sources, i.e. informants and respondents. Informants are people being asked about any matters about Special Autonomy and failures perception about Special

Autonomy in Papua as well as Social Movement and social arrangements, while respondents are people who are inquired about their views, attitudes, perceptions, expectations. and participation in the movement. In obtaining information from informants, researcher were not always in research site, Papua, but take various opportunities such as finding supporting literature, and attending relevant seminars in Germany, including various other cities.

Since total members/followers of the movement are unidentified, the respondents are determined "purposively" by searching for "keys" person in the "circle" of Government and society. It starts from the main initiator, administrators, followers and participants, sympathizers and oppositions. It prefers to Respondents' perception and participation level than their number, since this study attempts to obtain more fundamental facts about the causes and processes in implementing policies and Social Movements to society. Respondents in this study were divided into several categories based on their level of intensity in joining social movements, as illustrated in the following diagram:




Diagram: Respondent Category by Movement Activity

Based on the above diagram, the respondent group consists as follows:

1. Movement Leaders (inner circle), i.e., Chairman of Traditional Institution and Tribal Chief.
2. Loyalist, Traditional Institution management.

3. Partisipant, active community member.
4. Symphatizer, passive community member.

Outside the circle within such category, it has been interviewed the following group of community:

- a. The apathetic group to movement and compromise to Special Autonomy,
- b. Oppositions.
- c. Outsider (NGO).
- d. Government.

7. *Data Collection Technique*

Data collection technique used in this research consists of following three activities:

- a. Interview. before conducting in-depth interviews, the researcher initially seek for the key informants, i.e. Government, and community leaders to ensure that the interviewee were the right people. In addition, the researcher also interviewed members of papuan People's Assembly, People's Representatives Council, church leaders, NGO activists, local security forces and young Papuan intellectuals situated outside Papua.
- b. data collection by questionnaire, to obtain general and specific information on Papuan indigeneous people. If the interview is more focused on key person in the movement, then the questionnaire is distributed to movement follower outside the movement's leadership environment (peripheral followers).
- c. Documentation Study. In support of the above two data collection techniques, the researcher conducted a documentation study, through studying written materials related to the movement (internal movement) as well as documents from Government and NGOs. Movement document are important to study, since documents, social networks and ideas for its reform/refusal can be identified. In addition, documents in the form of reports from religious (church) figures were also studied, both personal and for discussion with various parties.
- d. seconday data collection, the research outcome performed by university and NGO.

8. *Data Analysis*

Data is analyzed using qualitative approach for the following reasons:

The type of this research is Case Study.

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- a. The data collected for the case is wide and varied.
- b. The data collected is qualitative, in the form of statements than numbers.
- c. In analysis, it is more oriented to sociology and political anthropology and not for testing hypotheses.
- d. The principle of research is to deepening case data, and informed by inductive analysis.

In qualitative analysis, analysis and data collection is made at the same time. Therefore, the hypothesis is not included in the research plan, but it is explored and developed in the field. The variables included in the concept definition are only used as a guide in exploring the phenomenon in the field.

CHAPTER II
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF PAPUA
IN A FLASHBACK

2.1. GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION IN PAPUA FROM TIME TO TIME

Papua Province and West Papua Province today are the outcome of past government's development when Resident Jan Pieter Karel van Eechoud announced the status of Papuan government was promoted from Residency to autonomous government chaired by "*waar nemend Gouverneur*" or Temporary Governor, equivalent to caretaker or Acting Governor. No genuine local government is covered for all Papua territories, as existed in other Indonesian regions in governmental system established by "Kingdom" or "Sultanate". The Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia tried to compete to build a political system of Papua government.

On August 19, 1945, Indonesian founding fathers immediately established 8 (eight) provinces within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. At that time, Papua or New Guinea remained under the administration of Maluku Province. This concept was same concept as in the United States of Indonesia (RIS) created by van Mook and continued by the Indonesian founders. In fact, the recognizing process of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia through negotiation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands was filled by conflict agreement on the territory of the Republic of Indonesia which was claimed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands as part of its territory and separated from the territory of the United States of Indonesia (RIS).

In the Round Table Conference (KMB) held in The Hague, the Kingdom of the Netherlands removed Papuan territory from the list of territories recognized under the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) and registered in the overseas of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which is located far from European continent. Accordingly, since December 27, 1949 the Papua region referred to and written as *Gouvernement* area at the provincial level under the name of "*Gouvernement van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea*" led by an official called "Gouverneur" who was appointed by the Queen of the

Netherlands. Resident Jan Pieter Karel van Eechoud was appointed as “*de Waarnemend Gouverneur van Nederlands Nieuw Guinea*” or interim Governor of Nederlands Nieuw Guinea based in Hollandia Binnen or Jayapura. When the Dutch occupied Papua, there were 5 (five) Governors leading Papua i.e.:

- 1) Jan Pieter Karel van Eechoud (1949 – 1950);
- 2) Stephan Lucien Joseph van Waardenburg (1950 -1953), definitive Governor of Nederlands Nieuw Guinea;
- 3) Jan van Baal (1953 – 1958);
- 4) Dr. Pieter J. Platteel (1958 – 28 September 1962); dan
- 5) Henk Velkamp (28 September – 1 October 1962).

Further, subject to the 1962 New York Agreement, the territory of Papua was required to be reinstated to Indonesia through the United Nations Agency (UNTEA), the administration of Papua was performed out by the Governor who was appointed in accordance with general requirements set out in the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia No. 2 of 1962 and Law no. 12 of 1969. At that time, there were 2 (two) Governors leading the government in West Papua Province, i.e. : 1) Eliezer Jan Bonai (1 May 1963 - 1964), as the First Governor of “New Version” West Irian Province based in Kota Baru or part of Jayapura City. The name Kota Baru is a transition from *Hollandia Binnen* to another name given later by the Government of Indonesia. This province has removed the Old Version of West Irian Province under Struggle Province with capital of Soa-siu, Tidore Island, a province established by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with Law no. 15 of 1956. 2) Frans Kaisiepo (1964 – 1973) was the initiator of name "Irian" in place of "Papua" in a conference held by the Dutch government in Malino (a city situated in the eastern Makassar City, South Sulawesi. He also suggested to all conference participants that the Nieuw Guinea region to form a Residency-level government separated from Maluku and Tidore.

Subsequently, upon officially joined the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with Act of Free Choice (PEPERA) in 1969, the Papua region officially changed its name to Irian Jaya Province with the capital of Jayapura. During such time, Irian Jaya Province was led by 7 (seven) governors in sequence based on its period, plus 1 (one) transitional governor. Since the name of Irian Jaya Province was reinstated to Papua Province during

the era of President Abdulrahman Wachid (Gus Dur), and 1 (one) Acting Governor (Caretaker) appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Governors who have served in Papua Province were as follows.

1) *Acub Zaenal* (1973 -1975), his name was marked to the land of Papua since it changed to Irian Jaya Province on March 1, 1973. Although only for 2 (two) years served as governor, he had performed many impressive activities, some of which were monumental works.

He has established a foundation with building spirit that made impression to hearts and minds of Irian Jaya people for limitless period of time. In addition, he succeeded in changing the image of Irian Jaya people to be equal with Indonesian people. The abandonment was accelerated by various development programs and changed the face of Jayapura as the capital of province. These efforts comprised of: building Mandala sports stadium, widening roads, arranging slum areas in several places, building housing estate for civil servants, building the Cenderawasih Sports Building, organizing soccer teams and other sports in promoting the name Irian Jaya in place of West Irian both at national and inter-regional levels in Indonesia, as well as building a magnificent governor's office to replace governor's office which was built during the era of van Baal as a masterpiece of the existence of the Unitary State of Indonesia from Irian Jaya to Papua.

At the start of his office as Governor, Acub Zaenal set 3 (three) economic and social development goals of Irian Jaya, i.e.: first, improving the economic and social life of Irian Jaya people, so that they can shortly establish strong economic and social foundations for the next-stage development in line with other Indonesian regions; secondly, supporting the accelerated realization of national economic and social unity within the framework of archipelago; third, improving the standard of living and welfare of all Irian Jaya people.

2) *Soetran* (1975 – 1979), elected as the second Governor of Irian Jaya Province, he divided Irian Jaya into 5 (five) Regional Developments which were continued by subsequent Governors. Soetran underlaid development area division on transportation sector which is connected to several growth points. Regional Development I is Jayapura and its surroundings as the center of government administration coordinating governmental, cultural, political and development activities. Development Area II is Sorong and Fak-Fak in western

Irian Jaya. Sorong is the center of the tenth economic development area for Maluku and Irian Jaya. Regional Development III is Merauke which is geographically isolated area in Irian Jaya, potentially for rice fields and livestock business development, as well as the fishery sector. Development area IV is Cenderawasih Bay and Yapen Waropen, potentially for agriculture, transmigration settlement besides Jayapura, Sorong and Merauke. Development Area V is Jayawijaya and the central mountains of Irian Jaya which require extra development management for improving economic, social and cultural life. All of them are possible if it open access for land transportation connecting to residential areas to and from the government capital. In addition, the opened access to land transportation is expected in motivating rational way of thinking in an agrarian society and enabling more empowerment.

3) *Busiri Suryowinoto* (1979 – 1982), elected as the third Governor of Irian Jaya Province, he started implement its strategy to place 9 (nine) native Irian Jaya people as echelon II officials within the environment of Local Government of Irian Jaya Province, out of 14 (fourteen) available structural positions. The 9 (nine) officials called as Indonesian native from Irian. Another strategic policy of Governor Busiri was to implement national government programs, i.e. transmigration from Java, Bali Island and spontaneous transmigrants from other islands. The coming of transmigrants from outside Irian Jaya is expected to bring positive impact on economic activities improvement to indigenous people of Irian Jaya and is able to reduce separatist ideology in the community. This transmigration program was then continued by Deputy Governor Izaak Hindom, in replacement of Governor Busiri, who has demised before the expiry of his term of office.

4) *Izaak Hindom* (1982 – 1983 and 1984 – 1988), as aforesaid, he continued the remaining term of office Governor Busiri and was then elected for period of 1984-1988 as the fourth Governor of Irian Jaya. He was known as vocal governor and continued the transmigration program during the era of Governor Busiri, for which he was known as "the Governor of Transmigration". He considered the indigenous people of Irian Jaya were not as developed as others people in Indonesian region, which development is assessed from the productivity contributing funds for governmental activities by themselves. Irian

Jaya people have to build themselves. Local government only motivates public awareness to build. He also believed that if the transmigrants resided massively in Irian Jaya, the central government will pay attention to Irian Jaya more seriously. In addition, the presence of these transmigrants is expected to raise local economy, transfer of technology and culture transformation to local communities.

Governor Hindom made a spatial policy by changing development division during the era of Governor Soetran into only 4 (four) regions, namely: 1. Jayapura and Jayawijaya to Development Area I, with a view to Jayapura would expand to Jayawijaya. Development priority is on development of economic support zones and efforts to solve regional isolation and develop inland areas, adjacent to neighboring Papua New Guinea; 2. Development Area II is Cenderawasih Bay, with focus on development of sea transportation/transportation, local development through transmigration in Manokwari and Nabire Regencies, unlock isolation for Yapen Waropen Regency and the Paniai hinterland; 3. Development Area III is Sorong and Fak-Fak with focus on export development and growth, economic support zones improvement, and thus the priority sectors are fisheries, plantations, transmigration, transportation and mining; and 4. Development Region IV is Merauke, with focus on efforts to improve agricultural production, livestock, transmigration, irrigation, and land transportation infrastructure.

In addition, he also tried to eliminate the use of the term "native" for native Irian Jaya as "native Indonesian from Irian Jaya", in order to eliminate the dichotomy between the indigenous Irian Jaya people and the migrants/transmigrants from other Indonesian islands. However, it does not mean that during his era everything went smoothly. He was challenged by political situation that made him in difficult situation to perform his duties as governor, when there were a large number of border crossings by the indigenous Irian Jaya people to neighboring country, Papua New Guinea. This condition was triggered by rumor that transmigration were "Javanization and Islamization" in Irian Jaya territory and people, plus the pan of "Melanesian Brotherhood Solidarity". In addressing the situation, Governor Izaak Hindom had proposed verbally to the central government (President Soeharto) to make expansion to Irian Jaya into 3 (three) provinces. However, the proposal for

province expansion was not possible at that time, due to relative small population and insufficient regional capabilities.

5) *Barnabas Suebu* (1988 – 1993), formerly as the Chairman of DPRD of Irian Jaya Province for period of 1982 – 1987 and in 1987 – 1992 was elected through DPRD elections led by him. He was not reluctant to say "Irian Jaya likes a sleeping giant, it would be fatal, if he lost control, therefore it must be managed properly" so he combines business sector concept and government. Investments involving the land owners created the concept of "equity empowerment" which starts from ownership of joint shares in Hotel Biak Beach Marauw, although this project in the end did not go as expected since the political and economic behavior of cross-regional business actors. His other spectacular policies are the Remote Area Allowance in Irian Jaya, Assistance for Villages and the Goes to Village (Turdes) program to communicate in person about their needs and satisfaction level with government services directly to the Governor, so that the Governor can identify the characteristics of community in order to conduct governmental duties, development and community empowerment.

6) *Jacob Pattipi* (1993 – 1998), the former Chairman of the Bappeda of Irian Jaya Province during the era of Governor Barnabas Suebu. He was also a native Irian Jaya who held this prestigious position for 12 years. During his era, he did not make a spectacular breakthrough like former Governors. However, he was successful to invite the President of the Republic of Indonesia to visit Irian Jaya Province 3 times within short time lapse, first for the launching of main harvest in Merauke Regency, and the second for construction of "Trans-Irian" road network, which was previously initiated by Governor Barnabas.Suebu, and transmigration settlements, and the third for the construction of New Town Tembagapura under the name "Kuala Kencana". Along with his achievements, there are various unresolved conflicts on human rights and the transfer of property rights / local assets through "ruislag" at an unjust price to authorities with irrational considerations. In addition, there is also administrative and bureaucratic uncertainty to personnel placement, career paths, and others.

7) *Freddy Numbery* (1998 – 2000), although only temporarily served as Governor of the Irian Jaya Province, he was successful in reducing conflict and

a long separatist movement in Papua by facilitating a Team of 100 Papuan Delegations consisting of traditional, religious, community, women, youth and figures who was vocal to speak up for separation from the Republic of Indonesia to Jakarta to hold a dialogue with central government (President BJ Habibie) in order to deliver demands of Irian Jaya people on "Return to Papuan independence-sovereignty, in accordance with 1 December 1961 declaration). This demand was then responded with regional expansion by Law Number 45 of 1999 on the Establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. During its course, the Law Number 45 of 1999, it brought pros and cons among the community and political elites in Papua, and accordingly regional expansion, especially Central Papua Province, was still pending.

Government Period in Papua Province

- 1) *Jacobus Pervidya Solossa (2001 – 2006)*, was the last Governor elected by People's Representative Council of Papua Province as for the former Governors, and also the last Governor of Irian Jaya Province before officially changing its name to Papua Province. During his era, J.P. Solossa continued the efforts initiated by Governor Freddy Numbery by keep facilitating Jakarta-Papua conflict through a dialogue to special autonomy status for Papua stipulated under Law No. 21 of 2001 on November 21, 2001. He argued that "special autonomy for Papua is the best alternative". His era was challenging, since he had to start to implement Papua's special autonomy, and he was also faced with delayed plan for regional expansion. Nevertheless, he has implemented development strategy with different development model and his side on Papuan people's life, or that is to say, he has begun to establish foundation for Papuan people to be the master in their country.
- 2) *Barnabas Suebu (2006 – 2011)*, as aforesaid, he served as the Governor of Irian Jaya for period of 1998 – 1993 who was elected through the election of Local People's Representatives Council of Irian Jaya Province. Unlike government period after Special Autonomy status for Papua Province; he was elected together with the Deputy Governor of Papua through Regional Head Election (Pilkada). As he continued his development program as in the

first era as governor, by restoring Trans-Irian infrastructure program in second era. He also issued RESPEK Fund Program (Strategic Village Development Plan), a people's movement for promoting the spirit of self-development. Developments with the spirit of building human dignity, since development in essence begin with people and end the people. Projects for each Regional Apparatus Organization Unit (SKPD) must be supportive for people so that they can develop independently. We must be pro-people. People seem poor, helpless and the bureaucracy is busy with their projects. How do we stand? Thus, people have to be respected and respect to people means people empowerment. There are many pros and cons in the course of Respect Program since it is considered only donation to corrupt village community, but he tried to convince the opposition to the program by preparing regulations served as technical guidelines for program, such as fund distribution mechanism, use method and mechanism for reporting fund used. According to him, people must be trusted and respected. When the fund distributed by the government, then people is capable of manage the fund. It's like saying "if we can, then you can, who said you can't, from incapable to capable. In the future it is expected turns to a culture".

- 3) *Lukas Enembe (2013 – 2018) dan (2018 – 2023)*, was the second elected governors through Regional Head general election and inaugurated on April 9, 2013 before thousands of Papuans at Mandala Jayapura Stadium. He emphasized that now is the time for the giant Papuan to wake up. We must uphold the dignity of Papua. We had to find a win-win solution for all parties. We had to struggle for people's wellbeing. Even single rupiah falling on this land must be used wisely for better life of Papuan. For this reason, a new policy is required to manage development in Papua, i.e., a policy for all Papuans, in line with the vision "for the awakened, independent and prosperous Papua "

The first strategic breakthrough taken by Papua Governor, Lukas Enembe, was to organize the framework of Papua development plan. Since the Special Autonomy in 2001, Papua Province has not had a long-term development plan (RPJP). However, in his first six months as Papua Governor, Lukas Enembe has succeeded in setting a scenario for the 2005-2025 Papua Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP) and also a provincial

spatial plan (RTRW) for Papua 2013-2033, in order to renew the RTRW Papua in 1993. With distinctive and diverse socio-cultural characteristics, Lukas Enembe initiated approach based on five (5) customary areas in national and regional development strategies. With the support from government of Papua Province, Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas finally adopted five customary areas in Papua, i.e *Saireri area* (Cenderawasih Bay Islands), *Mamta* (Mamberamo to Jayapura and its surroundings), *Mee Pago* (Central Mountains centered in Paniai and its surroundings), *Laa Pago* (Central Mountains centered on Jayawijaya and its surroundings) and *Anim Ha* (southern region centered on Merauke and its surroundings). This customary area-based approach has been accommodated in the 2015-2019 National RPJM. More over, he also provided an affirmative scholarship program for indigenous Papuan peoplen people to continue their education both domestic and abroad with funds sourced from APBD of Papua Province.

Government Period in West Papua Province

West Papua Province was originally part of Papua Province and was used to be called as West Irian Jaya. It had status under Law Number 45 of 1999 on October 4, 1999 on the establishment of West Irian Jaya Province, Central Irian Jaya Province, Mimika Regency, Paniai Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. This law was supported by Decree of DPRD of Irian Jaya Province Number 10 of 1999 regarding the expansion of Irian Jaya Province into three administrations. Upon being ratified on October 1, 1999 by President B.J. Habibie, the law was challenged by Papuan people in Jayapura by holding large demonstrations on October 14 and November 11, 1999. Accordingly, the province expansion was pending, but Regencies expansion was still executed according to the law.

After a year, in 2002, West Irian Jaya people, represented by Team 315, went to President Megawati Soekarnoputri to request the reinstatement of West Irian Jaya Province. The request was then replied by Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 1 of 2003, with acting governor (caretaker) Brigadier General, Marines Abraham Octavinus Tururi. Since then, the West Irian Jaya Province gradually shaped it self into definitive province. During the process, West Irian Jaya Province received strong pressure from its parent province, the Papua

Province, this defence was brought up to the Constitutional Court by a judicial review. Despite the Constitutional Court finally annulled Law Number 45 of 1999, as legal umbrella basis for West Irian Jaya Province. However, the existence of West Irian Jaya Province is still recognized and continues to equip its government apparatus and systems.

Slowly but surely, upon having a definitive territory, population, government apparatus, budget, DPRD members, then West Irian Jaya Province officially obtained full definitive when holding the Regional Head General Election (Pilkada), and those elected as the definitive governor and deputy governor for period of 2006 - 2011 was Abraham Octavianus Atururi and Drs. Rahimin Katjong, M.Ed who was inaugurated on July 24, 2006. The first governor in West Irian Jaya Province was Abraham Octavianus Atururi (2006 - 2011) and was re-elected for next period (2012 - 2017). Since then, conflicts on the legitimacy of the status of West Irian Jaya Province have occurred for approximately 6 years since the enactment of Law Number 45 of 1999 and the expiry of Presidential Instruction Number 1 of 2003. West Irian Jaya Province started to legally establish based on Government Regulation (PP) Number 24 of 2007 on April 18 2007 and officially changed its name as instructed by its parent province to West Papua Province. As the expanded Papua Province, West Papua Province also received special autonomy status by the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with TAP MPR RI Number IV/MPR/1999 concerning State Policy Outlines 1999-2004 Chapter IV letter (g) number 2 (two), and followed up by TAP MPR RI Number VIII/MPR/2000. Currently, West Papua Province is led by its second Governor Drs. Dominggus Mandacan and Drs. Mohammad Lakotani, M.Si (2017 – 2022).

2.2. GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF PAPUA

2.2.1 PAPUA PROVINCE

Papua Province is astronomically situated between 2⁰25' North Latitude - 9⁰0' South Latitude and 130⁰ -141⁰ East Longitude. The geographical position of Papua Province is adjacent to following:

- Northern Area is adjacent to Pacific Ocean;
- Southern Area is adjacent to Laut Arafuru;

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- Western Area is adjacent to West Papua Province; and
- Eastern Area is adjacent to Papua New Guinea.

The capital of Papua Province is Jayapura City, serving as government and economic center.









Figure 3. Map of Papua Province
















(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province)

The total area of Papua Province is 316.553,07 KM², consist of 28 Regencies and 1 City. The widest Regency is Merauke at a width of 47.406,90 KM², meanwhile Supiori is smallest Regency at a width of 634, 24 KM². Details of Regency and City in Papua Province are as follows:



Table 3. Name of Regency / City in Papua Province

No.	Regency/City and legal basis for its establishment	Capital	Total Area (KM2) Percentage (%)	Total population (2018)	District	Logo
1.	Asmat Regency Law No. 26/2002	Agats	24.687,57 7,80	92.909	19	
2.	Biak Numfor Regency Law No. 12/1969	Biak	13.017,45 4,11	144.697	19	
3.	Boven Digoel Regency Law No. 26/2002	Tanah Merah	24.665,98 7,79	66.209	20	
4.	Deiyai Regency Law No. 55/2008	Tigi	2.325,88 0,73	72.206	5	
5.	Dogiyai Regency Law No. 8/2008	Kigamani	4.522,15 1,43	94.997	10	
6.	Intan Jaya Regency Law No. 54/2008	Sugapa	9.336,60 2,95	48.318	8	
7.	Jayapura Regency Law No. 12/1969	Sentani	14.390,16 4,55	125.975	19	
8.	Jayawijaya Regency Law No. 12/1969	Wamena	2.331,19 0,74	212.811	40	
9.	Keerom Regency Law No. 26/2002	Waris	9.015,03 2,85	55.018	11	
10.	Kepulauan Yapen Regency Law No. 12/1969	Serui	4.936,37 1,56	95.007	16	
11.	Lanny Jaya Regency Law No. 5/2008	Tiom	3.439,79 1,09	176.687	39	
12.	Mamberamo Raya Regency Law No. 19/2007	Burmeso	28.034,87 8,86	22.313	8	
13.	Mamberamo Tengah Regency Law No. 3/2008	Kobakma	3.384,14 1,07	47.487	5	

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14.	Mappi Regency Law No. 26/2002	Kepi	23.178,45 7,32	94.671	15	
15.	Merauke Regency Law No. 12/1969	Merauke	40.406,90 14,98	223.389	20	
16.	Mimika Regency Law No. 45/1999	Timika	2.300,37 0,73	210.413	18	
17.	Nabire Regency Law No. 12/1969	Nabire	4.549,75 1,44	145.101	15	
18.	Nduga Regency Law No. 6/2008	Kenyam	5.825,22 1,84	97.012	32	
19.	Paniai Regency Law No. 45/1999	Enarotali	20.686,54 6,53	170.193	23	
20.	Pegunungan Bintang Regency Law No. 26/2002	Oksibil	14.655,36 4,63	73.473	34	
21.	Puncak Regency Law No. 7/2008	Ilaga	5.618,84 1,78	107.822	25	
22.	Puncak Jaya Regency Law No. 45/1999	Kotamulia	2.446,50 0,77	123.591	26	
23.	Sarmi Regency Law No. 26/2002	Sarmi	13.965,58 4,41	38.210	10	
24.	Supiori Regency Law No. 35/2003	Sorendiwari	634,24 0,20	19.104	5	
25.	Tolikara Regency Law No. 26/2002	Karubaga	6.149,67 1,94	136.576	46	
26.	Waropen Regency Law No. 26/2002	Botawa	5.381,47 1,70	29.480	11	
27.	Yahukimo Regency Law No. 26/2002	Sumohai	15.057,90 4,76	187.021	51	

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28.	Yalimo Regency Law No. 4/2008	Elelim	3.658,76 1,16	60.822	5	
29.	Jayapura City Law No. 6/1993	Jayapura	950,38 0,30	293.690	5	

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province)

The geographical conditions of Papua Province are varied, mostly covered by wide flat plains and swamps. However, there are areas located at a height between 1550 - 1770 ASL, i.e. Jayawijaya and Paniai Regency. Meanwhile, the other Regencies and cities ranges from 3 – 88 ASL, as shown in the following table:

Table 4. Name of Regency/ City by height

No.	Name of Regency/ City	Height (dpl)
1.	Merauke Regency	3
2.	Kepulauan Yapen Regency	3
3.	Mimika Regency	3
4.	Jayapura City	3
5.	Regency Nabire	10
6.	Biak Numfor Regency	11
7.	Jayapura Regency	88
8.	Jayawijaya Regency	1550
9.	Paniai Regency	1770

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province).

A number of large rivers flow through Regency areas in Papua Province and comes into the Pacific Ocean and Arafuru Sea. The rivers include Baliem River in Jayawijaya Regency (80 KM); Digoel River in Boven Digoel Regency (546 KM); Bian/Mbian River in Merauke Regency (580.6 KM); Lorentz River in Mimika Regency; Mamberamo River in the Mamberamo Raya Regency (670 KM); Torasi River in Merauke Regency; Merauke/Maro River in Merauke Regency (207 KM).

The climate condition in Papua Province is tropical with various rainfalls in each region. Meanwhile, the utilized land condition in Papua Province is about 100,000 Ha out of 410,660 KM². The soil is sedimentary rocks filled with minerals, lime and quartz. Most of land surface are slopes and cliffs. There are 10 dominant types of soil in Papua Province i.e organosol, alluvial, litosol, gray hydromorph, resina, red-yellow mediterranean, latosol, red-yellow podsol, red-gray podsol, and podsol. The flora and fauna in Papua Province are endemic and generally have similarities to the flora on the Australian

continent. Flora in Papua Province includes auranlaris, librocolnus, grevillea, ebny-dium. While the fauna, including paradise, wallaby, cassowary, and mambruk.

The indigenous people of Papua Province are Melanesian race, with population demographic conditions of Papua Province according to projection result of Papua Province poulation in 2017 by 3,265,202 million, with largest population in Jayapura City amounting to 293,690 and smallest population in Supiori Regency, totalling 19,104. On average, the population density in Papua Province is 10.31 KM². It means that one KM² of Papua Province is occupied by 10.

The population growth rate in 2017 compared to 2010 was 1.93 percent, while the population growth rate in 2017 compared to 2016 was 1.70 percent. Moreover, the composition of male in Papua Province is higher than female. The percentage of female population is 47.37 percent or 1,546,689 populations. The sex ratio in Papua Province in 2017 was 111.11. It means that out of 100 female populations, there were 111 male populations. Meanwhile, the population range by age and sex group in Papua Province dominated by group of productive age between 20 to 65 years is around 1,979.5 million, while group of potential age between 0-19 years is around 1,285.7 million, as described in table below:

Table 5. Total Population by Age and Sex Group in Papua Province of 2017

Age Group	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
0 - 4	168,4	164,7	333,1
5 - 9	163,8	158,7	322,5
10 - 14	164,5	151,6	316,1
15 - 19	167,6	146,4	314,0
20 - 24	165,3	146,0	311,3
25 - 29	156,6	145,5	302,1
30 - 34	145,1	136,6	281,7
35 - 39	138,7	130,8	269,5
40 - 44	132,7	122,5	255,2
45 - 49	113,7	95,6	209,3
50 - 54	86,2	64,7	150,9
55 - 59	55,4	39,5	94,9
60 - 64	30,7	21,5	52,2
65+	29,8	22,6	52,4
Total	1.718,5	1.546,7	3.265,2

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province).

Due to various geographical condition in Papua Province, it is surely affected the population's source of living. The indigenous Papuan people are mostly gathering, which is a combination of farming (tiller), hunting, and fishing, which the results are not in large scale and are only consumed for families. People working in this field are 1,163,328. In addition, community, social, and individual services are also the second largest employment in Papua Province totalling 231,233.

Based on Survey results made by National Employment Survey (SAKERNAS) in 2017, the population aged above 15 in Papua Province was 2,291,111. The Employment Participation Rate (TPAK) in Papua Province in 2017 was 76.94 percent. TPAK for male (85.28 percent) was higher than TPAK for female (67.45 percent). In addition, the unemployment rate in Papua Province was 3.62 percent. Employed population in Papua Province in 2017 was 1,699,071. Meanwhile, total open unemployment was 63,770. In 2017, the Manpower and Population Services of Papua Province recorded that there were 4,548 job seekers in Papua Province, dominated by 2,438 male. Furthermore, most of the job seekers (25.70 percent) are high school graduates.

Table 6. Total Registered Job Seekers by Graduated Educational level and Sex in Papua Province of 2017

Highest Graduated Educational level	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Not Schooling/Never attended School	0	0	0
Drop out/Not complete Elementary School	715	436	1.151
Elementary School	127	120	247
Lower Secondary School	169	100	269
Upper Secondary School	711	458	1.169
Vocational Upper Secondary School	356	207	563
Diploma I / II / III / Academy	134	368	502
University	226	421	647
Total	2.238	2.110	4.548

(Source: Manpower Services on Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics Papua Province).

Table 7. Type of Job Performed by the People of Papua Province


Type of Job	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Self-employed	161.745	75.827	237.572
Employer assisted by temporary worker	427.670	93.170	520.840
Employer assisted by permanent worker	14.404	1.731	16.135
Civil Servant / Employee	263.290	91.073	354.363
Freelance	17.067	1.876	18.943
Unpaid family worker	115.134	436.084	551.218
Total	999.310	699.761	1.699.071

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province).

Education

In 2017, the percentage of school population aged 7-24 years in Papua Province recorded at 63.43 percent while the remaining 14.86 percent and 21.71 percent were population who was not schooling/never attended school and drop out. In the same period, the Net Enrollment Ratio (APM) in Papua Province for elementary school (SD) was 78.83 percent. This percentage was declining at every educational level, and thus the lowest NER was at high school (SMA)/Vocational High School (SMK) level by 43.48 percent. The same pattern also shown for the Gross Enrollment Rate (GER), the GER for SD was 92.94 percent and decreased to the GER for SMA/SMK/MA/or equivalent, by 67.94 percent.

Figure 4. Net Enrollment Ratio (NER) And Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) Diagram by Educational Level in Papua Province, 2017



Health

In 2016, Health facilities in Papua Province were dominated by Integrated Healthcare Center (Integrated Healthcare Center) by 3,085 units, while total hospitals in Papua Province were 36 units. The highest number of hospitals was Jayapura City by 7 units. Health workers in Papua Province in 2016 were nursing personnel by 5,744. In 2017, BCG immunization was the most immunization received by toddlers in Papua Province, by 88.17 percent. Meanwhile, 62.62 percent of toddlers received measles/morbili immunizations were the lowest percentage compared to other immunizations.

Table 8. Total health facilities at Regency/City Papua Province of 2017

Regency / City	Hospital	Maternity Hospital	Care Center	Sub-Care Center	Integrated Health Center	Clinic / Health Center	Village Delivery House
Merauke	3	20	145	219	219	-	80
Jayawijaya	1	13	34	91	91	-	5
Jayapura	1	19	61	196	196	-	35
Nabire	1	26	25	240	240	-	28
Kepulauan Yapen	1	13	61	127	127	-	28
Biak Numfor	3	18	51	230	230	-	85
Paniai	1	18	8	86	86	-	9
Puncak Jaya	2	8	18	102	102	-	35
Mimika	4	13	36	87	87	-	13
Boven Digoel	2	20	20	84	84	-	10
Mappi	1	11	49	148	148	-	138
Asmat	1	13	43	124	124	-	33
Yahukimo	1	31	30	240	240	-	123
Pegunungan Bintang	1	29	11	106	106	-	92
Tolikara	1	25	24	86	86	-	-
Sarmi	1	9	27	71	71	-	36
Keerom	1	10	37	77	77	-	5
Waropen	-	10	25	70	70	-	8
Supiori	1	5	23	32	32	-	13
Mamberamo Raya	1	7	14	59	59	-	9
Nduga	-	8	6	32	32	-	-
Lanny Jaya	1	10	24	143	143	-	13
Mamberamo Tengah	-	5	9	16	16	-	87
Yalimo	-	7	15	57	57	-	18
Puncak	-	8	13	73	73	-	18
Dogiyai	-	10	21	79	79	-	14
Intan Jaya	-	6	12	17	17	-	2
Deiyai	-	10	-	33	33	-	16
Jayapura	7	12	26	160	160	-	14
Total	36	394	868	3.085	3.085	-	967

(Source: Health Services on Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province).

Religion

In 2017 Papua Province was dominated by Protestant Christians totalling 2,128,233. The second and third largest numbers were Catholic Christians, and Moslem, totalling of 841,990 and 632,201 respectively. In comparison to believer number, Protestant Christian churches were the

largest in Papua Province in 2017, by 5,105 units. Meanwhile, monastery was the smallest number in 2017, by 19 units.

Crime

In 2017, Papuan Local Police recorded that there were 8,042 crimes in Papua Province. This number has increased compared to the last three years. Crimes in 2016 were the lowest, by 7,648. Furthermore, 2015 was the lowest settlements, by 4.163 for the last three years and highest in 2018, by 5,694.

Other Social Issues

Based on data issued by Central Agency on Statistics 2018, the percentage of poor people in Papua Province increased by 0.14% in 2017, it was indicated by decrease in population monthly income per capita, which is below Rp. 440.021/capita/month. It means that an individual will be rated poor if his monthly income is less than the amount. Furthermore, the achievement of Human Development Index (HDI) of Papua Province reached 59.09. the achievement of HDI at Regency/City level in Papua Province in 2017 were quite variable.

Regency Nduga is the Regency with lowest HDI in Papua Province by 27.87 score. Subject to HDI component, the value for each component in Regency Nduga was the lowest compared to other regencies/cities in Papua Province which value of HDI component such as Life Expectancy rate (UHH) at birth were reached to age of 54.60. The Expected Years of Schooling Rate (HLS) was only about 2.64 years. It means that children with age of 7 in Regency Nduga have the opportunity to attend school for 2.64 years or only for grade 2 elementary school. Meanwhile, Average Years of Schooling Rate (RLS) was 0.71 years. It means that Regency Nduga residents with age of 25 and above have an average of 0.71 years of education or dropped out from grade 1 elementary school and the per capita expenditure price was adjusted (constant price 2012) by Rp. 3.97 million per year.

On the other hand, Jayapura City as the capital of Papua Province was the highest human development index, by 79.23 compared to other regencies in Papua Province. Based on knowledge and standar of living dimension, Jayapura City also hold the first position, which was indicated


with HLS by 14.98 years, RLS by 11.15 years, and adjusted per capita expenditure price (constant price 2012) up to Rp. 14.78 million per year, except for life expectancy and healthy living, the first position was hold by Mimika Regency with Life Expetancy at birth up to 71.93 years.

2.2.2. WEST PAPUA PROVINCE

West Papua Province is astronomically situated at 24°-132° East Longitude and 0°- 4° South Latitude, below the equator line at a height of 0-100 meter above sea level. Based on its geographical position, West Papua Province has boundaries with the following:

- Nothern Area is adjacent to Pacific Ocean;
- Southern Area is adjacent to Banda Sea, Maluku Province;
- Western Area is adjacent to Seram Sea, Maluku Province;
- Eastern Area is adjacent to Papua Province.

Figure 5. Map of West Papua Province



(Source: West Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of West Papua Province).

West Papua Province areas are 7.95% of mountain peaks, 18.73% of valleys. The rest of more than half areas are stretch area. All regencies/cities in West Papua are adjacent to sea, but only 37.04% of villages are located in








coastal areas. The rest of village areas are not adjacent to sea (not at coast), by 62.96%. The total area of West Papua Province reaches 102,955.15 KM².

West Papua Province, originally called as West Irian Jaya, was established in accordance with Law Number 45 of 1999 on the Establishment of West Irian Jaya Province, Central Irian Jaya Province, Mimika Regency, Paniai Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. However, provincial expansion was definitively implemented by Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003 and changed its name to West Papua Province by Government Regulation No. 24 of 2007. West Papua is a province with same special autonomy status as Papua Province. Administratively, West Papua Province consists of 13 (thirteen) autonomous regencies and cities. The Autonomous Region with largest area is Teluk Bintuni Regency with total area of approximately 20,840 KM² and the smallest is Sorong City (In accordance with Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 137 of 2017). The capital of West Papua Province is Manokwari as the capital of administration and economy.

Table 9. Name of Regency / Cityin West Papua Province

No.	Regency/City and legal basis for its establishment	Capital	Total area (KM ²) Percentage (%)	Total population (2018)	District	Logo
1.	Regency Fakfak Law No. 12/1969	Fakfak	14.320,00	84.692	17	
2.	Kaimana Regency Law No. 26/2002	Kaimana	16.241,84	61.370	7	
3.	Regency Manokwari Law No. 12/1969	Manokwari	3.186,28	185.615	9	
4.	Regency Manokwari Selatan Law No. 23/2012	Ransiki	2.812,44	34.009	6	
5.	Maybrat Regency Law No. 13/2009	Kumurke	5.461,69	41.431	24	
6.	Regency Pegunungan Arfak Law No. 24/2012	Anggi	2.773,74	36.818	10	

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7.	Regency Raja Ampat Law No. 26/2002	Waisai	8.034,44	62.861	24	
8.	Regency Sorong Law No. 12/1969	Aimas	6.544,23	118.98	30	
9.	Regency Sorong Selatan Law No. 26/2002	Teminabuan	6.594,31	57.676	15	
10.	Regency Tambrau Law No. 56/2008	Feb	11.529,18	28.978	29	
11.	Regency Teluk Bintuni Law No. 26/2002	Bintuni	20.840,83	76.932	24	
12.	Regency Teluk Wondama Law No. 26/2002	Rasiei	3.959,53	41.304	13	
13.	Sorong City Law No. 45/1999	Sorong	656,64	275.618	10	

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of Papua Province).

The topographical condition of West Papua Province varies ranging from lowlands, swamps to highlands, covered by tropical rain forests, grasslands and grasslands. The heights in West Papua Province are from 0 to > 1000M. Inter-regional topographical conditions in West Papua Province are quite variable. Such conditions will be barrier for inter-regional transportation, especially land transportation, and thus served as the basis for land use policies. Morphological characters based on the eco-region of West Papua Province are dominated by folded mountains and denucidal hills.

The climate condition in West Papua Province is relatively same as Papua Province, tropical climate with various rainfalls in each region. Meanwhile, soil conditions in West Papua are almost same as Papua Province, which the land surfaces are cliffs and slopes. Soil types in West Papua are latosol, resina, red and yellow mediterranean, podsol, red-yellow podsolic, red-gray podsolic, litosol, alluvia, gray hydromorph. The flora and fauna types in West Papua are quiet similar to the flora and fauna in Papua Province, the Australian type.

There are some huge lakes in the West Papua Province, among other things Ayamaru Lake and Hain/Uter Lake in Maybrat Regency; Anggi Giji Lake and Anggi Gida Lake in Arfak Mountain Regency; Sewiki Lake and Kamakawalor Lake in Kaimana Regency. Meanwhile, in West Papua Province there are a lot of rivers which amount 180 rivers, consisting of large rivers and creeks. However, only seven can be categorized as the largest and widest rivers i.e. Kamundan River (425 KM), Beraur River (360 KM), and Warsamsan River (320 KM), meanwhile the widest one include Kaibus River (80 – 2.700 M), Minika River (40-2,200 M), Karabra River (40-1,300 M), Seramuk river (45-1,250 M), and the Kamundan river (140-1,200 M). These rivers are mostly located in Regencies in development area of Sorong. Some of them are fastest currents, including Seramuk River (3.06 KM/hour), Kaibus River (3.06 KM/hour), Beraur River (2.95 KM/hour), Aifat River (2.88 KM/hour), and Karabra River (2.88 KM/hour). These rivers are situated in Kamundan Sebyar River and Omba River Areas, which are cross-provincial river areas.

Similarly to Papua Province, the indigenous people of West Papua Province are Melanesian, with a relative low population density. Based on projection result, West Papua population is 915,361 in 2017, consisting of 481,939 male residents and 433,422 female residents. The total population increased by 3.16% if compared to 2016 which was only 893,362. Meanwhile, the Sex ratio in West Papua Province in 2017 was 111.19. It can be interpreted that in 100 female residents there are 111 male residents. The population density in West Papua in 2017 is 8/KM². The highest population density is Sorong City by 365/KM² and the lowest density is Teluk Wondama Regency by 1 person/KM². Sorong City is the largest population, amounting to 239,815, followed by Manokwari Regency by 166,780 and Sorong Regency 84,906. The largest population of West Papua is 0 - 4 year age group, it means that the composition of young population is relative high that government policies are needed regarding toddler health and education.

Table 10. Total Population by Age and Sex group in West Papua Province 2017

Age Group	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
0 - 4	52.437	50.265	102.702
5 - 9	50.216	47.347	97.724
10 - 14	47.159	44.565	91.724
15 - 19	45.012	41.961	86.973
20 - 24	46.621	42.370	88.991
25 - 29	48.133	42.811	90.944
30 - 34	45.810	40.826	86.636
35 - 39	38.806	33.454	72.260
40 - 44	31.600	26.728	58.328
45 - 49	25.358	21.333	46.691
50 - 54	19.044	15.997	35.041
55 - 59	13.454	10.918	24.372
60 - 64	8.666	6.756	15.422
65+	9.623	8.091	17.714
Total	481.939	433.422	915.361

(Source: West Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics West Papua Province).

Total population in West Papua categorized as workforce is 75,191, with highest level of education at high school level by 1901,694. Meanwhile, population categorized no schooling/never attended school is relatively high, reaching 75,191.

Table 11. Total Worker and open unemployment by graduated level of education and sex in Papua Province of 2017

Highest Graduated Educational level	Status		Total
	Worker	Open Unemployment	
Not Schooling/Never Attended School	74.321	870	75.191
Elementary School	63.712	1.729	65.441
Lower Secondary School	65.181	4.123	69.304
Upper Secondary School	92.387	9.307	101.694
Vocational Upper Secondary School	35.828	5.785	41.613
Diploma I / II / III / Academy	14.409	1.191	15.600
University	56.688	4.947	61.635
Total	402.526	27.952	

(Source: Manpower Services in West Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics)

Due to various geographical conditions of West Papua Province, it is greatly affected the population's source of living. The indigenous people in West Papua are not much different that the indigenous people in Papua Province, the majority are gathering, which is a combination of farming (tiller), hunting and fishing, which the results are not in large scale and are only consumed for families. People working in this field are 84,678 people. In addition, community, social, and individual services are also the second largest employment in West Papua Province totalling 250,458.

Table 12. Type of Job performed by the people of West Papua Province of 2017

Type of Job	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Self-employed	52.337	33.485	85.822
Employer assisted by temporary worker	49.463	20.596	70.059
Employer assisted by permanent worker	7.840	759	8.599
Civil Servant / Employee	110.141	45.896	156.037
Freelance	12.945	1.683	14.628
Unpaid family worker	17.408	49.973	67.381
Total	250.134	152.392	402.526

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of West Papua Province).

Education


The ratio between in school group with age of 7-12 years old is 97.27 percent, group with age of 13-15 years old (SMP/MTs equivalent) is 96.92 percent, group with age of is 16-18 years (equivalent to SMA/MA/SMK) is 80.60 percent and group with age of 19-24 years (higher education equivalent) is 31.92 percent. Overall, the population aged 7-24 years old who are in school is 74.59 percent.

Table 13. Total School-Age Populations by Age Group and School Enrollment in West Papua of 2017

School-age group	School Enrollment		
	Not Schooling/Never Attended School	In-School	Drop Out
7 - 12	2,58	97,27	0,15
13 - 15	0,32	96,92	2,75
16 - 18	1,16	80,60	18,24
19 - 24	1,90	31,92	66,18
7 - 24	1,78	74,59	23,64

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of West Papua Province).

Figure 6. Net Enrollment Ratio (NER) and Gross Enrollment Ratio (GRE) Chart by educational level in West Papua Province of 2017



(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of West Papua Province).

The gross enrollment rate for elementary school in West Papua in 2017 was recorded at 110.21 percent, the percentage above 100 percent indicates that there is still a comparison of group at elementary school level whose age exceeding the age for elementary school students (7-12 years). It occurred in all regencies/cities of West Papua. It means that educational inequality is still found in most of West Papua. Meanwhile, the net enrollment rate for Elementary School in West Papua Province in 2017 was recorded at 93.58 percent, it indicates that the proportion of population with age of 7-12 years attending school in proportion to their education level is 93.58 percent.

This figure substantiates the assumption that there are still many elementary school students with age of above 7-12 years old schools at that level. Several causing factors are the lack of awareness of importance of education for West Papua people, especially remote area residents. In addition, educational facilities and infrastructure are still insufficient and difficult access to schools is the reason that net enrollment rate is different to gross enrollment rates for elementary school. The number of elementary schools during period of 2017/2018 recorded at the Education Services of West Papua Province was

1,038 schools with a total of 135,930 students; 296 junior high schools by 47,563 students and 121 high schools by 26,452 students.

Health

The availability of adequate health facilities and services is required for improving community health and nutritional status. In 2017, there were 14 hospitals in all regencies/cities of West Papua. In addition, there are 154 Care Centers, 1,352 Integrated Healthcare Centers, and 319 Village Delivery Houses in each district. In order to fulfill the needs of public health services, in 2017 there were 370 doctors consisted of 131 specialists, 205 general practitioners, and 34 dentists. In 2017, the number of fertile age couples (PUS) in West Papua Province was 163,921 couples.

Table 14. Total Health Facilities in Regency / City of West Papua Province of 2017

Regency / City	Hospital	Maternity Hospital	Care Center	Sub-Care Center	Integrated Healthcare Center	Clinic / Health Center	Village Delivery House
Fakfak	1	-	10	-	147	-	48
Kaimana	1	-	8	-	90	-	33
Teluk Wondama	1	-	6	-	26	-	17
Teluk Bintuni	1	-	20	-	136	-	20
Manokwari	2	-	13	-	256	-	41
Sorong Selatan	1	-	15	-	106	-	19
Sorong	1	-	18	-	155	-	26
Raja Ampat	1	-	19	-	124	-	17
Tambrauw	-	-	10	-	9	-	3
Maybrat	-	-	14	-	67	-	19
Manokwari Selatan	-	-	4	-	64	-	68
Pegunungan Arfak	-	-	9	-	57	-	2
Kota Sorong	5	-	8	-	115	-	6
Total	14	-	154	-	1352	-	319

(Source: Book of Papua Province in Number 2018 published by Central Agency on Statistics of West Papua Province).

Religion

Based on data from the Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion of West Papua Province of 2017, the religion majority of West Papua Province is Protestant Christianity, by 636,362 (52.21 percent), followed by Islam 466,627 (38.28 percent), Catholic 111,186 (9.12 percent), Buddhists 2,418 (0.20 percent), and Hinduism 2,396 (0.20 percent). Meanwhile, the number of houses of worship facilities in West Papua in 2017 was recorded of 2,818 churches, 767 mosques/musholla, 16 temples and 6 monasteries.

Crime

The total reported crimes in the last three years was fluctuated but tended to increase from 3,393 reports in 2016 to 3,419 reports in 2017. However, the settlement for criminal acts by the police in 2017 increased by 21.04% if compared to the previous year 2016.

Poverty

Based on the results of the 2017 National Socio-Economic Survey (*Susenas*), the rate of West Papua Province poverty line in 2017 was IDR 499,778. Accordingly, total population categorized as poor in 2017 reached 228.38 thousand people or 25.10 percent of the total population of West Papua spread within 13 regencies/cities.

