CFS working paper series
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- 2006 (3) (entfernen)
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Institut
2006, 12
We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. JEL Classification: G24, G32, G34
2006, 29
The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programs, ex ante grants and some types of investment grants depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome. JEL Classification: D82, G24, G32, H25, H81
2006, 11
We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and mixes). Thereby, contract completeness reduces when going from pure milestone financing via mixes to pure round financing. We show that the decision for a specific form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the development process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the lower the entrepreneur's expected bargaining power - the maximum level depending on the predictability of the development process. JEL Classification: G24, G32, D86, D80, G34