Power-sharing coalitions and ethnic civil war

  • How do coalition governments affect the risk of civil war onset in ethnically divided societies? Existing research argues that power-sharing coalitions decrease the risk of civil war because they redress grievances. Building on a formal model of coalition formation, we predict that ethnic elites are most likely to form oversized rather than minimum-winning coalitions in anticipation of future challenges to the regime. Put differently, we expect most power-sharing to occur where the risk of regime-threatening civil war is highest...

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Metadaten
Author:Nils-Christian Bormann
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-430242
URL:https://bretterblog.wordpress.com/2017/03/12/afk-eupra-1
Parent Title (German):Bretterblog
Document Type:Report
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2017/03/13
Date of first Publication:2017/03/12
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2017/03/13
Page Number:5
HeBIS-PPN:401647544
Institutes:Gesellschaftswissenschaften / Gesellschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 32 Politikwissenschaft / 320 Politikwissenschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung 3.0