P2P lenders versus banks: cream skimming or bottom fishing?
- We develop a simple theoretical model to motivate testable hypotheses about how peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms compete with banks for loans. The model predicts that (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We confront these predictions with data on P2P lending and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates the P2P lenders are bottom fishing when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.
Author: | Calebe de Roure, Loriana PelizzonORCiDGND, Anjan V. Thakor |
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URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-466728 |
URL: | https://ssrn.com/abstract=3174632 |
Parent Title (English): | SAFE working paper series ; No. 206 |
Series (Serial Number): | SAFE working paper (206) |
Publisher: | SAFE |
Place of publication: | Frankfurt am Main |
Document Type: | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Year of Completion: | 2018 |
Year of first Publication: | 2018 |
Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
Release Date: | 2018/06/12 |
Tag: | P2P lending; bank lending; competition |
Issue: | THIS VERSION: April 18, 2018 |
Page Number: | 66 |
Note: | FIRST VERSION: January 31, 2017 ; THIS VERSION: April 18, 2018 |
HeBIS-PPN: | 433319828 |
Institutes: | Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / House of Finance (HoF) | |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) | |
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) | |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
Sammlungen: | Universitätspublikationen |
Licence (German): | ![]() |