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The text reframes the current debate about refugees in Germany by contrasting Germany’s recent history of racist violence and limitations of asylum laws with the resistance and agency of refugee movements across Germany. Both provide an important lens to re-examine the simultaneous heralding of „welcome culture“, a sharp rise in arson attacks on asylum centres and the current legislative roll-back of refugee rights in Germany.
This is the seventh article in our series on refugees. This article deals with the accommodation of Syrian refugees living in Germany. Based on my personal experience living in a refugee camp („Heim“) in the city of Cologne (Köln), and based on relevant literature, the article will, firstly, address the different types of temporary residences for refugees in Germany, and, secondly, the process through which refugees pass while looking for a permanent accommodation. Thirdly, and most importantly, the article discusses the ongoing shift within Köln’s urban and social structure in the light of the emerging resettlement of refugees. Although the urban structure of Köln, like many other German cities, has a certain level of urban segregation manifested in the settlement of immigrant communities (Friedrichs 1998, p.1), I argue that, on the contrary, the resettlement of Syrian refugees shows coherence and dispersion. The article is accompanied by a mapping survey that investigates on the spatial aspect of the accommodation distribution...
In this review, I argue that this textbook edited by BENNETT and CHECKEL is exceptionally valuable in at least four aspects. First, with regards to form, the editors provide a paragon of how an edited volume should look: well-connected articles "speak to" and build on each other. The contributors refer to and grapple with the theoretical framework of the editors who, in turn, give heed to the conclusions of the contributors. Second, the book is packed with examples from research practice. These are not only named but thoroughly discussed and evaluated for their methodological potential in all chapters. Third, the book aims at improving and popularizing process tracing, but does not shy away from systematically considering the potential weaknesses of the approach. Fourth, the book combines and bridges various approaches to (mostly) qualitative methods and still manages to provide abstract and easily accessible standards for making "good" process tracing. As such, it is a must-read for scholars working with qualitative methods. However, BENNETT and CHECKEL struggle with fulfilling their promise of bridging positivist and interpretive approaches, for while they do indeed take the latter into account, their general research framework remains largely unchanged by these considerations. On these grounds, I argue that, especially for scholars in the positivist camp, the book can function as a "how-to" guide for designing and implementing research. Although this may not apply equally to interpretive researchers, the book is still a treasure chest for them, providing countless conceptual clarifications and potential pitfalls of process tracing practice.
In the last few years, Myanmar has undergone a severe and unexpected change. The military-led country has been starting to open up its borders and economy, enhance citizens’ rights and, allegedly, democratize. While the EU and US were quick to celebrate the changes and lift sanctions in return, a number of questions remain: Will the changes be sustainable? Does the opening-up indicate a movement towards democracy? What were the reasons for the military to relinquish some of its power – and has it actually done so in the first place?
Part IV of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat".
One element within US counter-terrorism strategies is “reducing terrorist group cohesion”, as the think tank RAND recommends in one of its reports. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) puts these recommendations into actions. Reports like ”Cracks in the Foundation” or ”Dysfunction and Decline” vividly depict the internal disagreement and disunity between al-Qaeda central (AQ) and its regional affiliates, most of all AQ in Iraq (AQI). Albeit these reports are drafted by pundits and certainly provide meaningful and often rare insights into the inner life of the global jihadi movement, they also serve another purpose: to deliberately amplify the very same trend they describe: disunity...
In the ‘age of transnationalization’, spatial mobility is highly valued as a resource and accordingly ‘sedentariness’ is often symbolically devalued. Migration between Poland and Germany (mainly from Poland to Germany) has a century-long tradition. Not only has it yielded the emergence of a dense transnational social space, but is also considered as a re-enactor of cultural traits and symbolic meanings. Spatial mobility is tied to notions of social mobility and to projects of life-making. Since legal restrictions for Polish migrants seeking to work and settle in Germany have vanished, the quest for ‘normalcy’ has enhanced and pressures towards even more migration have increased. I argue that symbolic meanings of mobility are decisive for hierarchies in transnational social spaces. I have put main emphasize on families’ practices of caring for and caring about each other: the first being more a physical or material activity, while the latter is a more symbolic and emotional one. The interviews reveal that people draw multiple differentiations between migrant populations in terms of their migration reasons as well as between the mobile and the immobile. Those differentiations are embedded in the distinct feature of the transnational social space between Poland and Germany with assumed differences in terms of ‘modernity’. At the end the symbolic meanings of mobility also help explain the puzzle of why the emigration rates from Poland are constantly high, although Poland is a comparatively wealthy country.