2.3. THE DIVERSITY OF SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES OF PAPUA PEOPLE

In the Anthropology literature, Papua is known as society consisting of ethnic groups and tribes with diverse cultures. According to the Cenderawasih University Research Team (1991), 44 ethnic groups have been identified, each of which is an independent community, culture and language unit. Most of the 44 ethnic groups were further divided into 177 tribes. According to Held (1951, 1953) and Van Baal (1954), the prominent feature of Papua is its cultural diversity, but in such diversity there are similarities in their cultural characteristics. The cultural differences exist in Papuan society are described in manifestations such as language, communication systems, economic life, religion, artistic expressions, political and social structures, as well as kinship system followed by these communities as manifested in their daily life.

Mientje De Roombiak (1993;1) divides Papuan cultures into 11 culture area categories by its ecology environment as mentioned below:

1. Culture area of resident living in living in Teluk Cenderawasih Coast Islands;
2. Culture area of resident living in North Coast;
3. Culture area of resident living in Raja Ampat Islands;
4. Culture area of resident living in Bintuni Bay; Fakfak and Kaimana;
5. Culture area of resident living in the Lowland Forest area (along Sentani Lake until coastal area to the border of PNG ;

6. Culture area of resident living in rivers and swamps area in the Southern Area of Papua;
7. Culture area of resident living in savanna areas along northern Merauke and Nimboran;
8. Culture area of resident living in southern foot hills of Jayawijaya mountains;
9. Culture area of resident living on the back of Jayawijaya mountain, Arfak and Ayamaru Lake area;
10. Culture area of resident living in land rivers area in Mamberamo-Rouffaer-Idenburg;
11. Culture area of Papua resident migrated to the city and coast.

Peter J. Silzer and Heija Heikinen Clouse (1991) divide Papuan culture by language into 251 languages. If it is mapped based on government administration in Papua Province and West Papua Province, the Papuan culture will be spread as follows:

Table 15. Map of Papuan Culture Division

No.	Regency	Culture	
1.	<i>Biak Numfor</i>	<i>1</i>	
2.	<i>Fakfak</i>	<i>21</i>	
		1. Arguni 2. Baham 3. Bedoanas 4. Buruwai 5. Erokwanas 6. Iha 7. Irarutu 8. Kamberau 9. Kamoro 10. Karas 11. Kowiai	12. Mairasi 13. Morl 14. Mer 15. Nabi 16. Nduga 17. Onin 18. Sekar 19. Semimi 20. Sempan 21. Uruangnirin
3.	<i>Jayapura</i>	<i>85</i>	
		1. Airooran 2. Anus 3. Awyi 4. Baguasa 5. Bapu 6. Baso 7. Bauzi 8. Berik 9. Betaf 10. Biritai 11. Bonerif 12. Bonggo 13. Burmeso 14. Dabe 15. Dabra 16. Demta	43. Masimasi 44. Masep 45. Mawes 46. Mekwei 47. Molof 48. Morwap 49. Nafri 50. Narau 51. Nimboran 52. Nopuk 53. Obukuitai 54. Ormu 55. Orya 56. Papasena 57. Pauwi 58. Podena

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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 17. Dera 18. Doutai 19. Dubu 20. Emumu 21. Eritai 22. Foau 23. Foya 24. Gresi 25. Isirawa 26. Itik 27. Kai 28. Kapitiau 29. Kapori 30. Kaure 31. Kauwerawek 32. Kayu Pulo 33. Keder 34. Kentuk 35. Kwansu 36. Kwerba 37. Kwerisa 38. Kwesten 39. Liki 40. Mander 41. Manem 42. Marengi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 59. Samarokena 60. Sangke 61. Sause 62. Senggi 63. Sentani 64. Sikaritai 65. Skow 66. Sobei 67. Tabla 68. Taikat 69. Tarpia 70. Taworta 71. Tobati 72. Tofanma 73. Towei 74. Turu 75. Usku 76. Waina 77. Wakde 78. Warembori 79. Wares 80. Waris 81. Waritai 82. Yafi 83. Yamna 84. Yarsun 85. Yoki
4.	<i>Jayawijaya</i>	27	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Biksi 2. Dani (Grand Valley) 3. Dani (Western) 4. Eipomek 5. Hupla 6. Kembra 7. Ketengban 8. Kimki 9. Kimyal 10. Kopka 11. Kosare 12. Lepki 13. Momuna 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 14. Mukim 15. Narca 16. Nduga 17. Ngalum 18. Nggem 19. Nipsan 20. Pyu 21. Silimo 22. Tofanma 23. Una 24. Walak 25. Yale 26. Yali 27. Yetfa
5.	<i>Manokwari</i>	19	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Arandai 2. Dusner 3. Hatam 4. Irarutu 5. Kaburi 6. Kemberano 7. Maibrat 8. Mantion 9. Meoswar 10. Mer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Meyakh 12. Moskona 13. Mpur 14. Nabi 15. Ron 16. Tanah Merah 17. Tandia 18. Wandamen 19. Yeretuar
6.	<i>Merauke</i>	42	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Aghu 2. Asmat (Causarian Coast) 3. Asmat (Central) 4. Asmat (North) 5. Asmat (Yaosakor) 6. Atohwaim 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 22. Momuna 23. Moraori 24. Muyu (North) 25. Muyu (South) 26. Ndom 27. Nduga 28. Ninggerum

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		7. Awyu 8. Bian Marind 9. Citak 10. Iwur 11. Kanum 12. Kauwol 13. Kayagar 14. Kimaghama 15. Kombai 16. Koneraw 17. Korowai 18. Makleu 19. Mandobo 20. Marind 21. Mombun	29. Pisa 30. Riantana 31. Sawi 32. Siagha-Yenimu 33. Tamagario 34. Tamnim 35. Tsak Wambo 36. Wambon 37. Warkay-Bipim 38. Yair 39. Yaqhay 40. Yelmek 41. Yei 42. Yonggom
7.	<i>Paniai</i>	21	
		1. Auye 2. Damal 3. Dani (Western) 4. Dao 5. Dem 6. Duvle 7. Edopi 8. Ekari 9. Fayu 10. Iresim	11. Kirikiri 12. Moni 13. Mor 14. Nduga 15. Tarunggare 16. Tause 17. Turu 18. Wano 19. Waropen 20. Wolani 21. Yaur
8.	<i>Sorong</i>	22	
		1. Abun 2. As 3. Amber 4. Duriankere 5. Gebe 6. Kais 7. Kalabra 8. Karon Dori 9. Kokoda 10. Kawe 11. Konda	12. Legenyem 13. Maybrat 14. Moi 15. Matbat 16. Morait 17. Puragi 18. Salawati 19. Seget 20. Suabo 21. Tehit 22. Yahadian
9.	<i>Yapen Waropen</i>	28	
		1. Ambai 2. Ansus 3. Awera 4. Barapase 5. Bauzi 6. Burate 7. Busami 8. Demisa 9. Kufei 10. Kurudu 11. Marau 12. Munggumi 13. Nisa 14. Papama	15. Pom 16. Rasawa 17. Saponi 18. Sauri 19. Saweru 20. Serui laut 21. Tause 22. Tefaro 23. Warembori 24. Waropen 25. Woi 26. Woria 27. Woriassi 28. Yawa

Therefore, Papuan culture can be mapped by language using government administration approach, and there are approximately 266 cultures.

Table 16. List of Regency / City and total cultures in Papua

Regency	Total Cultures
Biak Numfor	1
Fakfak	21
Jayapura	85
Jayawijaya	27
Manokwari	19
Merauke	42
Paniai	21
Sorong	22
Yapen Waropen	28
Total	266 *

** Total cultures is not absolutely amounting to 266, since same culture can be situated in two, even up to three Regencies*

Even though the number of indigenous Papuan people were very small, but in terms of ethnicity and culture, they have very large diversity compared to any other people in island or province within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The diversity of ethnic groups in Papua was reflected in various cultural characteristics such as language, social organizational structure, leadership systems, religion and source of living systems in line with its ecological conditions. For clarity, it can be seen in the following details.

1. Language

In general, Papuan people are divided into two major groups based on the use of language. The two languages are Austronesian and Non-Austronesian. The languages belong to the first-mentioned language group are referred to as Papuan languages. These two languages served as parent languages which are included in the local languages found in Papua. The number of local languages in Papua as described above is around 251 languages (Silzer 1986), as reported by linguists working in Papua under the Summer Institute for Linguistics (SIL) organization. Since language is used as a means of communication between members group and also as a symbol to express group identity, each group or ethnic group of speakers of a particular language always distinguishes themselves from other language speakers group. Thus, in terms of language, there are approximately 251 ethnic groups, each of which feels different from other groups. The division of languages in Papua is based on the following 12 families:

1. Trans New Guinea Phylum

Languages belong to this category are Iwur, Muyu, Ninggerum, Yonggom, Kauwol, Ngalum, Awyu, Aghu, Pisa, Tsakwambo, Siagha-

yenimu, Mandobo, Wambon, Sawi, Korowai, Kombai, Asmat, Mombun, Koneraw, Momuna, Ekari, Wolani, Moni, Auye, Dao, Damal, Dani, Yali, KwerbaSaber, Samarokena, Masep, Mairasi, Sentani, Tabla, Nafri, Demta, Yei, Kanum, Maraori, Yelmek, Makleu, Kimam, Kayagar, Marind, Yaghay, Iha, Baham, Mor, Kemberano, Arandai, Kaburi, Puragi, Kais, Kokoda, Inawatan, Konda, Tor, Turu, Mawes, Uria, Sause, Keder, Awyi, Taikat, Waris, Manem, Senggi, Waina, Nimboran, Kentuk, Gresi, Kwansu, Dera, Dubu, Towe, Emumu, Yafi, Yali, Nipsan, Nalca, Kimyal, Eipomek, Ketengban, Morwab, Molof, Usku, Tofamna, Dem.

2. *West Papuan Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Tehit, Kalabra, Moi, Moraid, Seget, Abun (Karon), Maibrat, Mpur, Hattam.

3. *Geelvink Bay Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Bauzi, Tarungare, Barapasi, Kofei, Sauri, Bapu, Nisa, Tefaro, Demisa, Worja, Burate, Awera, Rasawa, Saponi and Yawa.

4. *East Birds Head Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Meyakh, Moskona, Mation.

5. *Sko Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Skow and Sangke.

6. *Kwomtari Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Phyu.

7. *Sepik-Ramu Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Bhiksy.

8. *Warembori Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Warembori.

9. *Taurap Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Burumeso.

10. *Pauwi Phylum*

Languages belong to this category are Pauwi.

11. *Unknown Papuan language classification*

Languages belong to this category are Duvle, Fayu, Kirikiri, Tause, Baso, Betaf, Foya, Yoki, Yair, Kimki, Murkim, Yepki, Kembra, Yetfa, and Saweru.

11. Austronesian Languages

Languages belong to this category are Arguni, Bedoanas, Erokwanas, Kowiai, onin, sekar, Uruangnirin, Anus, Bonggo, Kayu Pulau, Lik, Masi-masi, Ormu, Podena, Sobei, Tarpia, Tobati, Wakde, Yamna, Yarsun, Dusner, Irarutu, Meswar, Nabi, Ron, Tandia, Wandamen, Yeretuar, Biak, Ambai, Ansus, Busami, Kurudu, Marau, Munggui, Papuma, Pom, Serui Laut, Waropen, Woi, Woriassi, Mor2, Iresim, Yaur, Amber, Kawe, Legenyem, Matbat, Salawi, Gebe, and As.

2. Social Structure

The social structure in question Papua refers to social relations governing social life in a particular social unit. A form of citizen relationship based on kinship and manifested in the kinship system and inheritance principle. Understanding of kinship system to particular ethnic group is important, because these terms contain rights and obligations that must be obeyed by one family member to other members. These rights and obligations will be binding elements to unite citizens into a social unit. These binding elements are not always the same in different ethnic groups.

Based on anthropological studies conducted in Papua, Power (1966), shown in his classification that Papuan people can be divided into at least four groups according to the adhered kinsip system:

1. Iroquois Type

Society belong to this type classifies paralell cousin as in term of siblings, in contrast to term for cross cousins. Another characteristic used for characterizing the system is the use of same term to call father or all father's male siblings and all mother's male siblings. Ethnic groups belong to this group are Biak, Iha, Waropen, Senggi, Marind-Anim, Humboldt Bay and Mee/Ekari people.

2. Hawaiian Type.

Is grouping system using uses same term to call siblings and all cross and parallel cousins. Ethnic groups belonging to the system are Mairasi, Mimika, Hatam-Manikion, Asmat, Kimam and Sarmi East Coast people.

3. Omaha Type.

Is a system classifying matrilineal and patrilineal cross cousins with different terms and terms for cross cousins are influenced by generation levels and are asymmetrical, so that term for mother's male sibling (MBS) refers to mother's male sibling (MB) and term for female father's male sibling (FZS) refers to father's sister female son (ZS). Ethnic groups belong to this group are Awyu, Dani, Meybrat, Mek people in the Bintang mountains and Muyu people.

4. Iroquois-Hawaiian Type.

Ethnic groups belong to this type are Bintuni, Tor, and Pantai Barat Sarmi (Pouwer, 1966).

Except for Papuan population classification by kinship system mentioned above, it can also be distinguished based on inheritance principle followed or recognized by Papuan people. There are three principles of inheritance recognized by Papuan people:

1. Patrilineality Principle.

This principle is recognized and followed by Meybrat, Mee, Dani, Biak, Waropen, Wandamen, Sentani, Marind-Anim dan Nimboran people.

2. Bilateral Principle.

This principle is recognized and followed by Sarmi in community.

3. Ambilateral or Ambilineal Principle; This principle followed by Mimika, Mapi dan Manikion people. (De Bruijn 1959:11;cf. Van der Leeden 1954; Pouwer 1966).

In addition to the above characteristics, another characteristic served as distinguishing element is community classification principle into phatry or moety is recognized or not. Among Papuan people, there are community groups dividing their community into moety groups, for example, Asmat people (aipmu and aipem), Dani people (waita and waya), and waropen people (buriworay and buriferai) but there are also those do not recognize the principle, for example, Muyu and Biak people (Heider 1979, 1980; Mansoben 1974; Held 1947; Kamma 1972; Schoorl 1957).

3. Customary Rights

The plurality of Papuan people can also be identified in their customary rights. Among Papuan people, it can be classified into two categories of land title as follows:

1. There are ethnic collectives not only regulating the customary land rights system through clans, become communal. Ethnic groups belong to this category are Dani, Biak, Auwyu, Yawa and Waropen people.
2. There are also other collectives regulating customary rights through nuclear families or individual rights; ethnic groups belong to this category are Mee people (Pouwer 1970; Galis 1970; Schoorl 1970; Verschueren 1970; De Bruijn 1970; Ploeg 1970; cf. Lavalin International Inc. and PT Hasfarm Dian Consultant 1988).

4. Political System

Other pluralistic essential features are political systems or political leadership systems exist in Papuan people. To figure out traditional political systems recognized by Papuan people, Mansoben (1985) applies continuum model proposed by Sahlins (1963) to existing ethnographic data and has recorded four political systems or types. The four political systems or types are as follows:

1. *Big man System;*
2. *Kingdom System;*
3. *Ondoafi System*
4. *Mixed System*

The analytical model proposed by Sahlins (1963) is using a continuum line. At one tip of continuum we find a political system characterized by ascription, and another by achievement. At the tip of continuum line characterized by ascription is a leadership system called Chief (tribal chief), while another tip of continuum line characterized by achievement is a leadership system called big man.

By applying dichotomy to classify the existing political systems in Papua, Mansoben (1985) notes that in addition to systems that are at these two extremes, there is also another system characterized by achievement and ascription, so it cannot be classified absolutely into one of extremes. By its nature, the system is called a mixed system. Moreover, in the leadership

system characterized by ascription and what called by Sahlins as Chief, it can be divided into two types, i.e Royal system and Ondoafi system. The main difference between the two systems lies in scope of power and political orientation. Brief description below shows the main characteristics and the main differences between the systems.

The first traditional political system discussed here is big man political system. The main feature of this system is leader's position is obtained through achievement. The source of power from this type of politics lies in individual's ability as manifested in concrete forms such as successful of allocating and distributing wealth (material wealth), master in diplomacy and speeche, has a virtue to lead war, has s big and well-built body compared to other membersm in their community and has a generous trait (Sahlins 1963; Koentjaraningrat 1970, 1984). The second characteristic of this political system is the power is exercised by one man, the leader himself. The communities belong to this system are Dani, Asmat, Mee, Meybrat and Muyu people.

The second is royal political system. The main characteristic of this system is the ascribed leadership position. The position here is seniority, both in terms of birth and clan. Another characteristic of this system is the exercise of power in traditional societies as called by Weber (1972:126) as a patrimonial bureaucracy or traditional bureaucracy, the role as political machine, a tool for following orders from the authorities. In such bureaucracy, there is a clear division of duties and authorities between leaders and assistants acting as employees. Likewise in ascribed leadership positions, in this system the positions of assistants are ascribed. If it is not ascribed to the eldest child, the position can be held by one of relatives within the clan meeting designated requirements. The community belong to this system is situated in the western area of southwest Papua, i.e. Raja Ampat islands, Onim Peninsula, Mac Cluer Bay and Kaimana area.

The third is Ondoafi political system. The main characteristics of the ondoafi political system are the ascription of traditional positions and bureaucracy, so it is similar to royal political system discussed above. However, the ondoafi system differs from royal system due to territorial factors and political orientation. The regional or territorial power of a leader

in the ondoafi political system covers or is only limited to one Yo or village and the social unit only consists of one group or sub-group. On the other hand, the region or territory controlled by a leader in the royal system is not limited to one village, but includes a wider geographic area in which there are social units of different ethnic groups. Another difference is, if in the royal political system the center of power orientation is trade, then in the ondoafi political system is religion. The ondoafi political system is found in the Eastern Sea Area of Papua, and supported by Sentani people, Genyem people, Humbolt Bay residents, Tabla people, Yaona people, Yakari-Skouw people and Arso-Waris people.

The fourth is a mixed leadership system. The characteristics of the mixed system are that the position of the leader is obtained through ascription and achievement. It means that in this system a person can be a community leader based on his individual abilities, or achievement and also ascription.

Leaders belonging to the first group (by achievement) usually appear at certain occasion, i.e. during wars among villages or regions, or when natural disasters occurred such as famine, epidemic or cultural decadence. Those belong to this category are called situational leaders, because they act as leaders in certain situations with special abilities in addressing challenges occur in certain occasion.

The position of a leader based on ascribed status in a mixed system usually comes when the community are not facing disturbances, both natural and non-natural disasters, such as war. In a "safe" state, leaders will come from village founders' descendant. As stated above, this position is ascribed in the clan of village founder, but it is different from the ascription system both in royal system and ondoafi system since in the mixed system "bureaucracy" is not recognized. Mostly, people supporting the mixed system are found in Teluk Cenderawasih resident, such as Biak, Wandamen, Waropen, Yawa and Muyu people.

5. Belief and Religious System

Before major religions such as Islam and Christianity entered Papua, each ethnic group had a certain belief system called by traditional belief system to distinguish from major religions. Each ethnic group has its own

traditional belief system, but they generally believe in one god or the almighty God than the others. God or the supreme god is called by different names, for example:

Table 17. Belief System of Papuan People by tribe

Culture Area	Belief
Biak-Numfor	Mansren Nanggi
Moi People	Fun Nah
Seget People	Fun Naha
Waropen People	Naninggi
Wandamen People	Syen Allah
Marind Anim	Dema
Asmat People	Mbiwiripitsy
Mee People	Ugatame

From the ethnographic information on belief system of Papuan people, it shows that the supreme God or God is recognized and respected because he is considered as creator god who has absolute power over human's destiny, but there is also a strong impression that the power of this God has been transferred to spirits found in universe such as wind, rain, and lightning or settle in certain objects within humans settlement, such as in large trees, rivers, whirlpools, seabeds or certain headlands. Since these creatures have the power to control human life, so it must be worshipped and respected.

Therefore, the Papuan people always use various ways to express their worship and respect for these spirits by giving offerings or performing certain rites. Such deeds are an expression to recognize the presence and power of spirits. Papuans expect such deeds will give kindness to their lives, or in other words, the nature forces are persuaded to protect humans through ritual ceremonies or offerings. Further, according to this traditional belief, Papuan people believe that the spirits of the dead obtain power from the creator God to control human living. For such reason, the living must establish good relations with the dead so that they are protected from various calamities that the dead spirits can bring. This is the reason of belief or *korwar* statues worship and *mon* ceremonies in Biak-Numfor culture area, the rite of skull gift to Meybrat people or *mbis* ceremony for Asmat people. These traditional belief systems have not been implemented intensively since the population converted to Islam or Christianity, but in addressing basic problems affecting to human life such as accidents, illness

and death, there are still many Papuan people trying to find answers through traditional belief systems.

Major religions such as Islam and Christianity entered Irian Jaya at different period of time. The first major religion entered Irian Jaya was Islam. Islam was entered Papua from Raja Ampat archipelago and *Fakfak* came from the Maluku Islands and was spread through trade relations made between two regions. According to Van der Leeden (1980:22), Islam entered Raja Ampat islands when it was influenced by the Tidore Sultanate shortly after entered Maluku in the 13th century. Although Islam has been in such region for a long time, but it is not widely spread to the community, but only embraced by certain groups in society, i.e.the ruling class, especially among king relatives and their assistants. Since from the onset of Islam in the Papua region until now, there has been no attempt to spread religion teachings to Papuan people and the followers remain limited to its circle as at the onset.

In recent years, Islamic Education Foundation (YAPIS) made efforts to spread Islam outside these areas by establishing public schools and sermon for Dani people in Walesi, Baliem Valley since the 1990s. According to the 1990 Population Census, the population in Irian Jaya (indigenous people and people from other Indonesian region) embracing Islam was 405,725 or 20.5 percent of total Papua population.

Another major religion from outside was Christianity. Christianity entered Papua in the mid-19th century, approximately 6 (six) centuries after Islam was recognized by most of Papuan people. Although it entered Papua almost half a century ago, the spread and recognition of Christianity were differed from one ethnic group to another, since there were ethnic groups accepted at the onset of spread, for example residents in Doreri Bay, Manokwari, residents along Wandamen Bay and other islands, which is situated in Cenderawasih Bay (Kamma 1953), but there were also only accepted no more than a few dozen years ago, especially people living in Central mountains, for example Mek people in Selah Valley who only knew and accepted Christianity in 1980 (Godschalk 1993:23).

The first Christian evangelists who brought Christianity to Papua were Ottow and Geisler. The two evangelists were sent by Rev. Gossner from

Berlin, Germany at the initiative of Rev. Heldring for evangelism in New Guinea (Kamma 1953:96). The missionaries, Ottow and Geisler, arrived on Mansinam Island, Doreri Bay in Papua on February 5, 1855. The evangelist Ottow worked for about seven years (1855-1962), died and was interred in Kwawi, Manokwari, meanwhile evangelist Geisler worked for over 14 years (1855-1870), then returned and passed away in his country, Germany. The Christian mission carried out by Ottow and Geisler, which were less developed at first, were then continued by Dutch priests sent by missionary body called Utrechtsche Zendings Vereniging (UZV) who arrived in Mansinam in 1862.

Although Christianity mission in the first fifty years were less successful, that can be seen by a number of baptized people, whichi was only 260 (Kamma 1953:101), but in the next fifty years, there was a big change since many Papuan people accepted Christianity. In 1956 Papuan people founded an independent church, Evangelical Christian Church (GKI) and now it is the church with largest members compared to other Protestant churches. At present, Gospel Christian Church activities in Papua include eight service areas and 24 classes.

The Christian message in Papua, initiated by the Zending Utrechtsche Zendingsvereniging agency in the mid of last century, was then followed by other Protestant church sects such as Unevangelized Field Mission (UFM), started its message in the back area of Jayapura in 1951, Bethel Pentecostal Church in Sorong in 1951 in the mid-1930s, the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA) in Enarotali (Lakes Paniai) in 1939, the Baptist Church in Inanwatan and Ayamaru in the 1940s, the Regions Beyond Missionary Union (RBMU) in 1952 and Moluccan Protestants in Fakfak in 1930 (Kamma 1953:112-130).

Nowadays, in addition to the above churchbodies, there are other Protestant church sects such as Adventist Church, Indonesian Pentecostal Church, Jehovah, Indonesian Bible Church and Indonesian Christian Christian Camp Church are also operating in Papua. The results of Christianity mission started about one and a half centuries ago in Papua by many Protestant church sects, according to the 1995 population census, Papua Christian populatin was 1,130,021 or 57 percent of total Papua

population, who were members of protestant churches (Population Census 1980, Series I, BPS, Jakarta).

In contrast to the Protestant Christian religion by its evangelistic mission in Northern Area of Papua, Roman Catholic religion carries out its evangelism mission in Southern Area of Papua. The missionary activity of Roman Catholic in Southern Area of Papua was marked by arrival of Pastor Le Cocq d'Armandville S.J. in Kapaur near to Fakfak in 1894. Le Cocq d'Armandville S.J. was the first Jesuit Pastor sent by Jesuit order who had worked a century earlier in other areas of Indonesian archipelago to open evangelism mission in New Guinea. He did not work for a long time in that area because he drowned in Mimika one year later during an orientation trip, and caused pending for time being (Verschueren 1953;183).

Although several visits had made by Jesuit missionaries in Merauke between 1892 and 1902, the official activities of Roman Catholic mission in the region began in 1902 when Missionarissen van het Heilige Hart from the Netherlands, whose representatives were based in Langgur, Kei Islands, obtained right to carry out mission activities in the region. Nevertheless, the missionary activity was actually carried out after two priests and two broeder arrived in Merauke on August 14, 1905 (Verschueren 1953: 183).

The missionary activity, started in Merauke region, was relative faster with zending activities in Northern Area of Papua, since in the past 50 years, it had become vicariate in 1920, then developed into two vicariates, respectively vicariate of Merauke in 1950 and vicariate of Hollandia (Jayapura) in 1954. Another development was the division of Irian Jaya region into three administrative archbishops in 1966, namely Merauke Archbishops (covering Merauke region), Jayapura Archbishops (covering Jayapura, Wamena, Mimika and Paniai region) and Manokwari Archbishops (covering Manokwari, Sorong and Fakfak region). In addition, Agats archbishops was formed in 1969. The division of above archbishops is based on Order to carry out missionary activities in certain region. Therefore, Merauke Archbishops working area of Ordo Hati Kudus (MSC), Jayapura Archbishops working area of Franciscan Order, Franciscan Missionaries Order (OFM), Manokwari Archbishops is working area of Augustine Order (OSA) and Agats Archbishops is working

area of Order of the Holy Cross, Order of the Sacred Heart (OSC). The results of Christian mission carried out by Roman Catholic in Irian Jaya region for almost a century can be seen by number of Roman Catholic adherents. According to the 1995 Population Census, Irian people adherent to Roman Catholic Christianity was 430,011 or 21.80 percent of total Irian Jaya population.

Since the 1960s, Hinduism and Buddhism had also entered Papua, but the adherents were from ethnic groups outside Papua, coming for work as government or private employees. Total Buddhists in 1995 was 2,702 or 0.13 percent of 3,644 Hindus or 0.18 percent of total adherents in Papua. The above description shows that the religious aspect contributes to diversity dimension of Papuan people, consisting of ethnic groups. On one hand, certain religion aspects (such as Islam or Protestant Christianity) unifying members from various ethnic groups into single religious community, but on the other hand religion in fact split one ethnic group members to another adherent according to their religion.

2.4. THE PRESENCE OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY

Since the enactment of Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province, in conjunction with Law Number 35 of 2008 and Presidential Instruction Number 1 of 2003 was the result of political compromise between Papuan people and central government to resolve multidimensional conflict since 1962. Special Autonomy for Papua Province is basically the granting of extensive authority to the Province and Papuan people to regulate and manage their ownself within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Extensive authority means also greater responsibility for the Province and Papuan people to administer their government and regulate its natural resources in Papua Province for their maximum benefit as part of Indonesian people in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations. This authority means also authority to empower socio-cultural and economic potential of Papuan people, and to provide suitable role for indigenous Papuan people through custom, religion, and women representatives. The role is in the form of participation in making regional policies, determining development

strategies in view of equality and diversity of Papuan people, preserving Papuan culture and natural environment, as reflected in change of Irian Jaya to Papua, regional symbols in the form of regional flags and regional anthems as actualization of Papuan people identity and recognition of customary rights, custom, custom communities, and customary law. Moreover, the granting of special autonomy is also intended to achieve justice, promote supremacy of law, respect for human rights, accelerate economic development, improve welfare and progress for Papuan people, for equality and balance with other provinces.

The law has placed indigenous Papuan people and resident at large as the main subjects of development. The existences of the Central Government, Provincial Government, Regency / City Government, as well as the apparatus are directed to provide best services and people empowerment. The law also contains the spirit of problem solving and reconciliation, including the establishment of National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. The establishment is intended to resolve various problems occurred in the past and has objectives to strengthen Indonesian national unity and integrity in Papua. The question is how is Papua's performance after Special Autonomy Policy was given? The questions on abundance of Papua natural resources and potentials which cannot be fully enjoyed by its people has resurfaced at this time, and even opinions about the "failure" of special autonomy and bring back social movement of indigenous Papuan people to reject special autonomy.

The granting of special autonomy status to Papua is not permanent, but only for 50 years or to catch up and align Papua with other regions in Indonesia. It means special autonomy status for Papua is an affirmative step taken by central government to address several gaps. Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua was effective by 2002. So far it has been running for almost 20 years. This means, special autonomy (Otsus) edition 1 will expiry in mid-2022 and may be re-extended, or will be expired in 2052 or thirty-one years from now.

From the perspective of central government, the granting of special autonomy status has encouraged positive changes particularly in Papua.

According to Minister of Home Affairs (2020), the positive impacts generated by special autonomy in Papua are as follows:

1. Improving accelerated Papua human resources and to promote development;
2. Promoting Indigenous Papuan people participation to be independent, empowered and strengthening culture;
3. Inviting foreign investor to Papua;
4. Promoting people-based economy; and
5. Providing access and government quality services to community.

It is undeniable that contribution of special autonomy funds to local governments (Provincial, Regency/City) is relatively large, especially from Revenue Sharing Fund for natural resources in mining sector and also crude oil by 70 percent. This number is higher than the percentage determined for other regions, i.e., 15.5 percent for oil mining revenue sharing and 30.05 percent for natural gas. In addition, there are also General Allocation Funds (DAU), Special Allocation Funds (DAK), and Infrastructure Funds (DI). These funds are prioritized for Education, Health, Infrastructure and people-based economy empowerment. However, Special autonomy for Papua in fact fails to bring welfare for indigenous Papuan people.

2.5. INDIGENOUS PAPUAN PEOPLE'S REACTION TO SPECIAL AUTONOMY

As from special autonomy status for Papua was granted in November 2001, but started to effective in early 2002 until now 2020 for almost 20 years (\pm 19) years, central government has allocated funds in the amount of 7.4 billion USD \$ or half of Domestic Product Gross Papua in 2019. In such year, Papua also received a Village Fund Allocation resepectively in the amount of 4.6 billion USD\$ and 1.9 billion USD\$ for infrastructure development. The latest data from the Central Agency on Statistics (BPS) shows that Papuan economy was contracted to minus 15.75 percent in the last quarter of 2019. GRDP growth drop from 7.37 percent in 2018 to 13.63 percent in the first quarter of 2019. Data BPS 2019 shows that Papua has the highest stunting rate in Indonesia. The high unemployment rate is also held by Papua at 10

percent of the 4.2 million unemployed Indonesians, while Papua's special autonomy will expiry in 2022.

Since the beginning of special autonomy status for Papua, it has invited controversy among indigenous Papuan people, who consider the granting of special autonomy are political trick from central government to suppress turmoil which has led to disintegration; the rising of New Rich People (OKB) from bureaucratic elite, as well as parties involved in this policy such as DPRP, Regency government to lower-level officials and the Chair of the Indigenous Community Institution (LMA); only benefits certain parties, in this case contractor (private). Not only from the projects granted by government, they also get opportunity from cultural authority regained by tribal chief (Ondoafi) over customary lands. It seems counter productive, but it is the actually condition. Some contractors (private) easily get customary land for business purposes after approaching tribal chiefs who is lack of protection from the government.

In addition, the indigenous Papuan people also consider that by granting special autonomy, central government releases their duty and consider the Papua problem is over; through special autonomy, central government has very strong political position to control Papua, it means that central government has a strong and logical reason to take action against any movement in Papua potentially and leading to disintegration due to special autonomy.

The same condition also occurred when central government confirmed that special autonomy for Papua to continue. In the last two years from 2019-2021, it recorded at least 75 activities carried out by various elements of indigenous Papuan people, both pros and contra against the second edition of special autonomy for Papua. By the escalation of pro and contra actions carried out by indigenous Papuan people in two provinces, Papua and West Papua, it appears that tendency to oppose or reject special autonomy is Papua Province rather than West Papua Province. It is clear from many rejections through peaceful demonstrations by a number of elements, both from Local Government (Papua Governor), legislative elements of Papuan Representative Council (MRP), religious leaders (Papuan Church Council), female figures (Solidarity Female Papua), Papuan community (Yuhukimo

Regency Youth and Students) and (Otsus Action Committee Edition II). In addition, the rejection to second edition special autonomy was also raised by Papuan Separatist Movement with its wings supporting organizations, such as: United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), 16 (Papuan Civil Organization), Front Rakyat Indonesia-West Papua (FRI-WP), Free Papua Organization (OPM), and Komite Aksi (Action Committee) ULMWP.

For example, case, anarchy carried out by Armed Criminal Group (KKB) as wing organization of OPM is a frontal action of Papuan social movement in rejecting second edition special autonomy which has caused many casualties, both from military and civil society in Papua. For example, the KKB attacked on security forces in Sugapa District, Intan Jaya Regency (Friday, 6.11.2020) and shot 2 TNI soldiers, 1 of them died. The attack also occurred in Serambakor District, Bintang Mountains Regency (Tuesday, 20.10.2020) and caused lightly injured to 3 TNI soldiers.

From the onset, mutual distrust or mutual suspicion between central government and indigenous Papuan people has filled the rise and fall of Jakarta-Papua relations. Therefore, it is difficult to build strong synergy between central government and indigenous Papuan people. They residing in the two provinces actually faced same problem; taking position in a very fast transformation (change) process and dealing with glitter modern life through special autonomy and regional expansion (Regency/City). This situation, in contrast to the managerial problems and low human resources suffered by local government, in this case provincial, regency/city governments and unable to formulate "grand design" of guided development by special autonomy funds. On the other hand, the central government also tends to allow local governments (provincial, regency/city) to find ideal format or to solve problems in special autonomy without any assistance or supervision on use of special autonomy funds.


In this process, the orientation becomes dilemma; rejecting/returning special autonomy to central government is not solution, insisted for (independence) referendum does not give guarantee for better life. Consequently, society becomes a "floating mass" ready to move in any direction, following the brightest light or the loudest voice. Therefore, the

rising of a leader from any group who is loudest and reachable will be a role model.

In the context of special autonomy, indigenous Papuan people expect them to be active actors, from planning to execution and enjoy development outcome like other people in other regions. Papuan People Representative Council (MRP) as the representative of culture institutions in Papua has intention to play its role as aspirations channel and facilitator for indigenous Papuan people's rights, whose existence based on Special Autonomy Law is actually heard and involved in the dialogue and decision-making processes in special autonomy and regional expansion in line the mandate of the special autonomy law.

In mid of November 2020, Papuan People's Assembly of Papua Province took an initiative to hold Hearing Meeting (RDP) in five customary areas, i.e: a. Tabi Customary Area in Jayapura Regency; b. Saireri Customary area in Biak Numfor Regency; c. Laa Pago Customary Area in Jayawijaya Regency; d. Mee Pago customary area in Dogiyai Regency; and e. Anim Ha Customary area in Merauke Regency. This Hearing Meeting aims to evaluate the Effectiveness of Special Autonomy in Papua, which was scheduled to take place on 17-18 November 2020. It was followed by Public Hearing Meeting (RDPU) on 24-25 November 2020 in Jayapura (public invitation for Meeting Hearing attached below). However, before the Hearing Meeting was held by MRP, a letter issued by Head of the Papua Regional Police regulating activities and limiting participation in Hearing Meeting on the grounds of COVID-19 pandemic (attached below). The letter from the Head of the Papua Regional Police was used by the Chief of Regional Police at Regency/City level to act repressively by arresting, disbanding activities held in five customary areas. Among others were in Merauke (Anim Ha customary area) on November 15-17, in Jayawijaya (Laa Pago customary area) on November 15 and in Di Dogiyai (Mee Pago customary area) on November 17, 2020. For that reason, the hearing held by the MRP of Papua province was canceled.

Figure 7. Public Invitation for Indigenous Papuan People to attend Public Hearing held by Papua MRP



MAJELIS RAKYAT PAPUA

PENGUMUMAN

Dalam rangka menjalankan tugas dan wewenang Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP) sesuai amanat Pasal 77 Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001 sebagaimana telah diubah dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 35 Tahun 2008 Tentang Otonomi Khusus bagi Provinsi Papua, yang menyatakan: "bahwa usul perubahan atas Undang-Undang ini dapat diajukan oleh rakyat Provinsi Papua melalui MRP dan DPRP kepada DPR atau Pemerintah sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan".

Maka Majelis Rakyat Papua akan melaksanakan Rapat Dengar Pendapat (RDP) tentang penilaian Efektivitas pelaksanaan Otonomi Khusus di Tanah Papua yang dijadwalkan pelaksanaannya pada tanggal 17 s/d 18 November 2020 bertempat di 5 (lima) wilayah adat, sebagai berikut:

1. Wilayah Adat Tabi di Kabupaten Jayapura
2. Wilayah Adat Saireri di Kabupaten Biak
3. Wilayah Adat La Pago di Kabupaten Jayawijaya
4. Wilayah Adat Mee Pago di Kabupaten Dogiyai
5. Wilayah Adat Anim Ha di Kabupaten Merauke

Dan dilanjutkan dengan Rapat Dengar Pendapat Umum (RDPU) yang dijadwalkan pelaksanaannya pada tanggal 24 s/d 25 November 2020 di Jayapura.


Kami Mengajak seluruh masyarakat Papua untuk mendoakan dan mensukseskan kegiatan Rapat Dengar Pendapat ini. Karena aspirasi anda menentukan masa depan Papua yang lebih baik sesuai semangat kearifan lokal.

Sukses RDP, Sukses Rakyat Papua...!

Figure 8. Announcement of Head of Regional Police of Papua concerning Restriction and Hearings held by Papua MRP



Figure 9. Announcement of Regent of Nabire Regency concerning Dismissal of Hearing held by Papua MRP



The Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS) condemned the arrests, disbandment and the absence of local police officer and regent when Papuan People's Representative Council (MRP) were holding a Hearing Meeting (RDP) on 17-18 November 2020 in 5 customary areas to hear the opinion of Indigenous Papuan People (OAP) regarding the evaluation of 20 years of Special Autonomy (Otsus) in Papua. In fact, RDP is the mandate of Article 77 of Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua.

RDP was supposed to be a safe, secured and legal discussion forum for OAP to express their opinion openly. However, as of November 15-17, 2020 in Merauke (Anim-Ha customary area) there was a forced disbandment and arrest of 55 people who wanted to participate in RDP by the police. The arrests took place at three points, among others Kelapa Lima by 27 people, Valentine Hotel

by 13 people, and Mandala Hotel by 15 people. All of them were brought to Merauke Police Station with allegation on discussing Papuan referendum and there was evidence for such reason. Based on information received by KontraS, the detained MRP and OAP members were interrogated since Tuesday, November 17, 2020 at 9:00 Eastern Indonesian Time until released on Wednesday, November 18, 2020 at 15:00 Eastern Indonesian Time. We do not see any legal basis to deprive citizens' freedom for 30 hours, either for arrest or "security" – which clearly violates the Criminal Procedure Code. Moreover, the police also intimidated and threatened the detained MRP members to agree on Renewal Special Autonomy and expansion of South Papua Province.

In Jayawijaya (Laa Pago customary area) on November 15, 2020 there was a motion for RDP rejection through demonstrations performed by a group of people at Wamena Airport. This motion resulted in 62 MRP members and RDP participants unable to leave Wamena Airport from 09.00 to 16.37 Eastern Indonesian Time, and finally MRP group was forced to return to Jayapura. The motion was usually performed without any notification by local police and at the same time Head of Resort Police and Regent of Jayawijaya did not answer the phone call when contacted by human rights activists on the field.

In Dogiyai (Mee Pago customary area) on November 17, 2020, the RDP was canceled due to the announcement published by Papuan Local Police and a letter from Mee Pago Regent Association, although the indigenous people took action in wait for MRP RDP, but in the end they were together reject the extension of Papua special autonomy.

We consider the arrest, disbandment and the absence of police officers who are supposed to secure RDP, a state institutions and legal forum, but instead criminalizing its participants are oppressive and unlawful action, since the laws and regulations states that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly as regulated in:

1. Article 28E Ayat (3) of the 1945 Constitution;
2. Article 19 ICCPR as may be ratified by Law No. 12 of 2005;
3. Article 24 Paragraph (1) of Law Number 39 of 1999 on Human Rights.

In consideration of the foregoing, we require the Police to:

1. Stop discriminating, criminalizing and violating human rights against OAP to hold, participate in, and express opinions in RDP. Participation in RDP is

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a right of indigenous Papuan people protected by law and is not a criminal act;

2. Take action actively in protecting freedom of opinion in RDP MRP in order to be carried out in accordance with Law mandate, to maintain all parties conducive with other parties expressing their opinions to reject RDP.

CHAPTER III

SPECIAL AUTONOMY AS SOURCE OF NEW CONFLICT

Papua Island, which now divided into two provincial-level governments, Papua Province and West Papua Province, consists of various ethnic groups and immigrants from outside Papua, and is a region with heterogeneous high-population. Social history in Papua demonstrates that social conflicts are something arises from tribal wars and other disputes, especially to residents who are considered as "immigrants" or "security personnel" (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police).

Special autonomy policy multiplies diverse Papuan people since it attracts more migrants to Papua. Accordingly, potential conflict in this region will escalate. In addition, physical developments also bring great environmental impacts, and the impacted communities feel injured. Along with the fact, the conflict will be intensified both in people and its type.

In order to reduce conflicts and protests filed by indigenous people, the central government issued a security-approach policy. As a matter of fact, the policy was unable to accommodate the conflict, since the approach model was repressive (militaristic). Meanwhile, the trauma when Military Operations Area (DOM) were implemented in new order era still left pain and was completely unresolved by central government. Although the indigenous people had frequently requested to stop security approach, however it reoccurred by reason of security stability in Papua from parties threatening state sovereignty.

On a cultural aspect, the assimilation of two totally different cultures in Papua region is also a source of conflict. On one hand, there are indigenous people who are very traditional and have "subsistence" character, on the other hand central government with modern development by special autonomy policy. It seems that the latter is more dominant than the first, so that the people under domination feel desperate facing conditions not fit with their expectations. This chapter discusses about three new sources of conflict arising from special autonomy policy, i.e., social impact on special autonomy, security approach policy and two cultures clash in Papua, traditional culture and modern development culture by special autonomy.

3.1. SOCIAL IMPACT OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY

When talking about social impact, it is closely related to physical environment impact, due to social changes, and besides due to ideas influence, physical influences cannot be ignored. Even social life of Papuan people in certain region is greatly affected by changes in physical environment. For that reason, after almost two decades of special autonomy, which now includes two sister provinces, Papua and West Papua, it has shown an increasingly rapid development trend. However, several groups in Papua consider the development is only limited to physical aspect. Seemingly the development process has not fully placed indigenous Papuan people as the main subject.

One of direct effects on environmental changes after special autonomy implementation is most land of Papua isolated for a long time by forests, ragged mountain, large rivers and sea, now generally can be explored or accessed, although some of the area must use a special mode of transportation. This fact supported by sufficient availability of various transportation, telecommunications and information infrastructures, so the conditions are much different when compared to the previous two decades. Villages used to be accessed using physical ability for days on foot or using hands strength to paddle a boat for miles is not can be replaced with transportation access by road, motorized boat, ship or airplane. It is clearly visible in several districts in Papua and West Papua, which have now divided into several districts and two cities.

If the granting of special autonomy is response to something wrong in past development, then repeated mistakes should not occur in special autonomy era. This means that the purpose of special autonomy should be a benchmark, so it is not only how the development program is implemented in Papua according to process and procedures, but it also must be effective and efficient. Emphasis on this aspect is very important since numerous parties have noted that development strategies and approaches in Land of Papua for decades were dominated by political policies and approaches, rather than welfare approaches, accordingly the results and benefits were also not incompatible with Papuan people desire. As a consequence, it brings social

impact on Papuan people. The study results show that social impact of Papua's special autonomy on indigenous Papuan people includes:

a. High-dependency among Indigenous Papuan people.

This matter can be recognized by dependency of Local Government (district/city) to Provincial Government, as well as Regency/City and Province to Central Government on transfer funds from central government. Moreover, they are also depending on direct government assistance such as Raskin and *BLT* (Rice for the poor and Direct Cash Assistance) and not promoting self-reliance. Meanwhile, the granting of special autonomy factually is a means for empowerment. Both empowered communities and local governments including their elements are also empowered, so there will not only be acceleration in development process but also the effectiveness of development results and benefits for Papuan people.

Changes in Papuan society due to shifting of natural influences to outsider's dependency have impaired indigenous Papuan people identity. Greater spiritual values on their existence as humans are greatly influenced by physical changes in their environment. They lost their identity as one-with-nature community due to development process. They are in searching for new identity to be "modern" creature, but it goes too far and causes long despair and dissatisfaction. The indicator rises negative behavior, by simply expecting permanent grant.

b. Increased Poverty rate in Papua.

In 2020, West Papua and Papua Province ranked fifth and sixth highest in national PDRB (*gross domestic regional income*) income per-capita above 5 million rupiah, most of which were from natural resources-related health. Unfortunately, this was not followed by difficult access to basic needs (i.e., community's health, education and economy). For example, the results of Population Health Survey conducted in Papua and West Papua (2020) indicated that infant mortality rate was 306 per 1000 births, and child mortality rate was 500 per 1000. Low access to public services for several cases led to increased urbanization. However, indigenous Papuan people as the majority living in rural or remote areas had lower access to basic needs. Based on population census in 2020, 30

percent of total population in Papua lived in downtowns or cities were 55 percent of non-Papuan people and 45 percent of indigenous Papuan people. On the other hand, 70 percent of Papuan populations living in rural or remote areas were 95 percent of indigenous Papuan people and 5 percent of non-Papuan people. The unbalance of population composition not merely only occurred among urban and rural areas residents, but also among indigenous Papuan people and non-Papuan people in transmigration areas such as Arso, Keerom Regency-Papua Province and in Warmare Manokwari Regency-Province West Papua: the indigenous population was about 1000, which the number of transmigrants (non-Papuan people) was about 19,000 (based on 2020 census). In the past, national transmigration program had objectives to send people from more-densely populated areas of Indonesia (mostly from Java) to less-densely populated areas (including Papua). This demographic imbalance was arising from transmigration, compounded by marginalization of indigenous Papuan people sourced by gap between community groups of indigenous Papuan people and transmigrants (non-Papuan people). Rapid assimilation between indigenous Papuan people and other cultures, indigenous people alienation from their customary lands, lack of living space (*lebensraum*) of indigenous people, as well as socio-economic and ethnic tensions were some of the consequences from transmigration program. The above transmigration cases indicated that population distribution is not in proportion to welfare distribution.

In addition, the poverty rate was high in Papua and West Papua. Based on Central Bureau of National Statistics (BPS) data, Papua and West Papua Province had a poverty rate of 26.55 percent and 21.51 percent, respectively. This condition was exceeding the national poverty rate of 9.22 percent. Papua and West Papua Province were included in areas with high poverty index and high-level disparity rate compared to Jakarta. Poverty-related challenges in Indonesia are not only to large number of poor people, but also to large disparities between regions, provinces, districts and cities. Jakarta and Papua showed a great difference among provinces: in Jakarta, only 3.4 percent of total population is poor, while about half of Papua's populations live under the poverty line. Based on objective analysis, it said that the “poverty” in such regions was the result

of structural impoverishment caused by lack of opportunities for people to participate in decision-making process. Accordingly, it prevented them from accessing and using existing resources (both natural, socio-economic, political, legal and cultural) belong to them.

