Equilibrium asset pricing in networks with mutually exciting jumps
- We analyze the implications of the structure of a network for asset prices in a general equilibrium model. Networks are represented via self- and mutually exciting jump processes, and the representative agent has Epstein-Zin preferences. Our approach provides a exible and tractable unifying foundation for asset pricing in networks. The model endogenously generates results in accordance with, e.g., the robust-yetfragile feature of financial networks shown in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2014) and the positive centrality premium documented in Ahern (2013). We also show that models with simpler preference assumptions cannot generate all these findings simultaneously.
Author: | Nicole BrangerORCiDGND, Patrick Konermann, Christoph MeinerdingORCiDGND, Christian Schlag |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-333172 |
URL: | http://ssrn.com/abstract=2521434 |
Parent Title (German): | SAFE working paper series ; No. 74 |
Series (Serial Number): | SAFE working paper (74) |
Publisher: | SAFE |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt am Main |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2014 |
Year of first Publication: | 2014 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2014/11/11 |
Tag: | Asset Pricing; Dynamic Networks; General Equilibrium; Mutually Exciting Processes; Recursive Preferences |
Issue: | Version November 2014 |
Page Number: | 42 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 351054065 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF) | |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | ![]() |