Persons traveling to participate in foreign conflicts by no means constitute a new phenomenon that is intrinsically tied to the ‘Islamic State’ (‘IS’). However, law enforcement agencies all over the world increasingly focus on foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq due to a considerable rise in their number as well as the perceived threat they pose upon their return. Currently, around 650 German residents and citizens have travelled to the region to support jihadist groups such as the ‘IS’.
This is the first article in our series on refugees.Attempts to address the current crisis often seek to make distinctions between ‘refugees’ and ‘migrants’ and between refugees / migrants and citizens. But, I suggest, these distinctions are part of the problem. Part of the solution is to rethink our histories of ‘national states’ – and the rights and claims they enable – through a ‘connected sociologies’ approach that acknowledges the shared histories that bring states and colonies together....
Sublimity, negativity, and architecture. An essay on negative architecture through Kant to Adorno
(2015)
Architecture defines and consumes people. It exposes them to a multitude of varieties of different aesthetic engagements. Architecture becomes a lived experience. However, this lived experience is always caught in the inner workings of the social and more specifically within cultural ideology. In modern capitalism, culture pervades every aspect of our lives. It shows its presence everywhere from our own homes to the public streets. Culture is everywhere, and architecture is a tool used for both the benefit and detriment of the “culture industry”. Kant speaks of the sublime as a profound moment of reason realizing its ability to overcome its own limits. In this experience is it possible to be completely ravaged and descend into hades and melancholy? Is there a beauty in this descent? More specifically, can architecture become banal or pedestrian, uplifting or depressing? According to Theodor Adorno, our subjectivity is defined by the constant dialectical struggle between freedom and unfreedom (among other things). It is realizing our freedom in the face of our unfreedom that makes us truly able to attain some form of resistance. The sublime experience can be transformed into a spirit of revelation and beautifully allow us to in a way resist the one-dimensional tendencies of modern capitalism. Architecture, which is immersed in our societal being and contributes to many of our own subjective unfreedoms, comes to define our lives as inhabited space. When does architecture produce a sublime experience? Can architecture’s authentic “aura” stand out amongst the reproduced city and produce a sublime feeling that can be a form of resistance against the culture industry? Does Grand Central Terminal provide the key to an architecturally sublime experience? Using dialectical experience and examining the sublime feeling (in a critique of the Kantian sublime) as the key to breaking through the culture industry’s banal architectural hold on our subjectivity, this essay will examine the experience of the sublime as a key to unfolding resistance in the face of the banality of modern architecture in the city and opening our minds to the Great Refusal through the exploration of Grand Central Terminal.
This paper1 investigates changes in the domestic work sector when passing from the informal to the formal labor market. The issue is explored within the context of the housework voucher policy (titres-services), which allows households to officially purchase weekly housework services from an authorized agency, through vouchers. This contribution has therefore a twofold focus: observing changes in labor market dynamics and investigating workers’ perception of this change. In order to discuss these issues, I will firstly look at the step from informal to formal labor market through two aspects: ethnic niches and individual labor dynamics – two bedrocks of Brussels domestic work market. Then, I will analyze workers’ personal experiences when acquiring a declared job in the voucher system.
Analyzing objective and subjective changes, a entral question of this article is to which extent the switch to the housework voucher system can bring empowerment to domestic workers. The sector work quality, in objective and subjective terms, has improved mainly by the setting of rules and by allowing workers to enjoy labor rights and a work status. The formal market dynamics of the housework voucher system remain, however, profoundly ethicized and marked by women’s presence, as was/is the shadow market.
