Hope and reasons

  • This paper argues that hope can be understood as an attitude or an attitudinal complex that is partially sensitive to reasons. One way that an attitude is sensitive to reasons is that it is permitted given the reasons available. A second way in which an attitude is sensitive to reasons is that it might be required in light of available reasons. This paper argues that hope may be permitted by the available reasons, and although it is sometimes good or praiseworthy to hope, hope is never categorically required. In that sense, hope is partially sensitive to reasons.

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Metadaten
Author:Darrel Moellendorf
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-554495
Parent Title (English):Normative Orders Working Paper ; 02/2020
Series (Serial Number):Normative orders working paper : Normative Orders, Cluster of Excellence at Goethe University Frankfurt, Main (2020,02)
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2020/08/17
Year of first Publication:2020
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2020/08/18
Tag:Benefits; Collective Action; Hope; Reason; Requirements
Volume:2020
Issue:02
Page Number:18
HeBIS-PPN:467900973
Institutes:Exzellenzcluster / Exzellenzcluster Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen
Dewey Decimal Classification:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Sammlungen:Universit├Ątspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung 3.0