The ignored performance measure
- This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
Author: | Volker LauxGND |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-15245 |
Parent Title (English): | Universität Frankfurt am Main. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften: [Working paper series / Finance and accounting] Working paper series, Finance & Accounting ; No. 117 |
Series (Serial Number): | Working paper series / Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften : Finance & Accounting (117) |
Publisher: | Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt am Main |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2003 |
Year of first Publication: | 2003 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2005/09/16 |
GND Keyword: | Leistungsmessung; Leistungsbewertung |
Issue: | October 2003 |
Page Number: | 42 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 203805895 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Licence (German): | Deutsches Urheberrecht |