The article shows that workers’ understanding of the transition from an informal to a formal sector is largely a result of their previous experiences and social position, mainly regarding migration status. This change will be thus much more assertive for workers who had their migrant status regularization and work formalization processes concomitantly, demonstrating that the most empowering shift is the one of acquiring papers, and not of entering declared work.
However far we are from either in practice, basic global and intergenerational justice, including climate change mitigation, are taken to be theoretically compatible. If population grows as predicted, this could cease to be the case. This paper asks whether that tragic legacy can now be averted without hard or even tragic choices on population policy. Current generations must navigate between: a high-stakes gamble on undeveloped technology; violating human rights; demanding unbearable sacrifices of the already badly off; institutional unfairness across adults; institutional unfairness across children; failing to protect children’s basic interests; and threatening the autonomy of the family. We are not yet forced to choose between bequeathing a tragic choice and making one, by adopting basically unjust measures. However, even the remaining options present a morally hard choice. The fact we face it is yet another damning indictment on the combined actions and collective failures of the global elite.
Climate justice
(2015)
In my paper, I intend firmly to criticize Taubes' interpretation of Benjamin's Theology as a modern form of Gnosticism (Benjamin as a modern Marcionit). In a positive way, I sustain rather the thesis that Benjamin's Messianism is in close connection with his conception of reason (“the sharpened axe of reason”) and, in particularly, with the paradoxical unity of Mysticism and Enlightenment, which, according to the famous definition of Adorno, distinguishes his thought. As a radically anti-magical and anti-mythical conception of the historical time, Benjamin's Messianism has to be considered as an original synthesis between motifs of the mystical tradition of the Jewish Kabbalah and motifs belonging to the rationalist tradition of the Jewish philosophy. Moving from Cohen's standpoint of a continuity between Maimonides and Kant, I consider therefore the affinity between his messianic conception of history and that of Benjamin. Both, Benjamin and Cohen, share, together with the reference to the a priori of the idea of justice, the reference to the Kantian connection between rationality and hope. Hence originates the non-eschatological Messianism of both. Motives of difference between Cohen and Benjamin’s messianic idea are to be found, conversely, in their different way to consider the idea of "the infinite task" and of its infinite fulfillment in the context of the historical time. Unlike the fundamentally ethical interpretation that Cohen gives of this relationship, Benjamin understands it ontologically in a monadological sense. This explains the constitutive relationship that exists, in Benjamin's philosophy, between Origin, Fragment and Revelation. In the light of this connection, Benjamin's messianic understanding of the historical time exceeds the Scholemian alternative between a restorative and a utopian conception of Messianism. Consequently, the Krausian motto “Ursprung ist das Ziel” (“The Origin is the Goal”) displays its truth in the idea of the messianic fragment or spark.
European energy policy dates back to the founding days of integration, yet the emergence of supranational governance is a recent development. The article examines the extent to which European policymakers have succeeded in building up governance capacity, and what the facilitating and impeding factors were that have shaped the governance mix. The conceptual framework differentiates between orders of governance in the multilevel context, and between policy modes involving hierarchical and non-hierarchical settings and varying actor constellations. The article finds that governance capacity has emerged where second order governance (institutional and procedural rules) is concerned, while first order governance (the concrete policy process) remains the remit of national and private actors. This becomes even more obvious once the interaction between policy modes is taken into account: governance networks enhance governance capacity in the area of competition policy and agency governance; self-regulation by industry constitutes a fall-back option in case of insufficient governance capacity on cross-border issues; soft governance helps to bridge multiple policy areas and levels of governance. The article concludes that second order governance may prove effective where it combines with hierarchy but that it may fail to overcome both trade-offs between contradicting goals and resistance at lower levels.
The burning of the Jordan pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh created a worldwide outcry, which was noticeably vocal in the Islamic world. Not only were we able to see people taken to the streets, we could also witness an utter condemnation of this act by prominent religious institutions like al-Azhar. Moreover, even before this terrific event the so called Islamic State (IS) has been criticized on various occasions by prominent Muslim scholars. The common trope these statements share is that despite its name, IS does not represent “true Islam”. The most prominent document in this regard surely is the open letter, which was addressed to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed “caliph” of IS, signed by 174 prominent Muslim figures and spokespersons from all over the world and which has been translated into multiple languages. The Facebook group that formed around this letter has currently reached over 100.000 likes and has developed into a hub for people from all over the world, who oppose IS ideology from a Muslim perspective. Although there has been some media coverage mentioning the publication of the letter, its actual contents have not been discussed very much in detail so far. So what does the document actually say?
The prefix cyber, prepended onto terms like war, peace, security, and so on, results in interesting word combinations which we construct with our spoken language. Many scholars, from political to social science, have discussed the terms and the semantics of it in order to understand the problem and to create some scientific value out of it. But this article will not be another endless discussion on whether cyberfoo exists somewhere in any computer network at the moment or not...
Do economic fluctuations change the labour market attachment of mothers? How is the reentry process into the labour market after childbirth dependent on the country context women live in? Are these processes affected by occupational status? We address these questions using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth and the German Life History Study. Event history analyses demonstrate that in Germany and the United States, mothers who work in high occupational status jobs before birth return more quickly to their jobs and are less likely to interrupt their careers. During legally protected leave periods, mothers return at higher rates, exemplifying that family leaves strengthen mothers’ labour force attachment. Economic fluctuations mediate this latter finding, with different consequences in each country. In the United States, mothers tend to return to their jobs faster when unemployment is high. In Germany, mothers on family leave tend to return to their jobs later when unemployment is high. The cross-national comparison shows how similar market forces create distinct responses in balancing work and care.
ISIS' politics of sex
(2015)
Part III of our series on ISIS : "Blogforum 'Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat#".
In the late summer of 2014, the international community watched helplessly as ISIS unleashed widespread serious human rights violations against civilians across Syria and Iraq. Of note, were the different forms of sexual abuse initially directed against women from the Yazidi community of Sinjar, but rapidly expanded to women from many regions and backgrounds. Far from being attributable to isolated incidents or to the behavior of a few individuals, the abuses were, and continue to be, part of the “sexual politics” implemented by ISIS in all “wilayas” (regions) under its control and endorsed by its military hierarchy. The abuses represent a clear example of the use of rape as a weapon of war, based on the “theology of sexuality” in a war zone. Fatwas and theological arguments inspired by the medieval practices of historical Muslim armies provide the justification for the policies and practices.
Last week, this year’s ISA conference brought together over 5000 scholars and exhibitors from all over the world to discuss all things international, political, scholarly, hold meetings, get lunch together, and party at Mardi Gras (it was in New Orleans, after all!). Similar to last year, a lot of this discussing took also place on Twitter. Scholars-slash-tweeps rallied around the hashtag #isa2015 to talk to each other online about great (and not so great) panels, trends in IR scholarship, gender bias in academia, and (not surprisingly for an academic conference) coffee. Who was most active during ISA2015 on Twitter? What were the most hotly debated topics online? When did ISAlers tweet?
I’m probably not alone in observing that there seems to be an increasing number of data articles being published in the field of conflict studies and IR. Together with some colleagues, I’m even preparing one myself at the moment! Is that perceived increase in data publication actually measurable? And does it indeed amount to “drowning”?
Some are arguing that the the Responsibility to Protect, an international norm that aims to prevent mass atrocities, was faltering, because of its abuse in Libya and its non-application in Syria. However, Gregor Hofmann argues in this cross-post from the ICRtoP-Blog that the critics' interpretation was limiting R2P to its interventionist aspects. If one looks at the whole set of norms that is included in R2P, it becomes apparent that R2P is under pressure, but not yet death...
Ibegin by providing some background to conceptions of responsibility. I note the extent of disagreement in this area, the diverse and cross-cutting distinctions that are deployed, and the relative neglect of some important problems. These facts make it difficult to attribute responsibility for climate change, but so do some features of climate change itself which I go on to illuminate. Attributions of responsibility are often contested sites because such attributions are fundamentally pragmatic, mobilized in the service of a normative outlook. We should be pluralists about responsibility and shape whatever conceptions can help to explain, guide, and motivate our responses to climate change. I sketch one such notion, ‘intervention-responsibility’, and argue that it should be ascribed to international regimes and organizations, states and other jurisdictions, individuals, and firms. Each has different capacities and thus different intervention-responsibilities responsibilities, but these differences are not always mirrored in public discussion. In particular, the moral responsibility of firms has been greatly neglected.
This is the eleventh article in our series on refugees. I came to Frankfurt four months ago. Before that, I had lived in Trentino, Italy, for 14 years. But with the European economic crisis, everything has become difficult; I finally lost my job and decided to go to Germany to give it a new try. Everybody knows that in Germany there are much better chances to get work because the economy doesn’t have such big problems like in Italy, Greece and Spain...
International society consists of states and the rules and institutions they share. Although international society has become a mundane feature of the world and the principal research focus of International Relations, it has become meaningless. More specifically, the technical rules that determine what states are and how they relate to other features of the world are units of semantic meaning, but their rampant, unprincipled proliferation has corroded their capacity to contain existential meaning. This deterioration is to be deplored because it alienates subjects from each other, it is totalising and excludes alternatives, and it is theoretically irreversible. To connect the two kinds of meaning, the first step is to reconceptualise international society as consisting strictly of constitutive rules whose meaning depends on the context they jointly compose, which implies that these rules can in turn be represented as signs in a semiotic structure. In order to evaluate the capacity of the signs to contain existential meaning, the next step is to adapt Baudrillard’s hierarchical typology of semiotic systems, ranging from the most meaningful systems based on symbolic exchange value to the vapid terminus of hyperreality based on sign value, in which semantic meaning is without value and existential meaning is impossible. The narrative traces the history of the signs of international law from the premodern period, when Christendom was understood as an approximation of the divine kingdom and a vehicle for salvation, to the present postmodern period, in which hundreds of articles of international maritime law make the decision to go to war over isolated rocks intelligible – even rational – and international trade law catalogues potato products to six digits. Three cases in particular exemplify this devolution in international law: the laws determining the territorial sea, the most-favoured national principle of international trade law, and nationality as a normative basis for statehood.
t is becoming less and less controversial that we ought to aggressively combat climate change. One main reason for doing so is concern for future generations, as it is they who will be the most seriously affected by it. Surprisingly, none of the more prominent deontological theories of intergenerational justice can explain why it is wrong for the present generation to do very little to stop worsening the problem. This paper discusses three such theories, namely indirect reciprocity, common ownership of the earth and human rights. It shows that while indirect reciprocity and common ownership are both too undemanding, the human rights approach misunderstands the nature of our intergenerational relationships, thereby capturing either too much or too little about what is problematic about climate change. The paper finally proposes a way to think about intergenerational justice that avoids the pitfalls of the traditional theories and can explain what is wrong with perpetuating climate change.
The role of social groups in making historical events succeed takes shape according to two important factors: Their ability to change and the kind of their contribution to the development of that change in a way or another. The role of social groups especially emerges at times of revolutions and their subsequent changes on the political, socioeconomic and even intellectual levels. The most active and capable group to achieve change is the group of youth and students. In the revolutionary movements in Latin America, for instance, students prominently contributed to the fall down of long-lasting totalitarian dictatorships such in Chile, Brazil and Argentina. In the Arab uprisings in 2010-2011, students‘ roles varied from one country to another based on three axes of context, networks and contentious practices. This article expands on the role of Egyptian student movement in thriving for change despite the intensified restrictions by the state and how it continued its protest under repressive circumstances as a political actor...
Political rationality as a theory is important in its own right. Government leaders must calculate political costs such as the resources needed to generate support for a policy, the implications of a policy decision for re-election, and the possibility of provoking hostility for decisions not well received. Bounded rationality approach has yielded an enhanced understanding of how government organizations may produce unexpected or even unpredicted policy or program results. With public organizations not operating under full rationality conditions, administrators aspiring toward rationality may nonetheless find their goals undermined by a variety of forces, such as informational uncertainties and non-rational elements of organisational decision-making...