Since the New Order era, opportunity for indigenous Papuan people to get involved in economic sector was very less. Indigenous Papuan people were unable to provide for their own source of income since most of the opportunities to develop businesses were only given to those having their own capital. It was evidenced from the following situation: Papua had two dominant economic sectors, mining and agriculture, contributing 76 percent of total PDRB (GRDP). One of main characteristics of indigenous Papuan people is subsistence. Thus, this character cannot meet the opportunities provided by business world; the capital-intensive mining industry generated 57 percent of PDRB (GRDP) and only absorbs 0.6 percent of workforces, while agricultural sector generated 19 percent of PDRB (GRDP) with 75 percent of workforces. In business sector, the involvement of indigenous Papuan people was very low and almost all entrepreneurs were migrants. It can be said that economic growth does not reflect the equality of distribution, including access to basic needs. Inequality of opportunity was sourced from prejudice and racism suffered by indigenous Papuan people to be positioned as inferior as documented in basic ideas underlying the formulation of Special Autonomy Law for Papua Province in the form of self-governing region in 2001.

Furthermore, in connection with education access in Papua and West Papua, based on the results of 2020 Population Census, it also illustrated that 75 percent of indigenous Papuan people did not have access for proper education, 50 percent had never received formal education or had not graduated from elementary school, 22 percent had only graduated from Elementary School, 10 percent graduated from Upper Secondary High School, and only 2 percent Papuan people successfully graduated from University. This condition surely affected quantity and quality of Papuan Human Resources who subsequently become Civil Servants in the provincial, regency/city Governments of Papua and West Papua. In Civil Servants structure, only 35 percent of Echelon II positions in Government

of Papua Province were held by Indigenous Papuan people and only 26 percent for Echelon III.

c. Feeling of Inferiority complex.

The collective identity of indigenous Papuan people as a modern and civilized society is forced by government programs. In 1971-1973, for example, government of Indonesia operated Koteka and Sale (cover for male genital organ made of pumpkin and cover for female genital organ made of grass, as traditional clothing in central highlands of Papua). This operation was carried out by Indonesian Armed Forces and Civilian Government elements who were involved in activities to designed hinterland people of Papua civilized and to develop and promote social, cultural, economic and political conditions, used for future development Papua, with the main objectives to build Indonesian national idea, just and prosperous society based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

Koteka and Sale operation was Indonesian military campaign aimed at influencing indigenous Papuan people in central highlands to abandon their original culture, schooling, to be economically modern, and more adapt to Indonesian identity in general. Officials tried to force Dani, Lani, Ekare and Mee tribes' community to exchange Koteka and Sale with Indonesian-style clothes. Therefore, humiliation strategy was used in development process among Dani, Lani, Ekare and Mee communities to cause them get more involved in social change. The inequality of is reflected in indigenous people perception by abusing local traditional cultures and labeling these cultures as "undeveloped", "primitive" and "uncivilized". In the name of modern development and progress, humiliation strategies are made to convince people and their culture worthless and meaningless which makes them feels inferiority complex and compelled to involve in social change.

The accumulated despair of indigenous Papuan people was combined with cultural rights abandonment as expression of their collective dignity. Indigenous Papuan people felt that their dignity and identity were not recognized (for example: processes without their involvement in transmigration programs policy, disclaimed of customary or ancestral lands, natural resources exploitation, lack of opportunities for local communities to participate in state administration, etc.).

Indigenous Papuan people expressed their accumulated frustration through a number of peaceful demonstrations. In most cases, the above inferiority complex above was filled by casualties arising from repressive security approach as a method of conflict resolution. Demonstrations carried out by Papua community began to be politicized after bloody tragedy in Biak on 6 July 1998, and then spread to other regions in Papua, which peaceful demonstration responded by military by violence. Afterward, the unclear security regulations triggered a series of bloody violence made by security personnel against Morning Star flag rising in a number places in Papua (for examples: Timika, Nabire, Fakfak). Meanwhile, polarization among communities occurred by establishing paramilitaries called Satgas Papua (Papua Task Force) and Satgas Merah Putih (Pro-NKRI). In some cases, the Morning Star flag rising also triggered horizontal conflicts between two paramilitary groups. Although Papua's status as Military Operations Area (DOM) was revoked in October 1998, insecurity and fear remained in Papuan people mind due to human rights violations committed by security personnel in a number places in Papua. The above situation had escalated the insistence to abolish security personnel dominant and to strengthen civilian governance in Papua.

The social impact of special autonomy implementation on indigenous Papuan people living in Papua Province seems deeper than those living in West Papua Province, even though both have same natural philosophical ground, assuming one with nature between human and the universe (physical environment). The condition was caused by granting of special autonomy status not followed by ratified derivative regulations of Law Number 21 of 2001, i.e., Provincial Regulation and Special Local Regulation by central government, unfinished settlement of past conflicts and high suspicion of central government towards Papuan people to social protest activities filed by Papuan people and labeled as "separatist".

Regulations must be prepared by Provincial Government together with People's Representative Council (DPRD) as an instrument for implementing special autonomy in Papua and mandate of Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua are as follows:

Table 18. List of Regulations Mandated by Law No.21 of 2001 in Papua Province

No.	Aspects	Mandated Supporting Regulation	Remark
1.	Local Emblem	Special Local Regulation (article 2 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
2.	Special authority for Papua province	Provincial Regulation or Special Local Regulation (article 4 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
3.	Special authority of regency/city	Provincial Regulation or Special Local Regulation (article 4 paragraph5)	Not yet drafted
4.	Consideration Procedures for governor on international agreement	Special Local Regulation (article 4 paragraph9)	Special Local Regulation No. 49 of 2014
5.	The establishment of Papuan People's Assembly (MRP)	Government Regulation (article 5 paragraph 2)	Government regulations No. 54 of 2004
6.	Papuan People's Representative Council membership stipulated by appointment mechanism for period of 2014 – 2019	Special Local Regulation (article 6 paragraph 4)	Special Local Regulation No. 6 of 2014
7.	Election procedures for Governor and vice governor	Special Local Regulation (article 11 paragraph 3)	Special Local Regulation No. 6 of 2011
8.	Accountability procedures for Governor as government representative	Presidential Decree (article 18 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
9	Accountability procedures for Governor as local head & provincial government head	Government Regulation (article 18 paragraph 7)	Not yet drafted
10.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Membership & total MRP members; - Accountability procedures for MRP - Election procedures for MRP members - Establishment & Inauguration procedures for MRP members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Special Local Regulation (article 19 paragraph 3) - Special Local Regulation subject to Government Regulation (article 23 paragraph 2) - Provincial Regulation subject to Government Regulation (article 24 paragraph 2) - Government Regulation (article 25 paragraph 3) 	Special Local Regulation No. 4 of 2010, and subsequently amended by Special Local Regulation No. 14 of 2016
11.	Financial position of MRP	Government Regulation (article 19 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
12.	Duties & powers of MRP	Special Local Regulation (article 20 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 4 of 2008
13.	Rights and Obligations of	Special Local Regulation	Special Local

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	MRP members	subject to Government Regulation (article 21 paragraph 3, and article 22 paragraph 2)	Regulation No. 3 of 2008
14.	The establishment of Provincial, MRP and People's Representative Council Office	Provincial Regulation subject to legislations (article 26 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
15.	Provincial and regency/city employment policy	Provincial Regulation (article 27 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
16.	Consideration & approval procedures for MRP on Provincial Regulation & Special Local Regulation	Provincial Regulation (article 29 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
17.	Implementation of Provincial Regulation & Special Local Regulation	Decision of Governor (article 30 paragraph 1)	Not yet drafted
18.	Ad-Hoc Legal Committee	Provincial Regulation (article 32 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted
19.	Revenue sharing fund of natural oil & gas and 2% fund between province, regency and city	Special Local Regulation (article 34 paragraph 7)	Not yet drafted
20.	Foreign aid procedures to Papua province	Provincial Regulation (article 35 paragraph 6)	Not yet drafted
21.	Amendment and Calculation of APBD	Provincial Regulation (article 36 paragraph 1)	Not yet drafted
22.	Preparation, implementation, amendment, calculation, accountability and supervision procedures for APBD	Provincial Regulation (article 36 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
23.	Allocation, Receipt and Management of Special Autonomy Fund	Special Local Regulation (article 37)	Special Local Regulation No. 25 Of 2013 and subsequently amended by Special Local Regulation No. 13 of 2016
24.	Economic efforts utilizing natural resources based on custom community, legal certainty, and environmental conservation.	Special Local Regulation (article 38 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 18 of 2008
25.	Capital investment procedures for Papua province government in BUMN & private companies operating in Papua	Provincial Regulation (article 41 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted
26.	Membership, position & duties management &	Presidential Decree (article 46 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted

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	finance of Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.		
27.	Strategic Program for Village Economic and Institutional Development	Special Local Regulation (article 42)	Special Local Regulation No. 10 of 2014
28.	Customary rights of Customary Community, Individual Rights of Customary Community for Land	Special Local Regulation (article 43)	Special Local Regulation No. 23 of 2008
29.	Intellectual Property Rights Protection for Indigenous Papuan people	Special Local Regulation (article 44)	Special Local Regulation No. 19 Of 2008
30.	Restoration of Papuan Women Rights as Violence and Human Rights Violations Victim	Special Local Regulation (article 45)	Special Local Regulation No. 1 of 2011
31.	Police Duties for order and peace and its related cost	Provincial Regulation (article 48 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
32.	Customary Court in Papua	Special Local Regulation (article 50 dan 51)	Special Local Regulation No. 20 of 2008
33.	Education & cultures management	Provincial Regulation (article 56 paragraph 6)	Special Local Regulation No. 3 of 2013
34.	Indigenous Papuan culture development through community participation, NGOs & financial support	Provincial Regulation (article 57 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
35.	Provisions of Health Service Management	Provincial Regulation (article 59 paragraph 5)	Not yet drafted
36.	Provisions of Community Nutrition Improvement	Provincial Regulation (article 60 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted
37.	Resident allocation within national transmigration program	Provincial Regulation (article 61 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
38.	Provisions of Employment Opportunity for Indigenous Papuan people	Provincial Regulation (article 62 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
39.	Sustainable Forest Management in Papua province	Special Local Regulation (article 63 and 64)	Special Local Regulation No.21 of 2008
40.	Environmental Management	Provincial Regulation (article 64 paragraph 5)	Not yet drafted
41.	Social Services	Provincial Regulation (article 65 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
42.	Special attention and care for isolated, remote and neglected tribes' development	Special Local Regulation (article 66 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 8 of 2014
43.	Social Supervision	Special Local Regulation (article 67 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs RI, 2020

Meanwhile, in West Papua province, regulations compiled by the Provincial Government along with People's Representative Council (DPRD) as an instrument for special autonomy in Papua and mandated by Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua are as follows:

Table 19. List of Regulations Mandated by UU No. 21 of 2001 In West Papua Province

No.	Aspects	Mandated Supporting Regulation	Remark
1.	Local Emblem	Special Local Regulation (article 2 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
2.	Special authority for west Papua province	Provincial Regulation or Special Local Regulation (article 4 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
3.	Special authority of regency/city	Provincial Regulation or Special Local Regulation (article 4 paragraph 5)	Not yet drafted
4.	Consideration Procedures for governor on international agreement	Special Local Regulation (article 4 paragraph 9)	Special Local Regulation No. 49 of 2014
5.	The establishment of Papuan People's Assembly (MRP)	Government Regulation (article 5 paragraph 2)	Government regulations No. 54 of 2004
6.	Papua People's Representative Council membership stipulated by appointment mechanism for period of 2014 – 2019	Special Local Regulation (article 6 paragraph 4)	Special Local Regulation No. 4 Of 2019
7.	Election procedures for Governor and vice governor	Special Local Regulation (article 11 paragraph 3)	Special Local Regulation No. 5 Of 2016
8.	Accountability procedures for Governor as government representative	Presidential Decree (article 18 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
9.	Accountability procedures for Governor as local head & provincial government head	Government Regulation (article 18 paragraph 7)	Not yet drafted
10.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Membership & total MRP members; - Accountability procedures for MRP - Election procedures for MRP members - Establishment & Inauguration procedures for MRP members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Special Local Regulation (article 19 paragraph 3) - Special Local Regulation subject to Government Regulation (article 23 paragraph 2) - Provincial Regulation subject to Government Regulation (article 24 paragraph 2) - Government Regulation (article 25 paragraph 3) 	Special Local Regulation No. 5 of 2010, and subsequently amended by Special Local Regulation No. of 20..
11.	Financial position of MRP	Government Regulation (article 19 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted

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12.	Duties & powers of MRP	Special Local Regulation (article 20 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 4 of 2008
13.	Duties and obligations of MRP members	Special Local Regulation subject to Government Regulation (article 21 paragraph 3, and article 22 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 3 of 2008
14.	The establishment of Provincial, MRP and People's Representative Council Office (DPRP)	Provincial Regulation subject to Legislations (article 26 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
15.	Provincial and regency/city employment policy	Provincial Regulation (article 27 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
16.	Consideration & approval procedures for MRP on Provincial Regulation & Special Local Regulation	Provincial Regulation (article 29 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
17.	Implementation of Provincial Regulation & Special Local Regulation	Decision of Governor (article 30 paragraph 1)	Not yet drafted
18.	Ad-Hoc Legal Committee	Provincial Regulation (article 32 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted
19.	Revenue sharing fund of natural oil & gas and 2% fund between province, regency and city	Special Local Regulation (article 34 paragraph 7)	Special Local Regulation No. 3 of 2019
20.	Foreign aid procedures to West Papua province	Provincial Regulation (article 35 paragraph 6)	Not yet drafted
21.	Amendment and Calculation of APBD	Provincial Regulation (article 36 paragraph 1)	Not yet drafted
22.	Preparation, implementation, amendment, calculation, accountability and supervision procedures for APBD	Provincial Regulation (article 36 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
23.	Allocation, Receipt and Management Special Autonomy Fund	Special Local Regulation (article 37)	Special Local Regulation No. of 2019
24.	Economic efforts utilizing natural resources based on custom community, legal certainty, and environmental conservation.	Special Local Regulation (article 38 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 18 Of 2008
25.	Capital investment procedures for Papua province government in BUMN & private companies operating in Papua	Provincial Regulation (article 41 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted
26.	Membership, position & duties management & finance of Commission for Truth and Reconciliation.	Presidential Decree (article 46 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
27.	Strategic Program for Village Economic and Institutional	Special Local Regulation (article 42)	Special Local Regulation No.

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	Development		10 Of 2014
28.	Customary rights of Customary Community, Individual Rights of Customary Community for Land	Special Local Regulation (article 43)	Special Local Regulation No. 9 of 2019
29.	Intellectual Property Rights Protection for Indigenous Papuan people	Special Local Regulation (article 44)	Special Local Regulation No. 19 of 2008
30.	Restoration of Papuan Women Rights as Violence and Human Rights Violations Victim	Special Local Regulation (article 45)	Special Local Regulation No. 1 of 2011
31.	Police Duties for order and peace and its related cost	Provincial Regulation (article 48 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
32.	Customary Court in West Papua	Special Local Regulation (article 50 and 51)	Special Local Regulation No. 20 Of 2008
33.	Education & cultures management	Provincial Regulation (article 56 paragraph 6)	Special Local Regulation No. 3 Of 2013
34.	Indigenous Papuan culture development through community participation, NGO's & financial support	Provincial Regulation (article 57 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
35.	Provisions of Health Service Management	Provincial Regulation (article 59 paragraph 5)	Not yet drafted
36.	Provisions of Community Nutrition Improvement	Provincial Regulation (article 60 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted
37.	Resident allocation within national transmigration program	Provincial Regulation (article 61 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
38.	Employment Opportunity for Indigenous Papuan people	Provincial Regulation (article 62 paragraph 4)	Not yet drafted
39.	Sustainable Forest Management in West Papua province	Special Local Regulation (article 63 dan 64)	Special Local Regulation No. 10 Of 2019
40.	Environmental Management	Provincial Regulation (article 64 paragraph 5)	Not yet drafted
41.	Social Services	Provincial Regulation (article 65 paragraph 3)	Not yet drafted
42.	Special attention and care for isolated, remote and neglected tribes' development	Special Local Regulation (article 66 paragraph 2)	Special Local Regulation No. 8 Of 2014
43.	Social Supervision	Special Local Regulation (article 67 paragraph 2)	Not yet drafted

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs RI, 2020.

3.2. UNRESOLVED FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN PAPUA

Special autonomy is accepted as national policy with purpose to overcome issues in Papua on a political manner and to improve public services, especially living conditions of Papua people. For that reason, special

autonomy is based on a recommendation from People's Consultative Assembly and specifically granted for Papua as dispute resolution method with certain political offers. However, special autonomy does not immediately solve all issues occurred in Papua given that previous conflicts have not been completely resolved. Special autonomy for Papuan people can be said becomes a source of new conflicts and increases conflict tension in Papua.

The development process performed by central government in Papua before the reform era has brought Papua in very rapid social change. It means that material factors are more affected on social change, since sophisticated equipment requires adequate infrastructure to be adjusted with human mental attitudes. Moreover, the coming of migrant from outside Papua to be transmigrant that factually brings great effect to resident's source of income needs change in value significantly to avoid Papuan people to be marginalized.

Very rapid changes create sharper social conflicts, due to tensions growth. The tensions are generated from the existing social situation with potential conflict due to dissatisfaction and competition. The government as the holder of power and sovereignty sometimes acts repressively and reluctantly in response to complaints or protests filed by indigenous Papuan people. The conflict process can be identified from initial stage to operational stage and the policies made.

Some of research results have successfully identified the sources of conflict in Papua, including those carried out by Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in its book entitled Papua Roadmap. According to the book, the four basic issues occurred in Papua are as follows: a) marginalization of indigenous Papuan people; b) development failure; c) human rights violations and military violence; and d) Papua integration process into Indonesia considered as problematic. Further, according to Richard Chauvel, an expert on Papuan political history, he concludes that there are at least four identified basic issues; (a) disappointment due to land of Papua is part of Indonesia, (b) feeling of competition between Papuan elite and officials from outside land of Papua who have dominated government since Dutch colonial era, (c) different economic development and administration in Papua, and (d) marginalization

of indigenous Papuan people due to migrants. From the above two opinions, seemingly there are similarities about the root of problems in Papua.

These issues used as legitimacy by groups feeling dissatisfied or neglected so as to trigger pro-independence groups in Papua. Based on the result of two research's, it can be concluded that there are five important factors serving as obstacles in special autonomy in Papua and creating assumption that special autonomy has faille das mentioned below:

1. *Policy and development failure factor*. In general, conflicts may occur due to development failures and demands for political and economic authority division between central and local through decentralization policies;
2. *Religious, cultural, ethnic and racial identity factor*. Horizontal clash between religions, ethnicities, cultures, and races;
3. *Historical factor*. Distinction of Papua integration history in to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia with other regions;
4. *Security Personnel Violence factor*. Violence activities committed by police and military against Papuan people;
5. *Corporate and International Capitalism interest factor*. Conflict between community and international capitalism interest through corporation operated in local territory.

The result of field research made by writer notes that there are at least three factors underlying Papuan people demand for independence, i.e., historical factor, Papuan identity and nationalism factor, and injustice factors. For injustice factor, supporting sub-factors include Papua's natural resources exploitation, low public participation, migrant domination, cultural domination and oppression, and violence by military. The research conducted by the writer is interesting since it is generalized through a long and comprehensive research process such as discussions and direct interviews with Papuan people.

The first factor is history. Papuan people think that Papua has no relation with the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. There are several facts supporting this assumption: a) Papua was not included in the Dutch East Indies based on the Batavia Declaration on March 7, 1910. At that time, the territory of Dutch East Indies from Aceh to Maluku was under the authority of Governor of the Dutch East Indies, while Papua was directly under the

supervision of the Dutch Government; b) Community leaders, especially Papuan youth leaders were not involved in Indonesian national movement started in 1908 by Budi Utomo and reached its climax by Youth Pledge on October 28, 1928. At such monumental event, no single Papuan youth leaders take part; c) Either physically or culturally, the indigenous Papuan people are different from Indonesian majority. If Indonesian majority came from Polynesian race with brown skin, meanwhile the indigenous Papuan people came from Melanesian race; d) Papuan people did not take part in the Proclamation of 17 August 1945. Papua was under the attention of the Indonesian Government after three years of independence; e) In 1948, Indonesia was in efforts to integrate Papua into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, meanwhile the Dutch Government started to prepare independence for Papua through establishment of political parties, district councils as gathering forum for Papuan from public figures to parliament.

The second factor is Papuan identity and nationalism. It should be admitted that the indigenous Papuan people are socially and culturally different from Indonesian people. If majority of Indonesian are dominated by Malay race, meanwhile Papuan people physically belongs to Melanesian race and Negroid race in Pacific. Socially, Papuan people have their own visions and ways of life. Papuan people have different unique authority for regulating, developing needs, and resolving problems according to customary law with individual rights and obligations that makes them little difficulty when cultures contravene with law applied by majority of Indonesian people. In the context of Papuan identity and nationalism, friction arises between Papuan people and migrants. This friction is empirically seen in dynamics of bureaucratic life and daily economic activities of Papuan people. In term of bureaucratic or governmental life, the main positions are always given to outsiders or migrants with assumption that Papuan people are still unable to manage. For holding a position, Papuan people must meet strict requirements, while this is not the case with migrants. In traditional Papuan markets, migrants use main facilities, while indigenous Papuan people sell on sidewalk of market. In general sense, identity and nationalism factors can be summarized as follows: a) colonial practices and ideologies; b) development ideology practice emphasizes only natural resources exploitation and ignores

human welfare development and dignity; c) Exploitation and violence by military; and d) Papua has a large land and abundant natural resources.

The third factor is injustice. The unfair treatment suffered by Papuan people on economic aspects includes natural resources exploitation, low indigenous people participation, immigrant's domination in governmental and economic fields, cultural oppression and biased human resource development, and military violence. In term of military violence, military oppression can be manifested in several actions such as intimidation, terror, torture and murder. Generally, the killings were carried out to militant people fighting for democracy, law, culture and humanity, and demanding for Papua independence.

Based on sources of conflicts described above, the author draws conclusion that the sources of conflict in Papua, and by making correlations and relevance to contemporary government policies. According to the author, the primary root of Papuan conflict is based on two things, i.e., the implementation Act on Free Choice (PEPERA) 1969 and development process occurred in Papua. In term of Act of Free Choice, differences of historical narratives existing Papuan society. Dominant narrative delivered by Indonesian Government is the political status of Papua as part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is legitimate due to under official process and United Nation (PBB) resolutions. However, Papuan people have different narrative. The Act of Free Choice held in August 1969 was invalid due to filled by intimidation and violence, and the implementation of New York Agreement of 1962 was deemed unlawful.

In relation to development process, different narratives also exist. The narration developed in Indonesia is that development process in Papua has succeeded in prospering, educating, and empowering Papuan people. Subject to fiscal decentralization made by central government to Papua through APBN funds, General Allocation Fund (DAU), and Special Allocation Fund (DAK) to Papua is the highest compared to other provinces in Indonesia, plus Additional Infrastructure Fund (DI). Meanwhile, the counter-narration developed by Papuan people is that the development performed by Indonesian government has unable to realize welfare and prosperity as set out in national goals of the 1945 Constitution. In fact, it is only a natural

resources exploitation, marginalization to indigenous people, environmental damage arising from irresponsible exploitation by foreign companies, and a number human rights violations for the reason of political stability and security.

Removal of Military Operation Areas (DOM) status in Papua by President B.J. Habibie is one of seriousness actions taken by reform regime to make total reforms in all state aspects, including to the wound of history in Papua. The period of 1962 to 1984 was a dark stage for Papua at which the government launched military operation to suppress Free Papua Operation (OPM), a group desperately desires to separate Papua from Indonesia. As a consequence, Papua was under DOM until 1998. During such time, Indonesian National Army (ABRI) in Papua was not only for suppressing pro-independence movement, but also for political and business purposes.

3.3. DISAPPOINTMENT TOWARD SPECIAL AUTONOMY IMPLEMENTATION IN PAPUA

Out of three provinces granted by special autonomy status, among others Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) and Papua and West Papua. Nangroe Aceh Darussalam can be said successful, but this is not the case with Papua and West Papua. Nangroe Aceh Darussalam can minimize conflict and armed violence and run local government smoothly, although little violence still arises. Unlike with Papua condition which are still filled by armed conflict and violence. Obviously, there are many factors affecting such differences in two regions. Nevertheless, there are two most prominent factors such as conflict resolution and special autonomy implementation. The fundamental difference between Aceh and Papua lies in conflict resolution. In Aceh, the political conflict over separation is resolved before Special Autonomy implementation. The special autonomy in Aceh is mutual agreement between the conflicting parties and serves as follow-up for conflict resolution.

This is contrast to Papua condition. Special Autonomy in Papua cannot be said as mutual agreement, but a way of central government to reduce conflicts occurred in Papua. If Special Autonomy in Aceh is a follow-up for conflict resolution, Special Autonomy in Papua is made as an effort to resolve the conflict. Consequently, there is no agreement between the conflicting

parties on the existence of Special Autonomy. In view of central government, Special Autonomy is a commitment to resolve the conflicts, while for some Papuan people, Special Autonomy is a method used by central government to stop their struggle.

In relation to Special Autonomy, there are small numbers of Papuan people get involved in discussion and drafting on Law Number 21 of 2001, who are members of Team 100, and accept the law as the best solution for peace in Papua. In terms of substance, Papua Special Autonomy Law gives a large portion to Papuan people. However, it only increases the conflict due to Special Autonomy Law is not implemented consistently. The rights, powers and obligations given to Papua are oftentimes limited, reduced, and even withdrawn by central government through operational and sectorial legislations.

The result of research from several institutions regarding Performance on Special Autonomy in Papua (2008) shows high public dissatisfaction toward Special Autonomy in Papua. In several cases, Special Autonomy even increases public distrust to government. The study has identified such failure by following reasons:

1. Some substances in Special Autonomy Law simply led to unresolved conflicts between Papuan people and government, concerning local emblem and flag. Although the stipulation of symbols and flags is set out in Article 2 paragraph (2) of Law no. 21 of 2001, however, no follow-up draft is made and even blocked by government. The raising of Bintang Kejora Flag is regular example. Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police personnel refused to the raising of Bintang Kejora Flag.
2. In its implementation, the political dimension for problem resolution in Papua is much stronger than development and welfare improvement. Special Autonomy was more filled with political events such as regional expansion, demonstrations, special autonomy reinstatement to Local Head Election (Pilkada). Very small space is available for concrete programs to improve living standard of Papuan people in order to diminish the gap between central and Papua, and other regions with Papua, even between indigenous Papuans and migrants.

3. Draft on special Autonomy provisions do not operate as fast as disbursement of Special Autonomy funds. Government Regulation on MRP is just completed after almost three years of Special Autonomy. The first Special Local Regulation was issued six years after Special Autonomy. In fact, since 2002, Special Autonomy funds in large amount continued to disburse. As a result, no single regulatory framework could guarantee that Special Autonomy funds were given for development oriented to people's living standard improvement. On the other hand, the Special Autonomy funds were suspected to be corrupted or used for elites in Papua.
4. Evaluation on Special Autonomy that should be carried out annually after the first third year evaluation as mandated by Special Autonomy Law is not carried out in depth and comprehensively. As a result, the community never obtained clear portrait about Special Autonomy implementation related to fulfillment of their basic rights. In fact, Special Autonomy funds were more misused by government bureaucracy.
5. Special Autonomy was spread to public (in this case cities and district capitals) but not well-informed. People knew about Special Autonomy but they do not fully understand. By reason of the reality, Special Autonomy has become a non-participatory policy. Policy implemented with a single perspective from government.

3.4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

The failure of Special Autonomy arises for five reasons. First, special autonomy is not followed up with efforts to peaceful political conflict resolution. It causes the “politicized” special autonomy implementation both by central government and groups within Papuan people. Special autonomy has turned into political issues, and not for improving the standard of living and respect for basic rights of Papuan people based on the special autonomy policy. The central government tends using security approach contrast with special autonomy objectives, respecting human rights.

Second, the security approach also reveals that special autonomy implementation has deprived the applicable basic values, i.e. protection and respect for ethics and morals, the basic rights of indigenous people, human

rights, supremacy of law, democracy, pluralism, as well as equal status, rights and obligations as citizens. The rise of violence and human rights violations, lack of legal process, non-established human rights court, Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, and the absence of a customary court indicate that Special Autonomy is only partially implemented. For certain reason, the government are still distrust of Papuan people to implement special autonomy.

Third, there is a tendency to undermine special autonomy by reinforcing centralized government pattern. It can be seen from the issuance of Presidential Instruction No. 21 of 2003 concerning the implementation of Law No. 45 of 1999 on the division of Papua province, which is actually substantially contradictory to Law No. 21 of 2001. The undermine of special status of Papuan autonomy has also occurred by various decentralization policies that is not made according to Law Number 21 of 2001 which emphasizes autonomy in province, and applies Law Number 32 of 2004 to emphasize autonomy at district and city levels so as to cause conflicts between regional government units.

Fourth, there is not sufficient institutional capacity required for implementing special autonomy, either due to its formal legal status or special political conditions. For example, the existence of the Papua People's Assembly (MRP), which is a cultural representation, is not able to affect policies and control government administration. In addition, to accommodate Papuan people' aspiration, it is required local political party infrastructure permitted by Law Number 21 of 2001. However, until now the provision has not been seen to be implemented immediately.

Fifth, there is a tendency to delay special autonomy implementation by suspending required draft for implementing regulations. According to Penelitian Kemitraan, until 2006 there were at least 2 Government Regulations, 2 Presidential Decrees, 13 Special Local Regulations, and 21 Provincial Regulations have not yet been drafted. In fact, these rules were the basis for achieving Special Autonomy, namely respecting Papuan people' rights in managing natural resources, protecting human rights, and participating in government administration.

3.5. MODERN AND TRADITIONAL CULTURE ASSIMILATION IN PAPUA

The perception of the special autonomy policy considered as "failure" in the perspective of indigenous Papuan people is the source of long conflict between central government and Papuan people. It arises from assimilation of modern and traditional culture, with very different way of thinking. The granting of special autonomy is a forum for indigenous Papuan people to catch up in all life aspects with characteristics as follows:

- a) Future cultural orientation
- b) Upholding science and technology
- c) Appreciating creativity and change
- d) Strong social control system based on supremacy of law
- e) Consider nature as apart from human beings.

Meanwhile, traditional societies, which are generally recipients of modern culture, have characteristics as follows:

- a) Cultural orientation on existing social harmony or has adopted long time ago
- b) Feeling is stronger than mind
- c) Resistant to social change
- d) State laws differs from cultures
- e) Consider nature as one with human beings (monism).

The commitments of Central Government according to laws and regulations on Special Autonomy for Papua are as follows (1) respecting human rights, religious values, democracy, legal and cultural values applicable in customary community (according to customs or culture held by each ethnic group and includes knowledge, practices, rules, laws and systems to define and regulate individuals and life under "customary community" law); (2) respecting variety and diversity of Papuan socio-cultural life; (3) protecting and respecting ethics and morals; (4) protecting fundamental rights of indigenous peoples and human rights; (5) assuring legal compliance; (6) safeguarding democracy; (7) respecting pluralism; and (8) solving issue of human rights violations against indigenous Papuan people. The protection of indigenous Papuan people' rights as described above include accommodating local culture and values in development policies in Papua and indigenous

Papuan people empowerment. It requires a long-term and sustainable program enables indigenous Papuan people to direct and participate in the progress of their land. On the other hand, some Papuan people expect a cargo cult brought to improvement to their source of living and/or as a solution to their problem. The existing problem brings high expectations to Special Autonomy which is considered as “salvation” paradigm resulting in direct social change. This mindset seems not compatible to the long-term required sustainable results.

CHAPTER IV

PROTEST FROM INDIGENEOUS PAPUAN PEOPLE AGAINST SPECIAL AUTONOMY IMPLEMENTATION

Protests from community against special autonomy implementation have been occurred since the granting of special autonomy status, while discussing on draft for Special Autonomy Law. The protests have continued until now, since the root of problems is not completely resolved. In addition, the impact and special autonomy policy are considered detrimental / beneficial to certain groups. There are factors from internal causing the protest is continuing, and even leading to socio-political movements. Such internal factor is the plurality of Papuan people. Since many immigrants coming with their respective cultures, the indigenous Papuan people feel marginalized. This condition is responded by strengthening their emotional relationship and keeping a distance from newcomer. This attitude is indication of resistance by indigenous people to immigrants.

The resistance arose since the dominant interest groups, in this case government, brought the migrants to Papua, and it considered marginalized the indigenous people. The feeling of threatened, and unsatisfactory conflicts resolution with indigenous peoples on human rights violations, is a primary cause of protests. The protest was started by making physical protests such as blocking of a number of public facilities and offices, making demonstrations with social unrest. Physical collective movements by some Papuan people are considered ineffective, so that many of educated and indigenous Papuan leaders formed organizations to fight for the interest of Papuan people. The organization was the embryo of social movement in Papua.

4.1. RESISTANCE TO IMMIGRANT AND SECURITY APPARATUS

1. Interest Groups in Papua

Prior to special autonomy status in Papua, the Papuan people are internally a pluralistic society. Anthropologically, Papua is divided into seven cultural zones, i.e.: *a. Tabi Customary Area (Port Numbay, Sentani, Sarmi, Mamberamo Raya and Keroom); b. Saireri Customary Area (Biak Numfor, Supiori, Yapen, Waropen and Nabire bagian pantai); c. Laa-Pago Customary Area (Bintang Mountains, Wamena, Lani Jaya, Puncak Jaya, Puncak, Nduga, Yahukimo, Yalimo, and Central*

MamberamoTengah); d. *Mee-Pago Customary Area (Intan Jaya, Paniai, Deiyai, Dogiyai and mountain area Nabire)*; e. *Anim Ha Customary Area (Merauke, Boven Digoel, Mappi and Asmat)*; f. *Domberai Customary Area (Manokwari, Bintuni, Wondama, Sorong, Raja Ampat, Sorong Selatan and Tambrauw)*; and g. *Bomberai Customary Area (Fakfak, Kaimana and Mimika)*. Out of seven cultural zones, it is also divided into approximately 266 tribes with different customs, cultures, languages or original religion in Papua. It means there are thousands of customs applicable in such two provinces.

Moreover, there are migrants from outside Papua, i.e.: Bugis-Makassar, Maluku, Javanese, Batak and others. Geographically, the Indigenous Papuan people are divided into two groups; groups living in mountainous and coastal area, which have different cultural systems and traditions. The ethnicity still has great effect and indifference to social harmony will usually lead to violence. Social communication actually is very limited and people are usually reluctant to make relationship with people from different ethnicities and religions. Conflicts / problems usually occur when we failed to see the plurality of norms and values. (Sugandi: 2008: 3)


According to Sugandi (2008), population number in Papua was about 1 percent of total population in Indonesia, 70 percent were living in rural areas and in remote mountainous areas. Based on the 2000 census, the most populous was in the highlands of Jayawijaya Regency amounting to 417,326 people. The total indigenous population, which is rich in culture, was estimated about 66 percent of the total population.

In addition to diverse community group, institutionally there are elements such as government, security apparatus ((Indonesian National Army and Republic of Indonesia Police)) and investors as interested parties in Papua. Therefore, in general, there are four parties who have main interests in Papua: a. Papuan indigenous people; b. Immigrant community; c. Government; and d. Security apparatus. Social interaction between the parties is highly complex, because each works is operated based on its own system and the society is more divided into sub-systems that often have conflicting interests.

In the previous chapter, it is illustrated on how the clashes arises, which is identified by various problems, both the old and new one, where the special autonomy policy fails to fully resolve the problems occurred in Papua. The first one is that special autonomy policy was from the marginalization of Indigenous Papuan people. The second is that human rights violations and military violence are still common. The third is that the process of Papua integration in to Indonesia, which is considered problematic and the fourth is that development failure to improve the welfare of Indigenous Papuan people and even creates social inequality between them and immigrants. There are three kinds of immigrants, i.e., migrants from outside regency/city area, migrants from outside Papua Province and migrants assigned by government as Civil Servants and security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police). All migrant types are potential source of conflict in Papua, and very important driving factor for social change.

Conflict is an intrinsic and unavoidable aspect in social change. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values, and beliefs that emerged as new formation brought about by social change (Miall, 2000: 7). Her opinion may give explanation about the ongoing conflict in Papua, where social change is taking place and bring social conflict since there are more interest groups get involved in the situation. In other words, the more pluralism, the more potential conflict there will be. Out of three main pillars of social relations, when examined more deeply, the relationship becomes more complex as illustrated in the diagram below.

Figure 10. Main Social Basis Chart Underlying Community Structure in Papua




The varied relationship in the course of rapid social change in Papua has made indigenous people more resistant to migrants, and term “*Komin*” appears among Indigenous Papuan for fellow Indigenous Papuan people and good migrants coming from outside Papua or their territory (district/city) called as “*Ambeer*”. The resistance from Indigenous Papuan people to the migrants called as “*straight hair*” from outside Papua is even stronger.

Interest groups called “community” are diverse, in terms of ethnicity, origin, religion and economic life, it is about 7000 Papuans & West Papuans working as civil servants / Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police, farmers, traders, private sector, and etc. Out of the figure, there is only 3500 civil servant / Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police are native Papuans. In addition, there are migrants who gradually settle in Papua either as spontaneous transmigrants holding positions as entrepreneurs and traders. They generally come from eastern Indonesia, such as Sulawesi and Maluku. Government transmigrants also exist almost in all regencies of Papua and West Papua Province who are placed in several settlement units (SP), both of which have special placements by their origin or mixed with Indigenous Papuan people. These conditions bring more complexity to Papua population. Aside from grouping by origin and ethnicity, there are also grouping by economic similarity. In Papua Province, there are about 536,975 people are factory employees; meanwhile in West Papua Province there are 78,658 factory employees. The rest are farmers, traders and civil servants.

From another perspective, there are security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) playing dominant role between community and civil government (local government). The security apparatus are the security guards, facilitators and mediators for violation of law, but in practice they are always the main perpetrators of human rights violations and military violence against indigenous Papuan civilian. Further, government acts as dominant agent of social change through special autonomy, but in practice there are push and pull between central government and local governments. In the government structure, there is a hierarchy, from national (central) government, the provincial

government to the regency/city government. By these sub-groups in three main groups, the triangular diagram is not sufficient to describe the complexity of community structure. Stakeholders in Papua can be expanded into several perspectives below:

Figure 11. Immigrants and In-Migrant Chart



The diagram shows that the community at the bottom corner of triangle consists of various groups, i.e. the indigenous people divided into tribes from mountainous, coastal and immigrant communities. At the two corners of triangle, there are security apparatus and civilian government. The security apparatus consists of top commander in Jakarta, provincial commander and regency/city territorial commander. Civil government consists of central, provincial and regency/city government. All of them are interconnected and the community is always in a lower position. The Indigenous Papuan people even feel marginalized by other groups called as “migrants”, both integrated in civil government, security apparatus and spontaneous migrants.

In a deeper perspective, besides the three main interest groups, there are other interest groups such as those with a direct relationship with three main groups and those with no direct relationship. They are called additional interest groups consisting of three sub-groups i.e. The private sector, including government partners and community service partners.

The second sub-group is Churches, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and advocacy organizations (lawyers). The church has significant role for Papuan people due to its historical and involvement in development and education activities. There are also religious institutions such as mosques and schools, built by immigrant Muslims from Eastern Indonesia. Non-governmental organizations and legal aid institutions also take great role to help Indigenous Papuan people, since other development impacts and human rights violations and military violence have injured many people. The two institutions are the source of hope for indigenous Papuan people to protect their interests.

The third sub-group of interest is international development organizations from donor countries, multilateral banks and world representative organization from the United Nations. These groups provide development funds executed by government or private groups in collaboration with community. They conduct research, planning and dialogues related to development issues in Papua. They continuously observe developments both directly and indirectly and will play great role in the future as increased challenges of development in Papua.

Along with new companies and institutions in Papua, the plurality rate will be higher. The simple diagram above is not able to describe the actual plurality, because in its process the interaction situation will be more complicated. Diagrams are not able to describe community dynamics in rapid change process. Every time, interaction will take place and changes always occurs. Each group moves and adapts to actions and decisions made by other party. In response to such influences, factions frequently occur and even internal conflicts.

Some groups have kinship bond, and the others have enemies in the past. Papuan people have not only one voice, but have different interests according to their kinship and domicile. Churches and NGOs may have different agendas and have

strong bond to specific subgroups. Governments play different roles at different levels. The educated people compete against the traditional group, the young with the old. Some agree on process, and the others agree on direct action. Each person is based on personal interests. (Anderson, 1997: 2-5).

All groups have power to mobilize mass, either by money, position, decision-making or moral strength. The power may be used for good or bad purposes as in many riots occurred both in Papua and outside Papua. In light of a number of interest groups, it shows that the plurality is the root of conflict. However, some experts stated that the roots are economic relations. If we track down the plurality rate in Papua, it can be identified that the process is due to economic driven by Freeport, BP Migas and other multinational companies. For that reason, there are opinion stating that one of the roofs of conflicts is marginalization of indigenous Papuan people and economic gap. In local communities, the economy is driven traditionally and on subsistence basis. In tribes living in central mountainous area, the community social character is in reliance on tribal war system, which results in strong conflict orientation.

2. *Indigenous People Urbanization and Marginalization*

“Where there is sugar, there are bound to be ants”, is perfect saying to describe the rapid migration rate from one area to another, from less profitable areas to more promising one. The general trend in migration process is people movement from outside Papua to Papua that is called spontaneous migration. The objectives of most migrants are to work for Freeport, BP Migas and other multinational companies as permanent or temporary employees. Some of them work as partners for these companies. At first, the transmigration program performed by the New Order government was blamed for driving factor of significant population growth, but in fact after 1999 the national transmigration program was discontinued. The rate of population growth in Papua was different when special autonomy was enacted. In addition, there were migrants working as civil servants, security officers, partners/contractors, lawyers, NGOs and traders.

Before Special Autonomy Law No. 21 of 2001 for Papua was enacted in 2002, the rate of non-Papuan population growth was insignificant, since it was dominated by Indigenous Papuan people. However, upon Special

Autonomy Law was enacted, the population spreading from various regions was much faster and filling the face of multi-cultural Papua. The high migration rate in Papua acknowledged by the former governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu in front of Papuan people in 2010 that the migration number in Papua is relatively high and even higher in the world, reaching 15 percent per year; normally it is only 1 percent. The head of Transportation Service of Papua province said that in March 2014 total migrants coming to Papua was 13,000 people. The figure increased in 2015 to 15,000 people. This data is excluded for the last five years (2016-2021).

In the meantime, a study conducted at forum of Indonesian Solidarity and the West Papua Paper Project in Sydney, Australia, August 9-10 2017, Dr. Jim Emslie predicts that non-Papuan population in 2020 will increase sharply to 70.8 percent of total 6.7 million Papuan populations. Even more worrying, in 2030 Emslie predicts that the indigenous Papuan population is only 15.2 percent of the 15.6 million Papua populations. In other words, the population ratio between Indigenous Papuan people and non-Papuans in 2030 will reach 1:6.5 (Haluk, 2015: 13-18).

The risk of degradation on indigenous Papuan population is actually a concern for Indigenous Papuan people. The poor education and health situation, high poverty rate (the first at national level), disadvantaged infrastructure development become a separate struggle for Papuans. Critically speaking, the root of such abnormal is the result of debate over political views between undisputed independent Papua (M/Merdeka) with undisputed Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

In fact, the indigenous Papuan people have different view about migrants. Papuans living in coastal areas considers migrants as other tribes besides their own tribes and originates from outside Papua coming and settling in Papua. Meanwhile, Papuans living in central mountainous area considers migrants are not only other tribes outside Papua, but also migrants from outside their Customary Area including those from other tribes outside their tribe. Tribes from Lano-Pago and Mee Pago Customary Areas seem to be more repressive towards migrants from outside Papua compared to tribes from coastal areas.

In light of above, there are three people groups in Papua i.e. Indigenous Papuan people, migrants and security apparatus. They interact each other, but with different direction and goals. The indigenous Papuan people always seek for their rights as the native of Papua. Meanwhile, the security apparatus are trying to eradicate armed criminal groups considered disturbing, undermining the sovereignty of the state and blocking development as well as the migrant who is divided into two, namely those who live for living (transmigrants) and non-transmigrant migrants having high awareness of “business”, and oriented to modern economy. These non-transmigrants are the “mediator” among various groups as their method to live and survive. These immigrants are engaged in trade, services, construction, legal services, NGOs, and other sectors.

From cultural perspective, these immigrants are very different from the native, especially those living in rural areas. Moreover, the immigrant community has forward-looking way of thinking, broad-minded and high in creativity. Therefore, not surprisingly that they generally have a better economic life compared to Indigenous Papuan people. Unfortunately, the migrant and the natives have not been fully assimilated, especially people from mountainous areas but excluded in urban areas. As a result, social interaction fails to be established and social prejudices and jealousy of indigenous people become stronger.

Jobs opportunity for position as Civil Servants (PNS), security apparatus (members of the Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police), and workers in private companies among the indigenous population is very high. However, due to the mismatch of educational background or skills, only few indigenous people are accepted and placed as low-level employees or unskilled workers. Likewise, related to trading business, the natives are only able to trade their garden products and hunted animals by occupying stalls on the outskirts (sidewalk of the market), and selling their wares on used cardboard or makeshift plastic mats. The situation is in contrast to immigrants who are able to rent a kiosk and trade goods for factory commodities, which are generally imported from Java Island. Likewise to the construction services business sector, Papuan construction contractor are less empowered in physical construction projects

due to lack of capital, expertise and equipment, including its continuity and timeliness for completing the work. They are unable to compete with new construction contractor. This situation leads to a feeling of ignored for natives, and make them in position as "out group" (Karsidi, in Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial, 1988: 153).

The relationship position between Indigenous Papuan people and migrants gradually leads to competition, and appears term "they (*dorang*)" and "we (*kitong/kitorang*)". Indigenous people are preferred to the "audiences (objects)" rather than the "actors (subjects) who are active in the implementation of special autonomy. If there are activities, they generally engaged in marginal positions as low-level employees, day laborers, vegetables/hunted animals' traders or sub-contractors of construction work project.

In many cases as in Civil Servants (PNS) recruitment, security apparatus (members of the Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) and scholarships for native Papuan who will continue their education abroad and the government has affirmed native Papuans to be recruited. Similar to native Papuan traders, who are generally Papuan mother, a special market has been created for Papuan women in Jayapura. This policy seems receive good response from indigenous people Papua, although just implemented almost two decades of implementing special autonomy and has not been widely implemented throughout Papua. For this reason, the progress of Indigenous Papuan people not keeps up with the newcomers.

The Migrants seem to be more adapted to take opportunities both for business and skilled labor compared to Indigenous Papuan people and the gap between migrants and Indigenous Papuan people increases, especially in term of economic. Through special autonomy status, it encourages regional expansion and positively changes the economic structure in newly-divided regions with two systems (economic dualism). On one side, there is a small-scale agricultural sector and a subsistence economy characterized by low level of productivity, oriented to self-sufficiency. On the other side, there are modern economic activities, running by immigrants and business-oriented.

Several training programs for Indigenous Papuan people are carried out by NGOs and local governments through relevant agencies, providing specific skills training for groups by their gender, interests and age, or by occupation such as village officials. However, they feel that they have not transferred their skills because learning passion of Indigenous Papuan people is low and they want to join training just for free travel, so the absorbed knowledge is not applicable after they return to their area. There are also trainings conducted at community skills development centers owned by the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration of the Republic of Indonesia, such as Community Training Centers in a number of provinces, including: Ciracas-Jakarta; Yogyakarta; Denpasar-Bali; Pekan Baru-Riau; Bengkulu; Banjarmasin; Makassar; Ambon and Jayapura. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia provides training for village government officials at the Center for Community and Village Empowerment in Malang, East Java Province.

4.2. TYPES OF PROTEST FOR THE CONTINUED SPECIAL AUTONOMY

The protest movement in Indonesia had existed and known since the era of Hindu kingdoms, especially on Java Island, and continued until the era of Islamic kingdoms. For instance, during the Mataram II kingdom, the term "pepe" (sunbathing) appeared to file social protests against king's decision. This "pepe" or sunbathing was done by people who disagree with king's actions or policies, situated in town center (palace courtyard), to get king's or court official's attention. In South Sulawesi, social protest against the king or ruler was carried out in two ways, namely: physical resistance (rebellion), or leave the kingdom's territory.

Social protest actions recorded in the literature are the protests occurred on Java Island in the twentieth century took place for a duration of 28 years (1900-1928). There were 24 riots as the indication of social tensions at that time. These social protests generally occur since land disputes, taxes and inter-ethnic clash. The social protest carried out were made by threats, theft, robbing, collective complaints (demonstrations) to destruction/burning and

government offices and factories blocking (see Report on Vandalism/Burning and burglary, National Archives of, 1981).

