Relocating the gap : physicalism and phenomenal concepts

  • The central aim of this dissertation is the defense of the metaphysical thesis of Physicalism against two anti-physicalist arguments, namely, the conceivability arguments and the knowledge argument. Both arguments confront Physicalism with apparently incompatible facts about consciousness, in particular, the so-called subjective character of consciousness. Both arguments depart from epistemic premisses to arrive at metaphysical conclusion that physicalism is false. This step will be justified through an inferential connection between conceivability and metaphysical possibility. The hypothesis is that the set of physicalist responses known as the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is the most promising way to respond to the anti-physicalist arguments. In this dissertation I have critically assed the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy and I have defended it from new formulated objections.

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Author:Julia Cavalcanti Telles de Menezes
Referee:André FuhrmannGND, Wilson Mendonça
Advisor:André Fuhrmann
Document Type:Doctoral Thesis
Date of Publication (online):2016/05/04
Year of first Publication:2015
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Granting Institution:Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität
Date of final exam:2016/02/03
Release Date:2016/05/04
Page Number:156
Institutes:Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften / Philosophie
Dewey Decimal Classification:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 10 Philosophie / 100 Philosophie und Psychologie
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht