Multiple but asymmetric bank financing : the case of relationship lending

  • Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoringintensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing. To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank. JEL - Klassifikation: G21 , G78 , G33

Download full text files

Export metadata

Additional Services

Share in Twitter Search Google Scholar
Author:Ralf Elsas, Frank Heinemann, Marcel TyrellGND
Parent Title (English):CESifo GmbH: CESifo working papers ; No. 1251 : Category 6, Monetary policy and international finance
Document Type:Working Paper
Year of Completion:2004
Year of first Publication:2004
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2005/10/06
Tag:Bank; Finanzierung; Fremdkapital; Kredit; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung; Theorie
lender coordination; multiple bank financing; relationship lending
GND Keyword:Fremdfinanzierung; Fremdkapital; Bankkredit; Kredit; Bank; Unternehmen; Finanzierung; Beschaffungsmarketing; Beziehungsmanagement; Lieferung; Abnehmer
Page Number:47
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht