Filtern
Erscheinungsjahr
Dokumenttyp
- Arbeitspapier (1304)
- Ausgabe (Heft) zu einer Zeitschrift (276)
- Wissenschaftlicher Artikel (148)
- Bericht (96)
- Dissertation (34)
- Konferenzveröffentlichung (14)
- Teil eines Buches (Kapitel) (7)
- Buch (Monographie) (5)
- Preprint (4)
- Rezension (3)
Sprache
- Englisch (1894) (entfernen)
Volltext vorhanden
- ja (1894) (entfernen)
Gehört zur Bibliographie
- nein (1894)
Schlagworte
- Deutschland (58)
- Financial Institutions (47)
- ECB (41)
- Capital Markets Union (36)
- monetary policy (34)
- Financial Markets (33)
- Banking Union (32)
- Banking Regulation (28)
- Monetary Policy (28)
- Household Finance (27)
Institut
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1894) (entfernen)
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
This paper is focused on the coordination of order and production policy between buyers and suppliers in supply chains. When a buyer and a supplier of an item work independently, the buyer will place orders based on his economic order quantity (EOQ). However, the buyer s EOQ may not lead to an optimal policy for the supplier. It can be shown that a cooperative batching policy can reduce total cost significantly. Should the buyer have the more powerful position to enforce his EOQ on the supplier, then no incentive exists for him to deviate from his EOQ in order to choose a cooperative batching policy. To provide an incentive to order in quantities suitable to the supplier, the supplier could offer a side payment. One critical assumption made throughout in the literature dealing with incentive schemes to influence buyer s ordering policy is that the supplier has complete information regarding buyer s cost structure. However, this assumption is far from realistic. As a consequence, the buyer has no incentive to report truthfully on his cost structure. Moreover there is an incentive to overstate the total relevant cost in order to obtain as high a side payment as possible. This paper provides a bargaining model with asymmetric information about the buyer s cost structure assuming that the buyer has the bargaining power to enforce his EOQ on the supplier in case of a break-down in negotiations. An algorithm for the determination of an optimal set of contracts which are specifically designed for different cost structures of the buyer, assumed by the supplier, will be presented. This algorithm was implemented in a software application, that supports the supplier in determining the optimal set of contracts.
This study analyses the labour market effects of fixed-term contracts (FTCs) in West Germany by microeconometric methods using individual and establishment level data. In the first part of the study the role of FTCs in firms’ labour demand is analysed. An econometric investigation of the firms’ reasons for using FTCs focussing on the identification of the link between dismissal protection for permanent contract workers and the firms’ use of FTCs is presented. Furthermore, a descriptive analysis of the role of FTCs in worker and job flows at the firm level is provided. The second part of the study evaluates the short-run effects of being employed on an FTC on working conditions and wages using a large cross-sectional dataset of employees. The final part of the study analyses whether taking up an FTC increases the (permanent contract) employment opportunities in the long-run (stepping stone effect) and whether FTCs affect job finding behaviour of unemployed job searchers. Firstly, an econometric unemployment duration analysis distinguishing between both types of contracts as destination states is performed. Secondly, the effects of entering into FTCs from unemployment on future (permanent contract) employment opportunities are evaluated attempting to account for the sequential decision problem of job searchers.
With ubiquitous use of digital camera devices, especially in mobile phones, privacy is no longer threatened by governments and companies only. The new technology creates a new threat by ordinary people, who now have the means to take and distribute pictures of one’s face at no risk and little cost in any situation in public and private spaces. Fast distribution via web based photo albums, online communities and web pages expose an individual’s private life to the public in unpreceeded ways. Social and legal measures are increasingly taken to deal with this problem. In practice however, they lack efficiency, as they are hard to enforce in practice. In this paper, we discuss a supportive infrastructure aiming for the distribution channel; as soon as the picture is publicly available, the exposed individual has a chance to find it and take proper action.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
This study examines the relation of bank loan terms like interest rates, collateral, and lines of credit to borrower risk defined by the banks' internal credit rating. The analysis is not restricted to a static view. It also incorporates rating transition and its implications on the relation. Money illusion and phenomena linked with relationship banking are discovered as important factors. The results show that riskier borrowers pay higher loan rate premiums and rely more on bank finance. Housebanks obtain more collateral and provide more finance. Caused by money illusion in times of high market interest rates loan rate premiums are relatively small whereas in times of low market interest rates they are relatively high. There was no evidence for an appropriate adjustment of loan terms to rating changes. But bank market power represented by a weighted average of credit rating before and after a rating transition serves to compensate for low earlier profits caused by phenomena of interest rate smoothing. Klassifikation: G21.
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources (too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance measure used.