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We develop a dynamic recursive model where political and economic decisions interact, to study how excessive debt-GDP ratios affect political sustainability of prudent fiscal policies. Rent seeking groups make political decisions – to cooperate (or not) – on the allocation of fiscal budgets (including rents) and issuance of sovereign debt. A classic commons problem triggers collective fiscal impatience and excessive debt issuing, leading to a vicious circle of high borrowing costs and sovereign default. We analytically characterize debt-GDP thresholds that foster cooperation among rent seeking groups and avoid default. Our analysis and application helps in understanding the politico-economic sustainability of sovereign rescues, emphasizing the need for fiscal targets and possible debt haircuts. We provide a calibrated example that quantifies the threshold debt-GDP ratio at 137%, remarkably close to the target set for private sector involvement in the case of Greece.