Is investor-state arbitration unfair? A freedom-based perspective

  • nvestor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) is an arbitration mechanism to settle disputes between foreign investors and host-states. Seemingly a technical issue in private international law, ISDS procedures have recently become a matter of public concern and the target of political resistance, due to the power they grant to foreign investors in matters of public policies in the countries they invest in. This article examines the practice of ISDS through the lenses of liberal-statist theories of international justice, which value self-determination. It argues that the investor-state arbitration system illustrates how liberal-statist theories of international distributive justice ought to care about relative socioeconomic disadvantage, contra the sufficiency principle that they typically defend. The sufficiency principle draws on a questionable conception of the freedom that self-determination consists in.

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Metadaten
Author:Ayelet Banai
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-451891
DOI:https://doi.org/10.21248/gjn.10.1.112
ISSN:1835-6842
Parent Title (English):Global justice : theory, practice, rhetoric
Publisher:The Global Justice Network
Place of publication:[S.l]
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Year of Completion:2017
Year of first Publication:2017
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2017/12/13
Tag:ISDS; international distributive justice; investor-state arbitration; negative freedom; opportunity freedom; self-determination; value of liberty
Volume:10
Issue:1
Page Number:22
First Page:57
Last Page:78
HeBIS-PPN:426122666
Institutes:Gesellschaftswissenschaften / Gesellschaftswissenschaften
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 34 Recht / 340 Recht
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht