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This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the call auction procedure on the German stock exchanges. The auction is conducted by the Makler whose position resembles that of a NYSE specialist. We use a dataset which contains information about all individual orders for a sample of stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). This sample allows us to calculate the cost of transacting in a call market and compare them to the costs of transacting in a continuous market. We find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the order book of the continuous market whereas transaction costs for large transactions are higher than the spread in the continuous market.
We further address the question whether active participation of the Makler is advantageous. On the one hand he may accomodate order imbalances, increase the liquidity of the market and stabilize prices. On the other hand, the discretion in price setting gives him an incentive to manipulate prices. This may increase return volatility. Our dataset identifies the trades the Maklers make for their own accounts. We eliminate these trades and determine the price that would have obtained without their participation. Comparing this hypothetical price series to the actual transaction prices, we find that Makler participation tends to reduce return volatility. A further analysis shows that the actual prices are much closer to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session than the hypothetical prices that would have obtained without Makler participation. These results indicate that the Maklers provide a valuable service to the market. We further calculate the profits associated with the positions taken by the Maklers and find that, on average, they do not earn profits on the positions they take. Their compensation is thus restricted to the commissions they receive.
Der vorliegende Beitrag führt eine detaillierte empirische Untersuchung über die Rolle der amtlichen Kursmakler an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse durch. Der verwendete Datensatz erlaubt eine Analyse des Einflusses der Maklertätigkeit auf Liquidität und Volatilität sowie eine Beurteilung der Profitabilität der Eigengeschäfte.
Die Beteiligung der Makler am Präsenzhandel ist erheblich. Ihre Eigengeschäfte machen über 20% des Handelsvolumens zu gerechneten Kursen und über 40% des Handelsvolumens im variablen Handel aus. Für letzteren wird zudem dokumentiert, daß die Tätigkeit der Makler zu einer deutlichen Reduktion der Geld-Brief-Spannen beiträgt. Die letztendlich gezahlte effektive Spanne beträgt im Durchschnitt weniger als ein Drittel der Spanne, die sich aus dem Orderbuch ergibt.
Für den Handel zu gerechneten Kursen wird gezeigt, daß die Preisfeststellung durch die Makler zu einer Verringerung der Volatilität führt. Eine Beurteilung des Einflusses der Makler auf die Volatilität im fortlaufenden Handel scheitert daran, daß das hierfür teilweise verwendete Maß, die Stabilisierungsrate, nach unserer Einschätzung keine aussagekräftigen Resultate liefert.
Die Makler erzielten während unseres Untersuchungszeitraums im Durchschnitt keinen Gewinn aus ihren Eigengeschäften. Eine Zerlegung der Gewinne in zwei Komponenten zeigt, daß positive Spannengewinne im Aggregat nicht für entstehende Positionierungsverluste kompensieren können.
Insgesamt zeigt unsere Untersuchung, daß die Kursmakler an den deutschen Wertpapierbörsen einen Beitrag zur Sicherung der Marktqualität leisten. Die Konsequenzen dieser Resultate für die Organisation des Aktienhandels in Deutschland werden diskutiert.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.