After five years of the Syrian war, we can recognize “four” conflicting parties on the ground – Assad, ISIS, rebel groups and the Kurds. Each one of these conflicting parties has regional and international backers, who ironically do not agree with each other about whom they are fighting for or against. The Syrian regime is backed by Iran, Russia, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias. ISIS is backed by the flood of global Jihadists from all over the world. Rebel groups are backed by Gulf States, Turkey, Jordan and the US. The Kurds are supported by the US. While in the media, we always say “the Syrian conflict, crisis or war”, I wonder what makes this war that much Syrian. It is rather a war on the land of Syria, in which more than 50% of Syria’s population have been displaced, over 220 thousand have been killed, and many more have been injured or imprisoned. According to Amnesty international, more than 12.8 million Syrian people are in “urgent need of humanitarian assistance”. In addition to this humanitarian catastrophe, most of the Syrian land and infrastructure have been destroyed. So what is that Syrian about the Syrian “war”?...
Practicing politics within religious frameworks is more likely to increase states‘ fragility. While employing religious references in political discourses could foster positive outcomes such as avoiding dangerous eruptions of violence under authoritarian regimes, it could also increase the space for political and religious elites to instrumentalise religion for their own interests. Such patterns of instrumentalisation are more common in the Middle East; especially the dominant religion in the region is Islam, which enjoys a decentralised mode of function...
Religion in the Middle East seems to define allies and enemies inside and outside the political borders. On the one hand, Shiite Iran is allies with the Iraqi government, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, revolutionary forces in Bahrain and the Syrian regime. On the other hand, Sunni Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, Egypt, Turkey and Sunni elements in the region form an alliance against what they call the expansion of the Iranian influence. There is an unmistaken pattern of alliance in the Middle East, in which states, monarchies and forces seem to define their allies and enemies based on sectarian dimensions, and by which we witness a minority oppressing a majority when it is possible and vice versa across the Middle East including Israel...
When the Iranian revolution embarked against Muhammad Reza Shah’s regime in the late 70s, it wasn’t a social revolution aiming at changing the society, but rather a political one with legitimate demands similar to what Syrians once were looking forward to achieve in 2011. When all this started in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the most central and inspirational figure in the Iranian revolution was still in exile. This is a story that happened 35 years ago and we cannot but see the rhyming of its events with the current Syrian imbroglio...
Using religious frameworks in political contestation and mobilisation processes has become more eminent in recent decades spiralling an intricate debate on the conceptualisation and implementation of such references in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region The contradiction, it is argued, mainly lies in the compromising nature of politics and the relatively dogmatic nature of religion. Accentuated by inaccurate media coverage and primordial analytical frameworks, it has become tempting to see religion as responsible for conflicts and underachievement in the MENA region...
This report was written by the organizers of the workshop "Accounting for Combat-Related Killings," which took place at the Goethe University Frankfurt in July 2014. Scholars from Israel, the United Kingdom, the United States,, Canada, and Germany came together to present and discuss case studies on the discourse practices involved in accounting for combat-related killings in different national and transnational contexts. Intending to reflect on the methodological skills needed to analyze newly available process data, the workshop brought together scholars using different methodological approaches (here mainly ethnomethodology and critical discourse analysis). In regard to the global trend towards increasing numbers of so called permanent, asymmetric, small, and permanent wars, the report turns to concepts, methods, and empirical findings that foster understandings of the difficulties war generates at social, cultural and political levels as well as the manner in which these predicaments are negotiated, denied, or deflected. The report summarizes the workshop by presenting the papers in a specific order, beginning with accounting in combat, followed by tribunals of accounting, and finally the sedimentation of accounting in cultural representations.
This thesis develops a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the impact of slow-onset climate and environmental changes on human migration in developing countries. Its regional focus is on the West African Sahel, where the majority of the population depends on agriculture and thus is highly vulnerable to environmental changes. Migration from fragile environments is predominantly considered one of several household strategies to adapt to and minimise the risk of environmental stress. Based on qualitative and quantitative data from two selected rural study areas, Bandiagara in Mali and Linguère in Senegal, this thesis analyses the drivers of migration from the two areas.
