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Against the difficult background of analysing aggregated data in this paper core inflation in the euro area is estimated by means of the structural vector autoregressive approach. We demonstrate that the HICP sometimes seems to be a misleading indicator for monetary policy in the euro area. We furthermore compare our core inflation measure to the wide-spread "ex food and energy" measure, often referred to by the ECB. In addition we provide evidence that our measure is a coincident indicator of HICP inflation. Assessing the robustness of our core inflation measure we carefully conclude that it seems to be quite reliable. This Version: April, 2002 Revised edition published in: Allgemeinenes Statistisches Archiv, Vol 87, 2003. Klassifikation: C32, E31
Since the second half of the nineties the euro area has been subject to a considerable accumulation of temporary and idiosyncratic price shocks. Core inflation indicators for the euro area are thus of utmost interest. Based on euro area-wide data core inflation in this paper is analyzed by means of an indicator derived from the generalized dynamic factor model. This indicator reveals that HICP inflation strongly exaggerated both the decline as well as the increase in the price trend in 1999 and 2000/2001. Our results reinforce those achieved by Cristadoro, Forni, Reichlin and Versonese (2001) based on euro area country data which indicates the robustness of the indicator. Klassifikation: C33, E31
This paper reviews the factors that will determine the shape of financial markets under EMU. It argues that financial markets will not be unified by the introduction of the euro. National central banks have a vested interest in preserving local idiosyncracies (e.g. the Wechsels in Germany) and they might be allowed to do so by promoting the use of so-called tier two assets under the common monetary policy. Moreover, a host of national regulations (prudential and fiscal) will make assets expressed in euro imperfect substitutes across borders. Prudential control will also continue to be handled differently from country to country. In the long run these national idiosyncracies cannot survive competitive pressures in the euro area. The year 1999 will thus see the beginning of a process of unification of financial markets that will be irresistible in the long run, but might still take some time to complete.
Equal size, equal role? : interest rate interdependence between the Euro area and the United States
(2003)
This paper investigates whether the degree and the nature of economic and monetary policy interdependence between the United States and the euro area have changed with the advent of EMU. Using real-time data, it addresses this issue from the perspective of financial markets by analysing the effects of monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic news on daily interest rates in the United States and the euro area. First, the paper finds that the interdependence of money markets has increased strongly around EMU. Although spillover effects from the United States to the euro area remain stronger than in the opposite direction, we present evidence that US markets have started reacting also to euro area developments since the onset of EMU. Second, beyond these general linkages, the paper finds that certain macroeconomic news about the US economy have a large and significant effect on euro area money markets, and that these effects have become stronger in recent years. Finally, we show that US macroeconomic news have become good leading indicators for economic developments in the euro area. This indicates that the higher money market interdependence between the United States and the euro area is at least partly explained by the increased real integration of the two economies in recent years.
This paper provides a broad empirical examination of the major currencies' roles in international capital markets, with a special emphasis on the first year of the euro. A contribution is made as to how to measure these roles, both for international financing as well as for international investment. The times series collected for these measures allow for the identification of changes in the role of the euro during 1999 compared to the aggregate of euro predecessor currencies, net of intra -euro area assets/liabilities, before stage 3 of EMU. A number of key factors determining the currency distribution of international portfolio investments, such as relative market liquidity and relative risk characteristics of assets, are also examined empirically. It turns out that for almost all important market segments for which data are available, the euro immediately became the second most widely used currency for international financing and investment. For the flow of international bond and note issuance it experienced significant growth in 1999 even slightly overtaking the US dollar in the second half of the year. The euro's international investment role appears more static though, since most of the early external asset supply in euro is actually absorbed by euro area residents.
No one seems to be neutral about the effects of EMU on the German economy. Roughly speaking, there are two camps: those who see the euro as the advent of a newly open, large, and efficient regime which will lead to improvements in European and in particular in German competitiveness; those who see the euro as a weakening of the German commitment to price stability. From a broader macroeconomic perspective, however, it is clear that EMU is unlikely to cause directly any meaningful change either for the better in Standort Deutschland or for the worse in the German price stability. There is ample evidence that changes in monetary regimes (so long as non leaving hyperinflation) induce little changes in real economic structures such as labor or financial markets. Regional asymmetries of the sorts in the EU do not tend to translate into monetary differences. Most importantly, there is no good reason to believe that the ECB will behave any differently than the Bundesbank.