How can a democratic constitution survive an autocratic majority?

  • Can the democratic constitutions of Hungary and Poland survive an autocratic majority? Hardly. Hungary and Poland seem to be lost for liberal and democratic constitutionalism. At least for the time being, the next question is how democratic constitutionalism can prevent an autocratic majority. The task is to make it difficult for an autocratic parliamentary majority to capture the institutions of critique and control of government and to undermine separation of powers.

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Metadaten
Author:Dieter GrimmGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-549930
DOI:https://doi.org/10.17176/20190211-224601-0
Parent Title (German):Verfassungsblog
Publisher:Verfassungsblog.de
Place of publication:Berlin
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Year of Completion:2018
Date of first Publication:2018/12/13
Publishing Institution:Universit├Ątsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2020/07/06
Issue:2018/12/13
Page Number:3
First Page:1
Last Page:3
Note:
LICENSED UNDER CC BY NC ND
HeBIS-PPN:467508879
Institutes:Rechtswissenschaft / Rechtswissenschaft
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 34 Recht / 340 Recht
Sammlungen:Universit├Ątspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoCreative Commons - Namensnennung-Nicht kommerziell - Keine Bearbeitung 4.0