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Whatever it takes to understand a central banker : embedding their words using neural networks
(2023)
Dictionary approaches are at the forefront of current techniques for quantifying central bank communication. In this paper, the author propose a novel language model that is able to capture subtleties of messages such as one of the most famous sentences in central bank communications when ECB President Mario Draghi stated that "within [its] mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro".
The authors utilize a text corpus that is unparalleled in size and diversity in the central bank communication literature, as well as introduce a novel approach to text quantication from computational linguistics. This allows them to provide high-quality central bank-specific textual representations and demonstrate their applicability by developing an index that tracks deviations in the Fed's communication towards inflation targeting. Their findings indicate that these deviations in communication significantly impact monetary policy actions, substantially reducing the reaction towards inflation deviation in the US.
Monetary policy communication is particularly important during unconventional times, because high uncertainty about the economy, the introduction of new policy tools and possible limits to the central bank’s toolkit could hamper the predictability of policy actions. We study how monetary policy communication should and has worked under such circumstances. Our main results relate to announcements of asset purchase programmes and the use of forward guidance. We show that announcements of asset purchase programmes have lowered market uncertainty, particularly when accompanied by a contextual release of implementation details such as the envisaged size of the programme. We also show that forward guidance reduces uncertainty more effectively when it is state‐contingent or when it provides guidance about a long horizon than when it is open‐ended or covers only a short horizon, and that the credibility of forward guidance is strengthened if the central bank also has embarked on an asset purchase programme.
This paper studies a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and rational expectations in an environment of low interest rates and deflationary pressures. We show that small changes in the public’s beliefs about the future inflation target of the government can lead to large swings in both inflation and output. This effect is much larger at low interest rates than under regular circumstances. This highlights the importance of effective communication policy at zero interest rates. We argue that confusing communications by the US Federal Reserve, the President of the United States, and key administration officials about future price objectives were responsible for the sharp recession in the US in 1937-38, one of the sharpest recessions in US economic history. Poor communication policy is the mistake of 1937. Before committing the mistake of 1937 the US policy makers faced economic conditions that are similar in some respect to those confronted by Japanese policy makers in the first half of 2006. JEL Classification: E32, E52, E61