Online shopping and platform design with ex ante registration requirements

  • We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (nonmonetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the firm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers’ registration decision. Finally, we confirm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition.

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Metadaten
Author:Florian Morath, Johannes Münster
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-429260
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2595
ISBN:0025-1909
ISSN:0025-1909
Parent Title (English):Management Science. Articles in Advance
Publisher:INFORMS
Place of publication:Hanover, Md
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Year of Completion:2017
Date of first Publication:2017/01/05
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2017/02/28
Tag:digital transformation; e-commerce; information; monopoly; platform design; price competition; privacy concerns; registration cost; security concerns
Volume:74
Page Number:22
First Page:1
Last Page:21
Note:
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. You are free to download this work and share with others, but cannot change in any way or use commercially without permission, and you must attribute this work as “Management Science. Copyright © 2017 The Author(s). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2595, used under a Creative Commons Attribution License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.”
HeBIS-PPN:451285735
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitung 4.0