The findings illustrate that, even though people highly depend on the natural environment, migration motives are manifold and that migration often is not a household strategy to cope with environmental changes. Although environmental conditions shape migration in the region and the migrants’ support is crucial for most households, environmental stress plays a relatively small role as a driver of migration - at least in Mali, where it is considerably less important than in Senegal. On the contrary, migration is often driven by better opportunities elsewhere rather than by livelihood stressors in the home area. Particularly the migration of young people is often an individual rather than a household decision and influenced by individual aspirations, such as aspirations for consumer goods or a better future, rather than by environmental stress.
This thesis claims that research should consider people’s capabilities to migrate or to stay as well as their individual aspirations and preferences - in addition to the household’s needs and the opportunities elsewhere. This is important in order to explain why some people stay in and others migrate from an area affected by environmental stress, though living under similar conditions. Depending on people’s capabilities to choose freely between staying and migrating and their preferences and aspirations for one or the other activity, people can either be “voluntary migrants”, “voluntary non-migrants”, “forced migrants” or “trapped people”.
Moreover, it is important to consider social trends and transformation processes in the analysis of the linkages between environment change and migration. Higher education levels and aspirations to a “modern” lifestyle among young people, for instance, might decrease the impact of environmental factors on migration, despite worsening environmental conditions.
Ruling parties as communities of practice and collective identity in China-Ethiopia relations
(2015)
While it helps to put the overemphasis on Chinese agency in the literature into perspective, the recent debate on the role played by African agency in Sino-African relations generally adopts the same rationalist perspective on international politics, and thus stands to miss important aspects of the relations studied. This paper takes the example of Ethiopia, which is often used to highlight African elites’ strategic use of the new options presented by China’s rise, and analyses it from a constructivist perspective. Such a perspective proposes that we need to take the role played by ideas, discourses and emotions seriously, and that Ethiopian policy makers do not exist outside a dense web of personal relations, common knowledge, and shared practices that inadvertently structure their relations with China. More specifically, it is argued here that the ruling parties of China and Ethiopia are linked together in an international community of practice, that exchanges within this community have strengthened the perception of like-mindedness, and that Sino-Ethiopian relations therefore rest on a different basis than is acknowledged by purely rationalist accounts.
In the nineties, Habermas redirected his political writings to the post-national constellation (global and European) and the possibilities of a society politically integrated through transnational democracy (or post-national democracy). This thematic reorientation took place on two fronts. The first one is the global transnational democracy, which includes the impacts of the economic globalization on national democracies, as well the proposal for a political Constitution for a pluralistic world society, based on a constitutionalization of international law. The second one is the European transnational democracy, which includes the redefinition of the political profile of European welfare state for an economic liberal profile, as well the paradox of democratic technocracy operated by European institutions and the proposal to overcome the decoupled technocratic policy model. This paper will address only this last topic, describing the reasons of the democratic deficit and the consequent delay of European political Union. Despite numerous reforms, the technocratic policies have not eliminated the discrepancy between centralization and democratization, and mistakenly indicate another direction further reinforcing the problem of European undemocratic institutions. In contrast, Habermas argues that the democratic deficit could only be overcome replacing the technocratic approach by a deeper democratization of European institutions.
Asymmetric conflicts in which rule is contested by non-state actors are often interpreted as a destabilization of order. This also holds true for the case of IS. Indeed, it cannot be denied that its transnational “jihad” has contributed to destabilizing a whole region. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly noted that IS has – within the territory it controls – established an alternative order offering stability. At least for those who fit in the worldview of the wannabe-caliphate. As reported by inhabitants of its powerhouse Raqqa, IS does not only create obedience by force but also by providing administration, workplaces and public services. Or as Benham T. Said put it, some few Arabs “associate an Islamic state with notions of justice, stability and prosperity”...
This paper studies the linkage between international male migration and changes on land inheritance patterns in rural Oaxaca (Mexico). Land inheritance is a long-term exchange between parents and male adult children in Oaxaca: sons are bequeathed with land as long as they provide for their parents (and their wives care for their in-laws) while daughters are excluded from the family patrimony. Drawing on theoretical sample and 37 in depth interviews, this paper argues that intergenerational solidarity based on the parent-son alliance through inheritance is breaking down due to the uncertainty of men´s migration project along with the increase in the fallback position of wives, who may refuse to take care of elderly in-laws. Other alliances emerge instead: parents try to build new alliances with their daughters, bequeathing them agricultural and building plots. However, these new alliances and inheritance shifts are neither a heterogeneous process nor an automatic change and several family and social dimensions must be included to understand the different outcomes.
This article discusses obstacles to overcoming dangerous climate change. It employs an account of dangerous climate change that takes climate change and climate change policy as dangerous if it imposes avoidable costs of poverty prolongation. It then examines plausible accounts of the collective action problems that seem to explain the lack of ambition to mitigate. After criticizing the merits of two proposals to overcome these problems, it discusses the pledge and review process. It argues that pledge and review possesses the virtues of encouraging broad participation and of providing a procedural safeguard for the right of sustainable development. However, given the perceptions of the marginal short term costs of mitigation, pledge and review is unlikely, at least initially, to issue in an agreement to make deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Because there is no rival approach that seems likely to better instantiate the two virtues, pledge and review may be the best available policy for mitigation. Moreover, recent economic research suggests that the co-benefits of mitigation may be greater than previously assumed and that the costs of renewable energy may be less than previously calculated. This would radically undermine claims that the short term mitigation costs necessarily render mitigation irrational and produce collective action problems. Given the circumstances, pledge and review might be our best hope to avoid dangerous climate change.
This paper argues that it is necessary to focus on gender rather than exclusively on women in discussions on global poverty eradication. It argues firstly, that the drivers of poverty are complex and multifaceted leading to a least two different forms of deprivation – transitory and structural poverty – each requiring different forms of analysis and treatment. Transitory poverty can arise as a consequence of an event or shock that would diminish an individual’s capacity to retain or secure employment and where a State lacks an appropriate form of social protection. Structural poverty, on the other hand, arises where groups are excluded from the workforce on a more permanent basis due to a wide variety of factors of discrimination such as sex, race, ethnicity, and age. Focusing on the sex of an individual alone cannot explain why some are more likely to experience different forms of poverty than others. Policies that protect women against transitory poverty, such as care related allowances, are not sufficient to eradicate structural poverty. Secondly, structural poverty prompts an examination of gender roles and relations. Unlike the category of ‘women’, the concept of gender demands consideration of a wider range of intersecting factors that influence life chances. The structure of contemporary gender relations, where women continue to experience higher levels of violence, and carry the greatest burden of responsibility for non-market based production activities, create the social conditions where domination and dependence thrive, and where persistently high rates of poverty seem inevitable. Such circumstances are generated by human agency. Thus, thirdly, it argues that these circumstances can and should be changed through human action. Knowledge of these circumstances gives rise to moral obligations for both men and women to avoid upholding values and practices that lead to domination and dependence as a matter of basic justice.
Last November, the media organisation of the „Islamic State“ (IS) published a video, the sole purpose of which was to prove that the „caliphate“ which the IS has established in June 2014 was in fact a proper state. The video highlighted a host of institutions in order to drive home the claim of real statehood, including examples like a working judiciary, a prison administration, a schooling system, and so on. At one point in the video, the IS claimed that it was also financially independent and had apt resources at its disposal, namely oil and gas.
However, while it is true that the IS controls a number of oil and gas fields in Syria as well as in Iraq, we have by now enough evidence to be rather sure that the economic base of the „caliphate“ is by no means sustainable...
Part II of our series on ISIS : Blogforum "Kalifat des Terrors: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf den Islamischen Staat"
On Thursday January 15, only a week after the bloodyattacks in Paris by the Kouachi brothers and AmedyCoulibali, Belgium was on high alert. In a raid carriedout by police and security forces in the small villageof Verviers, two alleged terrorists were shot dead, a third suspect wasarrested. The action was part of a larger operation carried out throughout thecountry to prevent imminent attacks by a group of Islamists, some of whomwere directly tied to the war in Syria and Iraq. In the days that followed itbecame clear that the prevented attacks probably were aimed at a highranking police official. The terror threat level was subsequently raised tolevel three, indicating that the threat of attacks was imminent. What makesBelgium such a hub for Jihadis?..