Based on data from the Regional Police of Papua, Papua and West Papua Provinces, during period of 2001 - 2020 most days there were social protests carried out by Indigenous Papuan people. By form and number, however it is more common in Papua Province, especially in Jayapura City and central mountains. It was not clear whether they protested to local government or to security apparatus, because when the violence occurred, whether in the form of peaceful demonstrations using flag symbol and "Hai Tanahku Papua" song or actions disturbing order and security, will be immediately labeled as separatist group (OPM) and a chase operation was immediately carried out by security apparatus (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police). Actions considered as protest movements against plan to continue special autonomy was attacks on security posts and shootings by armed criminal groups against security apparatus, government health workers and clergy. At least within the past two decades, there have been \pm 30 violent incidents occurred through anarchic protests by Free Papua Organization or Armed Criminal Group. In the meantime, other actions such as the raising of Morning Star flag carried out every 1 December every year almost always end in violence.

Through depth review, the causes of social protests from Indigenous Papuan people can identify are as follows:

1. Desire to work as Civil Servants, security apparatus (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) workers at multinational companies operating in Papua, is not accommodated (due to unqualified);
2. Economic and prosperity rate competition between natives and migrants;
3. Unfinished past conflict resolutions;
4. Violation to customary community's rights (especially rights on customary land);
5. Repressive (military) approach by security apparatus addition (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) by reason of maintaining security and conducting chase operation to separatist group.

6. The existence of Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) as native people representative seems ignored both by local government and center government.
7. Lack of participation of people opposing with government such as OPM/Separatist Group in discussion on Special Autonomy Law draft.
8. The government tends unilaterally determining the continued special autonomy for Papua, by submitting revision to special autonomy law with People Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia in National Legislative Priority (Prolegnas) agenda to be discussed in near time.

From points mentioned above, the triggering factor of social protests is generally arising from community's feeling of dissatisfaction with special autonomy implementation, both with development methods and processes, policies made to support special autonomy implementation are to handling social protests filed by Indigenous Papuan people on the impact of implemented special autonomy. Out of the three stages, appears to be closely related to the protest are the second and third stages.

As described in the previous chapter, since the beginning of Special Autonomy implementation, there is a wave and effort to cancel special autonomy implementation or to find new format to address Papuan issue, such as holding re-referendum to replace similar 'referendum' as meant by the Act. However, these efforts have in fact failed to stop special autonomy implementation, and only to lower the acceleration of special autonomy.

A protest, according to Eisenstadt (1986:54) is "an expression of tension between the complexity and fragmentation of human relations inherent in the institutional division of work and totally potential to unconditioned, and gap in participation of social and cultural orders". In Indigenous Papuan people, tensions have existed for a long time. However, the conflict continued after the granting of special autonomy status gave rise to a long-period protest movement and became more complex due to much migrants living and settling in Papua. The presence of NGOs, lawyers, businessmen, and certain political aspirations are assimilated into the "innocent" Papuan people life. As a consequence, the gap in participation and culture as expressed by Eisenstadt is wider, so it is difficult for Indigenous Papuan people to catch up. If available, it is only a fake, due to the pressure from outsiders who have hidden agendas.

Through protests, the Indigenous Papuan people desire to fully express themselves in new social order. Until now, most of Indigenous Papuan people feel that their existence as a tribe, the owner of customary rights and the unity of their tribe with all their environmental resources is not recognized. They question about their existence which is totally unappreciated and ignored in decision making. They asked, "why we are sacrificed, as if we did not exist, we did not enjoy special autonomy which was expected bring prosperity to us, in fact the fund was always increasing every year?" these expressions were conveyed by the leaders of customary institutions who considered that as a source of conflict.

The protests occurred up to present have started from disappointment with the integration process with Indonesia, as continued with Military Operations Area (DOM) during the new order. The granting of special autonomy status, which is expected as remedy for their desire to disintegrate from Indonesia, fails to benefit the Indigenous Papuan people. Social relations between ethnic groups and migrants are increasingly complex, especially since the government tends using militaristic approach. For such reason, the situation is frequently strained, and a sporadic outburst through protest is continuing. Symbolically speaking, the Papuan people had returned the special autonomy twice to the state, respectively on August 12, 2005 and June 18, 2010. In the 2005, a wave of protests with more than 13,000 Papuans was organized by Papuan Customary Council and student movement organizations. At that time, the mass brought casket as a symbol of special autonomy failure to be returned to the Papuan People's Representative Council as the representative of the Republic of Indonesia. Five years later afterward, the Democracy Forum (Fordem) reinstated a long march and returned special autonomy to Papuan People's Representative Council. The action for returning Special Autonomy was repeated after Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) and Papuan people held a large meeting at (Mubes) for 2 days, 9 - 10 June 2010 and concluded that special autonomy was proven failure. Special autonomy was considered as failure to be solution for Papuan people's desire to gain sense of justice.

Another wave of protests had also reinstated since mid-2020 until now. The protests took place not only in the Papua, but also in Jakarta and in many big cities outside Papua, the place Papuan students are currently studying. Not

only students held protests against the second wave of continued Special Autonomy, a number of elements within Papuan community also delivered their disapproval, including the Governor of Papua (Drs. Lukas Enembe), Chairman and Members of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP), Papuan Church Council, Papuan Women's Solidarity, Second Wave Action Committee for Special Autonomy and 16 from Papuan Civil Organizations combinations.

A massive mass action to reject the continued special autonomy shows that there was a problem with the legitimacy of the Papuan people to Law No. 21 of 2001. The fact indicated the low participation in Papuan community in drafting team for Special Autonomy Law, the death of the Chairman of Papua Presidium Council Theys Eluay, many government policies was in contrast with the spirit of special autonomy and less positive impact of special autonomy on social condition change to Papuan people was the motive of special autonomy not obtain full legitimacy from the Papuan people. Papuans did not believe that special autonomy can solve their problems even before the issuance of special autonomy law. Delayed and lagged implementing regulations for autonomy law strengthened their distrust in central government.

Moreover, the increasing of security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) deployed to Papua by December 2020 raises questions from Indigenous Papuan people, why is so many securities apparatus brought to Papua, in fact the government may talk to them directly. However, there are Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) established as representative of customary, religious leaders, and native Papuan women in accordance with the mandate of Law Number 21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua. There is no more reason for the government or any other party to speak on their behalf. Indigenous Papuan people asked for direct communication with government, and any plan on their interests / life must be firstly discussed, including the continued special autonomy to be carried out by the government.

So far, the government considers sufficiently allocating large funds to carry out development in Papua, so local indigenous people are not involved. This formal attitude makes government lack of understand to local community, since they consider matters from a different point of view. The tendency of government to use security / military approach is considered by community as

an arrogant attitude that hurts their feelings and no will to hear their voices. Indigenous Papuan people feel that they are only used as objects by the government and exploit their natural resources as well as damage their environment without mercy and responsibility. This attitude was occurred since the beginning of Papuan integration and continued after special autonomy implementation.

Although the government initially committed to change the approach used to develop Papua, the realization was different. Based on field research (2019), it is said that the development model that has been implemented for Papua so far is considered inappropriate because it tends oriented to community modernization due to strong modernization rationale. “In fact, the progress orientation with material parameters is not appropriate to local Papuan culture. On the other hand, the value system, way of life and traditions of Papuan people have tendency to not easily accept change, even to some degree they are anti-change. Through the conflict of perspective, it is not surprising leading to assumption that the Papuan development paradigm is contrary to the local cultural paradigm. The technocratic policy makers insisting their perspective and even consider local Papuan culture as a resistor to accelerate Papua's development. The initial step for achieving progress is to change and or even to eliminate the culture considered contrary to the values of modern life. However, in reality, the aggressive technocratic development paradigm has received cultural resistance from Papuans themselves, and both of them are in a position to mutually negating. This condition is illustrated from almost 20 years of regional development programs in the form of Special Autonomy for Papua and West Papua”.

The protests were filed sporadically by groups who have no space. Moreover, habit of “begging money in the name of donation” to local government. Sometimes they throw stone, block government offices and make verbal abuse to local government officials since they consider the government slow to disburse funds or dishonest. Based on assumption of local government officials, there was an “actor” behind the community who always made crowded around government offices and brought proposals with great content and format. Surprisingly, they were “capable of drafting standard project proposals”, said several respondents from local government elements. The

problem was, they thought every proposal filed would be successful. When explained about disbursement mechanism, they became impatient and threaten with violence or bring more friends.

A crowd of people around government offices in Papua was common almost every day. Either grouped or individually, they asked for local government services apart from administrative matters, mostly request for aid in the form of "money". They only knew that the Local Head (Governor/Regent/Mayor) was a person who can count on (asked for money, goods, and so on.), and therefore he was always the target of protests. In addition to the local government office area, other locations used for holding protest are campus, one of the oldest universities in Papua and security headquarters, both in the border and mountainous areas.

Aid in several forms were provided by the government, both directly managed and through existing community institutions, had made local communities always expecting instant aid. They thought it is reasonable for government to help them since the government had exploited Papua's natural resources. For such reason, the indigenous Papuan people were accustomed to aid, and has emerged a concept that community aid was their rights, without hard work. Finally, the competitiveness in preparation to global competition failed to be developed. This condition according to Van den Broek has created a "culture of poverty".

"This culture of poverty makes people not only depend on aid, but also not encourage them to perceive their role in all processes of the expected progress, they only act as people who deserve attention, and in turn as "beggar society" (Van den Broek, 1996: 18).

Van den Broek's concerns (1996) were responded by local government with providing aid oriented to sustainable development and human development by granting affirmative scholarships for native Papuan who wants to continue their education both domestic and abroad. However it has only been carried out by the government of Papua province. Meanwhile, the other programs, such as business incubator, are actually a more responsible method to prosper, and carried out in villages but the results are below the expectation. Only a few are successful to develop. For the successful, the aid programs are blessings for them, but for the unsuccessful the program are burden, since they

have to continuously strive and discipline and in the end, they feel dissatisfied and demand more.

The final condition is that institutional conflicts (customary land issues) have shifted to materialistic conflict of interest. The protests are related to efforts to get money instantly. The successful in conducting mass demonstrations through blocking public facilities to suppress granting of aids seemingly used as a model to put pressure on government or any person who is considered prejudice to them so far, to be exchange with some money. Through the above “model”, a group of people have obtained billions of rupiah from PT Sinar Mas since they are considered logging in their forest. This "game" was also assisted by people who understand the law, so people is conditioned to know their rights to be filled.

4.3. SOCIAL PROTEST AND DISTURBANCE OCCURED IN PAPUA AND ITS IMPACT

Since the beginning of special autonomy implementation in Papua, many protests filed by Indigenous Papuan people, especially in the central highlands. At that time, it may be said that only people associated with Free Papua Organization (OPM/KKB) took resistance seriously. However, by the end of twenty years of special autonomy (first period), social protests had led to mass riots which caused fatalities and property damages as well as take out government and community economic activities are suspected to be increasing.

Obviously, the good intentions to develop Papua by the government for Papuans will not stop their will for self-determination. It will collide with the security apparatus maintaining the state's sovereignty. (Prof. Nico Syukur Dister, 2020).

Since its integration with Indonesia in 1969–1998, it may be said that development and Indigenous Papuan people were neglected by central government. Despite programs and aid provided, it was granted without regard to specific aspects of region, customs and needs of Indigenous Papuan people. In other words, the development model applied was "uniformity" with other regions in Indonesia and used "top down" pattern. In addition, the implementation of the Military Operations Area (DOM) was suspected of causing violations of Human Rights (HAM) to Indigenous Papuan people.

Despite Military Operations Area (DOM) status has been revoked since the era of President B.J. Habibie and followed up with the granting of special autonomy status when Megawati Soekarnoputri served as president, but it did not automatically reduce social conflicts / protests occurred in Papua. The repressive (military) approach used by the government, push and pull between central and regional governments for implementing regulations mandated by Special Autonomy Law, including references to use and liability for regional finances, including other treatments found incapable of fulfilling sense of justice of Papuan people. This condition also triggers dissatisfaction. Various disappointments experienced by Indigenous Papuan people caused protest action led to mass riots in Papua and West Papua provinces, even outside Papua such as Surabaya, Malang (East Java), Jakarta, North Sulawesi which caused fatalities and material losses. They demanded that special autonomy to be discontinued and a referendum on independence.

The initiator of riots were “figures” from various ethnic groups/customary institutions, organizations supporting for independent Papua, and elements from Papuan students residing in Papua and outside Papua associated with Papuan Student Alliance (AMP). Several social actions had led to the riots began to widespread since 2018 or seventeen years after special autonomy implementation in Papua. The causes including attack by Free Papua Organization (OPM/KKB) who killed 31 construction workers in Nduga Regency on December 1, 2018. In such attack, Indonesian security apparatus suspected that the attack was organized by Egianus Kogoya, the leader of OPM armed wing in Nduga. The central government then sent 154 personnel to restore security. However, the conflict in Nduga had just escalated, brought impact on civilian population. On December 20, 2018, the government of Nduga Regency found four civilian bodies, which according to a spokesman for the Indonesian National Armed Forces, were allegedly caught in a fire-fight between military and armed groups. On August 14, 2019, the humanitarian team formed by the government of Nduga Regency said that 182 people had died in the refugee camps, but the central government said that the number was 53. On October 10, 2019, residents found five bodies in a hole covered in leaves and buried in the ground. Finally, on December 24, 2019, the Vice

Regent of Nduga, Wentius Nimiangege, resigned from his position due to the continuous violence and killing of civilians in Papua.

Later, a series of demonstrations that created mass riots in Papua and West Papua provinces in mid of August-September 2019. It started with a number of incidents occurred outside Papua, on August 15, 2019, Papuan students in Malang-East Java associated with Papuan Student Alliance (AMP) clashed with the community at the Rajabali intersection, Kayutangan-Malang City, because they wanted to hold a demonstration to commemorate the 57th anniversary of the New York Agreement but not permitted by local police. The second incident was triggered by an alleged act of persecution and racism conducted by community organization in Surabaya at dormitory of Papuan student which was deemed to have insulted the state symbol, red and white flag on August 16, 2019. The third incident, on August 19, 2019, false news (hoax) circulated on social media (Twitter) stating that Papuan student died in Surabaya because of tortured by security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police), whereas in fact the photo is a victim of a traffic accident occurred on Jalan Trikora Jayapura on February 19 2019. The second incident triggered a first mass riot in Manokwari-the capital city of West Papua Province on August 19, 2019 where the mob burned the Regional House of Representatives Building. On the same day, the action also took place in Sorong City-West Papua where mass damaged the airport, police station, prison institutions and 15 other public facilities. Furthermore, the action continued to Fakfak Regency on August 20, 2019, riots occurred at Thumburai market and the mass raised Morning Star flag, causing one casualties. Riots also occurred in Mimika Regency on August 21, 2019, mass damaged and burned Regional House of Representatives Building, Grand Moza Hotel and a number of vehicles. The same incident also occurred in Jayapura City on August 29, 2019, during the riot the mass damaged and burned 31 offices (Telekom, Pos, Papuan People's Assembly and Public Fuel Stations), 15 banking facilities, 33 two-wheeled vehicles, 36 vehicles four wheels, 24 shops and kiosks, 7 police stations, 3 motor vehicle dealers and many Papuan students who were studying outside Papua returned to Papua.

Another social riot as the impact of two events mentioned above also occurred in Jayawijaya (Wamena) Regency, on September 23, 2019.

Previously in 2000, large social riots had also occurred in Jayawijaya. During the riots, ± 43 were killed, ±70 were seriously injured, 374 vehicles were burned, 465 stores and 165 houses were burned, and 20 offices were damaged and burned, as well as tens of thousands of exodus migrants from Papua. Riots also happened at Resort Police Headquarters of Yahukimo, on December 18, 2019. The vandalism and burning of Regent's Office also took place in Keerom Regency on October 1, 2020 impacted by the announcement of results of formation of Civil Servant Candidates of 2018.

Besides the social unrest described above, there was also a conflict occurred in Intan Jaya Regency, Papua Province. This conflict had been going on for a long time. The shooting incident of one of the Pastors, Jeremiah Zanambani on September 19, 2020, was not the first victim. He is the 10th civilian victim in a series of conflicts between OPM/TPNPB/KKB and security apparatus ((Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) within period of October 2019 to 2020. The armed conflict in Intan Jaya since 2019 was a new chapter for the episode of separatist movement versus security apparatus after Intan Jaya Regency was officially established in 2008.

The incident started on Saturday morning September 19, 2020, the atmosphere was very harsh in the yard of the Elementary School of Foundation for Education and Schooling of Evangelical Churches in Land of Papua or YPPGI Hitadipa. The security apparatus (Indonesian National Army) raised Hitadipa civilians in the schoolyard occupied by Indonesian National Army, and used as the base of Military District Command or Koramil Persiapan Hitadipa. A number of soldiers from the Hitadipa Preparatory Koramil stated that the TNI had grant residents two days to return the lost SS1 weapon since September 17, 2020. The SS1 weapon was seized by West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) in the attack which killed Serka Sahlan. The threat clearly shows separatist stigmatization to Hitadipa civilians. This threat frightened Hitadipa civilians burdened by weapons which had not taken. The Saturday morning gathering was not attended by Pastor Jeremiah Zanambani. Since morning, he and his wife, Miriam Zoani had been going to Bomba, a small village on the hillside south of Hitadipa Village, to cultivate their gardens and to repair their pigsty. While they were working around 13.00 pm in Hitadipa, there was a gunshot. Immediately they went straight into the pigsty

and closed the door, since the Indonesian National Army had ordered when heard gunshots, they had to enter the house and lock the door. The gunshots escalated to gunfight between security apparatus (Indonesian National Army) and OPM/TPNPB/KKB who were trying to attack the base of Koramil Persiapan Hitadipa. The attack killed one Indonesian National Army member who was assigned to guard Koramil Persiapan Hitadipa. This incident was the starting point of Indonesian National Army personnel to chase OPM/TPNPB/KKB and sweep a small village called Taundugu and ending with shooting which killed Pastor Yeremia Zanambani.

If we view back, the expansion of Intan Jaya from Paniai Regency in 2008 had implications on shifting in conflict trends. The shift was a significant change, since formerly Intan Jaya Regency was not included in the conflict zone between TNI and OPM/TPNPB/KKB. Former conflicts were more related to communal, land ownership issues, clash among residents and various security disturbances and public order. When social conflicts such as tribal wars occurred, traditional value-based conflict resolution was made by conflicting community groups for alternative resolution.

After region expansion, the conflict shifted to struggle for power by local elites through the contestation of Pilkada in 2017. On the one hand, the addition of organic and non-organic soldiers for securing Pilkada and responding to various local security dynamics thereafter has increased the role of the security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) significantly in the regency with 49,293 population. On the other hand, OPM/TPNPB/KKB was also consolidating their struggles by expanding the Kodap and Reunification. After TPNPB Summit in Biak Numfor on May 1-5 2012, TPNPB had 33 Kodap throughout the Land of Papua. Intan Jaya itself was included in Kodap VIII. Internal consolidation was also strengthened by Reunification and Declaration meeting of TPNPB-Free Papua Organization on August 1, 2019 in Ilaga, Puncak Regency. Since then, the intensity of conflict between security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) versus OPM/TPNPB/KKB had increased in Intan Jaya Regency. Another point triggering the armed conflict is the existence of the Wabu gold block for potentially new conflict (resource war). Previous findings have

shown that there was a causal relationship between natural resources exploitation, armed conflict and violence escalation.

The violence escalation between security apparatus (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) and OPM/TPNPB/KKB also had an impact on refugee problem. Based on data compiled from Indonesian Gospel Tent Church (GKII), Timika Diocese Catholic Church and Government of Intan Jaya Regency, there were about 466 people who have fled. They were spread in several districts around Intan Jaya Regency and several other regencies such as Nabire, Mimika and Puncak. The figure was estimated higher due to difficulty to collect data by Humanitarian Team. In addition, the trauma experienced by residents made fear to report themselves to government agencies. The large number of patrols of security apparatus in Sugapa and Hitadipa Regencies also made difficult for the Pastors to record the overall refugees spread. Various problems with refugees arisen from previous armed conflicts, for example refugees from Nduga Regency, also created a tendency for many civilians to flee to the forest, keep off from residential or government centres where security apparatus were based. Difficulties in data collection will cause various humanitarian problems such as limited access to basic needs such as food, adequate housing, sanitation, education and health. The existence of women, children refugees, and the elderly also required special attention to be fulfilled immediately. Another urgent matter to be addressed was the fulfilment of security guarantees for refugees so that they could back to their hometowns for celebrating Christmas and return to normal activities.

It is recorded that throughout 2019 there were 21 gunfights between security apparatus (Indonesian National Army / Republic of Indonesia Police) and Free Papua Organization (OPM)/armed criminal groups (KKB), which cost nine lives of Indonesian National Army soldiers, two Republic of Indonesia Police personnel and ten civilians. This incident continued until now (March 2021). The Papuan Regional Police and Regional Military Command VIII Trikora noted that on 1 January - 26 September 2020, there were ± 100 conflicts in Papua and West Papua, which consisted of 40 strikes, 22 riots, and 38 violence against civilians, with total casualties reached 57 people. Meanwhile, from early 2021 to March, there had been 14 conflicts, 6 of which were gunfights and 8 violence against civilians. By comparison, the number of

conflicts occurred in Papua during period of 2019 - 2021 had increased, as illustrated in the table below:

Table 20. Total conflicts occurred in Papua during 2019 – 2021

Types of Conflict	1 January – 31 December 2019	1 January – 31 December 2020	1 January – Maret 2021
Conflicts Event	96	100	25
a. Battles	27	40	30
b. Riots	19	22	-
c. Violence against civilians	50	38	15
d. Fatalities	145	57	50

Source: Papua Regional Police and Regional Military Command VIII/Trikora

The above data shows that if the government continues using repressive/militaristic approach to conflict in Papua, this will persist and increase fatalities. Moreover, the government's authority will deprive, so it is feared that it will raise greater attention from international to interfere Papua issue.

The declining of government's authority is very detrimental to all parties because there are no role models who can unite informal figures. As a result, elements of control and social cohesion do not exist, thus opening up opportunities for all parties to influence society for both constructive and destructive purposes. Society is easily swayed by various forces, resulting in disorientation and loss of idealism. The increase and increase in the number of security apparatus (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) in Papua has made Indigenous Papuan people think that the government is not serious or even half-hearted in implementing special autonomy in Papua.

Based on the above description, it can be identified that the various policies issued by the government not always have a positive impact. Since former conflicts have not been completely resolved by the government before the implementation of special autonomy status, and therefore it has triggered various kinds of protests. Social history, social changes and drastic changes in physical environment have made people confused or lost direction, so easily led by certain parties to take various anarchic actions. The tradition of tribal wars underlying social history in Papua causes suspicion to one another. The implication is very clear for grants management for community empowerment provided by local governments. Each village felt deserves to greater aid compared to other villages.

4.4. TYPES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN PAPUA

In theory, social movements arise in certain social conditions allowing the movement to grow. This social condition is potential turned to actual if fulfilling the other conditions. Social movements do not appear suddenly but through a long process and various causes and effects. Its development does not stop at spontaneous protests, but growing into an organized movement. Due to diverse factors, the theories that provide explanations start from "indirect" causes to direct one and triggering factors.

"Indirect" causes can be traced through social change theory, the direct causes are social problems felt by the community and the trigger is special autonomy implementation which fails bring prosperity to people's daily lives. In explaining social change, there are two perspectives give greater influence among sociologists, i.e., materialistic perspective and idealistic perspective (see Etziomi, 1973 and Harper, 1989).

The materialistic perspective, as developed by Karl Marx, suggests that the factors affecting change are production method or changes in production technology. New technologies or production economic models changes social interactions, social organization, cultural values, beliefs and social norms. This perspective of thinking explains that production strength is central for shaping and changing society. The popular phrase said by Marx: *"The windmill gives you a society with the feudal lord, the steam-mill, the society with the industrial capitalist"* (1989:56). It means that the form of society is determined by the technology used in production process.

Another thinker emphasizing material factors as the cause of change is William Ogburn, who wrote intensively on the causes of social change in terms of technology developments in America. It was stated that car invention had caused rapid changes in society, such as accelerating geographic mobility, speeding urban areas growth and changing social procedures / losing direct supervision from parents. Technological developments have influenced many changes, not only material aspects, but also non-material aspects or non-material culture through changes in ideas, ways of thinking, values, ideology and norms (in Harper, 1989:57).

The idealistic perspective views the ideal aspects as driving factor for change. The ideal factor is cultural values in the form of ideas, norms and

values. If Karl Marx mentions technology as material aspect, meanwhile it is categorized in ideal aspect in this perspective, since technology is the product of ideas. In materialistic perspective, the product or realization of ideas are considered as the cause of change, while the idealistic perspective considers the idea itself as factor to cause of change along with other idealistic factors, science, belief, and social values. In the meantime, ideology refers to a combination of various elements of organized culture, beliefs and values, which validates forms of human action from ideology perspective such as democracy, capitalism and socialism.

The thinkers observing the causes of change according to this perspective are Max Weber, stating that capitalism development may not be viewed from material and technological aspects, but from certain value system interacting with material causes. He argued that spiritual values had an effect on capitalism development by giving example in Europe where industrial capitalism was highly developed when the early concentration of population adhered to the Protestant religion. Therefore, Weber concludes that the values of Protestantism, specifically Calvinism, have an influence on capitalism development, since the teachings contain values related to business, saving and consumption reduction. The unintentional consequence of this religious worldview is “asceticism”, which has encouraged capital accumulation (by motivating hard work, saving and reducing consumption). The accumulated capital is reinvested rationally to support economic growth (Harper, 1989:57-60).

The argument put forward by Weber on the relationship between Calvinism value and industrial capitalism development is a theoretical description focusing on the role of ideas and values as a driving factor for change, although it is not a single causing factor. It is recognized that the causing factors in social life are much more complex, so it cannot be called a single factor as the cause of change.

The two perspectives stated above are very important in analyzing social changes occurred after the granting of special autonomy status, either due to materialistic factors, the use of technology or by reason of idealistic factors, the emerged of new ideas in society. Drastic social changes encouraging people to take social movements or reactions are not actually neutral. It is a political

process involving an organized struggle between the ruler and the ruled. On one side, people having power as the favorable segment deals with lack of power people as a disadvantaged party on the other hand. Indeed, the latter group who frequently experience disappointment, so they are motivated to take action against the "status quo". Meanwhile, people with power and "privilege" are often in a better position to determine the direction and content of change to maintain or strengthen their power and privileges.

In relation to wider development, Neubeck and Glasberg (1996:310) explain that development is a political process characterized by historical inequalities among nation relations in the world system. If the case of Papua's special autonomy did not operate effectively, it will create local gap, especially between migrants and Indigenous Papuan people. It seems development also creates world gap. There are countries benefited from the modernization process, the countries applied modern production methods or advanced technology first, and there are also left-behind countries due to slow in developing or implementing high technology.

Technological innovation as the power of social change also results in power gap. The rulers are in the best position to choose technology according to their interests, while people who have not mastered the technology are "forced" to accept things beyond their breaking point. Technological innovation tends to increase power and control over those who is lack of power, both in determining technology type, placement, approach and personal relationships.

Social movements are instruments for powerless, disadvantaged and disillusioned groups to challenge the status quo. For their struggle forum, they formed organizations that beyond tribal and national boundaries to gather support in order to strengthen their movement.

The materialistic perspective, which ultimately leads to inter-class conflict, can be used to highlight problems occurred in Papua, because there is clear connection between special autonomy implementation and the rise of protest movement. This movement is a reflection of the conflict in society, which in the case of government administration appears in the form of a conflict between the continued special autonomy status and Indigenous Papuan people. But behind it are government elites (rulers) as decision makers in

determining formulation to be used. Indeed, the government elites (rulers) who will determine the direction of development policies, so that if it is implemented through projects/activities/programs, there will be challenges from the community. In essence, a conflict between the ruling class who controls the state and the people who do not have any power in state sovereignty. If they take social movements through protests, including attacks on security apparatus and weapons seizure at a number of security posts (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police), will be nothing if compared with the government and put the society in a weak position.

In an idealistic perspective, it can be explained that every policy, whether through projects/activities/programs, will certainly invite pros and cons ideas or views, which generated to discussion and reflection. In fact, every reaction to a policy begins with a "definition of the situation", which is an idealistic intellectual activity. These ideas will grow to into action or stop at thinking level depends on the developed "definition of situation". This means the idealistic dimension is very important in a social change process arising among the local resident.

Protest movements are more increasing along with various reforms, because in objective conditions, people's expectations also increase as quickly as possible. The lower expectation to be fulfilled, the stronger motivation for movement to be seeks. Population migration, development and construction with high rate of change will never give space for dialogue or for formulating integrated planning strategies. Pressure from all sides accelerates the change rate and confuses other issues. Meanwhile, the government in general aims to clear and specific goal, continuing special autonomy in Papua through revisions to legal umbrella and increasing fund allocation.

The central government less likely not to carry out a comprehensive evaluation to the on-going special autonomy implementation, or to give space for dialogue with Indigenous Papuan people what is the right formulation for special autonomy implementation and how to resolve past problems, both in overturning integration history and human rights violations, which is still in the question. These are obstacles and challenges which, if not resolved, will lead to change in social, policies, interactions and activities in this region.

Drastic changes require anyone to change in their orbit. Not only adapted to new behaviors and ways of thinking, but also suited to legal, technological and modern management world. Through this adaptation, the urbanized indigenous Papuan people becoming more open and organized. A number of people have opportunities to study at higher school, to work, and to have business chance, and some of them do not, because of their limitations. This condition encourages social conflicts and demonstrations of power. People create real power for rapid change or even drastic for Indigenous Papuan people.

The drastic change is only one side of the problems. On the other side, there is historical past and cultural stagnation. The actions taken by government together with security apparatus (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) using repressive/military approach had created disintegration, hatred/vengeance and suspicion to all parties. Many Indigenous Papuan people still brought memories of hatred and distrust to government and security apparatus for a long time. This is an important aspect to culture and substantiates the myths and traditions in some cases. Tribal rivalry and hostility are historical part, as in relationships, actions and perceptions of outsiders. The characteristic of "Warrior Society" which overestimates heroism combined with Millenarianism as social condition potentially to raise various movements, especially those accentuate courage. Some respondents considered that spontaneous reactions through riots, attacks, demonstrations with violence and destruction are heroism conversion to "the big man". This characteristic is mainly owned by tribes originating from mountainous areas, due to its tougher natural challenges, high fighting power and offensive nature. Meanwhile, tribes originating from coastal areas, is generally spoiled by nature, they have a high level of acceptance and tend to give up when competing. These characteristics ultimately affect movement style and social movements' formation process.

Social movements, either temporary or permanent, are initiated by collective behavior as a feeling of dissatisfaction about social conditions. However, people joining in mass action do not always have the same goal. Some people have motivation based on high ideals for a non-material goal, but the others are looking for material gains. In light of the above, the root of

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problem and the rising of social movements in Papua lies in special autonomy implementation which is considered fail to bring prosperity to Indigenous Papuan people.

CHAPTER V

SOCIAL MOVEMENT ANATOMY

Protests and riots that occurred in Papua before the implementation of special autonomy status (2001) can be classified as collective behavior, and can be categorized as social movements. This is because collective behavior such as demonstrations, riots, mass movements and other forms of protest have been well organized and have goals to be achieved collectively. Social movement has different characteristics from the mass movements mentioned above, although there are similarities. The existence of collective behavior that is directed to the achievement of certain goals is one of the prominent similarities, while the difference is that the goals are clearly defined and achieved through strategic efforts through the organization's forum.

According to Lofland (1996), there are six aspects that must be questioned or studied if you want to know the building of a social movement organization comprehensively, namely:

- a. Aspects of Beliefs;
- b. Aspects of Organization;
- c. Aspects of Causes;
- d. Aspects of Participation (joining);
- e. Aspects of Strategy; and
- f. Movement Effect

Based on Lofland's view above, the researcher tries to analyze the existence of social movements in Papua, as described below.

5.1. SOCIAL MOVEMENT BELIEF

In general, belief contains the meaning of "things that are considered true", where the assumption is used as a driving force to oppose reality. Included in this understanding are doctrines, ideologies, views of life, hopes, frameworks of thought and insights. Based on this understanding view, the researcher tries to see if it is true that the protests that took place in Papua and in several cities outside Papua are based on such beliefs?

As previously explained, the community groups that protested consisted of various indigenous Papuan sub-tribes. Among the sub-tribes can be broadly divided into two, namely tribes with mountainous and coastal

cultures. The two kinds of culture are represented by several large tribes in the provinces of Papua and West Papua who live in seven customary areas. Therefore, the belief system was extracted from several major tribes, especially the tribes living in mountainous areas who protested a lot, along with several other tribes.

The tribes that are in the Mee-Pago customary territory, around the Central Mountains of Central Papua such as Intan Jaya, Paniai, Deiyai, Dogiyai, Nabire Gunung and Mimika Gunung and La-Pago, around the Central Mountains of Eastern Papua such as the Bintang Mountains, Jayawijaya, Lani Jaya, Puncak Jaya, Puncak, Nduga, Yahukimo, Yalimo and Central Mamberamo. They have a clearer framework of thought or doctrine when compared to other tribes, because the leadership of the “tribal chief” is still strong and the culture of speech (storytelling) continues. They tell stories about *Hai*, for example, which contain complex doctrines about life that are still adhered to. In addition, there are Papuan intellectual figures who write down their tribal views on the reality of life and their hopes so that these values are preserved.

Talking about the substance of belief in social movements, according to Lofland (1996:102), actually talks more about the social location where the belief lives, rather than the substance or character of the movement because the mainstream is always in a certain social context. Construction of social realities such as: democracy, capitalism, individual freedom, human rights that are considered right by Americans, may be considered as deviations or mistakes for people in Russia. Therefore, the “*mainstream*” must be corrected, marginalized or eliminated, because it is contrary to the beliefs or ideology of the country.

In the context of indigenous Papuans, the “*mainstream*” which underlies the granting of special autonomy status is the answer to the demands of the indigenous Papuans who want to break away from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (political compromise) which is given by the central government to indigenous Papuans, in addition to the desire to “modernization” or “development”. Do indigenous Papuans intend to reject or marginalize the meaning of development or modernization? Based on the statements of several major tribal chiefs in Papua, they do not intend to reject

the approaches taken in carrying out development or modernization. It is said that:

We realize that the granting of this special autonomy status is the answer to the problems of left-beingness, backwardness, and poverty that are twisted in Papua. This includes opening up regional isolation, opening up wider world horizons. There is hope that with modernization (through development projects), the lives of the tribes in Papua will be improved, even though they actually experienced a "culture shock" because the entry of modernization values was so sudden, did not want to wait, let alone compromise with the traditional civilization that we live" (Dominikus Sorabut, Head of the Papuan Customary Council for the La-Pago region; interview in November 2020 via telephone).

Because of that shock they seek a balance by making various "movements", against reality. The reality they face is considered to be contrary to the view of life concerning the relationship between humans and nature and the conception of *Hai*. A good life, Happiness is when the spirits of the ancestors above (*Hai*) are not disturbed and left as a source of life values. While development requires the use of nature for humans. Natural wealth is meaningless without being explored and exploited to increase welfare. The meaning of prosperity for traditional society is very different from modern society, where in traditional society prosperity cannot be measured by the amount of money, income or growth, while the concept of modernization actually measures welfare based on these values.

Although indigenous Papuans generally support the "ideology" of development, this does not mean that their marginalized traditional views must be lost. What they demand is a balance between traditional values and modern values, namely building while respecting the rights and beliefs of the local (traditional) indigenous peoples. So that there is no total rejection of modernization ideas as "mainstream". The unpreparedness of traditional society culturally and socially to enter the arena of competition and a way of thinking that is too modern, even causes despair with a reaction that is even more radical, as if a battle between life and death.

The consequences that are felt by the indigenous Papuan people living in the coastal areas are actually no less devastating than their brothers in the mountainous areas. Tribes living in coastal areas also experience socio-cultural barriers in adapting to modern values. However, because of the social

historical background experienced, namely always succumbing to the pressure of immigrants, forming "*inferior*" behavior and the fighting power to defend their rights is less developed. Thus, efforts to challenge reality are not easy to express, even coastal people tend to "*avoid*" and be secretive.

According to Jaluwo (1999: 51), because they often want to avoid conflict, coastal people often make false agreements not based on demands of interests. Feeling dissatisfied with something, especially men, they usually vent it through drinking, bullying / extorting immigrants by pretending to be drunk, and fighting with each other. Abundant natural resources have spoiled them and weakened their fighting power.

Coastal people also adhere to the philosophy of nature, but it is not supported by other beliefs that associate it with "super natural" powers such as *Hai's* belief in people in mountainous areas. Coastal people prefer to adapt rather than against reality, although they may not necessarily be able to do so either. Although there is social jealousy, despair and dissatisfaction with the implementation of special autonomy as a real form of modernization, there is no courage from the people of the coastal areas to carry out direct confrontation. Due to the high level of "*self-control*", there is no collective action directed at fighting for their interests or opposing treatment against their will. Compromising is an attitude that is considered safer to be able to "*survive*" (*play it safe*) in accepting various influences of modernization.

To be able to bring up collective action, according to Lofland, there needs to be a "*frame*" of movement to distinguish or crystallize the existence of "the world out there", by defining the situation of events and experiences. In the process of forming the "*frame*" of the movement (collective action) there are three characteristics, namely:

1. *Punctuaction*: marking the existence of social conditions which are defined as: unfair, intolerable, so that corrective action is needed.
2. *Attribution*: giving attributes, diagnosis and prognosis. Early in the movement, activists "blame" some problematic conditions by identifying agents to blame or oppose. Then in the prognosis, there are suggestions, both to outline actions and to remove problems and provide action to take action.

3. *Articulation*: collective action framework that allows activists to articulate and construct a broad network through certain “events” and experiences so that they are interdependent in one unit.

These characteristics exist in the movement of indigenous Papuans who are in mountainous areas, where they feel unfair treatment from the government for the implementation of special autonomy to an intolerable extent, which encourages them to take collective action in the form of direct resistance (to attack and kill people security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) as well as migrant workers working on government projects, or to other civilians, confiscate firearms from security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police), dismantle, destroy and burn public facilities). In this case, the government and security forces are blamed for this disgraceful act, so concrete steps need to be taken to eliminate the problem of injustice felt by indigenous Papuans.

Steps towards prosecution for unfair treatment can be carried out because the tribes in mountainous areas (the La-Pago and Mee-Pago traditional territories) have leaders who are still effective, and among these leaders there are educated and understand the wishes of the local community. Through the Leader, various kinds of networks are arranged, so as to be able to form a broad opinion, not only limited to his tribe, but also other tribes as well as the international community.

This condition does not occur to indigenous Papuans living in coastal areas, because their leaders prefer to "join" with what the mountainous people consider the enemy. Among the grassroots, some people who feel injustice are looking for other leaders who are able to represent or articulate their interests. Therefore, it is not surprising that among people from mountainous areas there are those who consider the head of the La-Pago and Mee-Pago customary institutions (Timotius Murib) as their leader. It is also a sign that the network formed has succeeded in unifying the goals and directions of the struggle of the suppressed community.

How much change is required and at what level, are two questions related to the aspect of trust. In terms of the magnitude of the changes, the indigenous Papuans living in other mountainous areas do not seem to need a total change or reject the whole concept of modernization or development in

the form of the implementation of special autonomy, but only partial changes are required. The community demands fair treatment from the government by providing employment opportunities, educational facilities, health, environmental improvement and participation in decision making. In other words, what is demanded is an increase in welfare for indigenous Papuans because Papua's natural wealth is being exploited by multinational and foreign companies through the government. Therefore, they feel entitled to the results obtained from their land.

Thus, the level of change demanded is at the "state" level, which means government agencies or security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) are authorized to make decisions. They do not demand changes at the level of the *"superindividual"* structure. The changes that are expected do not reach the economic, cultural, political or world order, but only involve the fulfillment of their rights as owners of natural resources exploited by the state. Besides that, they also want to uphold the dignity of human beings who are equal in position to other ethnic groups (immigrants). With this demand, it means that the democratic ideology which is the *"mainstream"* of modern society is actually required to implement it, not to be opposed.

The values of reciprocity that have been living in traditional societies and the values of equality that are upheld are expected not only to apply to their internal environment, but also to be applied in a wider social context. A customary norm that applies in Papua is, if a native Papuan gives something, it must receive a balanced compensation. Because in their concept there is no term for compensation or transfer of property rights, the customary land currently used by the government must be returned within a certain time limit. In addition, as long as the land is used, they want to be involved in various negotiations/deliberations concerning development plans, revisions to the special autonomy law, regional expansion, extension of special autonomy and the determination of the fate of local communities.

One of the injustice forms against traditional communities is the plan for the division of provincial territories and the implementation of the second volume of special autonomy, which the central government has proposed to the House of Representatives in Jakarta to be discussed in the National

Legislation Program (Prolegnas) in 2021. In this process, the indigenous Papuan people who already have a legitimate Papuan indigenous representation institution (MRP) and are recognized in Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning the Implementation of Special Autonomy for Papua, are not represented or spoken to at all. This is a decision that concerns their future and the management of the natural resources on their land. Therefore, most of the indigenous Papuans want that the plan for regional expansion and extension of special autonomy should be reviewed. This is a decision so that the central government pays more attention to the aspirations of the lower classes or demands for democratization, not demands for changes in the economic structure. Changes in the ways in which democratization is implemented do not mean going against the “*mainstream*”, but straightening out what has been distorted.

In socio-economic life, indigenous Papuans demand equal rights to work as civil servants, security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) as well as in companies operating in Papua and are treated the same as workers and migrants in general. For this reason, because the socio-cultural conditions are very different, the indigenous Papuans demand "special treatment/affirmation" and the desire for objective conditions that are commonly applied, because otherwise the indigenous Papuans, who incidentally are still underdeveloped, will not be able to overcome their backwardness. This is still considered natural in a democracy to empower the community, so that one day they are in the same position as their other brothers and sisters.

If such changes are demanded, it means that the types of movements carried out by indigenous Papuans can be included in the reform movement according to Smelser's criteria (in Lofland, 1996). This movement is oriented towards changing the norms of a part of the prevailing system or changing part of the structure. This kind of movement has been carried out by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the United States.

By looking at the cultural system and historical background of the indigenous Papuan people as described earlier, it is seen that the movement's beliefs are closely related to the cultural system it adheres to. Cultural values

are a source of inspiration for the growth of new ideas and at the same time provide direction for justification and realignment of society. To understand the causes of the emergence of the movement, it can also be traced from its cultural values, where in the case of indigenous Papuans living in the mountains and coastal areas, the movement is mostly carried out by indigenous Papuans living in the mountains and less visible to indigenous Papuans in the coastal area. Because of the habit of facing challenges and self-confidence that is more prominent in the indigenous Papuan people in the mountains. The history of indigenous Papuans in the mountains full of heroism and conquest through tribal wars makes them more confident and responsive to new things, while indigenous Papuans in coastal areas prefer to "give up" rather than war. Thus, cultural factors are one of the causes of the emergence of social movements, where the values adopted so far provide new inspiration for social change, although in some respects they may be contradictory. In this connection Lofland said:

“In some respect of the (SMO’S belief) may be in contrast to the established values, according to the theory of dialectical process (in wich SMO’S) formulate their belief as contrast conception to established ideas (Lofland, 1996:121).

The new ideas are the antithesis of the views that have prevailed so far, because the old views are considered no longer in accordance with the demands of the times. In this connection, the indigenous Papuan people in the mountains see that dialectics exists when it comes to views from outside their tribe or from the thoughts of modern society, so they do not move to radically change traditional values, but want modern values to adapt to the way of thinking of the people which is still traditional. Because it is impossible for society to keep up with such rapid changes, driven by technology and modern management without protection. Efforts to adapt to the new environment have actually begun, but are still far from expectations. Because changing cultural values cannot be done in a short time.

5.2. SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION

Organization for a social movement is an effective medium to achieve goals. Even the organization is the deepest essence for a social movement, and organization is an absolute requirement that must exist to distinguish it from other collective actions. Understanding the organization in relation to social


movements is a way of moving people who have the same beliefs to want to do something to achieve goals. This means that the main requirement for an organization is to have a goal to be achieved. Social movement organizations are variants of human associations that are more or less formalized and special in nature, because the level of belief held by movement members is contrary to or directed against mainstream reality.

To find out whether there is a social movement in Papua, it is necessary to trace the existence of the organization and how the organization works in an effort to realize its goals. The anatomy of social movements in terms of organization is focused on several basic aspects that exist in organizations in general and specifically should exist in social movement organizations, namely:

1. the Organizational structure

The groups that are members of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) are very numerous, so the number cannot be ascertained. This social movement carries ethnic identity as the locus of its movement, and is included in a radical movement that has the main goal of separating itself / independence from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia through armed struggle to achieve its goals. There is no standardized organizational structure for Free Papua, because there are so many factions and the political agendas run by them, making their organizational structure never fixed and always changing. However, in general, the structure of the Free Papua Organization can be described as follows:


Figure 12. Organizational Structure of Free Papua Organization (OPM)



Source: processed from various sources

In addition, there is also the structure of the armed group / the West Papua National Liberation Army - OPM (TPNPB), as follows:

Figure 13. Central Command Militer Structure of TPNPB-OPM



Processed from various sources.

The West Papua National Liberation Army conducts military education and training (Diklat) for its members. It is noted that for the group under the leadership of Ricard Hans Yoweni, they carried out the last military training in 2009 in the Cenderawasih Bay area, Jayapura and the Manokwari

mountain area. Members who have completed the training will receive a membership card.

2. *Criteria for membership;*

Based on the process of the formation of groups that are under the auspices of the Free Papua Organization movement, it can be seen that they have never developed specific criteria for people who can become members of this group. They are formed based on their geographical location and generally based on the similarity of certain tribes or sub-tribes, but there is no obligation for members to register with the core management (leader of the movement center). The active involvement of members is indicated by militancy towards the activities of the movement that is targeted (group target) to be attacked. Membership here is active because this movement is reformist where members of the movement mean people who are actively making various efforts to achieve the goals of the movement.

In general, the relationship between ordinary people and members and sympathizers of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) is very close and close. Because they are emotionally attached, both in terms of kinship, religion and the location of their movement's operations. So that this movement can be categorized as an initiative and sporadic movement from each Regional Defense Command headquarters (Kodap) led by a commander, using guerrilla warfare tactics, and the nature of this movement is not directly organized with the highest leadership of the movement. This proves the existence of competition between the existing factions.

Members and sympathizers of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) are difficult to distinguish from people who are not members of the OPM because of their closeness and kinship, so they live mingle in society, unless there is a plan to carry out an attack, then they will intensify themselves in the group. Thus, there is no definite boundary that can separate the members of the Free Papua Movement from the indigenous Papuans outside the movement.

3. *Leadership;*

The figure of a leader in social movements is a must, because it is the leader who plays a role in directing the people who become his followers to act in an effort to achieve organizational goals. Determining the leadership

of a social movement in Papua is actually not easy, considering that there are so many social groups with different leaders. Viewed from traditional social groups, there are tribal chiefs who are elected from generation to generation. In terms of collective activities and protest behavior, namely the heads of the Customary Deliberation Institutions. From a government perspective, there are village heads, sub-district heads and regents. On the other hand, there are also church leaders, "*ekop*" leaders, namely local elites and opportunists, who are recognized and felt to exist but whose figures are unclear and always speak on behalf of the people.

As described in the previous chapter, the leadership system in Papua is divided into four types, as follows: a) The Big Man Type; b) Clan Head Type; c) King Type; and d) Mixed Type. Based on the geographical location of social movements that are often volatile, namely in the traditional areas of La-Pago and Mee-Pago which are located in mountainous areas, the type of leadership adopted is "Big Man" or an authoritative man. The characteristics of this leadership are obtained through achievement (own effort and based on achievement), not because of descent (ascription). The source of this type of power is personal ability as evidenced by the success of the person concerned in the economy (rich), good at war, skilled at diplomacy, big and sturdy and generous (Koentjaraningrat, 1994).

To show the authority of a leader, new issues or new movement ideas were created as a way to attract sympathy and mobilize the masses. Likewise, in "war" issues are always exhaled, with the intention of defending themselves so that their leadership continues to exist, considering that this method can further show their capacity in several ways as described above. However, considering that there are quite a number of types of leaders who influence people's lives, this condition makes the lower-class people very careful and even tend to hesitate in building loyalty. There is no leader who is fully recognized as a leader to be supported or followed by his invitations in all things but always sees his interests. For example, in customary affairs, it is oriented to tribal chiefs, religious affairs to the church, economic affairs to the government. Government officials have become the foundation of various hopes, but since the riots/shooting events became more frequent throughout 2018 - until now their authority has

decreased, so that the public no longer trusts the leaders (including the security forces Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police).

In line with the increasing number of plans to extend the implementation of special autonomy for the second volume, various leaders in Papua began to reappear. From those who support the implementation of the second volume of special autonomy, even those who do not want the extension of special autonomy and ask for a referendum on self-determination. Indigenous figures such as tribal chiefs who are members of the Indigenous Peoples Institution (LMA) as well as Papuan figures who are under the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) as well as various alliances of educated people such as Papuan students are currently actively voicing their disagreements. The Papuan People's Assembly, through its chairman Timothius Murib, has planned to file a lawsuit against the state through the Constitutional Court (MK) if the central government continues its plan for regional/provincial division and continues the discussion of the Draft Special Autonomy Law without hearing and involving the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) in the discussion process.

Government leaders began to be abandoned and tribal chiefs who were members of the Indigenous People Institution (LMA) with the support of church leaders united in political leadership directed at the struggle to break away from Indonesia. Although it does not reflect the aspirations of all ethnic groups, the tendency to reject the extension of the second volume of special autonomy is increasingly evident in all regions in Papua. In the decision-making process, as far as political activity is concerned, control rests with tribal chiefs. However, for internal affairs, each ethnic group has a different mechanism. Each head of the customary institution has authority over his customary institution, including making decisions to determine the attitude that will be taken by his customary institution.

In addition to high authority in making attitudes or decisions related to the interests of their tribe or group, the heads of these traditional institutions also act independently, such as carrying out "*maneuvers*" to achieve their wishes, including mobilizing riots, conducting demonstrations, blocking public facilities and government offices as well as other collective actions. These maneuvers are commonplace and become part of social life in order

to position oneself as an "authoritative man" who deserves to appear as a leader.

At the elite level, the desired changes appear to be more radical and political in nature (the desire for power), while at the grassroots level they want socio-economic changes, a more prosperous life. However, because the voices of the elite are louder and heard and have the ability to take advantage of various conditions for their political interests, the voices of the lower classes are faint or even unheard. They remain in a state of oscillation between economic and political interests. Thus, when viewed from the leadership aspect, although the organization is not stable, the crystallization towards the formation of leaders of an integrated movement is underway and the direction is clear, namely towards a socio-political movement.

4. *Funding*;

Since the beginning of the birth of the groups that are members of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM), they have relied on financing for the survival of their group through self-help or contributions from members and sympathizers of the movement. However, after the era of special autonomy began, these groups received new sources of funding from village funds and special autonomy funds for villages which were handed over to the village management through the village head voluntarily or forced through the circular letter they distributed. As well as direct assistance programs/activities such as grants from local governments to community organizations under the guise of community social activities. As for weapons and ammunition, they get through several ways, including:

- a. illicit trade with treasonous security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police);
- b. smuggling through state borders and the coast as well as from areas of former conflict areas;
- c. confiscates during attacks on security posts as well as on security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police).
- d. obtains financial assistance from international donor agencies that are committed to the handling of human rights, democratization and the environment.

The use of these funds has been outlined for the costs of activities: propaganda in order to raise support and sympathy, mobility of leaders and members of the movement, education and training of members and logistics.

5.3. THE CAUSES OF THE RISE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT

In terms of the process of the emergence of social movements in Papua, they can be broadly divided into two, namely movements that are rooted in culture or tradition and movements that arise spontaneously, motivated by economic motives. The culturally rooted movement has a clear belief system and doctrine, there is a kind of "*ideology*" that is firmly held as the driving motive, while the second movement is more economic, has no clear doctrine, is easily influenced by anyone who can offer economic benefits. The two forms of movement with these characteristics are movements carried out by indigenous Papuans who are accommodated in the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) as the organizational wing (under bow), whose groups vary, according to tribes / sub-tribes in Papua.

Although the motives and ways of carrying out the movement are different, at a certain point, the two meet, joining in one movement with a political nuance. Presumably, the "*floating*" movements eventually followed a more swift and basic current, so that there seemed to be a convergence towards a unified movement towards the achievement of political goals. Movements that are members of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) follow the flow of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) which is more tenacious and consistent in fighting for the values of its beliefs. Because there are two types of movements with different characteristics, in explaining the causes of the movements, they are also divided into two, namely the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). Apart from these movements, there are still movements whose organizational structure is not clear, so the discussion is more directed to the two movements.

1. Free Papua Organization (OPM)

The name of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is a general term that covers all movements that aim to separate themselves from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The Free Papua Organization

itself is not singular, but consists of many factions. In the early days of its establishment, the Organization for the Struggle for the Independence of the State of West Papua was founded by Terianus Aronggear in Manokwari in 1964, which later became the embryo of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM). Those who fight through diplomatic and armed political channels. For armed resistance the Free Papua Movement obtained members from former Papuan Vrijwilligers Korps (PVK) / Papuan Volunteer Battalion formed by the Dutch in 1960. After Papua officially integrated with the Republic of Indonesia, the PVK was then disbanded, leaving its former members dissatisfied with the decision to integrate and became part of Indonesia, joined to become part of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) and subsequently formed the TPN-PB (West Papua National Liberation Army).

Since the armed resistance was not organized at that time, Victoria Headquarters was established in Waris District in 1970. Waris District is currently the territory of Keerom Regency, Papua Province. The establishment of the Victoria Headquarters which is better known as (Mavic) was carried out by four people, namely: Seth Jafeth Roemkorem (former member of the Indonesian army), Jacob Prai, John Otto Ondawame and Rex Rumakiek. On July 1, 1971, Victoria Headquarters proclaimed the independence of West Papua with its first President for the interim government was Seth Jafeth Roemkorem and his deputy was Herman Womsiwor.

However, after five years of being founded, the Free Papua Organization movement began to experience divisions because there were differences of opinion between the four figures who founded this movement. So that Jacob Prai and two other colleagues then founded the group for Restoration of Justice (Pemka), while Seth remained at the Victoria Headquarters. At a later date, identification of the Free Papua Organization movement tends to mention the origin of the group, namely OPM Mavic or OPM Pemka. In recruiting their members, these two camps applied tribal sentiments, where the Biak and surrounding areas followed Seth's camp in the Mavic, while the Keerom and mountainous people joined the Jacob Prai camp in Pemka.

Furthermore, the Free Papua Organization also experienced divisions in the ideological aspect. For the old people of the Free Papua Organization movement, they are more inclined to follow Western ideology, with figures such as: Markus Kaisiepo, Nicolaas Jouwe and Herman Womsiwor. Meanwhile, the young people chose the neo-Marxist/Socialist ideology, including: Ben Tanggahma, Saul Hindom and Jacob Prai. In addition, in the Free Papua Organization movement, although they have the same desire to break away from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, there are differences in it where some want independence and are pro-Dutch, and others want complete independence.

In the 1980s, Kelly Kwalik emerged as the leader of the Free Papua Organization movement which chose the path of struggle through armed resistance in the Mimika region, until in 2009 he was shot dead by the security forces (Indonesian national army), and then the leadership of Kelly Kwalik was continued by Ayub Waker, Teny Kwalik and Germanus Elobo. In the Puncak Jaya area, Goliath Tabuni has been the leader of the Free Papua Organization movement since 2004, but his actions only became known after the death of Kelly Kwalik. In addition, in other mountainous areas such as Puncak, there are also leaders of other Free Papua Organization movement groups such as the Militer Murib, Puron Wenda and Enden Wanimbo; in Lanny Jaya there is Mathias Wenda.

If we look at the background of the formation of the Free Papua Organization movement, it seems that there are similarities with the emergence of peasant movements in Java in the 19th century, namely the "*holy war*" against injustice which is not solely motivated by economic motives, but there are other aspects that are more fundamental, namely: *messianic / cargo cult, navistic, and revitalization*. The movement emerged as a manifestation of social conflict that had long been buried and accumulated, resulting in group solidarity in society who felt they were being treated unfairly. The characteristic of this movement is the emergence of a holy figure (*Imam Mahdi*) who becomes the center and leader of the movement and uses a religious/mystic approach to accelerate the arrival of a new/golden age.

In the past era in Papua, the emergence of these socio-cultural movements had existed in Papuan communities spread across various regions, for example the "*Koreri*" movement in Biak, "*Hai*" in Mimika, "*Kasiap*" in Nimboran-Jayapura, and "*Kohei Dabo*" in Paniai. All of them hoped for the arrival of a "*Savior (Messiah) / Manseren Nanggi*" who would bring peace and prosperity to the Papuan people.

Quoting the opinion of Anthony Giddens (Runaway World, 1996), that democracy, human rights and global justice are increasing in the early 21st century, making Papua an open landscape. What is happening in Papua can be known directly by the world. Massive changes that turn ethical views into emics, namely looking at Papua from the point of view of the Papuans themselves. Papua's previous representation of homogeneity has shifted to heterogeneity. The view of positivism that was born along with the changes that occurred also shifted the position of humans from object to subject (subjectification). This of course encourages increased individual freedom, individual atomization, the formation of new elites, increased cultural politics and actors who become central.

In the case of Papua, the Free Papua Organization movement became a means of struggle to actualize itself to break free from the shackles of colonialism (the Indonesian government). Unfortunately, the Free Papua Organization movement is very decentralized, it doesn't have the same role model/leader. Because it consists of many factions and compete with each other. In front of the media, they present the image of a separatist movement that uses guerrilla methods of armed resistance. However, in practice, it is impossible to really have one command within the Free Papua Organization. This is due to the variety of clans/tribal groups and ethnic loyalties, personal/egocentric crosses, being in remote areas and having their own agendas. Units and commanders took turns without any communication from one group to another.

In addition, many political groups were established to unite separate movements, including:

1. **NCUF (National Coalition and United Fronts)** which again lowered the **National Liberations Council (NLC)** led by Amos Indey and Toto

Roemkorem. They organize forces that have existed since the 1960s, such as the Anti-Republican Indonesian Youth Papuan Spirit group (SAMPARI), the Free Papua Movement Operation Organization (OOPM) and the Papua National Movement (GNP).

2. **WPNCCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation)** was formed by the OPM of the Pemka stronghold, Tom Beanal and Jhon Otto Ondamawe, at Port Villa Papua New Guinea in 2005. This council has a military organization that is separate from the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM), namely The West Papua National Liberation Armed Forces with its commander-in-chief Mathias Wenda. At first they wanted to be the political wing of the OPM, but not all armed OPM factions agreed, including Goliath Tabuni and Kelly Kwalik. So they formed their own military wing.
3. **WPNA (West Papua National Authority)** was established in 2004 to oversee all OPM political organizations. Its founders were Edison Waromi, Jacob Rumbiak, and Herman Wanggai.
4. **The Free West Papua Campaign (FWPC)** was founded by Benny Wenda in England in 2003. Benny is a man born in Wamena who was arrested by the authorities in 2002 for allegedly masterminding the attack on the police station in the Abepura-Jayapura area. But he managed to escape to Papua New Guinea and obtain political asylum in the UK.
5. **KNPB (West Papua National Committee)** was established as a radical political organization in 2008. Since 2012, Victor Yeimo has emerged as its leader. In May 2012, KNPB tried to build ties with the OPM armed group by holding a meeting in Biak and appointing Goliath Tabuni as commander in chief, but this was not well received by Goliath Tabuni. He refused to enter and was appointed Commander-in-Chief in this group.
6. **ULMWP (United Liberation Movement for West Papua)** was established on December 6, 2014 by an alliance of several organizations that support the Free Papua Organization movement, namely: WPNA, WPNCCL, and KNPB. Benny Wenda became the spokesman for the ULMWP. This organization received monitoring status (observer)

Melanesian Sparehead Group (MSG), but Indonesia itself is also a member of the MSG.

7. **The West Papua Revolutionary Army (TRWP)** was formed in 2012 in Jayapura. Not much information can be obtained about this organization because it is not disseminated to the Papuan people so that it does not have many members and sympathizers. In addition, many indigenous Papuans think that the West Papua Revolutionary Army is still part of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB).
8. **The Federal Republic of West Papua (NFRPB)** was established by Forkorus Yaboisembut and its President, in Jayapura-Papua on 19 October 2011. They already have a representative office in Australia.
9. **The Federal Republic of West Papua (NRFPB)** was formed on July 31, 2018 in Jayapura-Papua, led by Yoan Syatfle as Prime Minister. This organization chooses diplomacy in carrying out its struggle, namely through speeches and social media to garner support and sympathy. The form of organization is a worship group, where in every worship they call on indigenous Papuans to be anti-government and remain passionate about fighting for a referendum and the liberation of Papua from Indonesian colonialism.

Based on the explanation of the conditions above, it can be seen that the movement that is incorporated in the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is divided into ethnic groups/sub-tribes (clans) and also personal interests, there is no one central command that becomes a reference in determining the steps of its struggle. Each group is competing to show its superiority as a group that is at the forefront and deserves to be the leader of the movement and the leader if Papua is independent. In addition, they also have many group factions that have overseas bases such as the Pacific, Europe, and the United States. Groups that carry out activities abroad whose task is to collect funds from foreign donor agencies and to mobilize international support for Papuan independence by bringing up the themes of human rights violations, democratization or the destruction of nature/environment.

Another thing that makes the Free Papua Movement (OPM) movement different from other socio-cultural-based movements is that the

peasant movements in Java are easily broken or destroyed after their physical movements are resisted, then another movement that is different, but not a continuation of the previous movement, emerges. Meanwhile, the Free Papua Organization movement continued even though its physical resistance was crushed. The peasant movement in Java also did not grow into a formal organization like the OPM, perhaps because the driving figures were not familiar with modern organizational methods.

The continuation of the Free Papua Organization movement is also driven by the current reality, where the social impact is in the form of a gap between indigenous Papuans and migrants. Social inequality does not only occur from the economic aspect, but also from the political, cultural and educational aspects. The political gap can be seen from the decision-making and planning process, where the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) as the representative body of the Papuan indigenous peoples is not involved in the plan for regional expansion and the continuation of the second volume of special autonomy, even more parties who clearly disagree with government. Although the Special Autonomy Law has mandated this, the government has made a decision by submitting a revised draft of the Special Autonomy Law to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia without negotiating with the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) as the party holding the mandate to represent the Papuan people.

In terms of culture, the values that are considered noble and sacred by indigenous Papuans are not appreciated by the government or multinational companies operating in Papua. This condition can be seen from the use of lands that are used as government public facilities or land managed by companies without heeding the procedures that apply in local customs. Likewise, the methods of relinquishing customary land rights, which are supposed to ask for permission and give them a portion of the proceeds, are not carried out by the government and companies. According to the customs and culture of the Papuan people, land is the '*mother*' which is a source of livelihood that cannot be traded forever. Lending or managing with a profit-sharing system is known in Papuan customs, but not for sale.

In terms of education and health, indigenous Papuans are far behind when compared to migrants, making it difficult for them to compete for decent access such as looking for work or access to adequate health care. The reasons why native Papuans are not accommodated in the competitive world of work are, firstly, lack of formal education and skills, secondly, lack of discipline and lack of dedication to their field of work. Many of them rarely come to work, even if they come to work the time is not in accordance with the applicable working hours.

According to traditional leaders in Papua, it is admitted that the education of many indigenous Papuans is still inadequate, but it is part of the government and companies operating in Papua to educate them. It seems that the efforts of the government and companies have not met the expectations of the indigenous Papuans, so protests continue and a more organized movement is carried out to achieve goals in a systematic and planned manner.

2. *West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB)-OPM*

The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) is a military organization of the Free Papua Organization which was formed on March 26, 1973, after the Proclamation of Independence of West Papua on July 1, 1971 at the Victoria Headquarters (Mavic). The formation of the TPNPB was based on the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of West Papua which was stipulated in 1971 in Chapter V section of Defence and Security.

Initially, the birth of the TPNPB had a series of issues with the integration of Papua as part of the Republic of Indonesia and the presence of PT Freeport in Papua. The negative actions of the Indonesian government and PT Freeport are considered to have insulted the dignity of the Papuan people, not only in terms of the customary land tenure process, but also the means of securing PT Freeport. Because for the sake of securing mining activities their area is often used as a Military Operations Area (DOM) where Indonesian national army officers often take inhumane actions. The forms of these inhumane acts are: killing civilians, torture, pressure in the form of intimidation and threats in order to break the actions of the OPM and separatists. In addition, the government through the security forces (Indonesian national army) often carries out forced evictions (evictions) of

indigenous Papuan areas or villages on the grounds that their territory is included in a mining area that will be explored by PT Freeport, resulting in a sense of antipathy from the indigenous Papuans towards the security forces (Indonesian national army) which is considered as their enemy.

Government policies that do not pay attention to the wishes of indigenous Papuans are a form of discrimination against indigenous Papuans, because they feel they are the owners of customary land. In the field of manpower, it is acknowledged by tribal heads/chairmen of customary deliberative institutions that they also feel they are entitled to a source of livelihood from government activities and companies that exist on their land. But in reality, not many indigenous Papuans can join and work in it. In addition to the small number, there are also complaints they feel including:

1. Within the government, it is rare for Indigenous Papuans to occupy strategic positions. Meanwhile, for the private sector, employees who are native Papuans are generally placed as temporary employees. Because to be appointed as permanent employees the requirements are very strict, without any affirmation so it is very unlikely that they can be transferred to permanent employees.
2. Besides being difficult to be appointed as permanent employees, it is also difficult for indigenous Papuans to be promoted to higher positions. This is also related to the strict or equally strict qualifications between migrants and indigenous Papuans.
3. Job placement does not match their area of expertise, so it seems that accepting Papuans is just a formality or a complement.
4. Lack of opportunities for indigenous Papuans to attend education and training in order to improve their competence and job skills.
5. The facilities provided, including their welfare, are felt to be unfair, or not the same as other employees who are migrants, such as: housing, vehicles and education for the employees' children.
6. The bureaucracy and management system implemented by the government and companies are very closed, making it very difficult for indigenous Papuans or employees to communicate. This closed attitude is

interpreted by indigenous Papuans as an attitude that does not respect the Papuan people.

The above complaints indicate a gap in understanding with the government and companies operating in Papua. People think in terms of their interests by using the benchmark of local traditional cultural values, while the government and companies have modern systems and ways of thinking that provide objective and rational requirements for their employees. This gap makes people feel left out and identify themselves as the "original" and the "most entitled", as opposed to the immigrants who are seen as "plunderers" and "invaders" who deprive not only of material wealth, but also of self-esteem.

Self-identification by calling "*kitong*" for the group and "*dorang*" for migrants is a sign of a deep conflict between the government, companies and migrants in general. The bitter facts experienced by the indigenous Papuan people which subsequently accumulated from the events that occurred encouraged the indigenous people to take the form of violent resistance.

Based on the description above, there is no difference regarding the causes of the emergence of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) and TPNPB movements, namely as an expression of public disappointment with the policies implemented by the Indonesian government in Papua. Indigenous Papuans responded "seriously" in the sense of involving the whole body and soul, in a more systematic and organized manner in carrying out the resistance. There are differences in efforts to fight for their ideals, where the Free Papua Organization (OPM) uses the organizational path (diplomacy) while the TPNPB chooses the violent path (guerrilla). In 2012 TPNPB reformed and held a major TPN conference which resulted in changes to the organizational structure into two models, namely: 1). based on geographical location in the mountains/coast/border; and 2). affiliated with the federation. As the commander/leader of the TPN-PB in the mountainous region is Goliath Tabuni, in the coastal area of Ricard Hans Yoweni and in the border area under the leadership of Lambertus Pekikir. Meanwhile, those who chose to be affiliated with the federation were led by Fernando Worabai. Nevertheless, these two movements can unite in a political movement. This

change in the form of the movement was made possible because of the leadership, communication and "opportunity" factors provided by the government.

According to the explanations of respondents from various circles, mass actions or mobs that often do damage, impoverishment, demonstrations and others, are carried out by youth groups who come from tribes originating from the traditional Mee-Pago and La. -Pago originating from mountainous areas, because the nature of these tribes is more aggressive than the tribes that live in coastal areas.

Thus, there are three forms of collective action taken by indigenous Papuans in dealing with various problems and dissatisfaction with the government. The first is the activities of the Free Papua Organization which is more organized and systematic, the second is the collective action carried out by the TPNPB which fights with "guerrilla" weapons, the third is the activities of indigenous Papuan youth that lead to acts of violence, and "*thuggery*" against migrants. All of these actions are reactions to the same source, namely the special autonomy policy given to Papua.

The implementation of special autonomy has led to very rapid social changes in Papua, where in general these changes are not able to be followed by indigenous Papuans, even leading to the marginalization of indigenous Papuans. In many ways, the indigenous Papuans are far behind from the migrants, resulting in deep social inequality between the two. This inequality has given rise to injustices that have been felt by indigenous Papuans for decades. The perceived injustice is not only from the economic and social aspects, but they are physically harmed which has an impact on the psychological and mental aspects. Coupled with the (repressive) methods of violence carried out by the government through the security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) in dealing with the reactions of the indigenous Papuans, then, it completes the suffering of the indigenous Papuans as victims of development wrapped in special autonomy status.

In such conditions they have no other choice but to "*fight*" with various actions. The common fate in facing the government, multinational companies and migrants is generally the cause of the emergence of

collective identity, which is a social force to carry out resistance in a more organized and systematic way. If the political situation allows and the control of the dominant group weakens, then these collective actions will become political movements. The demands are no longer merely the fulfillment of compensation or equal rights, but instead lead to secession, independence from the state that has been their oppressor. The condition for arriving at a political movement is the appearance of a leader who is able to unite the existing forces and communication networks between the elements of that power and their leaders.

5.4. PARTICIPATION (JOINING)

The reasons behind the occurrence of the movement as described earlier, have a close relationship with participation in the movement. Because it is on the basis of reasons on the causal factors that a movement attracts followers. Disappointment over the treatment that is felt to be unfair, social and economic inequality as well as disruption to belief or spirituality, makes them tend to seek efforts that are intended to change the conditions that make their lives disrupted. These efforts can be done by taking actions individually or collectively. From this collective action, there are those that escape without control (spontaneous), some are organized by forming a forum for struggle. This last form is what is meant by participation in the movement, namely the joining of someone in a movement organization.

A person's participation in a movement can be divided based on the intensity of participating in organizational activities, starting from the weakest level to the strongest, as stated by Lofland (1996; 228). The level of their power in the organization of the movement is highly dependent on their motivation and understanding of the direction and goals of the movement. In this connection, researcher need to compare the motivation and level of participation of the two major organizations in Papua, namely the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) and the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). This difference is important because the characteristics of followers and their educational backgrounds are different, thus the motivation for their participation is also different.

1. Participation in the Free Papua Organization (OPM)

As explained above, the birth of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) was due to the desire to establish a sovereign Papuan state according to the promise of the Dutch colonial government and the unwillingness of the indigenous Papuans to become part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. In addition, there is a sense of dissatisfaction with the attitudes and actions of the Indonesian government and security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) who do not respect the existence of indigenous Papuans. They also feel deprived of their rights as owners of customary land used by the government and multinational companies operating in Papua and the dissolution of the world of beliefs or natural philosophy that unites the mortal world with the heavenly realm. Thus, the reason for the birth of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is more complex than other organizations that are both fighting for Papuan independence.

Thus, the motivation and degree of following is also stronger and deeper, not just following along. The results of the author's interviews with indigenous Papuans in several regency/cities in Papua, show that they understand very well what they are fighting for through the Free Papua Organization (OPM). It is said that they not only want to ask for the rights to the land of Papua to be returned, but the most important thing is their dignity and the future of their children and grandchildren. They also want their traditional property rights such as the freedom to cultivate the land wherever they belong without being disturbed, a peaceful life, preservation of nature and the environment and freedom to travel and control their territory as before.

Indigenous Papuans who are part of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) do not all have membership cards, but they know that the institution exists and continues to fight for Papuan independence. Many indigenous Papuans are active in the Free Papua Organization (OPM), although not openly. They fully believe and support what the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is doing. It is to him that the steps and efforts of the struggle are submitted. This is because not a few members of the Free

Papua Organization are part of the government bureaucracy, so they move secretly (underground).


As previously described, the Free Papua Organization (OPM) is divided into three groups (factions), namely: a. armed groups; b. demonstration and protest groups; and c. small groups abroad to seek political sympathy and support. Each of these groups has a core administrator. The core management is the driving force behind the Free Papua Organization (OPM), some of whom sit as President/Chairman of the Presidium Council, Prime Minister and Governor/Head of Regions/Representatives, who are in charge of existing customary territories as well as head of representatives. Together with the Indigenous Deliberation Board, the three elements in the Free Papua Organization became the core force and main followers of the Free Papua Organization movement. Although the core team has not been effective in carrying out its duties, but with the full trust given by the Chairman of the Customary Deliberation Institution who is the "*primus inter pares*" among the core administrators, it means that there is internal legitimacy from the indigenous Papuan people to delegate organizational authority to someone only.

The people who sit on the core management are all indigenous Papuans, consisting of various professional backgrounds, scholars, religious leaders and traditional leaders in their respective regions. Meanwhile, the Executive Board is the executor of the decisions of the Customary Deliberation Board and the Governor/Head of Region/Representative. The performance of the components in the organizational structure is actually not optimal, because of the difference in education levels that are far from the core management.

The organizational structure reflects the layers of membership in the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM). At the core is the Customary Deliberation Institution, filled with Papuan traditional leaders from various customary areas and united with the Governor/Head of Regions/Representatives whose members consist of indigenous Papuans. Then, there is the Executive Board which implements the decisions that have been taken by the Customary Deliberation Institution and the

Governor/Head of Region/Representative. This agency carries out its duties and acts on behalf of the leadership of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM). This Executive Board is filled by Papuan intellectuals and students who are educated, have the ability to communicate and build networks with various parties. The Regional/Field Coordinator is in the third layer, consisting of local tribes from the lower middle strata or non-formal figures in the tribal government tradition. The fourth layer is the members and sympathizers of the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM). Members and sympathizers do not have to come from the same tribe, but come from various other indigenous Papuan tribes who are migrants in the customary area. This can be described as follows:

Figure 14. Membership System in the Free Papua Organization (OPM)



With the membership model as above, the development of the supporters and sympathizers is running. Starting with regional ties, then from close people of the same ethnic group, then extending to distant relatives to people outside of their customary territory/outside Papua. From the aspect of interpersonal relations, membership can be netted effectively. However, technical obstacles cannot be avoided due to difficult geographical conditions, and very limited means of transportation and communication. Only a group of educated indigenous Papuans are able to

influence followers effectively. In fact, although the organizational form is modern, the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) movement is only driven by a handful of people.

Talking about the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM), we will indeed be faced with many factions/groups, of course, each of these groups has a leader figure who is the center of the movement, spokesperson and personification of the Free Papua Organization. The role played by each of these leaders is similar to the Ratu Adil movement in Java, where the leader's charisma is the main force for the movement. The tradition of the indigenous Papuan people who know the Ratu Adil movement with various names, such as "*Koreri*" and so on. The difference is that the Ratu Adil movement does not yet recognize modern organizational forms such as the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM). Thus, the main supporters and sympathizers of the Free Papua Organization movement are indigenous Papuans, both in Papua and outside Papua. Supporters from outside Papua are aggressively voicing the issue of Papuan independence through various social media and their representative offices abroad.

Mass mobilization is one way to socialize the movement, in addition to carrying out religious activities in the Church. The church is the place most often used to socialize, because indigenous Papuans are very close to religious leaders. Leaders of the struggle for indigenous Papuans are generally religious figures who are respected and raised within the Church. Socialization to groups outside Papua is carried out by cooperating with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), especially those engaged in Human Rights, Democratization, Gender and the environment. This systematic effort was made not only to introduce the Free Papua Organization movement, but also to attract broad sympathy and support.

At least there are several indicators that show the existence of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) movement as a form of resistance by indigenous Papuans against the Indonesian government, including:

1. The name Free Papua Organization (OPM) has been widely accepted by the majority of indigenous Papuans as a movement for the liberation of West Papua.

2. The Free Papua Organization (OPM) and its struggle are internationally recognized, they have the support of the Pacific and African countries, and even have several representative offices in several countries.
3. The Free Papua Organization (OPM) has a neat and organized leadership structure under the leadership which is a combination of several groups/factions.

2. Participation in the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB)

As a military organization from the Free Papua Organization movement that chose the path of struggle through armed physical resistance, the membership of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) is very fanatical and radical in fighting for Papuan independence. Leaders and administrators who are appointed and occupy the organizational structure are carried out through large deliberation/conference channels. Each Regional Defense Command (Kodap) is led by a regional commander assisted by a regional chief of staff and assistants who are regulated by the regional commander. Members of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) are very active in the recruitment process to become members, usually they target young boys from the age of 15 to adults so they are categorized as “children” and “youth. While others were recruited from indigenous Papuan civil society as well as former members of the security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) who had been dismissed from their units for dissent. According to the narrative of one respondent who is a spokesperson for TPNPB, stated that:

"The existence of the children of freedom fighters grew up in the forest because they had "bitter experiences due to brutal military operations (Indonesia)" and automatically became fighters. This situation applies throughout West Papua which is an area of war conflict. They grow up and become Papuan freedom fighters, continue the struggle of their parents." The children of Papuan fighters do not go to school, partly because they are afraid of being kidnapped or killed by the Indonesian national army".

(written interview by email, in January 2021).

Although it is not clear how many children and youth are involved as TPNPB members or what specific roles they play, sources state that almost three quarters of their current personnel are young. There are many reasons behind them to join as members of the TPNPB, including: that they are

sometimes forcibly recruited but it is also possible that they join the military and armed groups because of cultural pressure, for protection or money to get out of poverty. Children in conflict, whether as combatants or in other roles such as porters, face a high risk of being abused, killed, or maimed, and those who survive can suffer profound psychological and social problems.

Based on the author's interview with the Public Relations of the Indonesian national army in Papua, Colonel Inf. Muhammad Aidi, said that most of the Papuan fighters killed by the TNI were aged 20-40 years. So far, he said that he had not seen direct evidence of the existence of young TPNPB members, but in some remote areas these children actually aspire to join the TPNPB West Papua National Liberation Army. "If we ask some children in remote areas like Mapenduma about their aspirations in the future, their answer is to become Free Papua Organization (OPM) fighters. Because they don't know the outside world. He also added that anyone, even if they are under the age of 18, who attacks the security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) with a weapon will not survive. The threat is the same as adults who can kill us with their weapons."

Based on the background, motivation to the vision and mission of the presence of TPNPB, they are an inseparable part of the Free Papua Organization movement, and have the same goal of liberating Papua, only they differ in their methods of struggle. If the Free Papua Organization (OPM) prefers diplomacy (peace), while TPNPB uses armed resistance. The movers are freelance people (individuals) who do not have a permanent mass base. Considering that each regional commander generally does not coordinate and cooperate with each other, so that there is no definite unity of command and no absolute loyalty support from his followers, except in terms of methods of carrying out terror and models of violence that achieve their wishes. The "community" that is built is only temporary, so it can be categorized as a "crowd" group.

The emergence of crimes/terrors that continue to threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, especially through shootings, attacks, killings of security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of

Indonesia Police) and civilians, vandalism, impoverishment, and burning are further forms of armed separatist actions. The actions of the group or individual were not well organized and commanded by the Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. Some of them just want to show their existence and try to stand out as "heroes" who are meritorious and deserve to be called leaders.

As a kind of "*crowd*" the movements of each group/faction are spontaneous, emotional and disorganized. This is different from the Free Papua Organization, which plans its actions carefully and is well organized, even though its movement is centered on its leadership. The changes expected by the Free Papua Organization are also far more basic than the TPNPB, which only calls for the attention of the Indonesian government to stop special autonomy in Papua by causing unrest through its terrors. This type of movement will usually be easier to extinguish, but also easy to re-emerge when there is a trigger that stimulates the emotions of the masses. The basic feature of this movement is that it is a direct reaction to a threat that is "existing" in front of the eyes or a reaction to repeated events.

Attacks, shootings of civilians, and mass riots that are increasingly rampant lately are the result of the Indonesian government's treatment which is considered too harsh in treating Papua. The deployment of a large number of security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) to Papua in response to every protest action by indigenous Papuans and inhumane acts received by indigenous Papuans has occurred repeatedly and ended in military operations, making the indigenous Papuans increasingly apathetic and lose respect with the government. They are the potential groups to be mobilized in various forms of riots.

5.5. STRATEGY

In the effort to achieve the goal, then a social movement must carry out certain strategies. Each strategy has targets, both short-term and long-term that are accumulated as a series of strategies to get to a predetermined goal. In this connection, the researcher will only discuss the strategy of the Free Papua Organization (OPM), because in terms of leadership and membership, other

movements do not qualify to be called social movements. OPM also consistently formulates strategies with clear lines of struggle.

Viewed from the strategic aspect, Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) has stages of struggle followed by different strategies, namely:

1. Violence Strategy

The establishment of the OPM cannot be separated from the promise of the previous Dutch colonial government, that Papua will be given full independence under the auspices of the Dutch kingdom. Thus, on December 1, 1961, the Morning Star Flag flew next to the Dutch Flag for the first time. However, on December 19, 1961, President Soekarno initiated the Three People's Command (TriKora) which one of the words was *"to thwart the formation of the Dutch-made Papuan Puppet State"* because for Soekarno the territory was formerly part of the Dutch colony. In other words, the "TriKora" call was an operation to liberate all former Dutch colonies from Sabang to Merauke from the clutches of the Dutch imperialists.

On August 15, 1962, the Indonesian and Dutch delegations signed an agreement mediated by the United States (US), which was later referred to as the New York Agreement to end the political dispute over West Irian. The contents of the agreement were that starting October 1, 1962, the Netherlands handed over Papua under the control of the UN's temporary executive authority under UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority). Subsequently, Papua would be handed over to Indonesia by the Dutch on May 1, 1963. However, the contents of the New York agreement were not approved by Papuan political figures, arguing "Papua is not part of Indonesia because from the beginning Papua was never involved in the movement in order to fight for Indonesia's independence and historically the origin of the Papuan people is different from other ethnic groups in Indonesia". Thus, the agreement is considered a handover from the hands of one colonizer to another. This is the forerunner of the Papua issue and as the initial strategy undertaken by the OPM to separate itself from the Republic of Indonesia. First of all, educated Papuan figures who already have political awareness together with members of the former Dutch-formed Papuan Volunteer Battalion (PVK) established a West Papuan

liberation struggle organization in Manokwari who refused to hand over the territory of Papua from the Netherlands to Indonesia, because they wanted to determine their own destiny as a nation sovereign. In December 1963, the OPM issued a proclamation *"We don't want modern life! We reject any development: groups of religious leaders, humanitarian organizations, and government organizations. Leave us alone!"*

The name of OPM began to be widely known through an armed rebellion under the leadership of Permenas Ferry Awom in Manokwari on July 26, 1965, then this massive armed resistance of OPM was carried out after Freeport's mining activities in 1973. Since then, the name of OPM has been used by the Indonesian side to give labels for political movements aimed at separating themselves from Indonesia. The name of OPM is considered more appropriate, short and easy to remember than the full name of their original organization, namely the Organization and the Struggle for the Independence of West Papua. In its development, every July 1 is commemorated as the birthday of the OPM, and December 1 is commemorated as the Independence Day of West Papua.

After the issuance of the Trikora edict by President Soekarno, the Regional Military Command (Kodam) VIII Trikora was inaugurated which had direct power from President Soekarno to oversee all elements under it, both civilian and military in Papua to begin preparing for the implementation of PEPERA. The practice of this military system was strengthened by Presidential Decree No. 79/PLM.BS OF 1962 which established Kodam XVII/West Irian based on the Decree of MEN I PANGAB No. KPTS-35/1/1963 dated January 12, 1963. Since then, military operations to prepare for the implementation of PEPERA and crush movements that did not want to join Indonesia began. During this period, eight military operations were recorded, namely: Operation Wisnumurti I, II, III and IV (May 1963 - April 1964), Operation Action, Agility and Awareness (1964 - 1966), and Operation Baratayudha (1966 - 1967).

During the Orde Baru era or during the period from 1968 to 1999, ten military operations were carried out, namely: Operation Sadar, Baratayudha and Wibawa (25 June 1968 - 1969), Pamungkas Operation

(1970 -1974), Kikis Operation (1977 -1978), Operation Clean Sweep (1978 - 1982), Operation Sate (1984), Operation Galak I and II (1985 - 1987), Operation Cassowary I and II (1987 - 1989), Operation Rajawali I and II (1989 - 1991), and Operation Security of Vulnerable Areas (1998 - 1999). Then, in the early days of the Reformation, military operations were carried out twice, namely: Operation to Control the Raising of the Morning Star (1999 - 2002) and Sweeping Operation in Wamena (2002 - 2004).

After the granting of special autonomy status, military operations have indeed been abolished, but the security/military approach is still being used in Papua. Given the high activity of the people's resistance movement in various places in Papua, which voiced dissatisfaction with the implementation of special autonomy. The government responded to this violent strategy by deploying additional security personnel (Indonesian national Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) in Papua. The security/military approach is perceived by indigenous Papuans as an action aimed at suppressing, frightening and adding to the trauma of the past. As a result, many indigenous Papuans fled into the forest because they could not stand the unfair treatment. They then continued the resistance by conducting guerrilla warfare and were labeled as separatists as the Security Disruption Movement (GPK) or the Free Papua Organization (OPM).

Responding to this condition, the Chairman of the Papuan People's Representative Council, Timotius Murib, asked "Who really is the OPM and what is the urgency of adding security personnel to Papua by the government?". The government's siding with multinational companies and fighting against its own people reversed accusations against indigenous Papuans that the government had acted as a "GPK". This certainly adds to the bad image and reduces the credibility of the government and security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police). Furthermore, the indecent actions of the security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) and various forms of human rights violations against indigenous Papuans have become weapons of struggle to attract sympathy and support from various groups, both local and international.

At the beginning of the Trikora, the indigenous Papuans tried to resist by carrying out armed resistance to the Indonesian government. The community also continues to commemorate May 1 and December 1 as historic days for Papua, but this is responded by the government with a repressive/military approach. This spontaneous movement was carried out in 1965. Since then, physical clashes have continued despite the implementation of special autonomy for Papua. The movement of the indigenous Papuan people by means of violence is not taken seriously, even ignored by the government. The moral and material losses and the small number of fatalities according to the size of the state have made the central government less responsive in viewing that indigenous Papuans do not have the power to fight the central government, which has large financial resources and is supported by the strength of the security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police).

Protests with violence according to Baldrige's terminology (1975: 333-334) are a pre-movement stage, where there is an increase in expectations and relative deprivation, namely elements in complex patterns of social power that will give rise to social movements. During this process, there is an awakening phase, in which a charismatic leader emerges, bringing together group members into an organization. According to Balridge, social movements recognize life as a career or living organism that is born through the pre-movement stage, the awakening stage, the movement development stage and finally the influence and outcome stage.

What happened to the indigenous Papuan people during the process leading up to the implementation of the PEPERA and after the handover of Dutch power to the Indonesian government during the New Order period can be classified in the pre-movement stage. At this stage, relatively deprivation occurs, in the form of surrendering their fate and land rights, but they still have great hope and confidence that they can establish an independent Papuan state. The strategies used at that time were not well planned, but spontaneous reactions with a pragmatic approach. After several decades (1999), the charismatic Papuan figure Theys H. Eluay emerged who was considered a figure who could unite all elements of the

indigenous Papuan community. He led the Papuan Customary Consultative Council (LMA) and issued the decree for an Independent Papua and raised the Morning Star flag, a year later he organized the Second Papuan People's Congress which sparked the birth of a special autonomy status for Papua. Because of his vocals in voicing an independent Papua, he was killed by the security forces (Koppasus), so that the stick of leadership was continued by other indigenous Papuan figures.

The initial spontaneous strategy by relying on physical strength is a typology of peasant movements in various places, especially Asia as suggested by Sartono, Scott and Plath (in Balridge). There are similarities between the three researchers, although their respective research locations are different, namely in Java (Indonesia), Southeast Asia and Japan. The similarity in question is regarding the causes of the emergence of the movement, namely the contact as well as the clash between traditional society and modern culture which is carried out in the name of development, modernization or industrialization. Dramatic changes surrounding the traditional Papuan society have destroyed the joints of their lives, so that they long to return to a calm, peaceful and prosperous life, even though for the size of "modern" people belong to a backward society. These radical peasant movements can generally be classified as a movement of withdrawal, rejecting changes that destroy their traditional order of life.

Rejection of change is often expressed spontaneously with the target of the project's physical facilities, because buildings and objects are considered to be the personification of the form of change. For traditional-minded people, accustomed to living in a socially "safe" environment, living in the midst of change is traumatic. This condition is also one of the reasons why people who are attached to tradition are the last group to adopt an innovation. They prefer to be oriented to the past rather than the future, so this group becomes alienated among the change recipients (adapters).

After ±32 years Papua joined as part of the Republic of Indonesia, the Papuan people fought for independence through violence which resulted in

the Special Autonomy Law for Papua. And two decades after the government granted special autonomy status, indigenous Papuans still continue to fight for their desire for self-determination (referendum). Why is this still and continues to happen in Papua? The answer is because the response and development paradigm imposed by the central government on indigenous Papuans has not changed much. The people's struggle was considered quiet and formally responded to, even though the violent acts carried out did not mean adding "credit points", but a bad image and considered uncivilized by the international community. The method of violence produces violence again from the government through the application of a repressive/security approach. Along the way, various acts of violence perpetrated by the security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) have also become weapons for indigenous Papuans to strengthen their struggle through human rights issues and democratization.

2. Institutional Strategy

Realizing that the strategy of struggle through violence or physical force is very unbalanced with the strength of the government and security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police), the Free Papua Organization (OPM) has taken another strategy, namely information warfare and non-violent struggle through diplomacy and online media. In Balridge's view, the presence of a leader like Theys H. Eluay, before the special autonomy status was granted to Papua, was considered successful in uniting the direction and perception of the indigenous Papuan people about the direction of the struggle to be achieved and the ways to achieve it. Through the figure of the leader of the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), this institution has a strong bargaining position for indigenous Papuans in the eyes of the government and expanded their ideas for struggle.

In the movement of the Papuan Customary Consultative Council (LMA) which is affiliated with the Free Papua Organization (OPM), the purpose of the organization is clearly formulated that "the essence of the establishment of LMAP is to fight for the dignity of indigenous Papuans" (Dyah and Hiniwati, 2006: 39). The main objectives are:

- a). Exploring and developing the existence of Papuan rights and entities as part of God's creatures on earth.
- b). Respect and uphold and enforce customary law and traditional and religious values that live and develop in indigenous peoples.
- c). Obligated to respect and appreciate the traditional values of other Papuan indigenous peoples.
- d). Obligated to enforce order and security within their respective customary law areas.
- e). Always obliged to explore, maintain, preserve and develop the values of art and indigenous Papuan culture.
- f). Obligated to respect and protect and use Papua's natural resources responsibly.

Based on the objectives set out above, it appears that the Customary Deliberation Institution is directed to increase awareness and standard of living of indigenous Papuans in all aspects of life, namely social, cultural, economic and political. Borrowing their terms to describe the essence of the struggle is: *"sit the same low, stand the same height and become masters in their own country"* (interview with traditional leaders). After the Customary Deliberation Institution (LMA) was formed, strategic steps were taken and the struggle strategy was changed. If previously the struggle was dominated by violence (violence movement), then through this LMA forum the struggle was carried out by combining methods of struggle with diplomacy (non-violence movement). This change in strategy was announced through a resolution of the Customary Deliberation Institution. Now the struggle of indigenous Papuans is more focused and organized by combining violence and diplomacy. This diplomatic struggle went through two phases, namely: before the granting of special autonomy status (1996-2000) and after the implementation of special autonomy (2001-to date).

- *Before the implementation of special autonomy status (1996-2000).*

The LMA struggle itself began in 1996 which was carried out by each LMA in their customary territories, but because they felt they could not put pressure on the government as they hoped, on July 24, 1998 they then formed the Irian Jaya Community Reconciliation Forum

(FORERI) was initiated by Tom Beanal on July 24, 1998. This forum consists of intellectual figures, youth, students, women and Papuan religious leaders including Theys Hiyo Eluay. There are three main objectives for establishing FORERI: *first*, to monitor, receive and channel all the aspirations of indigenous Papuans who are developing in Papuan society (Irian Jaya at that time). *Second*, convey the aspirations that exist in the community purely as they are, so that all parties who make decisions can consider them properly and benefit all parties. *Third*, seek assistance to indigenous Papuans to express their aspirations freely and democratically.

The first step taken by FORERI was to hold a meeting attended by indigenous Papuans both in Papua and overseas, which was held on August 1, 1998 in Jayapura. This meeting was intended to share the vision of the goals and directions of the struggle, as well as an effort to reconcile the national West Papuans (Pigay, 200: 319-320). FORERI as an absorber of the aspirations of the indigenous Papuan people is able to gather various community groups, including those who disagree with the government (OPM). This forum also prepares material for the national dialogue that will be brought by Team 100 who will face President B.J. Habibie in Jakarta. The statement of attitude read out at the dialogue meeting contained three demands, namely: 1) that the Papuan people want to separate themselves from Indonesia; 2) immediately establish a transitional government in West Papua, not later than March 1999; and 3) if the two points above are not reached, they demand international negotiations between the Indonesian government and the indigenous people of West Papua witnessed by the United Nations, in addition they also threaten to boycott the 1999 general elections.

Of course, this demand was not immediately fulfilled by the government, which still adhered to the decision of the UN session, that Papua is part of the territory of Indonesia. The struggle continued, in early 2000 LMA and FORERI held a General Meeting of Tribal Leaders in Jayapura and continued by holding the Papuan People's Congress in Jayapura on 29 May to 2 June 2000. The implementation of

this Congress was approved by President Abdurrahman Wachid, and he even provided assistance 1 billion Rupiah to make this activity a success.

It was at this congress that the Papuan leader for the first time called on the Indonesian government to have a dialogue with a neutral third party facilitator. However, the central government ignored the call and never heeded it. The congress also resulted in a number of political decisions, including: the formation of the Presidium of the Papuan Council (PDP), chaired by Theys Hiyo Eluay and Tom Beanal as representatives. This PDP also made the terms of reference for the proposed dialogue with the government. Subsequently, they demanded that it be formed a truth commission that is expected to straighten out the history of the integration of West Papua into Indonesia.

To support the implementation of the Congress, there was a massive mass mobilization from all regions in Papua, not only land vehicles chartered to transport Congress participants but also airplanes and ships. After the congress was over, they held victory marches throughout Papua, accompanied by propaganda that migrants were not allowed to live in Papua and had to leave the land of Papua, if Papua became independent.

The demands voiced in the Papuan People's Congress became the forerunner to granting special autonomy status to Papua, which the government then responded by issuing Law No. 21 of 2001, concerning Special Autonomy for Papua in October 2001. This law provides economic rights and broad politics for indigenous Papuans and the establishment of a Papuan People's Council consisting of all elements in the indigenous Papuan community.

- *After the implementation of special autonomy (2001-to date).*

In December 2002, Tom Beanal, deputy chairman of the PDP, declared Papua a "*Zone of Peace*". Beanal took over the leadership of the PDP after the brutal assassination of its leader Theys Hiyo Eluay, in 2001 by elite Indonesian forces (Koppasus). The Peace Zone means West Papua to be "an area free from violence, oppression and suffering". In October 2004, when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)

was elected president of Indonesia for his first term in office, he and vice president Jusuf Kalla tried to find what they hoped was a comprehensive solution for West Papua. At the time of his inauguration as president, SBY said: *"The government wishes to resolve the Papua issue in a peaceful, fair and dignified manner, with an emphasis on dialogue and persuasion."*

However, the dialogue has not been carried out and violence and militaristic approaches are still being put forward. Meanwhile, the concept and call for the "Zone of Peace" which was initiated by PDP Deputy Tom Beanal is still being obeyed and held by religious leaders in Papua as well as the OPM.

With growing frustration over the implementation of special autonomy in Papua in 2004, indigenous Papuans began to carry out peaceful demonstrations by taking to the streets to stage demonstrations demanding that the Special Autonomy Law be "returned to the central government". At the same time, thousands of people throughout Papua held peaceful demonstrations supported by former Political Prisoners (TAPOL), in their actions they also carried and raised the Morning Star flag. This peaceful demonstration demands that the government stop repressive practices that charge people involved in peaceful political activities with criminal offenses such as treason, which is a law inherited from the Dutch colonial era. These actions were then responded with an iron fist by the security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police); a number of intellectual figures and Papuans were arrested and imprisoned on charges of treason and subversion.

In the mid of 2006, the Central Highlands Papuan Student Association throughout Indonesia held the Second National Congress in Manado led by Secretary General Markus Haluk and his deputy Buchtar Tabuni. This congress issued a number of important recommendations, including: consolidation of the Papuan people for peaceful demonstrations demanding the closure of Freeport in Indonesia throughout the Land of Papua and in several regions in Indonesia. The recommendation divided the students into two opinions. The first opinion believes that it is the Papuan people themselves who carry out

demonstrations demanding the closure without being followed by students from outside Papua who are involved in the field. The second opinion says that Papuan students residing in study cities outside Papua should be the driving force for field action and planning an exodus to Papua. As a result, thousands of Papuan students left their cities of study in various places in Indonesia and returned to Papua from late 2007 to mid-2008.

During the repatriation process, a number of Papuan students who had returned early held a demonstration led by Buchtar Tabuni. On April 1, 2008, Buchtar Tabuni led a crowd belonging to the Student Coalition for People Care for the Land of Papua (KMMPTP), at a peaceful demonstration at the Papua Governor's Office. The KMMPTP demands that the Indonesian government revoke the special autonomy law for Papua and immediately hold an international dialogue to resolve the Papua-Jakarta conflict. Asking the MRP, the Governor and the Papuan DPRD to immediately write to President SBY to hold an international dialogue. They also threatened to boycott the 2009 presidential election if the government did not heed the aspirations.

After the mass action, the escalation of protests carried out by indigenous Papuans who want to restore special autonomy and ask for a referendum in Papua has increased. This has prompted religious leaders to call for a call for the conflict to be resolved peacefully, while reaffirming the commitment of the majority of Papuans to use peaceful means. Two years later, a Papuan Catholic priest (the late) Dr. Neles Tebay presented a new initiative to promote dialogue between West Papua and the Indonesian government. Father Tebay, who devotes himself to seeking dialogue more than any other Papuan leader, has always stressed that violence cannot resolve conflict. Moreover, at that time it was clear that special autonomy failed to guarantee the rights of Papuans as mandated in Law Number 21 of 2001.

Papua Peace Conference

Along with the protests of the Papuan people that continue to spread, on the initiative of (the late) Pastor Dr. Neles Tebay and (the late) Dr. Muridan S. Widjojo (the late) The head of the Papuan Study Team

from LIPI formed the Papua Peace Network on 7 July 2011 to encourage dialogue and peace for Papua. Then, they also held a Papua Peace Conference which was attended by approximately 1000 people from all over Papua. The conference was also attended by three high-ranking Indonesian officials, who gave remarks: Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto, Commander of the Cenderawasih XVII Papua Military Command Major General Erfi Triassunu and Inspector General Bekto Soeprapto, and the Papua and West Papua Police Chiefs. On that occasion, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Djoko Suyanto described the conflict in Papua as "multi-dimensional" and he acknowledged the importance of two-way communication, in other words, problem solving in Papua must be done through dialogue.

Also attending the conference was the Governor of Papua province, Barnabas Suebu, who underlined the paradox in West Papua: a region rich in natural resources, but full of internal conflicts that lead to social disintegration. He also emphasized the Papuan tradition of resolving local disputes through "dignified" talks as the best way to avoid loss of life. (the late) Pastor Dr. Neles Tebay, as the Coordinator of the Papua Peace Network, said after the conference: "I want to underline that this (recommendation) is not made to find out who is at fault, but rather to focus our attention on the real problems that need to be addressed to create a peaceful Papua." The conference proposed a number of indicators for this purpose:

- 1) Indigenous Papuans must feel calm, safe, enjoy a decent standard of living, live on their land and in peaceful relationship with one another, with nature, and with God.
- 2) Indigenous Papuans should not be stigmatized as separatist or subversive.
- 3) Papuan indigenous peoples must be free from discrimination, intimidation and marginalization.
- 4) Papuan indigenous peoples must have the right to express themselves, express opinions, and organize associations.

- 5) All forms of state violence against indigenous peoples, including women and children, must be stopped.
- 6) Anyone who is involved in acts of state violence must be tried and punished according to the sense of justice of the people.
- 7) Indigenous peoples' rights to customary lands must be legally recognized.
- 8) Exploitation of natural resources must take into account the conservation of these resources, recognize local customs, and as much as possible provide the maximum benefit to indigenous Papuans.
- 9) Companies that destroy the environment and destroy customary land ownership rights must be subject to legal and administrative sanctions.
- 10) Forest conversion practices that contribute to global warming must be stopped.

In relation to security issues, conference participants suggested that the security forces carry out their duties professionally and respect basic human rights to protect the sense of security of indigenous Papuans. Intelligence operations that intimidate or create insecurity must stop. Indonesian national army and Republic of Indonesia Police must be prohibited from engaging in business or politics, with legal sanctions for those who violate.

In relation to social and cultural issues, the conference proposed that the social and cultural rights of indigenous Papuans including rights to customary lands and customary norms should be recognized and respected. The labeling of Papuans as stupid, drunken, lazy and primitive must stop.

Discrimination against people living with HIV and AIDS must stop. Every effort should be made to reduce maternal and child mortality rates in indigenous Papuans with the help of professional medical services. Policies that lead to population reduction in indigenous Papuans such as family planning programs must be stopped, and steps must be taken to limit immigration to West Papua.

From the two phases of the struggle above, it is clear that the struggle through peaceful means has been intensively carried out by both intellectuals and indigenous Papuans and has produced a number of

resolutions. These resolutions were then used as a "platform" for the LMA struggle which was described in various activities and a statement of attitude was made which was socialized to the indigenous Papuan people and to migrants to be conveyed to the international community. The contents of their statement of position are:

- a) We all indigenous Papuans are stigmatized as members of the OPM by the government and security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police). For this reason, every movement carried out by indigenous Papuans in order to demand their basic rights is immediately labelled as a member of the OPM, including humanitarian and cultural movements which are also seen as separatist movements.
- b) Land, mountains, rivers and customary forest in Papua are our customary rights which were seized and taken forcibly by the state as locations for transmigration, mining, oil palm plantations and wood processing companies. For us, land is our mother. Forests and mountains are Mother's head, and rivers are Mother's milk; all of which have been vandalized and destroyed, our Mother has been raped.
- c) In principle, the government and security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) want indigenous Papuans (OAP) not to demand their basic rights or human rights. Indigenous Papuans must keep silent a thousand languages, and must follow (only) what the central government is thinking and designing. Indigenous Papuans must act like the "puppet" played by the main actor, namely the central government. Indigenous Papuans are required to follow the concepts and development strategies designed by Jakarta. Indigenous Papuans are prohibited from asking questions, let alone criticizing the concepts and development strategies designed by Jakarta. Anyway, the native Papuans who are in the easternmost region of Indonesia are "slaves" to the government of the Republic of Indonesia.
- d) For the central government, the OPM movement and the demand for independence are only movements with a motive for economic prosperity, not a question of demands for human rights and identity.

The emergence of various groups as OPM wings, such as TPN/OPM, KNPB, Papuan Student Alliance, etc., is seen by the central government as a movement demanding economic prosperity, not a movement demanding human rights. Therefore, the various demands for basic rights that are carried out by the Papuan people are always answered by the central government with a militaristic approach and mere physical or infrastructure development.

- e) This attitude of the central government, as evidenced by its economic and military intelligence policies, has killed the spirit of the Special Autonomy Law for Papua Number 21 of 2001, which essentially accommodates the basic rights of indigenous Papuans. When indigenous Papuans demand their basic rights, they are always labelled as OPM or separatism. Every attempt by indigenous Papuans to demand their basic rights is of course suspected and spied on by state security forces (intelligence). Because of this, Papuan people have been living under pressure, intimidation, and killing, either directly or indirectly (invisible victims), as well as the threat of extinction (genocide).

When compared with the initial formation of the LMA as described earlier, the demands in the form of resolutions and issues developed seem to be broader in terms of both the material demanded and the methods of prosecution. The targets are not only multinational companies operating in Papua, but also the government and security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police). The arena of struggle is not limited to the Papua region, but extends to regional and state boundaries. Because there is a shift in demands, it is necessary to study further, whether the LMA is a social or political movement, or a social movement that has shifted into a political movement. This can be seen through the next stage of the struggle strategy

3. Political Strategy

The shift in movement strategy began when demands were transferred from multinational companies to the government, in this case the security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) and migrant civilians. By determining the security forces and migrant civilians

as the main targets, it seems that a shift has begun to occur that the real enemies are the government and the security forces. Because the ones who have actually carried out acts of violence against the indigenous Papuan people are the security forces who are government officials. The repressive actions of the Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police in the face of social protests by the indigenous Papuan people were considered excessive because they were accompanied by the use of heavy weapons and intimidation. As a result, many indigenous Papuans were killed, injured and fled to the forest and other areas deemed safe because of fear. The refugees (runaways) from the indigenous Papuans then joined the OPM which was already moving latent in these areas under the leadership of the TPNPB regional commanders, including Goliath Tabuni, Egianus Kogoya and Lekagak Telenggen.

At the beginning of December 2018, there was an attack on construction workers of PT Istaka Karya who was building a bridge connecting the Aorak River and Yigi River as well as an attack on a military post in Nduga Regency which resulted in the fall of 31 people. The attack was carried out by TPNPB under the leadership of Egianus Kogoya, who was part of the group led by Kely Kwalik, who was the supreme commander of TPNPB. Kely Kwalik himself died in 2009 during an ambush operation by the security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) in Mimika. Egianus Kogoya and his followers are known to be very radical, militant and the majority are young. This is based on the criminal record submitted by the Papua Regional Police, that the TPNPB under the leadership of Egianus Kogoya has carried out a series of attacks, shootings, kidnappings that resulted in fatalities from both immigrant civilians and security forces, and even attempts to thwart the Regional Head General Election (Simultaneous Regional Elections in 2018). The following are some of the events led by Egianus Kogoya:

1. Shooting at Kenyam Airport

On June 25, 2018, Egianus Kogoya's group opened fire on a Trigana Air Twin Otter plane that was rented by the Police Mobile Brigade. These Brimob troops are on duty to secure the elections. Two people were also injured in the incident.

2. The confinement of teachers and medical personnel

In October 2018, the Egianus Kogoya group once detained a dozen teachers who were working at SD YPGRI 1, SMPN 1 and medical personnel who served at the Mapenduma Health Center, Nduga.

3. Shooting on the Trans Papua Road

In December 2017, Trans Papua workers in the Mugi sub-district were attacked by the Egianus Kogoya group. A project worker named Yovicko Sondakh died and one officer was seriously injured.

4. Attack on PT Istaka Karya workers

On December 1-2 2018, as many as 25 workers of PT Istaka Karya, a Trans Papua Road contractor, were kidnapped and taken to Puncak Kobo Hill with their hands tied, they were shot indiscriminately. Nineteen workers and twelve security personnel are said to have died.

In addition, on April 25, 2021, an attack occurred in Beoga District, Puncak Regency under the leadership of Lekagak Telenggen which resulted in the death of the Head of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) representative of Papua, Brigadier General Gusti Putu Danny Nugraha. In addition to the shooting of Kabinda Papua, the TPNPB group led by Lekagak also carried out a series of attacks on four civilians in the Ilaga area, Puncak Regency in early April, resulting in two of the victims being teachers. Then, he was also involved in several attacks in Mimika Regency in 2020, including: the attack on three teachers in Aroanop in mid-February 2020, the shooting in Zipabera Village, Tembagapura District on February 28, 2020 which resulted in the death of a police officer. The gang also attacked a patrol car from the Tembagapura Police in Itikini Village and the 745 Indonesian national army Post in Opitawak, Tembagapura in early March 2020. Still in Opitawak, Lekagak's subordinates were also said to have burned a church on March 13, 2020. Attacks were also carried out against PT Freeport Indonesia employees. in the Kuala Kencana area on March 30, 2020. At that time, TPNPB claimed to have controlled the Freeport area by involving 33 Kodap led by Lekagak Telenggen.

In addition to the above incidents, there are also several incidents of attacks and shootings against civilians who are native Papuans because they are accused of spying for the security forces (Indonesian national army /

Republic of Indonesia Police) which have escaped mass media publications, including: September 2020, torture and murder of two people civilians in Sugapa District, Intan Jaya Regency, Medio December 2020 a civilian died in an attack carried out by TPNPB in Sori Village, East Aifat District, Maybrat Regency, West Papua Province, and a civilian was shot by TPNPB on the Trans Papua Magataga road (border Intan Jaya Regency and Paniai Regency). In January 2021 TPNPB under the leadership of Egianus Kogoya killed civilians in Sugapa District and Homeyo District, Intan Jaya District. April 9, 2021, two teachers in Beoga District, Puncak Regency were shot by TPNPB and an elementary school was burned. On April 14, 2021, a motorcycle taxi driver was shot in Eromaga Village, Omukla District, Puncak Regency. And on April 15, 2021, a high school student was shot by TPNPB in Uloni Village, Ilaga District, Puncak Regency.

The high security escalation that occurs shows that the problems that occur in Papua have not been resolved with the implementation of special autonomy alone. LMA considers that special autonomy is a new source of conflict in social life in Papua. On the other hand, LMA has strengthened the struggle for the rights of indigenous peoples, which has been fought for since the beginning. The LMA rejects the implementation of special autonomy, aside from being considered unfair, there are also concerns that their principal demands will be deemed to have been completed with the implementation of special autonomy. Although the government insists on continuing special autonomy in Papua by increasing the allocation of funds and carrying out regional divisions (provinces/regencies/cities) through the revision of Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua, this has not stopped the LMA from carrying out maneuvers to influence the government and the international community. By bringing up issues of human rights, democratization and the environment, LMA has succeeded in attracting the sympathy of NGOs related to these issues.

In addition to obtaining financial assistance, LMA also has the opportunity to publish in the form of brochures, studies, publishing books, making short documentaries or YouTube channels that contain their defense and support for their struggle. Viewed from the published writings, it shows that the direction of the struggle which originally revolved around the

demands for welfare and customary rights of the indigenous Papuan people, shifted towards a political struggle. The steps of this political struggle began with demands to investigate cases of human rights violations committed by security forces (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) in various places in Papua, by inviting Komnas HAM, the DPR-RI Fact-Finding Team, the Indonesian Church Fellowship (PGI) and other churches in Papua to stop the repressive/military approach, withdraw security personnel (Indonesian national army / Republic of Indonesia Police) and immediately hold a national dialogue as recommended by the Papua Peace Network (JDP) on earlier.

One of the materials that will be proposed in the national dialogue is about political freedom for indigenous Papuans, whose final goal is a referendum for Papua. The LMA is among those who reject the implementation of special autonomy from the beginning until now. It appears that the problems that were originally in Papua have been drawn into the issue of national disintegration. This shows that there is an enlargement of the scale of the struggle in terms of the location and mission of the struggle.

The involvement of Papuan young and intellectuals in various political activities and the occurrence of mass mobilization to carry out larger protests not only in Papua but also in several other big cities in Indonesia, proves that the direction of the LMA movement to a political movement is getting clearer. This condition is a real process of growth starting from physical movements, becoming an organized movement and finally the movement which is dressed as the Indigenous Deliberation Institution transforms into a political movement. This is not only experienced by LMA, but also other social organizations in Papua.

5.6. EFFECT (INFLUENCE) OF THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The socialization of the Free Papua Organization movement which has been carried out through various strategies has yielded results; in other words, there is a significant influence on the intended parties. In general, the expected change is a change in the attitude of the government towards the demands made, because they are the makers and decision takers who have a direct impact on the lives of indigenous Papuans and the future of Papua. The

government has shown a change in attitude directed towards meeting the demands of the indigenous Papuan people, for example by appointing several indigenous Papuan figures to occupy strategic positions in the government. With this position, it is hoped that it will reduce the desire of the indigenous Papuans to break away from Indonesia and accept the implementation of special autonomy that has been granted by the government, although this is not a strong guarantee to eliminate the demand for self-determination (referendum). Therefore, if we talk about the effects of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) movement, it can be seen from two sides, namely:

a. Internal Influence (Indigenous Papuans)

Structurally OPM extends its innovative influence into society through the Executive Board and Regional Coordinators. Both components have the authority to implement decisions made by the Indigenous Deliberative Council and the Governor/Head of Region/Representative in addition to disseminating organizational programs and activities. For indigenous Papuans, OPM plays a role as a driving force in fighting for various demands both to the government and multinational companies operating in Papua.

Memoria passionis and the primordial ties of the indigenous Papuan people are very strong, coupled with a culture of practical thinking and even pragmatic tendencies, making it easy to follow or listen to the voices of people who are able to give them something they need "instantly". That is why the indigenous Papuans accept the existence of the OPM as a forum for their struggle which has actually led to the demand for independence. The role of the Indigenous Deliberative Council in coastal areas is felt to be less significant because of the compromising nature of its leadership.

The decisions of traditional leaders in coastal areas that tend to be ambiguous (compromising) were responded cynically by OPM supporters, because they were considered not "gentle" and chose to play it safe for their personal and group interests. However, this does not mean that their support has diminished, quantitatively and even strengthened, which is indicated by the willingness of the people in their customary territories to continue to support the OPM struggle, at least in terms of mass mobilization. The position of traditional leaders who play two legs is

considered advantageous and makes it easier for them to mobilize resources to support their struggle, both internally and externally. Through them, information about development plans and the distribution of special autonomy funds is obtained so that the sympathy of the Papuan people can be obtained because they are able to provide funds for their various public interests. Meanwhile, in their relationship with the government, they are also free to move and process issues that are pressuring the government.

b. External Influence (Governments and multinational companies)

The wider and more vigorous movement of the Free Papua Organization proves that its struggle has received a positive response from both the indigenous Papuans themselves and the government. The government's attitude is that, as long as it only concerns the demands for empowerment and welfare, the response is also by issuing Presidential Decree Number 20 of 2020 concerning the Integrated Coordination Team for the Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua Province and West Papua Province and Presidential Instruction Number 9 of 2020 concerning Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua Province and West Papua Province which mandates efforts to accelerate welfare development through an approach that prioritizes improving the welfare of indigenous Papuans. Although this response is not only addressed to the OPM, the incorporation of traditional figures into the OPM has made the customary deliberation institutional movement experience an enlargement of the scale from customary institutions to "political institutions". The accumulation of various sources of power into the OPM has caused the government to take it more seriously.

Previously, the government had several times issued Presidential Decrees and Presidential Instructions to accelerate development in Papua. Even in the era of President SBY, the government had formed the Unit for the Acceleration of Development of Papua and West Papua (UP4B) which is a clear proof that the government really wants to give what the indigenous Papuans want. Although this condition is not a direct influence of the OPM, the serious and continuous efforts of this organization have at least attracted the sympathy of the people to continue to support it so that the government must take it into account. Because no matter how small the

form of a movement, if it is organized regularly, the echo of its struggle can affect the international community. Which if this happens, of course, the threat of disintegration will be even stronger, so it must be seriously prevented, in a more aspirational and humanistic way.

The assimilation of OPM figures into various organizational forms and Customary Deliberation Institutions has caused the attention of the government, multinational companies operating in Papua and the general public not to be directed to OPM, but to the movement carried out by the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP). Apart from that, there are still Church institutions and NGOs that are within the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) membership structure. Now, the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) has become the center of attention, because it is a representative institution for indigenous Papuans, while the OPM enters into it through its leaders. In addition, there are partnership connections with various traditional institutions, universities, youth organizations, church organizations, mass media and others.

This strategic position, coupled with the increasingly crystallized political demands of the indigenous Papuan people for independence, has brought the OPM to a movement that does not only demand customary rights as it used to struggle, but is more directed to the acquisition of the political rights of the Papuan people. Although the government responded to these political demands by granting special autonomy for Papua, it has not been able to extinguish the ideals of Papuan independence in the hearts of indigenous Papuans, including if the government intends to implement special autonomy for the second volume through the revision of the Special Autonomy Law for Papua and carry out regional expansion (Provinces/Regencies/Cities) in Papua. Regarding the plan, the political elite in Papua is divided into two, namely those who want to continue special autonomy and those who refuse to continue special autonomy. For those who refuse, there is no other choice but to ask for a "referendum for self-determination" (independence) out of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, while those who want special autonomy to continue to run are also divided into two, namely there are those who still want to join the Republic of Indonesia, and those who want to use the Republic of

Indonesia. special autonomy status as a choice between "preparations" to achieve independence after a certain period of time.

In order to achieve this goal, the Papuan elite has established relations with other countries and the United Nations to support its movement. Diplomatic efforts continue to be carried out, accompanied by provocation and internal power-raising. The involvement of the OPM is very clear in this movement, where its figures who sit in the executive, legislative and military institutions in the shadow cabinet structure formed at the High-Level Conference which took place in the mid of 2012. Multinational companies operating in Papua seem to have begun to be embraced to finance their activities through the figures who sit in them. The existence of a "sense of belonging and the common enemy" succeeded in uniting the indigenous Papuan people to unite against the government, at least among the "educated" and opportunist spirits.

The effects of the OPM struggle after joining with various other customary institutions in Papua are clearly stronger than if they fought alone. In addition, the political support given by several foreign countries clandestinely, there is also the provision of funds from international donor agencies that work through global issues such as human rights, gender, democratization and the environment is evidence that their movement's access to foreign countries is more open. The number of publications carried out by Papuan intellectuals generally evokes the spirit of the struggle to form a "Free West Papua" state by exploiting the issue of human rights violations and atrocities committed by security forces (Indonesian national army/Republic of Indonesia Police), environmental destruction. Their writings, in addition to exposing the atrocities committed by the security forces (Indonesian national army/Republic of Indonesia Police) and existing multinational companies, are also accompanied by poems about the suffering of families who have been deprived of their human rights. The role of the mass media in revealing facts and leading opinions is a strategic medium of struggle for a movement, and this has been exploited to the fullest by OPM and its fighting partners.

The government has responded to the previous OPM struggle in three ways. First, by leaving it as if it does not care about the demands of the indigenous Papuans to settle their cultural and customary rights. The protests that have been going on since the 1970s have been allowed to continue without any meaningful settlement efforts, so that discontent has accumulated. Second, provide physical resistance by deploying large numbers of security forces to Papua to arrest people who rebel and want independence. It is indeed difficult to separate the OPM movement as a traditional and belief movement or cultural revitalization from the separatist movement in Papua, because they are mingled in the same social environment and region.

The next response is to give Papua special autonomy status, this moment is seen as the success of the movement because it succeeded in bringing the movement to the institutional system with the issuance of TAP MPR No. IV/MPR/1999 concerning the Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) which mandated the granting of special autonomy for Papua and later ratified in the form of Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua.

The OPM struggle after special autonomy was granted is currently being responded to by the government in five ways, namely:

1. Let the implementation of special autonomy run as it is, without any supporting instruments for its implementation (Government Regulations, Presidential Decrees, Special Regional Regulations and Provincial Regulations) as an elaboration of Law Number 21 of 2001, resulting in ambiguity of the rules that serve as guidelines for implementation governance and development in Papua. In addition, there is no complete and comprehensive evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy and leaves the implementation of special autonomy without integrated supervision. So, it seems that the government is only half-hearted in granting special autonomy in Papua.
2. Allowing local governments (Province/Regencies/City) in Papua to carry out special autonomy according to their respective interpretations.

3. The Commission for Reconciliation and Truth has not been established as mandated by Law Number 21 of 2001, to straighten the history of Papuan integration and resolve human rights issues that occur in Papua.
4. Return to using a repressive approach by increasing the number of security forces (Indonesian national army/Republic of Indonesia Police) in Papua to quell acts of attack, shooting, destruction by pursuing and arresting people who carry out separatist actions.
5. Want to extend the status of special autonomy for Papua (special autonomy volume two) and carry out regional expansion (Provinces/Regencies/Cities) in Papua by submitting a draft revision of Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua to the DPR-RI, without hearing input from indigenous Papuans who are in the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP).

The terms mentioned above have made social conditions in Papua again volatile and the OPM has returned to be intense in fighting for the political rights of indigenous Papuans, whether they are fighting for local, national or even international scopes. On the other hand, this reform era has also become a source of inspiration to voice and demand various rights of indigenous Papuans because the faucet of democratization is wide open. Thus, the government needs to be careful and wise in acting and deciding on the sustainability of special autonomy in Papua, because a little carelessness will confuse the situation, the safety of other civilians and the threat of national disintegration is at stake.

CHAPTER VI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT INTO A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The protests of indigenous Papuans that took place after the implementation of special autonomy were a reflection of the conflict of interest that developed in development in Papua. Protests occur because there are past problems that have not been completely resolved and people's rights have been violated, so they feel they have been treated unfairly. The source of this injustice is the implementation of special autonomy which is felt to have not brought prosperity to the indigenous Papuan people, besides that the government has exploited Papua's natural wealth in a way that is not in accordance with the procedures or systems that apply to the local community. The management of land and forests which are customary rights is carried out or decided unilaterally by the government, contrary to the beliefs of the indigenous Papuans. For indigenous Papuans, land and forests are collective property that cannot be traded. If you want to use it for the public interest, it can be loaned, but ownership rights cannot be transferred. Cultural values that live in society are not accommodated in the development process, because they are considered not in accordance with modern management principles. The planning applied is more "top down" and the planning material contains more physical and financial aspects. This has an impact on the neglect of the interests and rights of indigenous peoples. This condition was addressed by protesting, initially with physical force, then in an organized manner and finally into a political movement.

This shows that there is a continuous process from conflict to protest, then the protest develops into a social movement, and then collaboration with political movements. If it is likened to a tree, then a social movement begins with a condition of social tension that acts as an "institution" that has the potential to become a "tree" with its own system, which can emerge and develop or die. In the case of special autonomy in Papua, the conditions behind the emergence of social movements were conflicts that existed before the granting of special autonomy status, then became more complex (complicated) after the implementation of special autonomy status. This conflict is likened to the root of the "tree" of social movements, protests are like the trunk and separatist movements are like twigs and leaves. The culmination of the growth of social movements is the formation of interest groups or political movements.

The initial conflict between tribes did not cause protests, because it had become part of social life and relatively balanced opponents of conflict. Protests occur when the opponent is unbalanced or confronts the holder of power (government). Furthermore, the protest movement which was not responded to properly developed into a social movement. Social movements are also a form of organized protest with demands that revolve around improving socio-economic life. When demands shift towards power and act as pressure groups that are tightly organized, the movement turns into a political movement. In the case of Papua, the social movement did not develop into a political movement in the true sense of the word, that is, it became like a political party. However, the political nuances are very clear because they are related to political movements that demand broad independence/autonomy.

This chapter will discuss the development of protest into a social movement, starting with the roots of the movement in the form of conflict, the development from conflict to protest and from protest to social movement. In addition, the theoretical implications of social movements in Papua are also studied, which are highlighted from cultural acculturation theory, systems theory, exchange theory and movement models in Papua.

6.1. MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONFLICT: ROOTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN PAPUA

Conflict is the root of the problem that drives social movements. The roots of social movements in Papua in the form of conflict consist of three main sources, namely:

1. Conflict with Central Government and security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police)

In the dictionary of sociology, conflict is defined as:

"The overt struggle between individual or groups within a society, or between nation states" (Collins, 1991)."

Based on this definition, conflicts between indigenous Papuans and the central government and security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) are group conflicts that occur within a country.

Since the beginning, the government implemented its policies centrally during the New Order era, which then in mid-1998 the condition

underwent a very significant change through the reform movement initiated by the students. The reform era is considered as a momentum to make changes towards improving the life of the nation and state, including the structuring of relations between the central and regional governments through the implementation of real and responsible autonomy. Especially for some provinces that have historical characteristics and backgrounds, specialties are given in the implementation of regional autonomy such as the Province of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, the Province of the Special Region of Yogyakarta, the Province of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, and the Province of Papua (Papua and West Papua).

In general, the special autonomy policy applied to the land of Papua is a very good policy conceptually, but this policy certainly has many factors that hinder its implementation, such as contextual factors or the strategic policy environment that makes this policy difficult to implement ideally in order to reach its goal. In this term, the role of the central government remains dominant, in implementing special autonomy in Papua. This condition causes high conflict of interest or tug of interest between the central government and the provincial government. In addition, a repressive/military approach is still being put forward in solving problems that arise in Papua.

This is considered by the Chairman of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) Timothy Murib as the cause of the decline in the government's authority. He stated that:

In the eyes of the indigenous Papuan people, the authority of the government and the security forces is gone, because during the implementation of special autonomy for Papua, there are still marginalization's, discrimination, including the lack of recognition of Papua's contributions and services to Indonesia. The social infrastructure development in Papua is not optimal, especially education, health, people's economic empowerment and the low involvement of indigenous Papuan economic actors. Besides that, the process of political, economic and socio-cultural integration has not yet been completed." (Timotius Murib, interview, on January 2021).

A similar assessment was also made by Pastor Jhon Bunei Pr representing 57 Indigenous Pastors, who stated that:

"A Papuan security officer (Head of Regional Police) should not issue a ban on Papuans from taking action against special autonomy. Because it makes the government lose its authority and the government is

considered to be silencing voices and limiting democratic space for Papuans who do not feel the impact of special autonomy. In addition, the ban is considered too early and can provoke conflict between people who are for and against the second volume of special autonomy plan". (Interview, January 2021).

The same thing was expressed by Pastor John Baransano, from Indonesian Christian Church (GKI) who stated that:

"As a religious leader, I regret the attitude of the Papuan Regional Police Chief, because this matter must be considered properly. We see people who feel problems, are sick during this special autonomy, then democratic freedom is in the people, so freedom of expression must be respected because of the problems of the Papuan people. I ask to respect the opinion of the Papuan people, let's see and feel it. Those who feel and experience it, so let them appear and speak, then we must give space to the people and democratic freedom must be respected, not hindered". (Interview, January 2021).

The statements above show that the cause of conflict between the government and indigenous Papuans is that its policies have ignored or considered indigenous Papuans as enemies and did not uphold justice. When they protest due to policies that hurt the people, they are dealt with in a repressive way, using military force. In addition, there is "*preferential treatment*" against tribal actors that should be dealt with firmly. The militaristic repressive approach eventually became a source of new protests, which were later used as an excuse to sue the government and security forces on the basis of human rights violations against indigenous Papuans.

Conflict and protest are two concepts that are interconnected with each other, where protest is a reflection of the existence of conflict which is manifested in the form of action with the intention of changing an undesirable situation. Conflict is closely related to social change, because social change often creates various problems for certain groups, so they resist the change. Social change is often accompanied by the emergence of various conflicts because there are some people who are ready to accept (adapt) and some refuse (resistance). The conflict can occur between fellow citizens (horizontal conflict), or conflict between the community and the government (vertical conflict). The implementation of a policy or the existence of a project can trigger these two conflict models (see Sariyun 1980, Suparlan 1981, Stanley 1994).

In general, there are two explanatory perspectives on conflict, namely, the Marxist perspective and the non-Marxist perspective. The Marxist perspective comes from the thoughts or assumptions of Karl Marx about society, while the non-Marxist perspective comes from the thoughts of sociologists who see conflict from a different perspective. Several sociologists who discuss conflict that are classified as non-Marxist include: Max Weber and Dahrendorf (see Etziomi 1973, Layandecker 1983, Nasikun 1984).

Marx's theory, which places too much emphasis on economic aspects and class struggles in capitalist society, is considered by sociologists to be less comprehensive. Therefore, many theorists then follow Weber's theory which takes a multi-dimensional and less deterministic approach in explaining the stratification system in society (Johnson, 1981: 163).

The conflict process is also a central element in Weber's theory. Although this sociologist talks a lot about religious ideas as a rejection of Marx's very materialistic pressure, Weber admits that religious ideas themselves can be a source of conflict. In addition, he is aware that religious ideals can help legitimize the social position of the dominant group in society. Like Marx, Weber also recognizes the importance of conflict in the economic field, in addition to conflicts that occur in the distribution of prestige or social status and political power. According to Weber's analysis, conflicts originating from non-economic factors can occur because there are more conflicts and tension relationships. The first is between historical embodiments and their respective fields of value. In this case, it is not between the economy and religion (Christianity) and the market economy. In Christianity, mutual love and brotherhood are central values. This value will at some point clash with the politics of the market economy which emphasizes competition and seeking profit. Conflict is also related to groups and groups, in this case classes and status groups or to the structure of social inequality. Religion can conflict with politics, where the use of violence is acceptable in the involvement or enforcement of sovereignty, while religion teaches peace.

Another source of conflict proposed by Weber (in Layendecker, 1983, 326-327) is social inequality, which is divided into classes and status

groups. Because of the difference in power between these groups, social inequality occurs. Power is defined by Weber as the possibility that people have to continue to carry out their will, even if it is against the will of others. Power in a general sense is not solely synonymous with economic power or with social dignity, but can be the basis and result of power. Power does not always have social dignity and does not always result in great material wealth, but economic and social power occupies a central place in the analysis of class and status class.

Between status groups and classes which are power groups, there is tension, because grouping based on status hinders the development of free markets, especially regarding goods monopolized by status groups. This means that the market power of people belonging to a certain class is reduced. When engineering and economics developed, the arrangement based on status was replaced by an arrangement according to class. If the economic dynamics decreases again, then the meaning of social dignity increases (Layendecker, 1983:33). Thus, between the two groups there is a struggle for influence that causes conflict or tension in society.

Besides Weber, another sociologist who analyzes conflict is Ralf Dahrendorf. He is an adherent of modern non-Marxist conflict theory, who accepts that the extent of social conflict based on the position of class interests and the consequences of that conflict in generating social change. If Marx bases his theory of class formation on the ownership of the means of production, Dahrendorf argues that control over the means of production is an important factor. In the early stages of capitalism, those who own the means of production control their use, but this does not mean that there is an intrinsic or obligatory relationship between ownership and control. As capitalism developed and transformed into a post-capitalist society, legal ownership of the means of production and effective control were separated. Ownership of the means of production in a post-capitalist society has spread widely to shareholders, while effective control is exercised by professional managers or executives. Shareholders still have a control function, but are latent or potential, inactive. Shareholder control can be changed to active control, only if he is able to become a manager or executive who has a position of authority in the company. Thus, it is the

person who has the authority who has great power in the company (Johnson, 1981: 183).

According to Dahrendorf, every form of association is imperatively coordinated (Imperatively coordinated association), so it is not only production companies that have authoritative control. The social system is also coordinated imperatively, so that in it there are parties who have authority. He also assumes that obligatory coordination through authority relations is a basic characteristic of all social organizations. Within the organization there are always conflicting interests in any relationship between those who exercise legitimate authority and those who submit to them.

In every organizational model there must be a clear dichotomy between those who exercise authority and those who submit to authority. This distinction is based primarily on institutionalized positions and in "*imperatively coordinated associations*," not on personal characteristics. The role that individuals play, either as dominating or submissive, is always related to the position they occupy (Johnson, 1981: 182-184).

By combining Marx's and Dahrendorf's theories of conflict, we can assume that conflict is inherent in every society, whether it is a production society (companies), political society (state, political parties) or other social associations. The source of the conflict is due to the dominance of one party, which in Marx's concept is called the owner of the means of production and in Dahrendorf's concept is called the party who has the authority. Associated with the case in Papua, this conflict analysis seems closer to reality because there are two conflicting interest groups, namely the government and the security forces as the dominating party with the indigenous Papuan people who do not have any authority or as parties who must obey.

But of course, the conflict theory is not sufficient to analyze the symptoms of social movements in Papua, because the problem becomes very complex when it is associated with the many interested parties and the cultural conditions of the local community. What is clear, however, is that multi-dimensional conflict is the root cause of the subsequent protests.

2. Conflict with immigrants

The already tense social conditions with the custom of tribal wars, rivalry between groups and leadership mechanisms have escalated with the presence of other groups that indigenous Papuans call migrants. These migrants consist of other tribes outside their customary territory (fellow Papuans), as well as migrants from outside the island of Papua, such as Bugis/Makassar, Toraja, Javanese, Batak, Balinese, and others including multinational companies operating in Papua.

After the special autonomy policy and regional expansion in Papua were implemented, Papua became a political-economic destination and a hunting ground for natural resources. The government opens the widest possible space for foreign investment to enter and operate in Papua. This, of course, increases the existing tensions, namely: *First*, the opening of new areas is the opening of new economic lands for foreigners and people from outside Papua. *Second*, the expansion creates a new competition space (empty space) which is filled with conflicts of interest and threatens the Papuans themselves. *Third*, the expansion helped expand the security institutions in these new areas. Brimob posts, the police, the army became ubiquitous in every sub-district and village in remote areas of Papua. They were assigned because of the security situation in areas prone to civil conflict due to the division, besides they also guarded multinational companies operating in Papua.

The above conditions are accompanied by a very rapid arrival of newcomers to work and open new business fields. Appearances that are in stark contrast to the indigenous people create social jealousy, thus adding to the disappointment of the indigenous Papuans towards the government and migrants, which of course exacerbates the conflict. If the competition between the indigenous population (fellow Papuans) is quite balanced, then the competition with the government and security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) is really unequal, so that the indigenous people feel powerless. This helplessness creates a sense of frustration which in turn encourages people to rebel. In the psychological theory of the origin of the occurrence of aggressive actions can be explained as follows:

"The occurrence of aggressive behavior always presuppose the existence of frustration and contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression" (Gurr, 1974: 33)

Social tensions due to competition between indigenous peoples (fellow Papuans), coupled with disappointments due to the presence of immigrants and multinational companies have had social and physical impacts on the environment. What certainly accelerates the aggregation process, one of which is mass violence. For example, the case that occurred in Wamena-Jayawijaya between migrants and indigenous Papuans (Wamena) on October 6, 2000 and September 22, 2019, this incident was triggered by elements of racism, then in Manokwari, between Bugis-Buton-Makassar (BBM) and Papuans. on 28 december 2013, in Sorong, in the 1990s and most recently in 2014 in Jayapura 1996, in Timika in 2014-2015, and in several other places involving mass mobilization of religious, racial, ethnic, clan groups. All forms and arguments of these conflicts are largely influenced by economic and political economic problems ranging from market domination, trade monopoly and history of violence in economic areas. Meanwhile, politics can be seen from the transmigration policy brought in by the New Order and then followed by large-scale migration flows from outside Papua. This wave of arrivals from outside Papua has filled Papua and caused demographic inequality which directly affected the dominance of Papua's welfare sources. From here emerged a form of horizontal conflict, namely migrants (transmigration and migration) from outside Papua with indigenous Papuans. Horizontal conflicts include violence across ethnic, religious, and political entities in Papua that occur sporadically. This relatively uncontrolled mass behavior is called collective behavior.

"Collective behavior" which is spontaneous can develop into a social movement that is specifically intended to produce "collective action" as a means to achieve goals. On the other hand, there are social movements that are formed based on spontaneous activity, which later develop into an organized movement in an effort to achieve collective goals. Social movements are collective behaviors that are well organized, have a high

level of rationality, have clear goals for the common good and have measurable programs and strategies. Thus, the similarity between collective behavior and social movements is the existence of collective action, while the difference is the level of rationality, organization, structure and programs that are measurable and planned. To borrow the term Hobsbawm (1958: 1), the first movement is called the "*primitive*" or "*archaic*" forms of social agitation, the second (*social movement*) is called the modern movement.

Another characteristic of "*collective behavior*" is a form of unstructured action that is not guided by the actual issues that occur in society. In this connection, Hardert (1977: 235) states that *collective behavior* as social behavior is guided by non-traditional norms and is generally unstructured compared to traditional forms. As an unstructured or less organized action, collective behavior actually seeks to restructure what has been arranged in the structure. Behavior that is guided by traditional norms and has high stability and is predictable is called institutionalized. However, considering that collective behavior includes structuring or moving out of normative traditions, its actions are less predictable and can be seen as non-institutionalized behavior.

Blumer (in Harper) writes that in the early stages a social movement is typically "*amorphous*", poorly organized and formless, and characterized by collective behavior "**at a primitive level**" as well as "*elementary*" and "*spontaneous*" interaction mechanisms. Despite having a negative image, "**mob**" protests and panic contributed to the creation of new social forms. In short, elementary forms that continue (*persistent*), may lead to the formation of social movements and these may develop into integrated structures and form new collective behavior (Harper, 1989: 134). The perspective of collective behavior emphasizes that the breakdown of traditional patterns, order and social control produces forms of collective behavior that will crystallize into social movements that seek to create or prevent change. This is in line with functionalist thinking about order and change, where change is a reaction to imbalance and stress. Social movements can be seen as adaptive responses to social disorganization conditions.

3. Conflict Between Indigenous Peoples (Fellow Papuans)

Conflict between indigenous Papuans is an innate factor that has been inherent in everyday life. The tradition of tribal warfare is an important indicator of this. The traditions of the indigenous Papuan people who live in the mountains are still firmly held to maintain their existence as well as efforts to become the dominant tribe among other tribes. Collectivity within the tribe is closely guarded by tradition, so that collective consciousness remains embedded. As long as there is no common enemy among them, the rivalry between tribes will strengthen again. According to Durkheim's perspective, such collective bonds are called mechanical solidarity. If mechanical solidarity in each tribe continues to be revived, then tolerance for other tribes will weaken. Individual behavior is more influenced by the system prevailing in tribal society than the wider system.

Internal conflict between indigenous people is one of the factors that causes conflict in Papua to continue, because there is an assumption that people outside their ethnic/customary territory are "*foreigners*". Differences in character between tribes from the mountains and tribes from coastal areas also color the conflict in Papua, where Papuans from the coast consider tribes from the mountains to be too aggressive. So that in 2015, an anecdote emerged about **the people of the mountains versus the people of the coast**, which describes the current situation in Papua marked by the widening issue of native sons and daughters of the region so that conflict becomes inevitable. The anecdote of mountain people vs coastal people is an example of conflict and violence that occurs between fellow indigenous Papuans (Papua vs Papua) created by people/institutions as third parties (not Papuans). This conflict is based on a background of discrimination in the past which stigmatized Papuans living in the mountains who were very left behind compared to Papuans on the coast, then those who often rebelled to break away from Indonesia were also mostly carried out by Papuans who came from the mountains. It was during the New Order era that the leaders (Governors) were Papuans who came from the coast, which of course had implications for people who were placed in strategic positions, namely people who came from the coast as well. However, the political situation has changed because at this time the leaders in Papua (Governor) are

Papuans who come from the mountains, and of course also place people from the mountains to occupy strategic positions. Resistance occurred, and this became a new source of conflict in Papua. So, this needs to get serious attention so that development and social relations can run better.

Although this is not so obvious, it is clearly seen from the spread of propaganda about jokes that use mountain people and vice versa beach people as objects to be laughed at. Furthermore, political competition conflicts in the context of regional autonomy and regional expansion based on Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua. The successive expansion of territories has created more space for political competition, and has even created segregated camps, friends and foes. This then brought together fellow indigenous Papuans at the level of institutional power and resulted in the proliferation of civil conflicts in Papua. The division of territory into a new conflict space, the special autonomy law is interpreted according to the subjectivity of each party.

The growing rivalry among indigenous Papuans creates continuous social tension, so that mutual suspicion characterizes their social interactions. This condition affects the emergence and development of social movements in Papua. If in tribal life there is a mechanism for selecting leaders through the tradition of war, then in the context of inter-tribal relations the same thing happens. The struggle for hegemony continues which is integrated with the promotion of leadership for individuals and groups. If the leader of one of the tribes stands out, then the prestige of that tribe also increases, because the head of the tribe/head of the customary institution is the personification of the group.

Thus, the structural basis of social movements in Papua can be explained based on the concept of rivalry and leadership that takes place at all levels. The potential for competition is embedded through social grouping in society. The *genealogical base community* and the *territorial base* are the seeds for creating competition between individuals and between groups. The culture of war that lives in society requires that every individual is ready to become a war leader, which means that he must also prepare himself to become a leader of a region or group by placing the leader as a representative of his group.

6.2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT INTO SOCIAL PROTEST

The explanation of the conflict as described above shows that the granting of special autonomy status in Papua since October 2001 until now has not been able to solve the root problems in Papua and bring prosperity to the Papuan people. Marginalization, discrimination, including the lack of recognition of Papua's contributions and services to Indonesia. Coupled with the non-optimal development of social infrastructure as well as the cycle of political violence that has not been handled, even widespread and unresolved human rights violations in suppressing the actions of social movements in Papua. The government's efforts to solve the problems above are very lacking. The reason is that these problems are considered unimportant to be resolved compared to the more *"noble"* goals, namely the acceleration of development and economic growth. The government forgets that the granting of the status and the fast implementation of special autonomy (development process) without being followed by careful preparations from the human side itself, will have fatal consequences. The implementation of special autonomy can fail because people become victims of the implementation of special autonomy. The *"victims" (the people)* in the end become counter-productive to the noble goal of implementing special autonomy by means of continuous protests and tend to blame the government.

The development of conflict into protest is an expression of public disapproval of development policies that ignore social planning and justice. Dissatisfaction with the response given by the government, coupled with socio-political developments outside and within Papua resulted in growing community demands. The efforts of the government and security forces to overcome and reduce the turmoil of wanting to separate themselves from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia through an economic approach to improve welfare have not been able to overcome the problem, because the group of people involved in the movement is very large, with different motivations according to their interests. Therefore, in order to explain the development from conflict to protest, it is necessary to first look at what the root causes of the protests are. As previously explained, the trigger for the protest was the implementation of special autonomy for Papua which has not been able to prosper the indigenous Papuans and the plan for the

implementation/extension of the second volume of special autonomy. However, behind the special autonomy plan, there are government policies that can be categorized as driving protests.

▪ ***The Nature of the Protest: Rejection of the "Top Down" Special Autonomy Policy (Uniformity)***

Protests can be carried out by means of violence or peacefully. Sartono Kartodirdjo's writings on the theme of peasant protests or rebellions convey the connotation that peasant protests are often carried out by means of violence. This condition is reflected in his three writings on protest, namely: the Banten Peasant Rebellion (1984), Ratu Adil (1984) and the Protest Movement in Rural Java (1973). The three books describe violent peasant protests that occurred in the nineteenth century, when the Dutch colonial government was aggressively carrying out reforms in the field of agriculture/plantation.

What happened in Indonesia in the 19th century also happened in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Burma (see Scott, 1991, 1993 and 2000). In his 2000 book, it is illustrated by the title that the forms of peasant resistance are "*the weapons of the losers*". In the process of transformation from the pre-capitalist economic system, there are indeed many farmers who become victims or are sacrificed for the sake of economic growth and globalization.

The reality in Papua is not much different from the experience of farmers in rural Java during the Dutch colonial period. The farmers in the mountains and the gatherers in the lowlands experienced a process of marginalization and a great cultural shock along with the arrival of large investors in various sectors. Their arrival was not only sudden, but also brought a civilization that was far different from the original indigenous people around it. The government is very proud of the special autonomy policy as a bold step in order to save the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and an effort to atone for the past sins of the New Order government to the Papuans.

However, this condition is in stark contrast to the lives of indigenous Papuans who are still poor, left behind and prone to exploitation for the benefit of the national elite and Papuan elite. Therefore, efforts were made

to change the situation through protest. The root of protest is conflict, although not all conflicts are manifested in the form of protest. Conflict develops into protest if the disagreement or level of difference between what is expected and what is actually too big "*Das sein and Das sollen*". If the conflict is still latent, then the protest is a form of manifestation of the conflict, so that the conflict can be read clearly.

Social movements and protests are closely related, but protest cannot be said to be a social movement even though protest is an inherent or *carrier* factor of social movements. To distinguish whether protest is a social movement Lewis (in Gusfield, 1975: 152) states that there are at least three grounds to be sure, namely:

- 1) Common motivational base;
- 2) Consistent action beyond the limits of institutionalized politics;
- 3) An environment that supports each other (environmental relevance for each other).

He also added that although there is a link between one unit and another, in protests there are often conflicts within the class that will continue and eventually threaten the movement in the future.

Protests in the form of violence such as attacks on security forces, destruction/burning of public facilities (government offices, schools, shops, etc.) and mass riots are the initial forms of a social movement. If traced from the beginning of the conflict to the formation of protests, it is essentially a form of disapproval of the indigenous Papuans towards the government's policy of implementing special autonomy and opening up the widest possible opportunities for investors to exploit their natural resources without including them. The desire to be spoken to, the desire to be involved in the planning process regarding the direction of special autonomy and to share in enjoying the results of development with other brothers and sisters are forms of expression that actually demand their right to be able to actively participate in development. This means that the expected planning model is a "*bottom up*" model, not the other way around. Through this model, they can participate in planning what is good for them, as well as giving respect and recognition for their rights as civilized human beings.

In addition, the special autonomy policy is not equipped with **social planning** or **the Grand Design of special autonomy development**, so that the community does not have the opportunity to adapt to the changes that will occur, including absorbing the new values needed to be able to participate in guarding the course of special autonomy. What is meant by social planning is planning on human resources that will be the subject of development in the region which includes mental, skill, educational and financial preparation (if there will be an impact, social costs must be calculated in the form of money or costs that have been prepared since policy planning formulated). Meanwhile, what is meant by a grand design is a blueprint for development in Papua which will guide the direction for the use of special autonomy funds, although later in Papua there will be regional expansion (province/district/city). This grand design contains a strategy for accelerating development for indigenous Papuans, so that the goals they aspire to within a predetermined time period become clearer and more focused. This grand design will have to be in line with and have a common thread as part of the National Medium Term Development Plan and the National Long Term Development Plan (RPJM/RPJP). Thus, every development policy must consider the social costs and benefits obtained as well as the costs that must be incurred as a consequence of its implementation.

