Open Access

Sascha-Dominique Wilhelm

• This dissertation consists of four self-contained chapters in the overlapping fields of industrial organization and organizational economics on the topics pricing, careers and supervision. Each chapter is the result of an independent research project. The dissertation analyzes empirical research topics by exploring novel observational data sets. It sheds light on open questions in the economic profession by extending fundamental models on pricing in the first two chapters and by challenging conventional explanations and methods on careers and supervision in the last two chapters. - Chapter 1: The first chapter is based on joint work with Steffen Eibelshäuser. It models price competition among brick-and-mortar retailers with business hours. Specifically, we propose a dynamic model of intraday price competition featuring spatial differentiation and firm size heterogeneity. The model makes detailed predictions concerning equilibrium-pricing patterns. When spatial differentiation is high and consumers cannot easily switch between retailers, equilibrium prices are stable at oligopoly levels. When differentiation is low, equilibrium prices fluctuate in cycles. The shapes of the cycles depend on the level of differentiation and on retailers’ reaction times. When reaction times decrease, the number of price cycles increases. In a second step, we apply the model to the German retail gasoline market. Gasoline retailers have been using digital price tags for decades and fast-paced price competition with more than ten price changes per day is no exception. Our model has successfully predicted the emergence of an additional intraday subcycle in April 2017. Moreover, we were able to confirm several detailed predictions concerning the shape of equilibrium price paths and individual firm behavior. Finally, we calibrate the model using a generalized method of moments. The model fits the data remarkably well, with coefficients of determination ranging from 60% to 80%. We use the fitted model to evaluate a number of policy counterfactuals. Restricting price increases results in higher prices and decreased welfare, leading us to conclude that regulation of dynamic markets is highly complex and can easily backfire. - Chapter 2: The second chapter analyzes the price-matching policies of two gasoline retailers. Customers of these retailers that are able to provide evidence of competitors posting lower prices have the ability to claim price matches. As shown in the first chapter, the Edgeworth Cycle model rationalizes price fluctuations in the German gasoline retail market. To determine policy interactions in cycling markets, this chapter extends the classical Edgeworth Cycle model by price-matching. The model predicts that price-matching retailers post higher prices and initiate price increases. The price-consulted firm anticipates this strategy, posts lower prices, and provokes the implementing firm to restore the price more frequently. Consulted stations also anticipate earlier price restoration reactions from implementing stations and, thus, provoke restorations earlier. This effect dominates in welfare calculations, such that price matching has positive welfare implications. The second part of the chapter tests the hypotheses with price data on the German gasoline retail market. The estimation exploits a discontinuity in the policy-affected retailers. Therefore, the analysis disentangles the competitive effects of implementing and price-consulted market participants in comparison to retailers that are not affected. As predicted, the posted average and minimum prices of one implementing retailer and its consulted competitors increase. For the other price-matching retailer, I find reduced prices that contradict the model. The last part of the chapter relates the empirics to static models and shows that the dynamic component provides previously undiscovered insights. - Chapter 3: The third chapter is based on joint work with Emmanuelle Auriol and Guido Friebel. It represents the subtopic of careers in this dissertation. Specifically, the chapter provides the first comprehensive data collection analysis of women’s careers in all European research institutions in the field of economics. Using a web-scraping algorithm that constantly accesses position information on institutions’ websites, we collect a novel data set on researchers in Europe. These details entail information on researchers’ gender obtained by the first name and a face recognition. Similar to survey data on U.S. institutions, we identify a leaky pipeline, as women are less likely to become professors than men are. The situation is very heterogeneous across Europe. The gap is substantially larger in Western and Southern Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, we identify institutions with a higher research output and a better research-ranking having a systematically lower share of females in full professor positions as well as entry-level positions for Ph.D. graduates. Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are the drivers for this correlation. All these results are in line with the “leaky pipeline” hypothesis, in which, over the different stages of a career, the attrition of women is higher than the one of men. We show that the cohort hypothesis arguing that the lag effect between the time of Ph.D. completion and the time of promotion to a full professorship is unable to explain the current low number of females. - Chapter 4: The fourth and last chapter "What does Mystery Shopping do?" is based on joint work with Sidney Block, Guido Friebel, Matthias Heinz, and Nick Zubanov. It addresses an auditing practice with a yearly U.S.-turnover of 19.5 billion USD in 2016 (European Society for Opinion and Market Research, 2017: Global Market Research 2017). The term mystery represents the key aspect of the tool. During an anonymous visit, so-called mystery shoppers perform certain predefined tasks such as purchasing a product, asking questions, registering complaints, or behaving in a certain way. Following their visit, the shoppers provide detailed reports about their experiences to the evaluated firms. The chapter investigates whether the practice is suitable to determine employees’ pay. Contrary to the general understanding that firms are able to observe service quality and, in turn, can proxy for business success with mystery shopping, we do not observe mystery-shopping evaluations to correlate positively with firm performance. A decomposition of the evaluation reports indicates that mystery-shopping scores are biased and the shopper’s identity explains up to 20% of the score’s variance. Thus, the shopper’s identity has the largest impact out of all observable characteristics. With the results that mystery-shopping scores are noisy and biased, we conclude that they are not suitable for performance pay in the context of our study. In addition, we show that if the number of observations is sufficiently large, aggregated scores relate to business success. The required number of shops per evaluation period must be, however, larger by a factor between 3 and 30 per evaluated subject. Hence, cost advantages of mystery shopping diminish such that the cost benefits to customer assessments could vanish completely. The current methodology, however, may still be useful for other employee-related purposes like monitoring, which is in line with the policies of the considered firms.