Loss sharing in central clearinghouses: winners and losers

  • Central clearing counterparties (CCPs) were established to mitigate default losses resulting from counterparty risk in derivatives markets. In a parsimonious model, we show that clearing benefits are distributed unevenly across market participants. Loss sharing rules determine who wins or loses from clearing. Current rules disproportionately benefit market participants with flat portfolios. Instead, those with directional portfolios are relatively worse off, consistent with their reluctance to voluntarily use central clearing. Alternative loss sharing rules can address cross-sectional disparities in clearing benefits. However, we show that CCPs may favor current rules to maximize fee income, with externalities on clearing participation.

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Metadaten
Author:Christian KubitzaGND, Loriana PelizzonORCiDGND, Mila GetmanskyGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-772481
URL:https://www.icir.de/fileadmin/user_upload/editors/documents/working_papers/wp_31_optimal_multinetting_v24_icir.pdf
Series (Serial Number):ICIR Working Paper Series (No. 31 [25.10.2023])
Publisher:International Center for Insurance Regulation
Place of publication:Frankfurt am Main
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Year of Completion:2023
Year of first Publication:2023
Publishing Institution:Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg
Release Date:2024/03/28
Tag:Central Clearing; Counterparty Risk; Derivatives; Loss Sharing; OTC markets
Edition:This version: October 25, 2023.
Page Number:100
HeBIS-PPN:516922882
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaften / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE)
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Sammlungen:Universitätspublikationen
Licence (German):License LogoDeutsches Urheberrecht