▪ ***Demand Development: From simple to complex***

The protests that have taken place in Papua have been going on for a very long time and tend to develop in a more complex direction, as demands change from time to time. The escalation of this form of protest has been felt to have strengthened since last 2018 due to the use of physical violence and the development of demands for the problem to be more complicated. Increased demands mean greater difficulty for fulfillment or problem solving. The matrix below illustrates the development of increasingly complex demands, starting from the recognition of identity to the demand for independence/referendum.

Tabel 21. Papuan People's Demands After the Implementation of Special Autonomy

No.	Stage						Momentum/Year	
	Element	I	II	III	IV	V		VI
1	Environment						v	Demonstrations demanding environmental improvement by indigenous peoples.
2.	Open the widest access for journalists to Papua					v	v	Demonstrations demand that the government grant reporting permits for journalists, including foreigners, to be able to cover live in Papua
3.	Identity Recognition				v	v	v	Increasing cases of racist hate speech (2019 - 2021)
4.	Settlement of Customary Land/Ultimate Rights			v	v	v	v	Barrier, vandalism and burning of public facilities and offices 2001 - 2021
5.	Withdrawing Security Forces and Stopping Military Operations in Papua		v	v	v	v	v	The demonstration rejected the militaristic approach and demanded that the government withdraw Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police personnel from Papua.
6.	Human Rights (HAM) and Democratization	v	v	v	v	v	v	Demonstrations demanding the settlement of human rights cases that occurred after the implementation of special autonomy 2001 - 2021
7.	Reject Special Autonomy Volume 2, Regional Expansion and want Referendum/Self-Determination	v	v	v	v	v	v	Returning special autonomy to the government (2005 - 2021)

The demands continue to grow because the conflict behind them is also complex. Not only about the settlement of customary land/customary rights, but there are fundamental aspects that influence it. This includes philosophical, socio-cultural and self-esteem aspects. The philosophical aspect includes the Papuan people's understanding of the land and the relationship between humans and the universe, while the socio-cultural aspect includes the procedures for selecting leaders, customs of tribal wars and

interactions with migrants. While the aspect of self-esteem is related to the philosophy and social history of the local community, in this case the indigenous Papuans are positioned as the "*peasant class*" or oppressed citizens.

In this context, Marx's theory regarding the consciousness of the lower classes becomes very important and relevant to the development of the movement in Papua. The presence of special autonomy is a concrete manifestation of policies based on capitalistic development, and creates inequality between capital owners and farmers. Although in Marx's theory there is inequality between capital owners and workers, in the context of Papua not all indigenous Papuans experience oppression, for example Papuans working as government employees, private employees, security forces and members of the council do not feel oppressed. Their lives are very good when compared to their brothers who live in the villages. However, the socio-economic impact is not much different from the labor conditions described by Marx. Therefore, it can be concluded that the development of the movement leading to a referendum/self-determination is nothing but a symptom of the birth of class consciousness and self-identity.

This movement has something in common, as described by Scott, that peasant resistance is a violent reaction of uncontrollable anger. The explanation of these symptoms cannot be separated from their growing awareness of the meaning given to their actions. The symbols, norms and ideological forms they create are the background that cannot be removed from their behavior (Scott, 2000: 51). The peasant protest movement studied by Scott and Kartodirdjo has a common background, namely the introduction to capitalism. However, these movements did not develop further into organized social movements or grow into political movements, because the attitude of the Dutch colonial government at that time was very repressive and widely accepted charismatic leadership had not yet emerged. Likewise, the international network which is also a "*pressure group*" against the government has not been as much as it is today. After the reform era, where democratic channels have been opened as wide as possible, freedom of association, assembly and expression is allowed this has resulted in old

conflicts that were originally buried starting to surface, becoming open protests in mass actions and organizations.

▪ ***Welfare (Economic) Approach in Responding to Protests***

Not all changes are responded to by carrying out social movements, if the changes do not harm certain groups. In the case of Papua, change is met with protest, even becoming a socio-political movement because the change is considered detrimental to indigenous Papuans, both physically and socio-politically. Changes that have a negative effect are caused by erroneous planning policies and the absence of a grand design for special autonomy development, so that only physical and financial aspects are considered. Since the beginning of the birth of this special autonomy policy for Papua, it has not considered the interests of cultural aspects or the rights of indigenous peoples, and has never included them in sustainable planning or as a social component that must be considered for financing.

Social costs are not always synonymous with money/materials, but can take the form of appreciation and respect for tribal and individual rights. What the indigenous Papuans want, as stated by Timothius Murib, is to "*sit the same low and stand the same height*", meaning that they want to be involved in planning regarding the wishes and survival of the indigenous Papuans. The government's response to this demand was very slow and wrong according to the views of the indigenous people of Papua, where they considered that the implementation of special autonomy had failed for the welfare of the Papuan people. The government considers that the granting of the status and the large special autonomy funds are sufficient to compensate for moral and material losses and reduce the desire of the indigenous Papuan people to determine their own destiny. As a result, the disbursement of large special autonomy funds is not balanced with planning, the preparation of a number of supporting regulations mandated in the special autonomy law, the absence of regulation on the mechanism for the distribution and accountability of special autonomy funds and the lack of supervision have made the existence of special autonomy a new conflict, adding to the existing conflict. existed before. This condition led to conflicts and prolonged protests that gave birth to social movements. Money is only a target between struggles for groups that target the return of self-esteem and position, while for those

who are only economically motivated, no matter how much money they get, it will never be enough.

▪ ***The Plurality of Groups and Their Motivation in Movement***

Community groups involved in the movement are divided into four criteria, namely:

1. *Radical Traditional Group*

This community group considers the movement a "*holy war*" to uphold their dignity and beliefs that live in tradition. These are figures and members of the Free Papua Organization movement who are members of their respective regional defense command headquarters (Kodap). Having a leadership structure and a clear struggle strategy with the demand to break away from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. However, their whereabouts are very difficult to trace, because they blend into the structure of society.

2. *Educated Group*

This group is intellectual figures as well as students who are active in the movement under the pretext of upholding the rights of the Papuan people. Some of them have worked or have a lot of experience in the political field and have a fairly wide social network. The struggle is always in the name of society, using tradition as a shield, but behind that they have hidden personal ambitions to gain positions and power in government circles and multinational companies. This group is a politically motivated group, has wide access and space for movement at all levels, both local, national and even international.

3. *Opportunist Group*

This third group consists of tribal chiefs and heads of traditional institutions, which were formed by the government to balance the Presidium of the Papuan Customary Council. From the traditional structure, they were not actually the chiefs of the tribes or the heads of the original traditional institutions, but people who had access to the government at that time so they were trusted to lead the traditional institutions. The issue of funds is used as an excuse to keep fighting, even though the platform is not clear and the economic motive is the goal of their activities. Basically, indigenous Papuans have an "*opportunist-*

pragmatic" mentality, where everything that is being done at this time must be useful or profitable, if they feel it is not profitable, they will immediately be abandoned.

4. *Wild Group*

Those who are members of this group consist of unemployed youths who often cluster around public transport terminals and crowded places around the city. The demands are not clear, but they often take spontaneous actions such as destroying public facilities, throwing stones and even asking for something by force. They are very easily instigated to carry out anarchic actions or mass actions.

Viewed from the point of view of Weber who divides action motivation into four types, namely *the pure rational type, rational on the basis of values, traditional and emotional* (Weber, in Heberle, 1951: 95-99). The first group can be classified into the traditional type, the second group includes rational based on traditional values, the third group includes economic motives and the fourth group is emotional. The diversity of groups involved with various motives has resulted in the organized movement still being colored by collective behavior in the form of riots, destruction, crowds and others that are difficult for the Free Papua Organization to control.

▪ ***Protest as an Effort to Divert Heroism***

Social movement is a modern technique in achieving non-violent goals, but in Papua it is still characterized by physical clashes and destruction. This is a characteristic of the movement carried out by people who still adhere to the tradition of war (*warrior society*), where war is part of a social mobility ceremony to determine a new leader. Thus, violent protests are a form of diversion of *"heroism"* to become *"the big man"* in traditional society, or as a means of promoting leadership. In the *"warrior society"* culture, with leadership that is always changing, where physical strength is the main criterion for selecting a war leader, *"conflict creation"* is a means to show the superiority of a person or group in fighting or solving problems. Every conflict is an opportunity to show progress and gain social, political and economic promotion. The existence of special autonomy also opens

opportunities and becomes a vehicle for maintaining and generating conflict for the promotion of leaders in Papua.

The changing demands that continue to grow are the efforts of movement leaders to create issues in order to find followers from the local community to support the movement. Maintaining leadership in a pluralistic and "*intra family*" society is not easy, so it requires the right strategy according to the dynamics of the local community. Changing the issue can also be interpreted as using conflict as a strategy of struggle, because in an atmosphere of conflict the leader will survive as a patron, which requires people in conflict to seek protection from a stronger leader.

▪ ***Together Towards Balance***

The process of change from traditional to modern society has implications for the sacrifices that are not small for traditional societies, so that a "*balance*" is needed for all the turmoil that has occurred or a reward for the sacrifices that have been made. The principle of balance and reward is very important for indigenous people whose world of thought is still in the monistic realm, because they can survive when nature and humans are united, in a state of giving and receiving. Humans take care of nature and nature gives life to humans. The destruction of the ecosystem has also damaged the balanced relationship, resulting in disharmony. The cause of this disharmony is modern humans (immigrants) who exploit nature with the power of technology. In the midst of the turbulence that pervades social and cultural life, there is an effort to reach the remaining cultural roots to uphold self-esteem, so that balance can be re-created.

To achieve it all, means in the form of material or money cannot be avoided, some even make it the main target. This is because, in modern society, the need for a medium of exchange is very urgent so that it can survive. Without money they cannot live because the barter system is no longer valid, they want to return to nature, nature has been damaged, while in front of them the luxury and pleasures of life are displayed which they cannot reach. For those who have intellectual abilities, this condition is used as an excuse to evoke struggles that arise in the form of social movements.

6.3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTEST INTO A SOCIAL POLITICAL MOVEMENT

Protests that appear in various forms and opportunities will certainly stop if they are responded to in the right way according to the wishes of the actors. But what happened in Papua was not like that. Besides the wrong way of responding, other factors are also very influential. Thus, the protest developed into a social movement, and eventually collaborated with a political movement. Because it cannot be called a purely political movement, the latest development of a social movement in Papua can be said to be a socio-political movement.

The development process actually includes changes in the form of movement, locus of movement and the nature of the movement. In terms of form, there is a "metamorphose" from an *amorphous* movement to an organized movement, in terms of locus there is an expansion from Papua to Jakarta and even to the international level, and in terms of the characteristics of the movement it develops from a cognitive movement to a political movement/instrumentalist.

1. Development of Form: From "Amorphous Movement" to Organization

Collective action in the form of protests by indigenous Papuans against the implementation of special autonomy turned out to be a political movement through several stages, namely: *The first stage*, is an amorphous movement, is a spontaneous action by the community demanding an evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy after three years of being enforced in Papua in accordance with the mandate of the Law on special autonomy for Papua, with the aim of identifying the weaknesses that are inhibiting factors in the implementation of the special autonomy. The protest action was originally carried out by holding peaceful demonstrations in a number of places in Papua, which were carried out by the LMA and a number of community organizations together with student elements. However, because the security forces acted repressively, the masses carried out physical resistance which took place sporadically. In the form of an unorganized crowd (*mob*) the masses act aggressively to damage or attack public facilities and offices. The central government is considered not wholeheartedly in granting special autonomy to Papua by failing to stipulate a number of regulations that become technical rules for the implementation

of special autonomy and forcing the management of authority and finance to still refer to Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government even though Papua's status is autonomous. special. This creates ambiguity for local governments in implementing development directions and optimizing local financial management and accountability. Judging from the motivation for such a protest, it is very meaningful for the indigenous Papuan people, this spontaneous, unorganized movement has a sacred meaning as a "*holy war*" to maintain honor and dignity along with the special rights it has as a consequence of the implementation of special autonomy for Papua.

The second stage is the unification of various community organizations into the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) as an integral part of its struggle. This stage is a very important momentum, marking a shift in the strategy of struggle from violence to a combination movement that combines the strategy of guerrilla warfare (*hit and run*) with diplomacy methods or non-violence movements, such as raising the star (kejora) flag at certain moments that are considered historic days, issuing statements protesting the New York Agreement, carrying out movement propaganda through social and electronic media, and others. In fact, the Papuan people who feel disappointed with the implementation of this special autonomy are not only in mountainous areas, but also Papuan people in coastal areas. However, the people who are active and continue to protest against the implementation of this special autonomy are people who live in mountainous areas. The social background and natural environment of the indigenous Papuan people who live in coastal areas prefer to find a peaceful way and be compromising on the influence and social changes that hit them. West Papua Province was born after the Special Autonomy Law was in effect for approximately two years in Papua and the motivation for the movement is not as strong as that of the indigenous Papuans in the Papua Province, so the analysis is focused on the social movements carried out by the indigenous Papuans in the Papua Province. which is considered eligible to be called a social movement, because: supported by followers who have dedication and high loyalty, have clear goals, are organized and have a demand for a change. In addition, this organization also has a planned

strategy of struggle and efforts to expand its influence by recruiting and strengthening sympathetic followers.

These characteristics are owned by social movement organizations in the Papua Province region, while community movements from the West Papua Province region do not exist or only a few conditions are met. The initial aim of the social movement was to request an evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy and to urge the government to implement special autonomy in a real and just manner, through fulfilling basic needs (*education and health*), infrastructure development and empowering the people's economy.

The Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) grew into a social movement because of its social history and leadership factors. The social history of the indigenous Papuans regarding the process of integration of Papua into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia which is considered legally flawed and cannot be fully accepted by the indigenous Papuans, the existence of the ideals of forming a sovereign state, having an established social structure and having high fighting power (*due to natural factors*) This makes them more determined in facing various challenges and more consistent in their attitude. The feeling of "*superior*" is also one of the impetuses to dare to be different from others and motivates to appear as a leader among other tribes.

The next stage is the process of "*metamorphose*" from a collective behavior of indigenous Papuans living in mountainous areas to become a political movement. In the previous stage, the struggle only revolved around the demands of meeting basic needs (*education and health*), infrastructure development and empowering the people's economy. Since the demands still revolve around changes in social status, economy and cultural revitalization, the work at that stage can be said to be a social movement. However, since 2017, where the demands have clearly shifted from changing social status to demands for power and openly opposing legitimate power, this movement has been classified as a political movement. The demands are no longer in the context of citizens who demand the improvement of their fate or civil rights against the state, but the state is positioned as an "*enemy/colonizer*" who must be fought to realize his goal

of establishing a sovereign state on its own. In this political movement, the object of protest is no longer the security forces alone, but the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

The development of such a movement shows that the conflict between the government, security forces and the Free Papua Organization is still ongoing, so that any policy taken by the government is considered wrong. Even now, protests against the plan for the continuation of the second volume of special autonomy are increasing, because the period for the implementation of the first volume of special autonomy will soon end in October 2021. This conflict does not only involve the Free Papua Organization, but also various elements of the community and Papuan students who are members of the Papuan Student Alliance.

2. Locus Development: From Local to International Scale

The Free Papua Organization (OPM) was born out of disappointment over the results of the New York agreement in 1962, which was carried out by the Dutch, Indonesian, American and United Nations (UN). In the agreement, a dispute resolution mechanism for the Papua region was agreed. The Papuan people felt cheated because in the agreement there were no Papuan figures involved. The Dutch then left Papua in December 1962. In the New York agreement, it was stipulated that the administrative management of the Papua region was handed over to Indonesia, for which a People's Opinion (Pepera) was held to determine the status of Papua's integration with Indonesia (Premdas, 1985). Then, the indigenous Papuans formed a resistance movement which in 1963 in Manokwari was led by Terianus Aronggear with Ferry Awom who was a former member of the Papuan Volunteer Battalion (Papua Vrijwilligers Korps). The name Free Papua Organization (OPM) became known in 1964 when there were arrests of leaders of the Organization and the Struggle for West Papuan Independence, including Terianus Aronggear (Djopari, 1993: 100). The reins of leadership then turned to Ferry Awom who then carried out the first rebellion in Manokwari (Djopari, 1993). This movement then developed widely in Papua, although it is divided into various factions and there is no clear unity of command, but for the government the Free Papua Organization movement (OPM) is a designation for every

organization/faction located in Papua and abroad, and has the aim of break away from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) (Djopari, 1993).

The expansion of the next locus of movement is to the periphery. The Free Papua Organization Movement (OPM) along with its military apparatus carried out security disturbances in the community, generally those in the newly opened suburbs and close to forest areas (transmigration). This condition triggered the new order government to impose Military Operation Areas (DOM) in Papua, which for the Papuan people is considered an act that hurts the hearts of indigenous Papuans. After the reform, the government began to change the development policy from centralization to decentralization by giving autonomy to regions, arguing that autonomy was a necessity.

Specifically for Papua, the government then granted special autonomy status through Law Number 21 of 2001 with the aim of reducing the development gap in Papua with other regions in Indonesia. However, after special autonomy has been running in Papua since 2001 until now, in fact it has not fully resolved the problems that occurred, including:

- a) The problem of distrust between the central government and local governments;
- b) There are still many complaints that arise as a result of negative reconciliation, problems related to representation;
- c) Policies that are not in accordance with local culture, excessive extraction of natural resources (SDA);
- d) Security approach;
- e) Low social capital, polarization that can trigger conflict and inequality between groups, as well as anomie people in social change.

This condition again triggered social protests which again questioned the implementation of special autonomy in Papua. However, this time they did not only protest through violent acts but also through diplomacy. This strategy was taken by expanding the network within an organization West Papua Coalition for Liberation (WPCL) in 2005 initiated by Tom Beanal and John Otto Ondamawen based in Port Villa-Papua New Guinea. This organization later merged into the United Liberation Movement for West

Papua (ULMWP) in 2014 in Vanuatu-Papua New Guinea led by Benny Wenda who is currently seeking asylum in England. It is through this organization that the movement that wants an independent Papua is fought for through diplomacy and seeking international support.

During the period of 2017 to date, there have been at least 50 social movements that are quite large and have captured the public's attention, including the hostage incident of 1,300 civilians by the Free Papua Organization Movement (OPM) wing organization, namely the National Liberation Army for West Papua (TNPPB) around the Tembagapura-Mimika area. on 17 November 2017. These actions were then carried out more and more frequently, including in early December 2018 in Nduga to March 2021, which on average occurred in mountainous areas. In addition, other social protests are the raising of the Morning Star flag every December 1 throughout Papua and demonstrations against the plan to extend special autonomy in Papua. These demonstrations have been rife since mid-2020 until now. It was held not only in Papua, but in almost all major cities in Indonesia, especially in cities where many children from Papua are used to continue higher education. The government responded to the protest action in the form of attacks by deploying joint security forces from the Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police to conduct sweeps, pursuits and arrests of the groups that carried out the attacks. Meanwhile, for protests in the form of mass demonstrations, the government also responds with a repressive military approach which often results in casualties. The government also seems increasingly arrogant in responding to any protests made by indigenous Papuans, this can be seen from the increasing number of security personnel who have been deployed to Papua to suppress these actions. This action further shows that the government's attitude towards indigenous Papuans is increasingly inhumane and formal.

Due to the government's indifference and imposition of will on indigenous Papuans, a number of parties, such as the Free Papua Organization Movement (ULMWP) wing, and its representatives spread across several countries, are increasingly voicing issues of human rights, democratization and the environment to seek international support and sympathy. In addition, the legislature, namely the Papuan People's Council,

also filed a lawsuit against the government regarding the plan for regional expansion and the discussion of the Draft Law on the Extension of Special Autonomy for Papua through the Constitutional Court (MK). These steps are an effort by the Free Papua Organization to bring local issues to the national and international level. Quoting the opinion of Anthony Giddens (Runaway World, 1996), that democracy, human rights and global justice are increasing in the early 21st century, making Papua an open landscape. What is happening in Papua today can be known directly by the world. Massive changes that change the original view that is ethical to emic, namely looking at Papua from the point of view of the Papuans themselves. Papua's previous representation of "*homogeneity*" has shifted to "*heterogeneity*".

The separatist movement in Papua shows the combined character of the traditional understanding of the tribes in Papua (*cargo cult*) which believes in the coming of a golden age with a symbol of worshipping the *koreri* (*morning star*) on the one hand, and on the other hand led by educated Papuans to conduct political lobbying to the government and the international community through the global issues above, then the pressures on the government are getting stronger so that the struggle is more effective.

3. The Development of Movement Character: From Recognition to Politics

a. Recognition

Initially, the indigenous Papuan people wanted an evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy and urged the government to implement this special autonomy in a real and fair manner after some time. As owners of the "*birthright*" (*local owners and rulers*), they want to have a talk/dialogue first. Because the Special Autonomy Law for Papua already has an institution that is the cultural representation of the Papuan people, the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) should be able to represent the Papuan people to be the "*host*" for negotiations. Their rights to land, forests and other natural resources must be recognized by asking for approval if they want to use it, the use has a price (*compensation*). Then, indigenous Papuans who are the owners of the premises must have priority in gaining access to jobs through the affirmation program.

Another form of acknowledgment is to involve and ask for their consideration in every submission of proposals for the sustainable use of natural products, regional expansion and discussion plans for the extension of special autonomy for Papua. Besides that, they also want the government to stop taking a formal stance if it wants to solve the problems in Papua, namely through a militaristic approach because this is not in line with the spirit of special autonomy. Violations of these rights have resulted in trauma and deep wounds for indigenous Papuans so that separatist movements cannot be extinguished. Even if there are regulations that are helpful in accelerating development in Papua, for indigenous Papuans they do not mean anything because they are more physical in nature. While the settlement of past conflicts, the recognition of existence and autonomy has not been touched.

b. Reformation

The statement of the position of the movement leaders that they do not reject the existence of special autonomy, as long as it is carried out seriously, transparently and fairly for the Papuan people, shows that their movement is not against the flow of development. Rather, they only want changes to some of the order, not structure. The behavior that they want to change is also not the behavior of all indigenous Papuans, but only the behavior of stakeholders (government/security forces), so that they involve the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) in every stage of policy making and consistently carry out what is mandated in the Special Autonomy Law for Papua.

Reform is the development of the movement after efforts to request an evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy and urge the government to implement special autonomy in a real and fair manner did not get the proper response. The reform stage is a form of compromising demands in order to obtain rights as citizens. There are efforts to adapt to the policies that have been set, provided that the indigenous Papuans get prosperity and affirmation of the policies that are being carried out.

At this stage, improvements in socio-economic life take precedence over political rights. The indicators are that they demand the opening of regional access, the opportunity to work as government

employees/security officers/private employees, uniformity in the price of fuel oil (BBM) with the Java region. This demand actually received a good response with the issuance of policies that support the above program. However, this good intention has not succeeded in bringing indigenous Papuans to take part in development and enjoy the results, due to various obstacles faced.

c. Resolution

In an effort to expand the network and seek support from the international community, the themes that are carried and developed are of course adapted to issues that are currently being considered by the international community, such as human rights, democracy and the environment. Several times activities that carried the theme of calling for dialogue were put forward, including in 2000 or a year before the implementation of the special autonomy policy in Papua. This activity was in the form of the Second Papuan Congress which was held in May - June 2000, initiated by the Chairman of the Papuan Customary Council (LMA) Theys H. Eluay. The Congress passed the following political resolutions:

1. To appoint Theys H. Eluay as Chair of the Presidium of the Papuan Council (PDP) who became a unifying figure for the indigenous Papuans;
2. Call for and develop a framework for dialogue on the resolution of the Papuan problem, which will be facilitated by a neutral third party; and
3. Establishing a Commission for Correcting the History of Papuan Integration.

The results of the implementation of the Second Papuan People's Congress became the basis for the preparation of the draft Special Autonomy Law for Papua, which was issued in 2001.

A year after the issuance of the Special Autonomy Law for Papua, Thom Beanal who is the Deputy Chair of the Presidium of the Papuan Council declared "*Papua as a peace zone*" or an area free from violence, oppression and suffering. This concept is firmly held by religious leaders and the OPM. In the era of SBY and JK's leadership, namely in 2004,

they were determined to resolve the Papua issue by peaceful, fair and dignified ways and with an emphasis on dialogue and persuasion.

In 2007, religious leaders again called for the indigenous Papuans to remain committed to using peaceful means to resolve the Papuan problem. Two years later, in 2009 the Papua Peace Conference was held, which was initiated by Father Neles Tebay, a Papuan intellectual figure who actively calls for dialogue as the best solution to resolve the Papuan conflict.

"He initiated the idea of initiating a dialogue between Papua and Indonesia (Jakarta). He argues that violence will not resolve the conflict, this is after seeing the development of the implementation of special autonomy which is seen as failing to guarantee the rights of indigenous Papuans as mandated in the Special Autonomy Law for Papua. In addition, more and more indigenous Papuans are feeling frustrated with special autonomy and demanding that special autonomy be returned to the government. Thousands of Papuan people demonstrated peacefully carrying the cultural symbol of the Morning Star flag, and as usual the security forces responded with iron hands ".

The Papua Peace Conference was held as a response to the protests that continue to spread throughout the Papua region, this activity took place on 5 - 7 July 2011 in Jayapura attended by the coordinating minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, the Governor of Papua, the Commander of Kodam VIII/Trikora, the Papua Police Chief and all elements of the Papuan community, except for Free Papua Organization Movement (OPM) figures. With the theme *"Mari Kitong Bikin Papua Jadi Tanah Damai "* (Let's Make Papua a Land of Peace). The Conference resulted in the following resolutions:

1. Indigenous Papuans must feel calm, safe, enjoy a decent standard of living, live on their lands and in peaceful relationships with one another, with nature, and with God.
2. Papuan indigenous peoples should not be stigmatized as separatists or subversives.
3. Papuan indigenous peoples must be free from discrimination, intimidation and marginalization.
4. Papuan indigenous peoples must have the right to freedom of expression, expression opinion and association.

5. All forms of state violence against indigenous peoples, including women and children, must be stopped.
6. Anyone who is involved in acts of state violence must be tried and punished in accordance with the sense of justice of the community.
7. The rights of indigenous peoples to customary lands must be legally recognized.
8. Exploitation of natural resources must consider the conservation of these resources, recognize local customs, and as much as possible provide the maximum benefit to indigenous Papuans.
9. Companies that destroy the environment and destroy customary land ownership rights must be subject to legal and administrative sanctions.
10. Forest conversion practices that contribute to global warming must be stopped.

In addition, the Conference also proposed to the government to:

a. Regarding security issues,

So that the security forces carry out their duties professionally and respect basic human rights to protect the sense of security of the indigenous Papuan people. Intelligence operations that intimidate or create insecurity must stop. Indonesian National Army and Republic of Indonesia Police must be prohibited from engaging in business or politics, with legal sanctions for those who violate.

b. Regarding social and cultural issues

So that the social and cultural rights of the indigenous Papuan people, including the rights to customary land and customary norms, must be recognized and respected. The labeling of Papuans as stupid, drunken, lazy and primitive must stop.

Discrimination against Papuans living with HIV and AIDS must stop. Every effort should be made to reduce maternal and child mortality rates in indigenous Papuans with the help of professional medical services. Policies that lead to population reduction in indigenous Papuans such as family planning programs must be stopped, and steps must be taken to limit immigration to West Papua.

Not long after, because the request for a dialogue with the government did not get a response, on August 2, 2011 the indigenous

Papuans who were members of the West Papua National Committee (KNPB) held a peaceful demonstration calling for an immediate dialogue and demanding a referendum (self-determination) be held as the only long-term and reliable solution to determine the future of Papua for the Papuan people. This activity coincided with the International Lawyers Meeting for West Papua (ILWP) in the UK. As usual, security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) were deployed fully armed to deal with this demonstration, because it was considered a "*treason*" activity against the government.

On October 17-19, 2011, the third Papuan People's Congress was also held, which was initiated by Forkorus Yaboisembut (President of the Federal Republic of West Papua) in the Zakeus field, Padang Bulan-Jayapura. This congress passed a resolution to the government to recognize the independence of the Federal Republic of West Papua, with Edison Waromi as its Prime Minister and ended with the raising of the Morning Star flag. In response to this, the government through the security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police) carried out attacks, shootings and arrests of the figures behind this congress action, resulting in the death of six people.

Furthermore, during 2020, protest actions in the form of peaceful demonstrations were more often carried out by various elements of the Papuan community in Papua and outside Papua to reject the continuation of special autonomy. This condition triggered the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) to hold a Hearing Meeting (RDP) in order to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of special autonomy and capture the aspirations of the indigenous Papuans regarding the plan for the sustainability of special autonomy, including finding an exit solution that will be included in the revision of the Law Special Autonomy for Papua. The activity took place for two days simultaneously in seven customary areas in the provinces of Papua and West Papua on November 17-19, 2020, namely: a. Tabi/Mamta Customary Territory in Jayapura Regency; b. Saireri Customary Territory in Biak Regency; c. La-Pago Customary Territory in Jayawijaya Regency; d. Mee-Pago Customary Territory in Dogiyai Regency; e. Anim Ha Customary Territory in Merauke Regency;

f. Domberai Customary Territory in Manokwari Regency; and g. Bomberai Customary Territory in Fakfak Regency.

The results of the RDP will be discussed in a Public Hearing Meeting (RPDU) which will be held on November 24-25, 2020 in Jayapura, and will be attended by elements of the Regional Leadership Coordination Forum (Forkompimda) from the two Provinces, the two Governors, Leaders and Members of the Council. Representatives of the People of Papua and West Papua. Furthermore, the voices of the indigenous Papuans who have been reported will be determined in the Extraordinary Plenary Meeting as a result of the decisions of the Papuan and West Papuan People's Assembly, to then be submitted to the Papuan House of Representatives for plenary and forwarded to the central government. However, in its implementation it did not go as expected because the security forces tended to hinder the implementation of the RDP by arresting members of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) who would carry out the RDP in designated districts. This certainly received a strong reaction from a number of parties such as the chairman of traditional institutions including the leadership of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) who filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court. Responding to these conditions, subsequently triggered demonstrations against the expansion of regions and the extension of special autonomy in Papua throughout the region in Papua and spread to other cities.

When compared to the reform phase, the resolution is broader and has louder echoes, because it has linked global issues that will become a means of pressure on the government and security forces. This stage can be regarded as the determination of the indigenous Papuan people to fight for their rights. The momentum for the shift in the nature of the movement is very real compared to the beginning of the implementation of special autonomy, namely the issue of self-determination for the Papuan people.


d. Political Movement / Actualization

A clear sign of the changing nature of this movement was when elements of the indigenous Papuan community joined in voicing the desire to separate themselves from the Unitary State of the Republic of

Indonesia (NKRI), regardless of what faction and ethnic group they belonged to. This condition is still happening in Papua and other big cities including abroad by using technology and online media to garner international sympathy and support. This shows that the direction of the struggle to break away from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is increasingly intensive and massive.

Apart from that, the idea also developed for the government to improve the governance of special autonomy by preparing a grand design for the development of special autonomy and revising a number of articles in the Special Autonomy Law which were felt to be out of line with the times and the dynamics that developed, resulting in polarization of the movement. On the one hand they want a referendum (self-determination), and on the other they want to continue with special autonomy. Between these two camps, there are those who think they can accept special autonomy for a while preparing themselves for independence. The government's response to this demand is to include a revised draft of the Special Autonomy Law as a priority agenda for discussing the Prolegnas (national legislation program) which must be immediately discussed with the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) and to increase the number of security forces in Papua. The government's choice is seen as imposing the will of the Papuan people and the government's (formal) arrogance in solving problems in Papua, so that it does not provide space and opportunity for an equal dialogue with indigenous Papuans. Facing the government's attitude which tends to be formal, the indigenous Papuan people are divided into two opposing camps, between the pros and cons of special autonomy. This process can be said to be actualization, which is part of the change from the attitude of the movement that is recognition into politics of actualization.

Figure 15. Illustration of Social Movement Tree in Papua



The tree is an illustration of the process of growth and development of a movement that started from a conflict causing a protest, then the protest developed into a social movement and the culmination of a social movement is a political movement.

6.4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

1. *The Clash of Modern and Traditional Culture*

Based on developments that occurred in Papua where the presence of special autonomy is a very phenomenal thing, leading the author to a thesis that protests indicate a conflict, and conflict occurs because of an imbalance in the distribution of power and welfare. On the one hand there is a concentration of power with all the luck that follows it, while on the other

hand there is an imbalance that results in powerlessness and all its suffering. A protracted conflict will lead to movements, ranging from collective actions to organized movements known as social movements. When the government is weak and the system is not running well, coupled with the rise of global issues, the social movement has developed into a political movement.

In Papua, such a development process was triggered by the implementation of special autonomy which did not go according to the expectations of the indigenous Papuan people with all its implications which tended not to give full trust to indigenous Papuans to be creative, to stigmatize incompetence, not to protect the rights of indigenous Papuans, and marginalize the existence of indigenous Papuans. Coupled with the presence of foreign investors who exploit Papua's natural wealth with sophisticated technology, as a symbol of power and strength. Indigenous Papuans are in a state of being squeezed in their midst and forced to go with the flow. In a normal stage, it takes a long time for indigenous Papuans to get to this stage. However, with the special autonomy policy that provides a red carpet for foreign investors, indigenous Papuans like it or not, have to accept this condition. As a result, there was social unrest in society because of the clash between traditional and modern civilizations.

The interaction between global culture and local culture raises various problems for indigenous Papuans because they are not ready to adapt to the new culture. The values, ways of thinking and social behavior between the two cultures are very contrasting and tend to be opposite, so that in their meeting there is a clash of cultures. In every collision, of course, the loser and sufferer are those who are in a weak position and structure, while the strong must show their superiority. In a state of confusion and difficulty in self-positioning, comes the strength to survive with all the power of ability, and gives birth to the persistence to change the situation that is experienced. These efforts are manifested in the form of physical and verbal protests.

Weak parties or the public protest directed at the strong or dominant party, in the case of Papua, the strong party is the government supported by security forces (Indonesian National Army/Republic of Indonesia Police). Protest and conflict are two things that are closely related and cannot be

separated from each other, where protest is a manifestation of conflict, although conflict is not always responded to by protest. Protest is an expression of disagreement over a situation that is carried out individually or in an open group. This condition shows that behind the protest there is a conflict between the protesting party and the protested party. The conflict will end if a middle way or "*win-win solution*" is found between the conflicting parties. On the other hand, the conflict will continue if no agreement is reached or there is a violation of the agreement that has been made together.

In the current era of globalization where openness is the main characteristic, events that occur in one place will be quickly known by outsiders. Under various pretexts, motives and interests are exploited in the conflict situation for the benefit of themselves and their group, and then invite third parties to take part in the midst of the conflict. In such situations the need for a leader is needed to direct collective action into an organized movement. The leader is the main requirement for the existence of a social movement, because with the leader will be able to gather various sources of strength, hidden ideas can be revealed and goals can be formulated. In traditional societies, leaders play a central role in forming and directing movements, because people are generally still closed and have not been able to express their desires logically according to the size of modern people, as well as in forming networks with out-of-group groups which are needed in order to garner support. The leader in the structure of indigenous peoples means the chief of the tribe or the head of the customary institution which is the personification of the organization and social movement he leads. This condition is very different from the organizational culture displayed by the bureaucracy where expertise and division of tasks are mandatory.

These clashes between the two cultures occurred because the indigenous Papuan people were not prepared in advance to face the new values brought by the bureaucracy. The preparations made are only physical and ignore the human aspect. Policy and development planning that focuses on the economic aspect alone, will create an imbalance between material and cultural developments so that there is a *cultural lag*. In a position of weakness and helplessness, there are only two possible responses that can

be made. The first "*relents*" while waiting for the arrival of *Ratu Adil* (*Koreri*), and the second appears the courage to fight or rebel. The choice between the two attitudes depends on the social history of the community and the influence of the strategic environment that supports it. The form of disapproval is manifested by fighting or protesting either in peaceful or frontal ways. Peasants in rural areas generally protest violently as a form of rejection of "*renewal*" which is considered the source of the cause of their weakness in their position against the power of "*reformers*".

2. *Agrarian Conflict Continues in the Capitalistic Development System*

In the case of Papua, the use of customary land, mountains and forests has led to the exclusion of farmers, not only economically but also culturally. Economically, they are not free and even lose the right to use their land according to their farming traditions, while to be able to follow the flow of change, the way of thinking in the capitalist system does not meet the requirements. As a result, in one area there is an economic dualism, on the one hand there is a subsistence economic system organized by farmers and on the other hand a modern economy is taking place (Scott, 1981). Culturally, the entry of modern industry has urged and destroyed local customs, beliefs and wisdom. The habit of preserving nature is contrary to the habit of exploiting nature. This different philosophy for people who are in a weak position is considered a too heavy pressure because it is not balanced. So that there is no acceptance of new cultural elements, they even "*escape*" from the challenges of the new culture.

Several research results on peasant resistance prove that what is happening today is a continuation and has similarities to what is happening in Papua. Sartono Kartodirdjo in his book *Revolt of the Banten Peasants* writes based on the results of a case study on the events of the rebellion and traces its causes in a study of the genesis of the movement, so that in his book entitled *Ratu Adil and Protest Movement in Rural Java* he uses several case examples. The aim is to find out the content of the teachings of "*Ratu Adil*" which is able to move farmers to carry out radical movements. The characteristics of the movement found are: 1. the movement shows a religious movement (belief); 2. is revitalistic and millennial. In addition, he managed to generalize from various movements that are "*Ratu Adil*" and

examine the common causes and triggers. So, from the three books, it was found that there were similarities, namely they succeeded in identifying social movements as a manifestation of social conflict with the authorities at that time (the Dutch colonial government) as a result of the pressure felt by farmers. This depressed condition creates group solidarity out of existing primordial ties.

The peasant movement as described by Sartono Kartodirdjo did not only occur in Indonesia (Java), but also occurred in other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, Burma and the Philippines. Research conducted by James Scott shows that the upheaval of farmers occurs because of fears that the values and habits that have been the support for subsistence morality have become the driving force for them to survive in conditions of uncertainty and poverty. Radical conflicts that occur between farmers and other parties who adhere to different systems are also a reflection of the existence of a conflict between the "*big tradition*", namely the model of behavior for civilized humans and the "*small tradition*" which is believed and lives among farmers who lack cultural resources. The disobedience of the "*small tradition*" according to Scott (1993: 90) stems from the fact that its social basis, namely the farming community, both historically and culturally, was formed before the existence of the city and its great traditions. With the presence of a modern economy, traditional values are destroyed and the existing kinship system is neither able to dampen nor balance the "shock", so they seek a solution through a millenarian movement, as happened to farmers in the mountainous regions of Sardinia and Andalusia (Hobsbawn, 1958).

Research conducted by Sartono and James Scott has the same object, namely the farming community and the search for the causes of upheaval or peasant social movements. Although the location is different, the findings are almost the same regarding the influence of modernization along with the arrival of colonialism in the places studied. The difference is that Scott focuses more on socio-economic analysis as a source of conflict, while Sartono focuses more on aspects of belief or ideology. Aspects that have not been touched on in their research are related to the continuity of the movement and its effectiveness as well as its relation to efforts of a political

nature. They both stop at collective actions that lead to physical, sporadic and spontaneous, while the organizational aspect has not been touched.

Another research conducted by Fajar Pratikto in Gunung Kidul Regency-DI Yogyakarta is about the Hunger People's Movement. This research does not only cover socio-economic aspects, but also looks at the political aspects. The political background seems to be more prominent when compared to other studies, especially the political dynamics that occurred in the 1959-1964 period, namely when the guided democracy system was implemented. The similarity with the research conducted by Sartono and Scott is that the peasant movement is described as a movement that is radical and tends to be anarchic in carrying out its actions. In research on the Hunger People's Movement, it is clear that the relationship between political parties and movements is part of the political strategy carried out by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its wing organization Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) to create social tensions in rural areas. However, this movement failed and was unable to become an integrated political movement, because it was unable to formulate realistic demands or was not well organized (Pratikto, 1999: 66-67).

Another research with a political background was carried out by Robert Hefner in the mountainous community of Tengger-East Java. The political research conducted shows tribal communities when dealing with political and cultural penetration from the "outside" and state intervention through various agricultural projects. The impact is very serious on the order and process of transformation of the search for an egalitarian social identity in society (Hefner, 1999). Landsberger and Alexandrow (1981:58) state that the peasant movement is not only part of social change, but is also a consequence of social change itself. So, there is a lot of dissatisfaction. Social changes that are very likely to cause dissatisfaction include: a. eviction of farmers and their existing communities, annexation of their rights by the process of feudalization; b. the emergence of new groups (urban communities) along with the growth of economic and industrial centers; c. the breakup of the feudal political and economic structures that gave rise to incongruities and sharpened status differences; d. the spread of

new ideologies (egalitarian, socialist visions) and the spread of ideas about special rights (education, health, work and quality of life).

Social change seems to have raised the social awareness of the peasants about their position which is always "beaten", so it takes a hard effort to reclaim their rights through social and political movements, either by frontal or peaceful means. The social movement in Papua that emerged along with the implementation of special autonomy which has not been able to prosper the indigenous Papuan people, recalls the history of the past peasant movement which was resistant to radical changes due to the policy of the Dutch colonial government which forced farmers to change their farming methods. The entry of investors with their technological power has triggered such rapid social change, that indigenous people who generally make a living as farmers and gatherers do not have the opportunity to adapt to different environments. So, they protested which developed into an organized movement, even many of the figures involved in political movements.

The revolt of an agrarian society against the modernization of the economy seems to be a universal phenomenon. This can be proven from the emergence of "*social bandits*" that occurred in Europe during the industrial revolution era in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. In Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, peasant rebellions increased during the colonial period, when the commercialization of agriculture began to meet global markets, not just to meet the social needs of farmers. The tendency of investors to expand agricultural areas (plantations) to meet market demand. As a result, many agricultural lands were taken over by investors through local authorities, resulting in agrarian conflicts. The same symptom of the process of peasant revolt was the domination of land by the investors which eventually led to the existence of landlords. This means that the peasant movement went hand in hand with feudalism, both during the colonial period and after independence. Public protests that occurred in urban and rural areas that occurred during the New Order era until now cannot be separated from the problem of land domination by investors under the pretext of economic development. The same thing happens in Papua, where investors are represented by multinational companies. These modern

companies are actually no different from feudalism which developed into capitalism, where the domination of land and capital by a small group of people is the main characteristic.

Intervention or contact with other cultures is responded to in various forms, either at the individual or group level. At the individual level, the response varies, ranging from directly accepting a new culture or rejecting the own culture (first culture), to the opposite response, namely refusing the new culture altogether (second culture). Between the two there are those who synthesize and facilitate the two cultures. The level of commitment to response to a new culture and its consequences for society is described by Bochmer (1982: 27) as follows:

Table 22. Outcomes of Cultural Contact at the Individual Level: Psychological Responses to The Influence of "Second Culture"

Response	Type	Multiple group membership affiliation	Influence on Individual	Influence on Group
Reject the first culture, including the second culture	past	Cultural norm I loses the salience Cultural norm II becomes prominent	Loss of ethnic identity Defamation	Cultural Assimilation Erosion
Reject the second culture, exaggerating the first culture	people who have too much patriotism	Cultural norm I increases in salience Cultural norm II decreases in salience	Nationalism, Racism	Friction between groups
Tossed between two cultures	marginalized	The norms of the two cultures stand out but are considered contradictory	identity confusion conflict Overcompensation	Reform Social change
Synthesis of the two cultures	Mediate	The norms of both cultures stand out and are considered capable of being integrated	Self-development	Harmony among plural society groups Cultural preservation

The social movement in Papua seems to be a reaction to social change as a result of cultural contact which is responded to by facilitating the original culture with a new culture, but because of the weak position of

the original culture, marginalization occurs. In an effort to strengthen its position, reformation was carried out in the form of a social movement that was revivalism. Every revivalism movement, always uses elements of tradition as a movement technique, although in Papua the elements of modern organizations are trying to be absorbed to achieve the goals of the movement.

3. *Movement Type: Combination of Neo-classical and New Social Movement*

A critical attitude towards development efforts is the result of social learning after experiencing various clashes with outside forces that affect the lives of traditional communities. The mechanical solidarity that drives them causes the movement of the community to be slow because they must always consider the social risks for the group to maintain balance. Because interactions with the more dynamic outside world are unavoidable, tensions arise which ultimately push them to rebel.

Smelser (1976) says that "*Structural Strain*" is one of the driving factors for the occurrence of social movements. Strain is interpreted to have a double meaning, deprivation, deficiency, tension arises in a relationship in a conducive structural way as defined. For example, inequality in the caste system is a conducive factor that allows or does not allow the creation of tension. In this case, tensions only develop when inequality is perceived as an oppressive fact. Thus, the source of the tension lies in the perception of the social order and the opposite of its interpretation of legitimacy.

The birth of a set of ideas is a prerequisite for the spread of tension against the ongoing movement. The system of ideas, such as ideology, is a source of tension as well as an "antidote" to reduce tension by providing solutions to the problems at hand. In America, for example, ideology is analyzed as a limiting source of minorities and women, this is a derivation of a fundamental aspect of American culture that has encouraged the emergence of the civil rights movement and feminism.

Based on the background and characteristics of social movements that have been developed by researchers on social movements, Singh (2001:89-131) broadly divides social movements into three types, namely: *classical, neo-classical and new social movements*. Each of them has characters, struggle issues, basic assumptions and methods of struggle that are different

from each other and there are also elements in common, so that a collective activity can be classified as a social movement. In general, the types of social movements can be explained as follows:

a. Classical Type

The classical type of social movement is motivated by ideological contradictions, namely the Capitalist and Marxist ideologies. The main factor that drives it is the domination of the owners of capital over the workers, where various means of production are controlled by the capitalists. This domination breeds poverty and misery for the workers. The leader of this movement was Karl Marx, who advocated a revolutionary way to restore the rights of the proletariat. The ultimate goal of his struggle is the creation of a classless society.

This type of social movement is characterized by a strong attachment to the ideology of its fighters who come from certain classes. The actors are industrial workers and farmers who reflect a certain economic class. The focus of this movement's attention is on political economy, especially economic growth through industrialization which has given birth to social beliefs. The social structure of capitalism that has given rise to class conflict is used as the basic assumption that all human groupings are essentially class groupings and the conflicts that occur are none other than class conflicts.

b. Neo-Classical Movement Type

This social movement takes the basic assumption derived from Marx (classical type) which states that society is essentially a totality (system), so that the movement that appears is considered a pathology. The thinking of Talcott Parson and Smelser is the main basis of this type in providing an explanation of the driving factors, characteristics of methods and issues of struggle of a social movement. Some of the salient features of this type of social movement are:

- a) It is within a Marxist dialectical framework which is elaborated in class formation, historically materialistic and deterministic materialism.
- b) Movement based on emotional stimuli such as anxiety, excitement, stress and dependence, giving rise to spontaneous behavior.

- c) There are political nuances, because there is an element of resistance to certain classes.
- d) The actors involved in the movement are not objectively deficient.

The driving factor for the movement was the power imbalance that gave rise to structural tensions. Inequality occurs because there is dominance from one party which also creates status tensions and a feeling of relative deprivation (relative deprivation). Issues of struggle that have been developed are self-esteem, revitalization and the emergence of "Ratu Adil". The method of struggle is by mass mobilization (crowd, riot, rebellion) or collective action.

c. New Social Movement Type

The basic assumption of this type of movement is that all groups have an identity that must be maintained, so this movement is often referred to as an identity movement. The goal of the struggle is to build a "*Civil Society*", while the main driving factor for this movement is too much state control or interference over its people. Strict control has narrowed the space for public movement, so that in order to open it, it is necessary to develop a discourse on autonomy and individual freedom, collectivity and identity. Some of the characteristics inherent in this movement include:

- 1) Not bound to any particular ideology.
- 2) Trans-national in nature.
- 3) Generate "end"
- 4) Non-segmental actors, coming from the grass root of all segments.
- 5) Reject the "collective behavior" approach
- 6) Advanced organization and communication (information is power).
- 7) Fighting discrimination.

The issues of the struggle are: human rights enforcement, the environment, democracy, anti-institutionalism, anti-rationalism, gender/feminism, egalitarianism, peace, and others. The method used is the mobilization of resources on a wide scale, forming an organization that is managed as a multinational company.

Viewed based on the motivation behind the emergence of these movements, there are three basic differences, namely the ideological

background adopted by the Marxists, the cultural background (revitalistic), adopted by the functionalists and the background of the mobilization of resources adopted by the new social movements. The similarities between Marxists and functionalists are that they use a lot of psychological approaches in explaining social movements. Meanwhile, the new social movements put more emphasis on an economic rational approach.

The similarity of the three types of movement is the existence of an element of conflict as the source of the emergence of the movement. There are basically three causes of conflict, namely conflict between workers and employers giving rise to Marxist (*Classical*) ideological movements, conflicts between modernity or modern culture and traditional giving rise to revitalistic movements (*Neo-Classical*), and conflicts between social groups giving rise to identity movements (*New Social Movement*). Social movements in Papua have elements in common with two types of movements, namely neo-classical movements and new social movements. Therefore, the social movement in Papua can be said to be a combined or mixed movement between neo-classical and new social movements. Neo-classical elements can be found from the background and motivation of the movement, characteristics, issues of struggle and the methods used. As for the new social movements, it can be seen from the issues that are carried out to develop the movement, namely human rights, the environment, democracy and egalitarianism. Similarly, in terms of the method used, namely by forming an organization as a forum for struggle. Although the movement and management techniques still apply traditional methods, or use traditional elements as the main mover.

The elements of the neo-classical movement still seem to be more dominant than the new social movements, because almost all the elements that make up this type of movement are in the social movements in Papua. Even viewed from the background of the emergence of social movements, what is happening in Papua is much more complex than the new social movements. Modernity conflicts and conflicts between social groups exist simultaneously in social movements

in Papua. The combination of these two types makes social movements in Papua have a special color where there is a tendency to combine traditional elements as an inward mover and rational elements to move outward. The inward movement in question is to consolidate, attract sympathy and followers from the indigenous Papuan people, so that new identities are formed such as the mention of "*Komin*" and "*Ambeer*" to distinguish indigenous Papuans from migrants or "*mountain people*" and "*coastal people*" to refer to indigenous Papuans who come from the interior with Papuans who come from the coast. It is on this basis that collective actions are mobilized. Meanwhile, the rational elements are directed to seek international support and sympathy. Through the issue of human rights, the environment, and democracy, the movement was expanded not only in terms of the area of the movement, but also filled with political ideas. A new strategy that was not found in social movements in Indonesia in the past. Although the organizational movement is only centered on the character of a leader, but because the strategy of raising both internally and externally is very intensive, this movement can last a long time. To give a clearer picture of the various types of social movements and their comparison with social movements in Papua, see the matrix below.

Figure 16. Matrix of Comparison of Types of Social Movements and Social Movements in Papua

Classical Type (C)				
Cause	Basic Assumptions	Struggle Issue	Characteristic	Method
Ideological Conflict; Dominance of Capital Owners; Absolute Deprivation	Human grouping is essentially a class grouping; Society as a system (totality); Disorder is endemic to every social system.	Changing social structures that oppress workers; Class struggle	Bound to ideology; Emphasizing the economic aspect; Returns "mean"; Actors: Industrial workers, farmers; Disciples: from a certain class of economists (workers).	Revolution

Neo-Classical Type (NC)				
Cause	Basic Assumptions	Struggle Issue	Characteristic	Method
Changes in the colonial system; Relative Deprivation (DR); Structural tension.	Society as an orderly system/totality; Periods of renewal raise expectations, which, if not met, lead to frustration.	Revitalization; Self-esteem; The emergence of "Ratu Adil".	Using a Marxist dialectical framework; Movement is based on emotional stimuli; Spontaneous behavior in collective action; There is resistance to certain classes; Actor: not objectively deficient.	Mass Deployment (Crowd, riot, rebellion)

Social Movements Type in Papua

New Social Movement Type (NSM)				
Cause	Basic Assumptions	Struggle Issue	Characteristic	Method
The domination of the state over the people; Inequality between groups; Unbalanced relations between the state, the economic community	All groups have an identity that must be respected and maintained; Information is power.	Human rights; Democratization; Environment; Anti-institutional; Feminism/gender; Egalitarian	Not bound by ideology; Trans-national Actor: Non-segmental; Followers: "grass root"; Reject the "collective action" approach; Using technology to communicate.	Multi-national organization Resource mobilization. Looking for accesses to support the struggle. Implementing a sophisticated managerial system.

Combination of Neo-Classical Type (NC) And New Social Movement (NSM)				
Cause	Basic Assumptions	Struggle Issue	Characteristic	Method
Conflicts with activities carried out by multinational companies; Economic disparity between indigenous Papuans and migrants; Relative Deprivation (DR); Structural tension; Government policies do not pay attention to the wishes of the indigenous Papuans (top down) and uniformity; Social history/tradition of tribal warfare	Indigenous people's rights must be restored; Indigenous people are likened to the owner of the house (ruler) who is supposed to manage immigrants as guests; Reformation stay in balance.	Cultural revitalization; Restoration of self-esteem; The arrival of "Ratu Adil" (Koreri); Human rights; Democratization; Environment; Feminism/gender; Egalitarian.	Bound to traditional beliefs (as ideology); Movement is based on emotional stimuli; Spontaneous behavior in collective action; There is resistance to certain classes; Activities are centered on certain figures (leaders); Using various kinds of struggle issues; segmental actors; Ethnic struggle	Organized Building access with the international world Taking advantage of the national political situation

The matrix above shows that various elements of existing social movements have been absorbed or coincidentally have similarities with social movements in Papua. One of the basic things of commonality that underlies the occurrence of social movements is conflict. Conflicts can occur between ideologies, between social groups and between countries and society. These factors are able to be a driving force for the emergence of social movements, because there are activities or interactions and policies whose implementation has an influence to create social change. In fact, this social change is the direct cause of the disturbance, because change can have a bad impact or be perceived as such by certain people or groups so that it inspires to change the condition or restore it to its previous state. Social movement is a form of reaction to social changes that have intervened in the cultural system of society.

4. Social Movement as Living Organism

A collective action is categorized as a social movement, when the action is directed to change or replace part or all of the social or cultural order prevailing in society by means of organization. The movement is intended to strengthen self-identity, increase status, change the behavior of other groups and improve social conditions. This means that the orientation of the movement is more focused on reformative matters. Movement is a form of participation to carry out internal reforms or changes in the community concerned. However, if the collective action is directed at power or gaining political freedom, the movement can be categorized as a political movement. There is a clear boundary between a social movement and a political movement, which is seen based on the goals to be achieved.

In the case of Papua, there has been a shift from a social movement to a political movement, namely when the power of the central government was weak, or during the transition from the New Order to the Reform Order. Social movements can be likened to living organisms that undergo a process of formation, growth and decline (dead). In this connection, Blumer (in Harper, 1989: 134) states that in the early stages, a social movement is typically "*amorphous*", and less organized, which is characterized by collective behavior at the "*primitive*" level and also as a mechanism of

elementary and spontaneous interaction. What Blumer describes can be equated with Hobsbawn's description of social bandit, which he calls a form of primitive process, carried out by farmers against pressure and exploitation of the landlords. In the context of Southeast Asia, the resistance carried out by farmers against colonialism had the same implication, namely extortion and suppression of the peasants (Scott, Sartono and Hefner). Such collective behavior, by the oppressed, is seen as a reflection of heroism (heroic), and not as a crime.

However, according to Hobsbawn's notes (2000: 12), banditry movements, both reformist and revolutionary, have never produced a social movement. History proves that in Indonesia also shows the same thing, where movements with the theme "Ratu Adil" which have almost the same background, always disappear after their leader is arrested. Even if there will be similar movements in other places, there is no organizational relationship between them. Such movements are mostly sporadic and temporary. While Hobsbawn describes social bandits as "heroes," Blumer says otherwise. Protests, mobs and panic are considered to create a negative image, although it is recognized that such actions have contributed to the creation of new social forms. If the elementary form can survive and carry out activities in a sustainable manner, according to Blumer, there is a possibility that it will develop towards the formation of a social movement.

At this time the social movement in Papua is in its infancy, where the direction of its development is not to become a social movement that is increasingly solid and widespread as an international movement to fight for the customary and cultural rights of the community and the environment, but is in the process of becoming a political movement. This is a rare phenomenon, because in general a social movement is consistent with its original goals, but its areas of struggle are expanded to include feminism, Greenpeace and human rights. These movements do not turn into political movements, although they can influence political decisions. These movements emerged in parts of the world such as the United States and Western Europe, and are now expanding worldwide. In addition, a social movement will usually de-escalate if the demands of its struggle have been met, such as the movement that fights for the civil rights of black citizens in

the United States. Although the movement is still alive, its activities are not as intensive as it was in the early days of its formation, where the rights of black citizens were sidelined compared to white citizens. Changes in the form of a movement do not only occur in Papua, but are a common phenomenon that occurs in various places. This is expressed by Larana (1994: 46) as follows:

"Movement cultures are not static over time, there is no guarantee that insurgents will confine their attention to the specific issues or institution originally targeted. When this happens, movement can take on the character of hothouses of cultural innovation. Anything and everything are open to critical scrutiny. Change becomes the order of the day".

The statement illustrates that social movements are open to rearranging social arrangements in order to achieve their goals. This means, change occurs not in the goal, but in the culture and locus of movement. Social movements typically develop within a particular social environment and generational strata or geographic location. Locus shift means an expansion of the geographic scale to reflect different regions and generations. Meanwhile, social movements in Papua have shifted their goals, not just their locus and culture.

This change in form from a social movement to a political movement can be analogous to Dahrendorf's view (in Nasikun, 2000: 19-21). It is stated that pseudo-groups can develop into interest groups if they meet three conditions, namely:

1. Technical conditions of an organization, namely the emergence of a certain number of people who are able to formulate and organize latent interests into manifest interests.
2. Political conditions, namely the presence or absence of political freedom given by the community.
3. Social conditions, namely the presence or absence of a communication system that allows members of a group to always communicate easily.

To this view, the author would like to add one more condition to explain the development of social movements in Papua, namely the strategic environment. In addition, according to the existing conditions, the technical requirements put forward by Dahrendorf should be a leadership requirement

and a social requirement as a technical requirement. Thus, the conditions determined by the government are as follows:

1. Leadership Requirements;

Technically, social movements in Papua are formed because of the dominant leadership factor. It is the presence of a strong leader that allows the social movement to become a political movement because of the ability to build linkage with traditional movement figures in other parts of the indigenous Papuan community. The traditional movement, by its leaders, has been transformed into a political movement.

2. Political Requirements;

The uncertain political conditions during the transitional government from the new order to the reform order allowed movement leaders to communicate more intensively and open new networks more freely, both among followers and to expand regional and international networks. The leadership factor alone is not enough to direct a social movement to a political movement, if the opportunity to communicate and establish relationships with other parties is prohibited by the authorities. During the New Order era, political communication was very limited, while during the reformation period, political communication was opened as wide as possible. The freedom of politics, association, assembly and speech granted by the government will determine the development of the movement in Papua.

3. Technical Requirements;

This requirement relates to the facilities provided by the community and the government to communicate with each other. In the current technological era, movement actors are greatly helped by advances in communication technology, starting from the use of computers, laptops, smartphones, electronic media, email and similar social media. These technological advances not only support the expansion of the movement but also the messages of the movement can be expressed effectively.

4. Strategic Environmental Requirements

What is meant by a strategic environment is the influence of the international community or the global environment which is aggressively campaigning for global issues, such as human rights, democracy and the

environment. The influence of the activists working on the issues above is very large in growing the courage to open political discourse for people who have been marginalized. Meanwhile, among the authorities there is uncertainty in responding to the political discourse that has developed due to pressure from the international community. The strategic environment is one of the important requirements because it is supported by technology.

Thus, it seems clear that a social movement has close links between other social movements. Likewise, social movements originating from sporadic protests can develop into political movements due to external influences.

The process of shifting social movements to political movements also means shifting demands from simply evaluating the implementation of special autonomy to becoming a "referendum" to the government. The tendency is to direct issues of human rights violations, environmental destruction and silence the right to express opinions of indigenous Papuans on the implementation of special autonomy in order to seek and strengthen support for their struggle with foreign countries. This means, because there is a shift in interests, there is also a change in attitude in determining the decisions taken. A shift in form can mean a shift in strategy, but a shift in goals means a shift in opponents and the ideology of the movement.

When traced the origins of social movements in Papua, there are five important factors that encourage the occurrence of social movements, namely:

- 1) Social characteristics, which are formed by history and beliefs held.
- 2) Conflicts with the government that have not been resolved.
- 3) Damage to nature and the surrounding environment.
- 4) Social jealousy and accumulation of disappointment.
- 5) Desperation in the face of social change that is happening too fast.

These factors interact and reinforce each other to compose a movement. Although the main source is the implementation of special autonomy, if social characteristics do not support it, then there will be no social movement. The case in Papua proves that the '*rebel type*' has indeed been shaped by the natural environment and the ways of earning a living. People

who are used to living and making a living in a harsh way, namely people who live in mountainous areas produce a type of society that is easily rebellious while people who are pampered by nature tend to be compromising like the indigenous Papuans who live in coastal areas.

The explanation of the origin of social movements can be seen from various perspectives, as explained by Harper (1989:130-134), namely: "psychological, social psychological and structural approaches".

▪ *Psychological Approach*

Psychological theory focuses its explanation on a number of individual characteristics. The oldest theory on this subject is called "*crowd psychology*", which emphasizes the "*irrational*" nature of social movement participation. In this perspective, the actions of the crowd (crowd) that produce social movements are the result of the failure to prevent anonymity and can be influenced (dissuggested), as well as behavior that can spread. Individual behavior is described as rational and controlled, but crowd behavior is described as irrational and easily stimulated. From this perspective, followers of social movements actualize their form of compensation for their frustrated lives.

Followers of the psychological approach emphasize the involvement of rational calculations of social movement actors, and they see social movements as efforts to overcome collective problems. The weakness of this approach is that it assumes that humans are rational, thus ignoring the ideological and social influences that stimulate social movements. The psychological approach tries to explain the development of social movements by highlighting the motivations or psychological roles of the participating individuals. There is a withdrawal of "*expressive*" movements such as veneration and enthusiasm, which followers describe as "*raising resistance in a search for identity*". Behind that, the psychological approach has limitations. This theory emphasizes the irrational behavior of a crowd or riot, but many movements thrive without it. In other cases, the psychic problems underlying the movement are held constant and do not mention anything about the social conditions that trigger the movement for change.

▪ *Social Psychological Approach*

The socio-psychological explanation of the origins of social movements focuses on the relationship between social conditions, psychological dispositions and the emergence of social movements. Although there are many variations of social psychological explanations, there are several that have developed and are quite good at explaining social movements, namely the theory of relative deprivation and the theory of status tension.

Deprivation Theory (relative loss/deprivation)

Some experts explain that absolute deprivation is a motivating force for the emergence of social movements. Absolute deprivation includes deprivation matters such as: hunger, pain and insecurity which causes people to be in minimal conditions to survive. This analysis explains that changes in objective conditions such as poverty and rising food prices are the causes for the emergence of collective behavior and social movements. However, the conditions of absolute deprivation that occur in society usually do not lead to social movements, then it is observed that most social movements do not reduce absolute deprivations (*absolute deficiencies*).

Based on these considerations, it leads social movement experts to reject objective conditions (*deficiencies*) as causal factors and state that relative deprivation or subjective deprivation is a psychological condition that gives rise to social movements. Relative deprivation (DR) arises when there is a real gap between the expected values and the resulting values, or in other words what people expect and what they get. DR theory also implies the importance of reference groups that are the source of such expectations. So, people who feel satisfied or dissatisfied by comparing their condition against relevant categories that exist in others. DR theory explains why protest movements usually emerge during times of renewal under objective conditions (expectations rise more rapidly) and people who engage in movements are often not objectively deficient.

The DR approach to social movements was very popular in the 1960s, but declined as analysts saw weaknesses. This theory is seen as more relevant for explaining political protests than expressive movements,

which also produce change. Some see DR as a good enough explanation for predicting the emergence of social movements, but not enough evidence. The results of the Mc. Phail in 1960 (in Harper, 1989:151) concluded that there were logical reasons for the acquisition of the idea that the DR and the frustration that followed were the root cause of the rebellion. The results of the latest research also prove that what drives the rebellion consists of many factors. Although there are weaknesses, this theory is still continued to analyze social movements for several reasons, namely:

- a) The DR perspective is conceptually clearer than the old "mass discontent" arguments.
- b) Does not contain views that degrade participants.
- c) This approach is useful when combined with other approaches.

Status Tension Theory

Many experts state that the motivation to participate in social movements is a result of the threat of someone's status in society. Such threats increase in times of social change (due to demographic, immigration, occupational or political changes). Status tensions can also occur when there is an increase in the influence of the conquering group or by the erosion of a cultural perspective that maintains the legitimacy of social status. Since Status Tension Theory (TT) deals with threats to privilege, it is used to explain people's attraction to right-wing movements that seek to maintain or renew the traditional status order.

In conclusion, social psychological theory that focuses on the interaction between individuals and related social structures to understand the sources of dissatisfaction. This is certainly very useful, but it is still far from a comprehensive explanation of the emergence of social movements. To explain the motivational sources of a social movement, according to Harper (1989: 133), we must know more about:

- a. Structural environmental boundaries that may lead to dissatisfaction.
- b. Availability of different sources, both material and ideological to develop the movement.
- c. Interaction that takes place between one movement with another movement as well as with the surrounding social order.

These questions do not seem to be able to be answered adequately by social psychological theory, so they need structural theory support.

▪ Structural Approach

Structural explanation is a macro theory of the origin of social movements. While there may be an integration of several theoretical perspectives such as psychological and social psychology, the emphasis is on understanding the development of social movements within the broader structures within which they develop. If it is associated with the researcher's findings that there are five factors that drive the occurrence of social movements, the explanation from the socio-psychological side seems to be closer to reality. Except for social characteristics, other factors such as conflict with the authorities, environmental damage, social jealousy and hopelessness in the face of change are sources of tension. These factors are also incentives for the emergence of a sense of relative loss. Although relative deprivation is often used to describe protest movements in urban areas, it can also apply to remote areas such as Papua. Because rural communities have been in contact with urban culture. In fact, because of the presence of metropolitan culture and lifestyle, indigenous Papuans feel the difference and discriminatory attitude from the authorities (government and security forces). It is in contact with the modern world represented by the newcomers that they are able to compare their reality with outside groups. The realization that something has been stolen (lost) actually appears after there is a comparison with the reference group.

5. Exchange as the Foundation of Social Movement in Traditional Society

The process of the presence of a social movement and the direction of its development cannot be separated from the cultural values of the actors who play in it. One of the cultural values inherent in the indigenous people of Papua, is "*balance*" which is based on the philosophy of exchange that has developed in traditions from generation to generation. The manifestation of the philosophy of exchange in order to achieve balance is a barter system that contains costs and rewards, as described by observers of exchange theory. That is, there is a need to help each other to get something (*take*) in interacting with other groups, both in-group and out-group. In order to maintain a harmonious relationship, it is necessary to have a willingness to

be able to give and take each other. If this condition does not occur, then the balance will be disturbed and harmonious life is difficult to maintain. From the perspective of the indigenous Papuans, accepting the existence of special autonomy as a middle way from their demands for "independence" and allowing investors to destroy and take the natural wealth that is in their possession is certainly an extraordinary sacrifice. The sacrifices are not only in terms of self-esteem, but also economic, cultural, and political, so there is a demand to compensate or pay for the sacrifices with equal value. Their sacrifice is not based on willingness, but through coercion with power and pressure both physically and mentally. So, the rewards that are asked for are also related to the same thing. The desire for political independence is a reaction to the protests against their marginalization and powerlessness so far. Because the main source that forces them to make sacrifices is the authority (government), then that power is also what is demanded or fought for in the movement.

In exchange transactions there can be a paradox, where people often refrain from interacting with those who are able to provide attractive rewards, because they want to avoid the subordination that can occur in an unbalanced exchange relationship. Unbalanced exchanges can eventually become a relationship between those who control and those who are controlled, if the reward from one party is greater and is not reciprocated by the other party. Unbalanced exchange, but based on the willingness of each party is called a patron-client relationship.

If the exchange between two or more groups is balanced, then the relationship of interdependence will take place. However, if the exchange relationship is not balanced, differentiation of status and power will arise. If this is the case, then the leader of the dominant group can control the subordinate group and unite it into a larger unit to develop an integrated line of action within it. This means, subordinate groups become smaller groups in a larger association.

The formation of a power structure in the above ways is able to provide legitimacy for those in power, but cannot guarantee that its members will continue to follow the will of the leader or always feel satisfied. In the long term, the structure of power and authority is highly

dependent on the results of the cost-rewards comparison that benefits all parties. If the results are consistent with the expectations of all members or the results are more favorable, members are more likely to accept the leader as honest and committed and will continue to maintain the existing pattern of exchange. On the other hand, if the cost-rewards scale is less favorable or does not match the expectations of members, they may become angry and reject their leadership. This gave rise to an opposition movement to overhaul the existing power structure (Johnson, 1986: 91).

Other things that are included in the element of power to be exchanged are cultural and human values. The destruction of the inner world of the indigenous Papuan people is considered to have damaged the culture and human values that they have been proud of, so they demand the restoration of self-esteem. The initial movements that they demanded to be involved in the planning process as well as the evaluation of the implementation of special autonomy were a manifestation of cultural exchange and all its contents. In fact, recently there has been an argument that their motivation to fight with violence has increased because there have been many casualties from indigenous Papuans, so the principle they adhere to is "*debt of life, paid for by life*". Exchange in this case is certainly not individual or interpersonal exchange as proposed by the followers of micro-exchange theory, but involves exchange at the macro level, where power is in it. Which means it contains exchanges between groups (Blau, in Johnson, 1996: 97).

The ultimate goal of the demand for power is a balance of economic aspects. Political marginalization has caused people to suffer economically as well, because they are not given the opportunity to control and manage the natural resources they have had for generations. The main motivation in exchange is generally economic factors, as embodied in the basic principles of social exchange theory and the psychological foundations of exchange transactions as described below.

- Basic Principles of Social Exchange Theory

The process of social exchange has been discussed by a number of classical social theorists. In the classical theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political economists in England analyzed the market

economy as the result of a comprehensive aggregation of a very large number of individual transactions, it was assumed that exchange transactions would occur only if both parties benefit from such exchanges, and that the general welfare of society can be best guaranteed if individuals are allowed to pursue their own interests through privately negotiated exchanges. Another feature of exchange theory is the emphasis on achieving individual goals and rewards.

The individualist pressure currently prevailing in the United States according to Johnson (1986: 56) is motivated by the British tradition of utilitarianism in general. The main idea in utilitarianism is that each individual acts to avoid suffering and maximize pleasure. This view is considered as one of the basic laws of human behavior. The classical pioneers of the development of sociological theory were Herbert Spencer who most reflected on the basic principles of individualistic utilitarianism in his sociological approach. Spencer emphasized the individual as the basis of social structure. According to him (in Johnson, 1986: 56), although society can be analyzed based on the structural level, the social structure of a society is built to enable its members to meet their individual needs. This opinion is different from the theory of August Comte and Emile Durkheim which emphasizes the idea that society or social structure overcomes the individual. The emphasis on the importance of the individual is also reflected in the various forms and theories of contractual society. According to the basic principles of this theory, society is formed as a result of contractual agreements negotiated by people as they each seek to pursue their own needs and interests rationally.

The contemporary theory of exchange, developed by Homans and Blau, is in line with the individualistic pressures in English social thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, exchange theory can be analyzed through a different set of basic assumptions. For example, Durkheim's theory of organic solidarity, although this theory is not considered a theory of exchange. The reason is because Durkheim's theory of organic solidarity contains an exchange process based on interdependence that cannot be developed in any other way. Likewise, in

primitive societies, which are characterized by mechanical solidarity, there are simple collaborations in which the members are involved because they carry out a common task. This cooperative behavior contains an exchange process (Johnson, 1986: 57).

So according to Durkheim, exchange occurs because there is a relationship of interdependence or mutual need. In social life, both in primitive and modern societies, this condition cannot be avoided because no single group or individual can fulfill their own needs without cooperating with others. Moreover, in a modern society that is complex and specializes in various fields, exchange is a condition for survival both as a group and individually.

- Psychological Basics of Exchange Transactions

Exchange theory, which is based on the concepts and principles of behavioral psychology and basic economics, was put forward by Homans (in Johnson, 1986: 64). In behavioral psychology, a description of human behavior is given which is shaped by things that reinforce or provide different support. Humans provide positive or negative support to each other in the process of interaction where they shape each other's behavior.

In terms of basic economics, Homans took concepts such as costs, rewards and profits. The description of human behavior provided by economics is that humans are constantly involved in choosing between alternative behaviors with choices that reflect the expected costs and rewards or profits associated with the alternative behavior lines. For Homans, economic exchange in the market related to money can be extended to social exchange. Social support (social approval), such as money can be seen as a form of rewards, and being in a subordinate position in a social relationship can be seen as a cost. The concept of rewards in economics parallels the psychological concept of support, while the economic concept of costs parallels the psychological concept of punishment. By combining these two perspectives, Homans wants to describe social behavior as an exchange that involves at least two people, which is visible or hidden and provides rewards or incurs costs.

How can anyone arrive at a fair-trade standard or a fair comparison between costs and rewards, or between profits and investments? Part of the answer lies in the individual's past experiences. A person in the past has received a certain level of rewards in exchange for a certain level of cost, expects this ratio to persist in the future, or even wants to increase it if the investment is enlarged. If what they get is less than before, people will consider it unfair (Johnson, 1986: 67).

This may help explain the demands of the indigenous Papuans for the second volume of the plan for the continuation of special autonomy. Compared to the previous time, the costs given are not comparable to the rewards received after the implementation of the special autonomy status, where the costs given by the indigenous Papuans actually increase due to environmental and social risks, so it is natural that they want more benefits than before. Social and physical risk can be interpreted as additional investment, so it is necessary to get a balanced exchange rate in the form of material and non-material (power). If the expected exchange is not balanced, then various efforts are made to create a balance between costs and rewards or between investment and profit.

By looking at the direction of development of social and political movements in Papua, it is also seen that currently there is a process of balancing the various values that have developed in the past and present by means of an equal exchange. What was lost or sacrificed in the past is required to be returned through political resistance. In the field of government there is a demand not to extend special autonomy and choose to determine own destiny, from government superiority to community empowerment and from uniformity to diversity.

To speed up the finding of a balance point, the government must respond by developing a system of democratization in every decision making. Democratic means providing opportunities and rewards and freedom for the community to express their aspirations, participate in planning for their future and the freedom to organize their own society. Because the social movement has led to a political movement, the authorities can open channels of communication and influence the movement by bringing it into the framework of the constitutional system.

This attitude was proven by the government by submitting the Draft Revised Special Autonomy Law and Regional Expansion Plan (Province) to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) as a priority program for national legislation (Prolegnas) on December 4, 2020.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGIOUS AND HUMANISTIC VALUES AS DEVELOPMENT PILLAR

7.1. UNDERSTANDING THE ESSENCE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT

1. The essence of social movement is resistance to development policy ignoring the existence of indigenous people

At the initial stage of special autonomy implementation in Papua, the existence of indigenous Papuan people has been ignored and carried out reluctantly by central government. This can be proven by the perception that the indigenous Papuan people know special autonomy only by name, but not knowing its contents and nature clearly and comprehensively. The indigenous Papuan people in this way consider special autonomy as a program to distribute fund for indigenous Papuan people (cargo cult) without need to hold accountable for its use.

The pointless attitude from government against special autonomy implementation in Papua can be seen from the following indicators:

- 1) The formal attitude shown by government to regard social protests taken by community among other by security/military approach; dualism and ambiguity in attitude, for example, by not allowing hearings held by the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) to see how effective is special autonomy implementation in Papua whereas the MRP is a legal institution under Special Autonomy Law for Papua as a cultural representation with right to give consideration in special autonomy implementation; unfinished regulations served as mandate in and implementing regulations for Special Autonomy Law in Papua. In addition, although Papua already has Special Autonomy Law, however, practically, the governmental administration and regional financial management shall refer to Law on Regional Government applicable nationally. This rises to confusion for local governments to implement special autonomy in accordance with law regulating the specificity of autonomy applicable in Papua.
- 2) Feeling of suspicious/distrust to central government against local governments in Papua and indigenous Papuans related to social protest

activities instantly labeled as separatists, and so the Papuan people with government.

- 3) No preparation for social planning and Grand Design for special autonomy development served as blue print in special autonomy implementation in Papua causing the implementation for local government is made based on its own interpretation and there are no indicators used as criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of special autonomy in Papua.
- 4) Uniformity in development patterns for all Papua regions without regard to the topographical and demographic conditions of Papuan people who have distinctive characters according to their customary zones or territories. The pattern used for indigenous Papuans living in coastal areas is therefore applied to indigenous Papuan people living in mountainous areas. This is certainly not appropriate and inviting resistance from community to accept programs and activities carried out by government.

Spontaneous physical protests have been carried out against the policy plan for the second period of special autonomy and regional expansion (province/regency) seemingly unfair since they do not respect the existence and customary rights of indigenous Papuan people but without result. The opposed policy is the centralized planning carried out by Jakarta or "top-down planning", without prior negotiation and/or considering the indigenous Papuan people' aspiration. Even in case of the Papuan People's Assembly intended to hold Hearing Meeting (mid November 2020), to evaluate how effective was the government's special autonomy through security forces (Regional Police of Papua) issuing a ban and arresting MRP members exercising their duties to hold Hearing Meeting. The central government unilaterally submitted the Draft Law on Revision of Special Autonomy to the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) for discussion in the near future; this is a form of the government's ignorance to special autonomy implementation in Papua. The participation of indigenous Papuan people in every policy planning is the deepest essence to their demands, to be recognized and equal with other citizens.

2. Protest as a reaction to social impact on special autonomy implementation

Research shows that policies taken and implemented by government actually have large social impact. These changes include cultural and traditional values, removed religious and spiritual values, changes in source of living patterns, social gap and customary rights deprivation. Moreover, special autonomy policy also invites a large number of investors in Papua to compete in exploiting natural resources without taking into account the impact on environmental damage. This condition leads to drastic social change, and forces indigenous Papuans to adapt these changes.

The social impacts and rapid social changes bring deep disappointment on government policies. Policies that are supposed to improve the quality of indigenous Papuan people's life are not completely enjoyed by indigenous Papuan people. Through these sacrifices, they demanded for improvements, struggling to bring change with protest.

3. Protest as a reflection of conflict

The root of problems triggered protests in Papua are past conflicts related to history of Papua integration with Indonesia and human rights violations resolution, socio-economic and cultural gap between indigenous Papuan people and migrants, including feeling of distrust between government and indigenous Papuan people, and vice versa. Therefore, it may be said that the complexity/multi-problem in Papua is the trigger for the protests.

Protests occur more easily if social conditions are already tense and it happens due to a conflict. The more complex and diverse of the conflicts, the easier the protest becomes. Since the issue of protest is conflict, then the source of the conflict must be eliminated (resolved) to stop it. Although it is theoretically impossible, there should be at least an effort to resolve the conflict by minimizing cost or without cost at all. If someone is forced to pay cost for the continuation of special autonomy policy, it must be made through a cultural and humanitarian approach, respecting the applicable procedures of indigenous peoples in managing and utilizing nature as well as involving them in the planning process.

4. Long Protest due to growing conflict and people demand

Conflict should be functional to make social change for forcing society dynamics. However, if the conflict arises with the authorities in an unbalanced position, then the expression will be made through a protest. In Papua case, the conflict is formidable since there is a huge potential in society, the special autonomy policy aimed at reducing their desire to separate from the Republic of Indonesia has instead become a source of new conflict, since it is not performed to their expectations.

In addition, the government's interest to continue the second period of special autonomy together with regional expansion (province/regency/city) in land of Papua also triggered protests by the community since many parties are not satisfied with current special autonomy administration. This rejection is reflected by following reasons:

- a. The unfinished a number of regulations drafted by government has not completed a number of regulations which are derivatives of the Special Autonomy Law;
- b. Lack of evaluation conducted by central government and local governments on the effectiveness of special autonomy implementation makes impression that each level of government interprets special autonomy implementation according to their own perception;
- c. High suspicion of central government to indigenous Papuans related to social protest activities which were instantly labeled as separatists;
- d. Non-involvement of Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) members, the institution for cultural representation of indigenous Papuan people, to determine the direction of the continued special autonomy implementation by the government;

For this reason, the indigenous Papuan people from various elements of society and organizations including Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) have consistently struggle with growing demands and makes the protests continued. Along with that, collective actions continue taken by TNPPB-OPM uncontrollably.

5. *Social movement as struggle strategy distraction from violence to peaceful resolution*

Various social organizations were formed by elements of the indigenous Papuan community in an effort to express their social protests against special autonomy implementation. Admittedly, not all of them are affiliated with Free Papua Movement, but many of them choose to be affiliated with Free Papua Organization Movement (OPM) to fight for their aspirations. The Customary Deliberation Institution (LMA) is an institution meeting the requirements to be served as social movement organization based on criteria made by Lofland. Formerly, indigenous Papuan people's struggle was mostly carried out by violence or mass demonstrations ended in riots and in group, but this method was considered less effective, so they affiliated with Free Papua Organization Movement (OPM). The unification to various Customary Institutions certainly does not mean eliminating all protests with violence, since the conditions in the field shown that people movements from various ethnic groups mixed in their actions. This strategy is far more effective because it amplifies their struggle internationally.

6. *Types of Social Movement: neoclassical combination with new social movement*

There are three types of social movement if viewed from its concept or, basic assumptions, issues and methods or strategies of struggle i.e.: Classical, Neo-Classical and New Social Movements. The classical was initiated by Karl Marx, it is because of its ideological conflict, issue of struggle by changing the oppressive social structure and the method applied is revolution. The neo-classical is initiated by functionaries; since system change during colonial period, relative deprivation and structural tensions. The method of struggle is through mass mobilization (crowd, riot and rebellion).

Meanwhile, New Social Movement initiators are environmentalists, human rights activists and feminists since the rising of this movement is state's powerful domination against its people, the issues raised related to human rights enforcement, environmental conservation, democratization and strengthening identity. Methods used to achieve goals by organizing, mobilizing resources and building international networks. Social

movements in Papua are a combination of neo-classical elements and new social movements.

7. The characteristics of social movement in Papua: centralized leading figure

In Papua, the customary council generally served as a forum for indigenous social movements in addition to social organizations formed by other community elements and Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) as legitimized in Special Autonomy Law for Papua. The organizational structure and task division have been following modern organizational design. However, in practice all activities are centralized on leader (tribal chief), so that he also serves as social movement leader. If members' activities in new social movement are very concrete, however the follower in social movement in Papua is very passive and therefore relies on their leader's role (tribal chiefs).

A leader is the personification of organization, so he is free to choose policy direction and struggle strategies for his organization. Although in organizational structure positions are shared to others, but this organization is more recognized through its leaders. Accordingly, it is arguable that social movement in Papua has modern forum, but the content is mostly traditional. Movements with traditional motive are prepared and developed with global and modern issues so it is viewed as new social movements.

8. Development without Social planning and Grand Design will throw community into capitalistic culture system

Development policies with special autonomy have created rapid social changes and therefore make indigenous people unable to adapt with new culture brought by the immigrants. In addition, the investor also arrives with their culture which is marked by "boom town" and very specific community behavior i.e., people only work for money and pleasure. They are limited and exclusive. The recruitment for civil servants, security apparatus (TNI/Polri) and company employees are also very strict without giving affirmation to indigenous Papuan people, so it makes very difficult for indigenous Papuans to compete with migrants who are purposely recruited according to their specialty. As a consequence, the indigenous Papuan people are merely being a spectator and holding disappointment and swing in the wave of rapid change without an identity. This is because the

government from the beginning gives no attention to the aspirations and interests of the indigenous Papuan people, and fails to prepare social planning and grand design for special autonomy development before it is implemented in Papua.

In fact, development and other multinational companies are manifestations of capitalistic development system, since it focuses more on oriented-economic growth and globalization rationalization and modernization. Meanwhile, the process from traditional society to modern system takes considerable time. In Papua case, indigenous Papuan people are forced to jump into new system directly without any transition and planning. In such circumstances, either government or multinational companies is dismissed the psychological and sociological impact of two very different acculturation. Naturally, the dominant culture will force the indigenous people to adapt. Due to lack of preparation, the acculturation process is not running smoothly, there is no chance for traditional indigenous people to adapt new capitalist culture.

9. *Failed social development*

Although the special autonomy status has been given to Papua as a response to Papuan people' demand who want to separate from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia or as a win-win solution for problems in Papua, but in reality, it fails to bring prosperity for indigenous Papuan people and to fulfill the basic aspects expected by Papuan people for the following reasons:

▪ *Lack of trust between government and indigineous Papuan people*

Trust is a critical social capital created through a long process. The successful of *Pepera* which led to Papua integration into the Republic of Indonesia was due to high trust and expectations of indigenous Papuan people at that time. When the trust is weaken due to various causes and reasons, then a program or policy that is substantially great or better than the previous one has made the implementation of objectives difficult.

This condition also applies to special autonomy policy which is substantially better than the previous one, but it has made the implementation difficult. A number of obstacles arose as if the policy from the beginning had brought problems because its contents were considered

to have intrinsic defects. In general, the special autonomy policy implemented in Papua is conceptually a very good policy, due to other factors such as context or strategic environment (trust); it is difficult to achieve its objectives. For example, the management and utilization of special autonomy funds must be carried out transparently in order to gain "trust" from community to government.

▪ *Difference in perception*

Perceptions on the expected "special autonomy" implementation are different between government and indigenous Papuan people, so the action will cause dissatisfaction. In addition, the "*skeptical*" indigenous Papuan people' mindset about development makes them having an "*opportunist-pragmatic*" mentality, where everything done at present must be efficient (profitable) otherwise, they will immediately leave it.

▪ *Instant culture*

Dissatisfaction creates growing suspicion and demands and makes the concentration on development distracted. Demands seem to be the goal, so it creates "*instant culture*" (*always looking to others for sustenance or help*). This culture tends to ignore continuous effort, and immediately available.

▪ *Fund distribution in elite groups*

Special autonomy funds disbursed by the government are managed by provincial and district governments throughout Papua. The management model also does not have obvious and definite references, since the approach is elitist; fund is hold by influential figures (regional heads), so it depends on the elite. Meanwhile, the allocation of special autonomy funds in accordance with Special Autonomy Law for Papua, respectively at 15 percent for health and at 30 percent for education, but not all districts/cities have allocated them. In addition, the absence of a specific target makes evaluation indicator difficult. This contributes to the ineffective and inefficient use of special autonomy funds, since elite interests place above the community and it is often misdirection.

▪ *Unsuccessful bottom-up planning process*

Programs and activities for empowering indigenous Papuan people are planned by elite groups, including NGOs. The reason is that the

indigenous Papuan people are considered unable to identify providing themselves. Thus, governments elites, local governments and NGOs are still become initiators.

▪ Lack of competent human resources

Competent Human Resources is one of major factors to be big burden for utilization and development of natural resources owned by local, Papua is no exception. However, improving competent human resources does not come easily within a short time since it requires a sustainable and inclusive program. Educational problems such as lack of school facilities and teaching staff in remote areas, lack of government assistance to provide more incentives for teachers in remote corner of Papua, as well as the customs of the indigenous Papuan people are still constraint. It takes strong commitment from the government in order to promote and build quality education for indigenous Papuan people. In addition, community's participation in stimulating younger generation to participate in formal education launched by the government is highly required. Therefore, it is not impossible that the quality of Papuan human resources can be more improved and competent and they can manage and utilize special autonomy for the prosperity of Papuan people.

▪ Absence of Grand design in special autonomy development

Why so far the implementation of special autonomy in Papua has not been able to improve the welfare of indigenous Papuan people? The answer is special autonomy implementation in Papua has not had a Grand Design for Special Autonomy Development. Through Grand Special Autonomy Design, the Strategy for Accelerating Indigenous Papuan people development will be clear, so it will have obvious goal for the next few decades, for example in next 20 years. In the future, this Grand Design will be a separate blue-print in formulating goals agenda to be achieved through special autonomy. This Grand Design must also have connection (common thread) as an inseparable part of the Medium and Long Term Development Planning (RPJM/P).

Additionally, the Grand Design for Special Autonomy Development will be legal umbrella for using special Autonomy funds for Indigenous Papuan people. This Grand Design will be direction for using Special

Autonomy Fund, even if there will be regional divisions (province/regency/city) in Papua either from two or five and so on. This Grand Design must be agreed mutually by the Papuan people in the customary institution, the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP). In accordance with mandate of Special Autonomy Law for Papua that the management of special autonomy is under the province, so the distribution will not be distributed to regency/cities in all over Papua. If the special autonomy funds are distributed to regency/cities, then it is logical that the provinces also transfer some their authorities to the regency/city managing the special autonomy funds. This means if some authorities are partially transferred, the obligation of regency/city government receiving special autonomy fund will be directly responsible to central government. When this is implemented, there is no point that delay in receiving special autonomy funds is due to long accountability made by regency/cities to the provinces.

The government and Papuan people should now prepare and make Grand Design for Special Autonomy Development in Papua and formulate regulations on mechanism for using special autonomy funds to indigenous Papuans. This is not discriminatory but all parties must be realized that this is award incentives for Indigenous Papuan people. The Special Autonomy Fund is not the only one source of income for development in Papua, but it is one of source of incomes. The other sources of income are therefore used and utilized for developing all communities in Papua. The special autonomy fund is used to develop indigenous Papuans due to being left behind for about thirty-five years before the issuance of special autonomy. It must be a mutual understanding that the government of Papua and West Papua province will naturally prepare and submit Grand Design for Special Autonomy Development to the Central Government to be mutually agreed upon and then ratified according to Government Regulation. When this occurs, special autonomy implementation will be useless and wasting the time.

10. Social movement develops by conflict escalation, change in form, nature and locus

A movement is rooted in social conflict and develops into development issue and then finally turned into political conflict. In the face of such conflicts, the indigenous Papuan people made various efforts to change undesired situation by taking protest or physical resistance. These efforts did not succeed as expected and even got pressure from the government through a security/military approach. Since violence strategy has almost no effect, resistance was carried out diplomatically as a way for peaceful resistance.

It should be noted that out of movement organizations, not all of them are affiliated with Free Papua Organization Movement (OPM). Through institutional strategies, this social movement continues to take action and join political movements. If at first these movements only demand for evaluation of special autonomy implementation in Papua, their ultimate demands as a political movement, is to disintegrate and form state of Papua peacefully. When the government offered option for continued special autonomy with additional funds allocation by revising Special Autonomy Law for Papua, it was responded by stating that "Papua are no longer need special autonomy, because it has failed and want a referendum (self-determination) for Papua".

In addition to movement development by conflict escalation, there was also development by nature and locus. The nature of movement develops from recognition, reform and politics, while the locus of movement develops from local movement to an international. The developed Issues also accumulated, starting from compensation damages for property/land/customary forest, social welfare, environment to democratization and human rights.

7.2. RECOMMENDATION FOR POLICY HOLDERS

1. Building Papua by prioritizing Social Planning and preparing Grand Design

Every society is basically capable of adapting to environmental changes in general sense. However, rapid and drastic changes in almost all

of sectors in life can obscure people's orientation. Only a small number of indigenous Papuans are capable of facing rapid challenges through hard work, while mostly tend to escape from reality or fight with violence. The unpreparedness of indigenous Papuan people in facing the existing challenges as the excess of increased development activities involves social organizations or traditions influencing people's attitudes and behavior patterns. Therefore, the social aspect should not be ignored in development planning. The social aspect should play important role in development planning which calculated as a social cost. In implementing development, especially special autonomy in Papua, the most important thing must be done is to prepare the community first so they can actively participate in every stage of the process.

In other words, the government must change its perspective, not only physical development, but they also have to question to the people by following *three models: cultural approach, religious approach and equality approach "soft power approach", with following policy stages: building trust with indigenous Papuan people (trust building), and then use the trust as strength to change the mindset of indigenous Papuan people (Changing mind set)*. Therefore, social planning and Grand Design preparation for special autonomy development are the keywords in implementing special autonomy policy for inclusive Papua. Technical planning is not enough to accommodate social aspects, due to emphasizing physical and financial aspects but ignoring human aspects. Social Planning and Grand Design for Special autonomy development must be integrated with national development planning (RPJM/P). Through social planning and grand design, special autonomy development is to compensate social losses and prioritize maximum benefit for community in all development processes.

2. Appreciation to indigenous people by participatory development model

This research gives evidence that granting special autonomy status to Papua is unable to resolve conflicts or stop protests taken by indigenous Papuans, since social losses such as respect, security, equality, traditional rights lost and resolution for human rights violations have not been restored. In addition, there are other problems in form of differences in perceptions

between central government and indigenous Papuan people on various fundamental matters. The people's primary demand is not related to the additional amount of special autonomy funds given to Papua if special autonomy is continued, but appreciation for its existence as a human being "*having equal position when standing or sitting and trustworthy*" are values to be struggling through social and political movements. In other words, it concerns social values and relationships, trust and self-esteem. For this reason, conflict resolution must be carried out based on social principles adopted by indigenous Papuan people. Indigenous Papuan people's value must also be respected by migrant communities and government through supportive government policies or regulations. As a party in adapting process to modern world filled with competition, it is normal that the indigenous Papuan people should be protected through affirmations to be crushed by oriented-modern interest development; one of methods is by rehabilitating environment and/or relocating community. The indigenous Papuans affected by development must be relocated to their previous habitats, so that they are not disconnected from nature/lose their source of living, while keep building and guiding to adapt with modern life. Provide access for education and health as wide as possible and as easily as possible for Papuan younger generation in addition to providing affirmations for Papuan graduates entering the workforce.

3. *Rebuilding public trust for government, with dialogue and resolving unfinished past problems.*

The source of conflict as the root of social movements is government's excessive formal attitude (repressive/security approach) in responding to any protests made by the people, stand with investors in oriented to economic growth development (capitalistic approach), with dualism/ambiguity in behavior. This policy not only neglects the indigenous Papuan people's aspiration but also hurts their feelings which results in an aggressive attitude by indigenous Papuan people who feels treated unjustly. Continuous unfair treatment by government makes indigenous Papuan's distrust towards the government.

One of efforts to solve problems in Papua is holding a dialogue with all existing elements, such as the indigenous Papuan people / political elites

/ bureaucracies / customary leaders, religion, women, and others by preparing dialogue format can create new political consensus between Papuan leaders and government. In short, the dialogue format positioning the government and Papuan leaders legitimate to sit together for drafting peace agreements in Papua. The dialogue therefore is not only discussing problematic matters in Papua, but concludes with binding and legitimate political consensus. Formerly, the government tended using repressive approach by making ad-hoc and reactive policies when it shows unexpected direction. It is only a pseudo peace.

4. Discourse on Regional Expansion (Province/Regency/City) must be made based on seven customary areas divisions existing in Papua

Regional expansion plan (province/regency/city) of Central Papua will be reinstated by central government, referring to Law Number 45 of 1999 Law Number 45 of 1999 on the Establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. However, this discourse is opposed by indigenous Papuans, because it is considered incompatible with seven customary areas divisions in Papua which may have potentially polemics in determining the boundaries of customary areas as determinant for prospective Central Papua province in the future.

Based on meeting result on January 26, 2021, attended by local government of Mimika Regency together with five customary representative institutions, such as: *Lemasko* (Customary Institution of Kamoro Tribe), *Lemasa* (Customary Institution of Amungme Tribe), *Kerukunan Keluarga Kaimana*, *Kerukunan Keluarga Fakfak* and delegates from Nduga, they stated that they rejected claim for their customary areas was included in Mee-Pago customary area which actually included in Bomberai customary area. Thus, if the government desired to expand the territory (province/regency) of Central Papua, it would only include four districts: Fakfak, Kaimana, Mimika, and Nduga.

5. Advanced research

Theoretically, this research has proven that the granting of status and special autonomy implementation to Papua fails to suppress social protests taken by indigenous Papuans to government and economic modernization in

traditional society caused has caused sharp social shocks as happened with farming communities in various countries during transition process from traditional to modern. Javanese people in the colonial era with indigenous Papuan people in the reform era are in a very similar situation. They responded by escape from reality and waiting for "*Ratu Adil*" (*Koreri*) and followed by sporadic acts of violence. The difference is "*Ratu Adil*" (*Koreri*) movement in Papua developed into a social movement that grown into a political movement; while in Java, at that time, rebellions could be quelled immediately after their leaders was arrested. This condition was due to the modern organizational strategy at that time was not recognized in Java; while in Papua it could develop because of information technology support. The "*Ratu Adil*" (*Koreri*) movement can transform into modern social movement, although it is not completely. Social movements in traditional societies are strongly affected by local socio-cultural factors with leader figures as their center of strength.

A further question interesting to study is social movements in urban areas, where customs are no longer dominant. Where exactly the source of social movements' strength in urban areas is, the leaders, the funders, or other factors such as mass media and social media using information technology? In this reform era, social movement in urban areas becomes very prominent as well as the role of invisible hand, whose presence can be felt but cannot be detected. Sociologists and anthropologists have duty to explain the activity of movements controlled by invisible hands through in-depth research.

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5. Legislation

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